

2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Japan

In action 20 of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, States parties are called upon to submit regular reports on their implementation of the action plan, as well as of the 13 practical steps towards disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”. In action 21 of the plan, it is stated that, as a confidence-building measure, all nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. Japan submits the present report in accordance with those commitments.



I. Nuclear disarmament

- 1 All States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, Japan remains strongly committed to strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regime on all of its three pillars and moving closer towards a world without nuclear weapons.

Japan observes the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not possessing, not manufacturing, or not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into the territory of Japan as policy guidelines.

Japan is of the view that, in order to take steps towards a world without nuclear weapons, it is essential to build up realistic and practical measures on the basis of cooperation between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, while not losing sight of a clear recognition of the humanitarian aspects of the use of nuclear weapons and an objective assessment of the severe international security environment.

Furthermore, Japan is committed to making progress in realistic and practical efforts by, among other things, promoting the transparency of nuclear forces, submitting resolutions calling for united actions towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons to the General Assembly, making active contributions towards an entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pursuing the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and participating actively in discussions on nuclear disarmament verification.

Japan has played an active role in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), a cross-regional group of non-nuclear-weapon States, which is committed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the essential foundation for the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, and has proposed realistic and practical measures to advance nuclear disarmament.

Japan has also participated in the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament, another cross-regional group of non-nuclear-weapon States, which actively contributed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process through submitting the working papers, including on Negative Security Assurances and emerging technologies.

As the presidency of the Group of Seven (G7) in 2023, Japan, together with members of the G7 issued “G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament” on 19 May, which is the first leaders’ level stand-alone communiqué on nuclear disarmament.

In 2022, Japan established the International Group of Eminent Persons for a World without Nuclear Weapons (IGEP), which consists of a total of 15 experts: 3 Japanese experts and 12 experts from nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclear-weapon States and others. After comprehensive deliberations over five meetings, the sixth and final meeting was held in Tokyo on 30 and 31 March 2025 as the culmination, and the IGEP members issued their recommendations for the 2026 NPT Review Conference entitled “Stepping back from the Nuclear Precipice: Urgent Actions in Pursuit of a World without Nuclear Weapons”. It represents a

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		consolidated vision for advancing nuclear disarmament amidst current global complexities which Japan submitted as a working paper to the 2026 review process. On 18 March 2024, then Foreign Minister KAMIKAWA chaired the ministerial briefing of the United Nations Security Council on “Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation” under Japan’s presidency of the Security Council. In the meeting, Council members made statements, engaging in active discussion on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and reaffirming the importance of maintaining and strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. The meeting provided an opportunity to accelerate substantive discussion between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2026. Japan has been engaged in raising awareness of the reality of atomic bombings and the clear recognition of its humanitarian consequences across borders and generations. Japan stresses the importance of the women and peace and security (WPS) perspective. Japan has called for the importance of gender perspectives to be taken into account in the decision-making process in its annual General Assembly resolutions on nuclear disarmament.
2	All States parties commit to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations.	Japan reaffirms the importance of the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of treaty obligations. It submits a General Assembly resolution annually, which calls upon all States to adhere to those three principles in implementing their respective nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Furthermore, Japan aligns itself with the view of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), as one of its member countries, on transparency measures, as indicated in a series of working papers on transparency and accountability that were submitted through active participation in the NPDI meetings. In light of the 2026 Review Process, the NPDI remains committed to promoting these transparency measures and has submitted working papers in 2023, 2024 and 2025, and to holding outreach meetings with other groups. – As the G7 president in 2023, Japan led the discussion within the G7. The members emphasized the importance of transparency with regard to nuclear weapons and welcomed actions already taken to promote effective and responsible transparency measures through providing data on their nuclear forces and the objective size of their nuclear arsenal. The members also called on nuclear-weapon States that have yet to do so to engage with non-nuclear-weapon States in a meaningful dialogue on transparency regarding their nuclear arsenals and limiting nuclear competition, including through an open explanation of national reports coupled with an interactive discussion with non-nuclear-weapon States and civil society participants at future Non-Proliferation Treaty-related meetings (G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, May 2023).

