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Letter dated 5 June 2026 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whose mandate was extended pursuant to Security Council resolution [2783 \(2025\)](#), have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 6 of that resolution, the final report on their work.

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 8 May 2026 and was considered by the Committee on 5 June 2026.

The Group would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

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Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Summary

The security and humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remained critical due to persistent armed violence and a deepening socioeconomic crisis. The conflict displaced millions, pushed over 60 per cent of the population into extreme poverty and acute food insecurity and severely disrupted access to healthcare and education. Conflict-related sexual violence and child recruitment reached unprecedented levels. The isolation of certain areas from humanitarian assistance further compounded vulnerabilities.

Although all armed actors engaged in violations, the Alliance Fleuve Congo and the sanctioned Mouvement du 23 mars (AFC/M23) (Cde.006) alliance was responsible for the largest share of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

The sanctioned Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) became the second most violent Islamic State (Da'esh) affiliate globally. It continued attacks against civilians and significantly expanded its territorial footprint in response to joint operations by Ugandan and Congolese forces. The latter increasingly relied on Wazalendo groups to fight against ADF, who imposed taxation, under threat of violence.

AFC/M23, with sustained support from the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), expanded territorial control, capturing Uvira in December 2025, later vacated under international pressure. AFC/M23 maintained objectives of regime change and federal restructuring and entrenched its parallel administration by creating alternative banking and insurance mechanisms. Diplomatic efforts yielded limited progress; ceasefire and withdrawal commitments were only partially implemented, with RDF and AFC/M23 withdrawals amounting to tactical repositioning. The Democratic Republic of the Congo did not implement commitments to neutralize the sanctioned Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) (Cde.005), which remained engaged alongside the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) to fight against the military aggression and occupation by AFC/M23 and RDF.

The increased use of uncrewed aerial systems reflected a significant evolution in military tactics. AFC/M23 and RDF demonstrated enhanced deep-strike capabilities, including through repeated drone attacks on Kisangani airport. FARDC conducted targeted strikes against senior AFC/M23 figures, killing its spokesperson, Willy Ngoma. The increased use of remote strike capabilities extended the battlespace beyond front lines, increasing risks to civilians. RDF continued to employ jamming and spoofing, disrupting navigation and communications and posing serious risks to civilian aviation.

The FARDC continued to rely on Wazalendo groups against AFC/M23 and RDF, while seeking to assert greater control over the different factions operating in North and South Kivu. This included efforts to consolidate different groups under more unified command structures and monthly payments for frontline combatants. Private military contractors provided strategic planning and tactical support to FARDC.

In the mining sector, gold production in Ituri Province increased sharply due to the expansion of semi-mechanized alluvial mining, generating several tons of gold, far exceeding declared exports. Cyanide-based leaching of artisanal tailings expanded, with much of the production smuggled to Uganda. This coincided with increased Ugandan gold exports not substantiated by declared trade data.

Mining at AFC/M23-controlled coltan sites around Rubaya increased significantly in 2025, with systematic taxation, tight transport control and integration into Rwandan supply chains. From the second quarter, Rwandan exports of coltan and cassiterite rose sharply, a trend not supported by domestic production and closely aligned with sustained output in AFC/M23-controlled areas.

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* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Introduction

1. The mandate of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo was extended on 30 June 2025 by the Security Council in its resolution [2783 \(2025\)](#). Five members of the Group of Experts were appointed by the Secretary-General on 2 September 2025 (see [S/2025/545](#)), and the sixth expert was appointed on 23 February 2026 ([S/2026/91](#)).
2. The final report of the Group of Experts is submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution [2783 \(2025\)](#). The report covers investigations conducted up to 15 April 2026, including field visits to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Kenya and Uganda. The Group of Experts exchanged information with the panels of experts on the Central African Republic, Haiti and Al-Shabaab.
3. The Group of Experts expresses its gratitude for the enhanced support and collaboration by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the reporting period.

Methodology

4. The Group of Experts used a rigorous methodology built on evidentiary standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see [S/2006/997](#)). Annex 1 fully details the methodology of the Group.
5. Owing to word count limitations, the Group of Experts has placed certain evidence, analysis and findings in the annexes, which constitute an integral component of this report and should be read in conjunction with the main findings and analysis.