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		Furthermore, Japan, through the G7, emphasized that the transparency of the management of civil plutonium must be maintained, underscored the importance of the implementation of the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549) and called on all States that had committed to reporting annually their holdings of all plutonium in peaceful nuclear activities to IAEA to fulfil those commitments.
3	In implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States commit to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.	
4	The Russian Federation and the United States of America commit to seek the early entry into force and full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and are encouraged to continue discussions on follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals.	
5	The nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security. To that end, they are called upon to promptly engage with a view to, inter alia:	

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5 (a)	Rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, as identified in action 3;	
5 (b)	Address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process;	
5 (c)	To further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;	
5 (d)	Discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons;	
5 (e)	Consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security;	
5 (f)	Reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons;	
5 (g)	Further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.	
6	All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.	Japan has consistently called for the adoption of a programme of work that leads to the negotiation of a disarmament treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. Japan has stressed the importance of adopting a comprehensive and balanced programme of work. In that regard, Japan welcomed the establishment of subsidiary bodies in accordance with CD/2390 and CD/2391 on the work of the Conference on Disarmament for 2024 and their re-establishment in accordance with CD/2443 for 2025 and actively participated in the discussions.

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		The following political figures called upon all members of the Conference on Disarmament in its recent high-level segments to overcome the prolonged stalemate over several decades and revitalize the Conference on Disarmament. – Mr. ONISHI Yohei, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in 2026 – Ms. IKUINA Akiko, then Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, in 2025 – Mr. Fukazawa Yoichi, then Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in 2024 – Mr. HAYASHI Yoshimasa, then Minister for Foreign Affairs in 2023 (video message) In addition, Japan has submitted General Assembly resolutions, including the resolution entitled “Steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons” in 2025 (resolution 80/48), which was adopted by a substantial majority and in which Japan stressed the need to continue exploring possibilities for overcoming the ongoing deadlock of approximately three decades at the Conference on Disarmament.
7	All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument. The Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.	Japan welcomed the establishment of the subsidiary bodies in 2024 and their re-establishment in 2025, which include Subsidiary Body 4 (Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons), and actively participated in the discussions. Japan has submitted General Assembly resolutions, including resolution 80/48, which was adopted by a substantial majority, and in which it stressed the importance of security assurances by nuclear-weapon States.
8	All nuclear-weapon States commit to fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances. Those nuclear-weapon States	

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	that have not yet done so are encouraged to extend security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.	
9	The establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, is encouraged. All concerned States are encouraged to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols, and to constructively consult and cooperate to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of all such nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties, which include negative security assurances. The concerned States are encouraged to review any related reservations.	Japan has supported General Assembly resolutions regarding five treaties of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia. In General Assembly resolutions, including resolution 80/48 , Japan stressed the importance of the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with the 1999 guidelines of the Disarmament Commission.
10	All nuclear-weapon States undertake to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty with all expediency, noting that positive decisions by nuclear-weapon States would have the beneficial impact on the ratification of that Treaty and that nuclear-weapon States have the special responsibility to encourage annex 2 countries, in particular those which have not acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify.	

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11	Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, all States commit to refrain from nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of that Treaty, and all existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions should be maintained.	Japan signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 24 September 1996 and ratified it on 8 July 1997. Japan's "Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors" was amended when Japan ratified the treaty. Japan has expressed its commitment to the importance of moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions calling for such moratoriums via the following: (i) General Assembly resolutions, including the resolutions entitled "Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons" and "Steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons", submitted by Japan and adopted by a substantial majority. (ii) Japan served in an important role as an Article XIV Coordinator of the Treaty, together with Kazakhstan, from 2015 to 2017, and as a co-chair of the CTBT Friends meeting in 2016, 2018, 2022 (held at the leaders' level for the first time), stressing the importance of the entry into force of the Treaty and of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions.
12	All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty recognize the contribution of the conferences on facilitating the entry into force of that Treaty and of the measures adopted by consensus at the Sixth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in September 2009, and commit to report at the 2011 Conference on progress made towards the urgent entry into force of that Treaty.	Japan took every suitable opportunity in its bilateral contacts and its multilateral conferences with the remaining Annex 2 States, at the political and official levels, to encourage the signature and/or ratification of the Treaty. Japan also confirmed the importance of the entry into force of the Treaty with countries that have not yet signed/ratified the Treaty. Mr. IWAYA Takeshi, then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, attended the 2025 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 26 September 2025.
13	All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty undertake to promote the entry into force and implementation of that Treaty at the national, regional and global levels.	Japan has led and coordinated international efforts to promote the entry into force of the Treaty. The country founded the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, together with Australia and the Netherlands, in 2002 and served in an important role as an Article XIV Coordinator of the Treaty, together with Kazakhstan, from 2015 to 2017. Japan has taken every suitable opportunity in its bilateral contacts and its multilateral conferences with the remaining Annex 2 States, at the political and official levels, to encourage the signature and/or ratification of the Treaty. For example, in the G7 Leaders' Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, the members emphasized that bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force is an urgent matter (May 2023). Also, in the Joint Leaders' Declaration at the Eighth Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting, Japan and the members of the Pacific Islands

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14	The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is to be encouraged to fully develop the verification regime for the CTBT, including early completion and provisional operationalization of the international monitoring system in accordance with the mandate of the Preparatory Commission, which should, upon entry into force of that Treaty, serve as an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory verification system with global reach, and provide assurance of compliance with that Treaty.	Forum acknowledged the call for the entry into force of the Treaty and expressed their intention to seek ways to cooperate on detection of nuclear tests. At the Group of 20 Buenos Aires Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Japan stressed the necessity of entry into force of the Treaty. Japan also held regional conferences on the Treaty in 2017 and 2023 and called for the early entry force of the treaty and initiation of a dialogue among States in the region. Japan has co-chaired the ministerial meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which convenes a high-level meeting biannually. The meeting was held at the leaders' level for the first time in 2022 and adopted a joint statement on the Treaty. In his opening remarks at the outset of the meeting, then Prime Minister KISHIDA stressed the importance of the universalization of the Treaty and its early entry into force, as well as the strengthening of the verification system. Japan has co-sponsored and voted in favour of the annual General Assembly resolution entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty", which urged all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty at the earliest opportunity, with a view to its early entry into force and universalization. Ambassador KAIFU Atsushi, Permanent Representative of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna, served as a Chair of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in 2024. Taking this opportunity, Japan contributed to the efforts including the promotion of the entry into force of the CTBT, the development of its verification system, and maintaining and strengthening the functions of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO. All of the International Monitoring System stations and a laboratory hosted by Japan (six seismological stations, one infrasound station, two radionuclide stations and one laboratory) have been certified by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. In 2022 Japan made a voluntary contribution of €140,000 to the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to further boost its verification abilities. Japan made a voluntary contribution of \$747,026 in 2011, \$455,000 in 2013, \$2.4 million in 2017 and €140,000 in 2019. In support of the entry into force of the Treaty, Japan has provided a global seismological observation training course since 1995 to introduce up-to-date technologies and knowledge in the field of global seismological observation. Japan has invited seismology experts from developing countries including several Annex 2 States to the annual training course and has supported their capacity-building on global seismological observation and its application for nuclear test monitoring technology.

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15	All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. Also in this respect, the Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.	Japan strongly supports the objectives of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as a fissile material cut-off treaty and has stressed the importance of the commencement of negotiations on the treaty on numerous occasions, including in the General Assembly resolutions on a fissile material cut-off treaty and its annual resolutions entitled “Steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons”. The immediate commencement of the negotiation of such a treaty was also called for in the G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament (May 2023). Furthermore, on 19 September 2023, then Prime Minister KISHIDA hosted the Commemorative High-Level Event on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) entitled “Whittle Down Fissile Materials, Whittle Down Nuclear Weapons”, co-hosted by Australia and the Philippines, and urged all countries to refocus political attention towards the FMCT on the occasion of this year that marks the 30th anniversary, in 2023, of the adoption of the General Assembly resolution calling for an FMCT. In March 2024, Japan, together with 11 countries, established the “FMCT Friends”, which is a cross-regional group with the participation of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States and aims to maintain and enhance political attention on an FMCT and to contribute to expanding support for the negotiation of an FMCT. Then Prime Minister KISHIDA hosted the high-level meeting to launch the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty on the sidelines of the General Assembly high-level week in September 2024, and the participating states issued the Joint Press Release to call for the immediate commencement of the negotiation. As a follow-up, then Foreign Minister IWAYA hosted the first Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of an FMCT on the sidelines of the General Assembly high-level week in September 2025, which adopted the Joint Ministerial Statement. Japan, with the other member countries of the NPDI, submitted working papers on a fissile material cut-off treaty to the 2025 Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/WP.7).
16	The nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful	

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	purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.	
17	In the context of action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes.	
18	All States that have not yet done so are encouraged to initiate a process towards the dismantling or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.	
19	All States agree on the importance of supporting cooperation among Governments, the United Nations, other international and regional organizations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament.	Japan has participated actively in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), an international initiative to further understand and find solutions to the complex challenges involved in the verification of nuclear disarmament by sending experts to all working groups. Japan has emphasized the importance of the efforts to develop nuclear disarmament verification capabilities in the recurring General Assembly resolutions, including resolution 80/48. Japan has actively participated in discussions within the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Nuclear Disarmament Verification from 2018 to 2019 established pursuant to the General Assembly resolution in 2016 and the subsequent GGE on Nuclear Disarmament Verification from 2022 to 2023 established pursuant to the General Assembly resolution in 2019. In addition, Japan, along with members of the G7, called on nuclear-weapon States that have yet to do so to engage with non-nuclear-weapon States in a meaningful dialogue on transparency regarding their nuclear arsenals and limiting nuclear competition, including through an open explanation of national reports coupled with an interactive discussion with non-nuclear-weapon States and civil society participants at future Non-Proliferation Treaty-related meetings (G7 Leaders' Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, May 2023).
20	States parties should submit regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened	Japan submitted the following national reports on the implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference:

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	review process for the Treaty, on the implementation of the present action plan, as well as of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.	NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/4 (2014) NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/9 (2017) NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/5 (2018) NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/4 (2019) NPT/CONF.2020/22 (2020) NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/3 (2023) NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/2 (2024)
		The present report by Japan on the implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference updates our 2024 report.
21	As a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is invited to establish a publicly accessible repository, which shall include the information provided by the nuclear-weapon States.	As part of efforts to promote the implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference, Japan, with the other member countries of the NPDI, submitted 10 working papers on transparency to the 2012, 2014, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2023, 2024 and 2025 Preparatory Committee meetings and the 2015 and the tenth Review Conferences, respectively. Japan submitted working papers with recommendations for consideration, including elements of transparency and reporting to the 2015 and the tenth Review Conferences, proposing a text to be included in the Final Document of the respective Review Conferences. During the eleventh Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle, Japan, with other member countries of the NPDI, submitted three working papers on enhancing transparency and strengthening the review process, and further elaborated on strengthening the review process in 2023, 2024 and 2025.
22	All States are encouraged to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, in order to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.	As the only country ever to have suffered atomic bombings during war, Japan is committed to ensuring that the catastrophic humanitarian consequences and tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki will never be forgotten. With this aim, and also as the champion of action 38, “Establish a platform for youth engagement” of the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament, Japan places utmost importance on disarmament and non-proliferation education, especially for the younger generation, to encourage it to think on its own and act on matters of international security, as well as on disarmament and non-proliferation at the national, social and individual levels. A) Educational outreach Japan has invited young diplomats from various countries through the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme every year since 1983, and, to date, more than 1,000 fellows have travelled to Japan and visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki to learn about the realities of the use of nuclear weapons. In 2023, Japan contributed \$10 million to the United Nations for the establishment of the “Youth Leader Fund for a World without Nuclear Weapons”. This is for the purpose of creating a global network among

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youth towards the elimination of nuclear weapons by inviting future leaders from both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to Japan and providing them with opportunities to learn first-hand the realities of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The 100 participants of the first cohort were selected by the United Nations from more than 2,000 applicants and are between the ages of 18 and 29 from 63 countries, including both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, from a wide range of backgrounds, including government, international organizations, civil society and academia. In December 2023, the official start of the learning programme took place with an online event under the auspices of the United Nations. At the launch of the programme, then Prime Minister KISHIDA delivered a video message to the participants.

B) Promoting understanding of the realities of atomic bombings

Japan started a programme entitled “Special Communicator for a World without Nuclear Weapons” in 2010 for the purpose of sharing the first-hand experience of atomic bombing survivors (hibakusha). In addition, Japan launched a programme entitled “Youth communicator for a World without nuclear weapons” in 2013. Under the programme, young people are expected to share the tragic consequences of nuclear weapons and their thoughts about possible steps across borders and generations. As at 31 December 2025, a total of 335 special communicators, on 113 occasions, and 834 youth communicators, on 60 occasions, had been dispatched around the world through such commission programmes.

Since 2015, the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in cooperation with the Government of Japan, have opened a permanent exhibition on the atomic bombings at the United Nations Office at Vienna, following those held in New York and Geneva, to promote understanding of the devastation caused by the use of nuclear weapons.

In 2025, which marked 80 years since the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan carried out the initiative “80 Years since the Atomic Bombings: Testimony to the World” in which two hibakusha and three youth involved in succession activities were dispatched to France, the United Kingdom and Poland as “Special Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons” and “Youth Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons” with the aim of deepening global understanding of the realities of the atomic bombings.

C) Public awareness

In the preparatory process for the 2026 Review Conference, Japan submitted a joint working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education, together with the member countries of the NPDI, to the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Japan also made a joint statement on disarmament and non-proliferation education on behalf of 96 countries at the same Preparatory Committee meeting.

In 2023, Japan, together with G7 members, underscored the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education and outreach and encouraged leaders, youth and people from around the world to visit

Hiroshima and Nagasaki to raise and sustain awareness of the realities of nuclear weapons use.

II. Nuclear non-proliferation

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| 23 | The Conference calls upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty. | Japan has made every possible effort to encourage and call upon all States not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to accede as non-nuclear-weapon States to the Treaty promptly and without any conditions, in order to achieve its universality and, pending their accession to the Treaty, to adhere to its terms and to take practical steps in support of the Treaty. |
| 24 | The Conference re-endorses the call by previous review conferences for the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III of the Treaty. | <p>Japan signed the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement in March 1977, and it entered into force in December 1977.</p> <p>Japan signed its additional protocol in December 1998, and it entered into force December 1999.</p> |
| 25 | The Conference, noting that 17 States parties to the Treaty have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, urges them to do so as soon as possible and without further delay. | Japan has continued to promote the universal acceptance of an IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with the model Additional Protocol to the Agreement, as the international verification standard and has called upon all States who have not yet done so to sign and bring them into force as soon as possible and without further delay. |
| 26 | The Conference underscores the importance in complying with the non-proliferation obligations, addressing all compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty's integrity and the authority of the safeguards system. | <p>Japan has implemented the obligations of the comprehensive safeguards agreement between Japan and IAEA and the Additional Protocol and has been making necessary efforts to ensure transparency of its nuclear activities. "Broader conclusion" that all nuclear material in Japan remained in peaceful activities has been consistently drawn since it was drawn for the first time in the IAEA safeguards statement for 2003.</p> <p>Japan is committed to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In particular, as a designated member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Japan has been cooperating fully with IAEA and providing appropriate support to the activities of IAEA.</p> <p>Japan continues to uphold the principle of "not possessing plutonium without specific purposes, which reflects its commitment to non-proliferation". In addition, Japan has declared a policy to reduce the amount of its plutonium stockpile. Moreover, as our own voluntary measures to secure the transparency of nuclear materials, Japan has been publishing information on its plutonium management in a way that is more detailed than that required by international guidelines.</p> |

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27	The Conference underscores the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the IAEA statute and the respective legal obligations of Member States. In this regard, the Conference calls upon Member States to extend their cooperation to the Agency.	Japan has made the utmost effort to resolve the cases of non-compliance with IAEA safeguards obligations at every possible opportunity in coordination with the international community, including on the occasion of the IAEA Board of Governors Meetings and the IAEA General Conference. As for North Korea, Japan has co-sponsored resolutions on North Korea at the IAEA General Conference. As for Iran, Japan has contributed to relevant activities of the IAEA, including those under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the comprehensive safeguards agreements between Iran and IAEA.
28	The Conference encourages all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.	Japan, as a Chair of the Friends of the Additional Protocol in Vienna, has been actively working towards the universalization of the model additional protocol at every possible opportunity and continues to provide necessary assistance, especially for Asian countries. The outreach in which Japan participated in 2024 has contributed to the entry into force of the additional protocol for Timor-Leste. In addition, Japan hosts annual Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP), which many Asian countries attend, to further strengthen efforts and partnership towards the shared non-proliferation objectives in Asia and the Pacific, including promoting the universalization of the additional protocol. See www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00626.html.
29	The Conference encourages IAEA to further facilitate and assist the States parties in the conclusion and entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Conference calls on States parties to consider specific measures that would promote the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreement.	Japan has organized outreach events in Japan as well as in some countries, through the Japan Atomic Energy Agency/Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Security and Human Resource Development, and has supported IAEA safeguards seminars to facilitate safeguards implementation, including the additional protocol. Japan participated in and contributed to the annual meetings of the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) held in Viet Nam in December 2022, in Thailand in November 2023 and 2024 and in Australia in November 2025. Japan chaired the Steering Committee of the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network from 2023 to 2024. Japan has been collaborating with other countries for outreach in this area, especially in Africa.
30	The Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources, and stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional	The NPDI presented a working paper on wider application of safeguards in the nuclear-weapon States to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2013. See the following page: Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

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	protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.	
31	The Conference encourages all States parties with small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible.	Japan has called upon all States to adopt the modified small quantities protocol, where relevant at every possible opportunity. Also through the Japan Atomic Energy Agency/Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Security and Human Resource Development, Japan hosted the IAEA international training courses on safeguards implementation in States with small quantities protocols, in 2018, 2019, 2021 and 2024.
32	The Conference recommends that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented.	Japan has worked to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of safeguards by the IAEA. In particular, as a designated member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Japan has actively supported the efforts of the Director General and the Board to continually strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards by using both human resources and budgetary resources.
33	The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that IAEA continues to have all political, technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the Treaty.	As at 2025, Japan was the third largest contributor in terms of scale of total payment of assessed contributions, and one of the largest contributors of extrabudgetary and voluntary contributions (€2,954,523) to IAEA in the safeguards sector.
34	The Conference encourages States parties, within the framework of the IAEA statute, to further develop a robust, flexible, adaptive and cost-effective international technology base for advanced safeguards through cooperation among Member States and with IAEA.	The Japan Support Programme for Agency Safeguards has contributed to strengthening international safeguards through improvements in effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation by sharing Japanese technology and expertise with IAEA. The Japan Atomic Energy Agency operates the Clean Laboratory for Environmental Analysis and Research as a member of the IAEA safeguards network laboratories. Moreover, Japan, in close cooperation with IAEA, has made robust efforts to apply stringent IAEA safeguards to the Rokkasho Uranium Enrichment Plant and Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant, such as by establishing an on-site laboratory.

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35	The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.	Japan has enhanced its nuclear non-proliferation efforts through the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, as well as through the implementation of obligations related to nuclear non-proliferation, such as the establishment of effective national export controls stipulated in Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) . Japan contributes positively to the activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group by, for example, assuming the role of the point of contact through its Permanent Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna.
36	The Conference encourages States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls.	Japan regularly updates its domestic export control regulations in accordance with changes in multilaterally coordinated nuclear export control lists.
37	The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.	Japan, in accordance with multilaterally formulated guidelines, considers whether a recipient State is fulfilling its IAEA safeguards obligations in making its export decisions.
38	The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes.	See actions 48 and 49.
39	States parties are encouraged to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation among States parties, in conformity with	See actions 48 and 49.

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	articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.	
40	The Conference encourages all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.	Japan carries out efforts to protect nuclear materials, foster a nuclear security culture and strengthen nuclear security measures based on its legal instruments. Japan has enacted a domestic law which obligates operators dealing with nuclear and other radioactive materials to take necessary nuclear security measures. Japan has also taken additional measures, including the amendment of related regulations, to conduct personal trustworthiness determination. Furthermore, the relevant regulations require operators to implement cybersecurity measures, such as the introduction of the latest technology to block malicious external access to nuclear facilities.
41	The Conference encourages all States parties to apply, as appropriate, the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)) and other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date.	Japan has been closely following internationally recognized guidance on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5) and other relevant international instruments by incorporating recommended physical protection measures into its legal and regulatory instruments, including the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors. The International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission in 2015, as well as its follow-up missions in 2018 and 2024, observed that the nuclear security regime in Japan is robust and well established and incorporates the fundamental principles of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities.
42	The Conference calls on all States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the amendment to the Convention as soon as possible and encourages them to act in accordance with the objectives and the purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. The Conference also encourages all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and adopt the amendment as soon as possible.	Japan concluded the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1988 and its 2005 Amendment in 2014.

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43	The Conference urges all States parties to implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004.	Japan has been closely following internationally recognized standards (guidance) on radioactive sources (IAEA/CODEOC/2004, IAEA/CODEOC/IMP-EXP/2005) by incorporating recommended measures into its legal and regulatory instruments, including the Act on the Regulation of Radioisotopes. The IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission in 2016 observed that the Japanese Government has officially committed to IAEA to implement the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources in the national legislation. See the following page: www.nra.go.jp/data/000148261.pdf (see section 2.1).
44	The Conference calls upon all States parties to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations, and calls upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard. The Conference also calls upon States parties to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations.	Japan contributed approximately \$1 million to the trust fund for global and regional disarmament activities for the full and universal implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in March 2017, as well as approximately \$720,000 in March 2025. Through the Office for Disarmament Affairs Regional Coordinator for Asia and the Pacific, Japan engaged in more than 100 activities in 32 different States between 2022 and 2025 to enhance the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Japan's recent matrix regarding its status of implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), approved by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), is available at the following page: www.un.org/en/sc/1540/documents/JapanReport2Sep2020.pdf. Japan made proactive contributions during its Presidency of the Global Partnership in 2023. See the following page: www.mofa.go.jp/dns/n_s_ne/page1e_000598.html. Japan proactively participated in the Proliferation Security Initiative exercises and meetings. Japan hosted the Initiative's maritime interdiction exercise, Pacific Shield 25, in December 2025. See the following page: http://www.mofa.go.jp/dns/n_s_ne/page25e_000216.html. www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01896.html. Japan also participated in the maritime interdiction exercise hosted by Australia in September 2024 as well as the high-level political meeting commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Proliferation Security Initiative, hosted by the Republic of Korea, in May 2023. http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001613.html http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002681.html
45	The Conference encourages all States parties that have not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of	Japan concluded the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2007.

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	Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.	
46	The Conference encourages IAEA to continue to assist the States parties in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of the State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, as well as systems on regional level. The Conference calls upon IAEA Member States to broaden their support for the relevant IAEA programmes.	Japan, through the Japan Atomic Energy Agency/Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Security and Human Resource Development, has actively organized various bilateral seminars and workshops, international training courses for personnel of other Member States to enhance the functions of their State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, including a training course on State systems of accounting and control, non-destructive assay related to safeguards and additional protocol commodity identification. Japan, through the Japan Atomic Energy Agency/Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Security and Human Resource Development, has also actively hosted some training courses for IAEA inspectors, such as training courses on inspection methods for reprocessing processes both at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency experimental facilities, such as the Chemical Processing Facility, and the Tokai Reprocessing Plant.
III. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy		
47	Respect each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle policies.	
48	Undertake to facilitate and reaffirm the right of States parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	Japan transfers nuclear-related materials, equipment and technologies only under strict conditions that ensure their use exclusively for peaceful purposes. At the same time, Japan actively promotes international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by making its advanced civil nuclear technologies, services and expertise available to partner countries. For example, Japan implements export control measures in accordance with the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines established in 1978 so as to prevent any contribution to nuclear proliferation while facilitating responsible nuclear trade. Japan also concludes bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with partner countries and regions to establish a legal framework required for securing assurances from the recipient on nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of the nuclear-related materials, equipment and technologies transferred between the parties. As of March 2026, Japan has concluded bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with 14 countries and one regional organization, namely Canada, France, Australia, China, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), Kazakhstan, the Republic of

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		Korea, Viet Nam, Jordan, Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and India.
49	Cooperate with other States parties or international organizations in the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.	Japan pursues international cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy in both power applications and various fields of non-power applications, including medicine, agriculture, environment, and industry. Japan's contribution in the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy takes place through financial and technical contributions to international organizations such as IAEA as well as playing a pivotal role in Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific (RCA). Japan also leads the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA), to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the region through organizing workshops and accepting fellowships.
50	Give preferential treatment to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.	Japan duly considers the needs of the developing countries. In particular, Japan's financial and technical contributions through IAEA primarily target the developing countries.
51	Facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty, and eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.	See action 48.
52	Continue efforts, within IAEA, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of its technical cooperation programme.	Japan has actively participated in relevant meetings of IAEA, including those of the Board of Governors and the General Conference, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA technical cooperation programme and to strengthen it in order to better assist Member States in their endeavours for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
53	Strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	See action 52.
54	Make every effort and to take practical steps to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable.	Japan has continuously provided voluntary contributions to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund in full and on time over the decades and has called on other Member States to do the same.
55	Encourage all States in a position to do so to make	Japan remains one of the biggest contributors to extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA to supplement the Technical Cooperation Fund.

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	additional contributions to the initiative designed to raise 100 million dollars over the next five years as extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA activities, while welcoming the contributions already pledged by countries and groups of countries in support of IAEA activities.	Specifically, Japan is the second largest donor to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI), having contributed around €90 million to the Initiative as of March 2026.
56	Encourage national, bilateral and international efforts to train the necessary skilled workforce needed to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	Japan has been actively contributing to international efforts for the human resource development in cooperation with IAEA and other countries. Examples of such efforts are as follows: – Training at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency/Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Security and Human Resource Development (ISCN) on Safeguards and Nuclear Security (more than 6,000 people from 105 countries and 6 international organizations have been trained since 2011) – Hosting IAEA training courses at the designated IAEA Collaborating Centres, including Rays of Hope Anchor Centres, and other organizations – Accepting fellowship and scientific visits under the IAEA technical cooperation programme – Workshops within the framework of the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia – Capacity-building for countries seeking to introduce small modular reactors, as a partner country in the United States Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology programme, hosting a study tour in Japan in 2024 and 2025 – Support to the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET) Capacity Building Centre in Fukushima, which conducts workshops and exercises on nuclear technology in fields such as radiation emergency management. Japan also supports a more active role for women in the nuclear field and supported the IAEA Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme with a voluntary contribution of around €1.7 million. In addition, Japan hosted the IAEA Lise Meitner Programme in June 2025, which provided career development opportunities for 15 young and mid-career female researchers and professionals in the nuclear field.
57	Ensure that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by commitments to and ongoing implementation of safeguards as well as appropriate and effective	Japan attaches paramount importance to ensuring the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. Japan strictly implements relevant measures within nuclear facilities in Japan and actively advocates these principles in the international community. Japan also supports international efforts aimed at human resource development to enhance nuclear safety, security and safeguards (see action 56).

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	levels of safety and security, consistent with States' national legislation and respective international obligations.	
58	Continue to discuss further, in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner under the auspices of IAEA or regional forums, the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities of creating mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the back-end of the fuel cycle without affecting rights under the Treaty and without prejudice to national fuel cycle policies, while tackling the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues, including, in this regard, the requirement of IAEA full scope safeguards.	Japan continues to engage in discussions in this regard at IAEA and other international forums.
59	Consider becoming party, if they have not yet done so, to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and to ratify its amendment so that it may enter into force at an early date.	Japan has already concluded the following conventions: – Convention on Nuclear Safety (1996) – Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (1987) – Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (1987) – Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1988) – Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (2003) – International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2007) – Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2014)

<i>Action number</i>	<i>Actions</i>	<i>Actions taken by Japan</i>
60	Promote the sharing of best practices in the area of nuclear safety and security, including through dialogue with the nuclear industry and the private sector, as appropriate.	Japan has been actively sharing best practices in the area of nuclear safety and security, both domestically and with the international community. This effort includes the following: – Exchange of views on regulatory issues to improve safety and security between nuclear regulators and operators at both management and technical levels – Sharing lessons learned from drills among nuclear operators through working groups to confirm and evaluate the plan-do-check-act cycle of nuclear operator emergency drills – Participation in incident reporting systems, the fuel incident notification and analysis system and other accident and failure reporting systems operated by IAEA and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency to disseminate information on Japan and to collect important information from other countries – Holding annual workshops of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency/ Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Security and Human Resource Development in collaboration with the World Institute for Nuclear Security since 2012 – Support for the IAEA Response and Assistance Network capacity-building centre in Fukushima to share lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station in 2011 and foster a safety culture internationally through workshops on nuclear and radiation emergency management.
61	Encourage States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use, where technically and economically feasible.	Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, Japan and the United States have been removing nuclear materials (highly enriched uranium and plutonium) that posed a threat of nuclear terrorism and converting them to low-enriched fuel, which had been provided by the United States to Japanese research reactors in the past. In the fact sheet issued in April 2024, then Prime Minister KISHIDA and President Biden welcomed that the United States Department of Energy and Japan's Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) have removed all excess highly enriched uranium from the Kyoto University Critical Assembly and Japan Atomic Energy Agency's Japan Materials Testing Reactor Critical Assembly to the United States and a new joint commitment to convert the Kindai University Teaching and Research Reactor from highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium fuel and to return its highly enriched uranium to the United States.
62	Transport radioactive materials consistent with relevant international standards of safety, security and environmental protection, and to continue communication between shipping and coastal States for the purpose of confidence-	With the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors, the Ship Safety Act, the Civil Aeronautics Act and other national regulations, Japan implements IAEA regulation No. SSR-6, 2018, and other international standards on transport regulations. Japan, together with other Shipping States, has continued communication with coastal States for the purpose of confidence-building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.

<i>Action number</i>	<i>Actions</i>	<i>Actions taken by Japan</i>
	building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.	
63	Put in force a civil nuclear liability regime by becoming party to relevant international instruments or adopting suitable national legislation, based upon the principles established by the main pertinent international instruments.	Japan concluded the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage on 15 January 2015 and amended its domestic laws as necessary to implement the Convention.
64	The Conference calls upon all States to abide by the decision adopted by consensus at the IAEA General Conference on 18 September 2009 on prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.	