II. Humanitarian situation and impact on civilians

6. Throughout the reporting period, the humanitarian and socioeconomic situation in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, notably Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu, remained critical due to persistent armed violence (see [S/2025/446](#), para. 78 and annex 41).
7. All parties to the conflict committed violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. United Nations statistics identified the Alliance Fleuve Congo and the sanctioned Mouvement du 23 mars (AFC/M23) as the primary non-State armed group perpetrator (see [S/2025/858](#), para. 80) and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) as the primary State perpetrator (see annex 2).¹
8. Increased use of online propaganda and hate speech exacerbated ethnic tensions. The proliferation of drone warfare exposed civilians and civilian infrastructure to heightened risks (see paras. 161–172; and [S/2024/432](#), para. 51).
9. In March 2026, 3.4 million internally displaced persons were recorded across Ituri and North and South Kivu.² Over 60 per cent of the population in those provinces were living in extreme poverty.³ The erosion of civilian livelihoods – including lost access to agricultural fields due to constant fighting and restrictions on humanitarian

¹ See <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2026/03/deputy-high-commissioner-al-nashif-democratic-republic-congo-peace>.

² See <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-humanitarian-key-figures-31-march-2026>.

³ See <https://www.undp.org/fr/drcongo/publications/enquete-sur-les-conditions-de-vie-des-menages-ecvm>.

movement – intensified food insecurity across the region (see S/2025/858, para. 42 and annex 19).⁴ The operating environment for humanitarian workers became increasingly complex (see annex 3). The conflict reduced access to safe water, sanitation and essential health services, contributing to disease outbreaks.⁵ In Minembwe, South Kivu, fighting resulted in the isolation of the Banyamulenge population, cutting off access to essential goods and humanitarian assistance (see paras. 83–89).⁶

10. Children were disproportionately affected by the conflict, subjected to recruitment by armed groups, sexual violence and the disruption of their education, including due to destruction of and attacks on schools.⁷

11. AFC/M23 was the leading perpetrator of conflict-related sexual violence according to cases documented and verified by the United Nations (see S/2025/858, para. 80 and annex 37). Humanitarian actors recorded a dramatic increase in cases of such violence since 2024, with cases disproportionately affecting women and girls (see annexes 4 and 5).

III. Allied Democratic Forces/Islamic State Central Africa Province

12. The sanctioned Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) (CDe.001) remained one of the most lethal armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, with documented civilian fatalities in 2025 exceeding 1,000. Large-scale and systematic attacks against civilians included killings, abductions and sexual violence, particularly affecting women and children.⁸ ADF continued to operate under the banner of Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), maintaining ideological links and communication with Islamic State (Da'esh) (see S/2025/446, para. 124), becoming the second most lethal Da'esh affiliate worldwide in 2025 (see annex 6).

13. ADF maintained resilience and adaptability to military pressure by the joint Operation Shujaa (see S/2025/446, paras. 122–124), as efforts to neutralize it or contain its geographic expansion remained unsuccessful (see paras. 21–22 and 27–28).

Geographic footprint and organization

14. ADF consolidated its structured deployment model (see S/2024/969, paras. 9, 15–17, 23; and S/2025/446, para. 123), organized around a system of fixed positions, mobile units and designated supply rendezvous points or logistical sites. ADF remained primarily active in Beni and Lubero territories (North Kivu Province) and in Irumu and Mambasa territories (Ituri Province), with a discrete presence in eastern Tshopo Province, indicating possible future expansion. This configuration enhanced the operational resilience of ADF, enabling rapid retreat and regrouping of mobile units. Annex 7 contains a detailed description of the structure, functions and locations of these camps.⁹

⁴ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-key-message-update-season-1-begins-amid-continued-escalation-conflict-march-september-2026>.

⁵ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/rd-congo-situation-humanitaire-dans-la-province-du-nord-kivu-rapport-de-situation-4-21-avril-2026>; and <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/rd-congo-situation-humanitaire-dans-la-province-de-lituri-rapport-de-situation-4-15-avril-2026>.

⁶ United Nations, humanitarian and civil society, international non-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, media and researchers.

⁷ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/republique-democratique-du-congo-cluster-education-situation-des-incidents-contre-leducation-au-28-fevrier-2026>.

⁸ United Nations; civil society; military, police and intelligence; judicial authorities; humanitarian organizations; researchers; former DF combatants; and ADF abductees.

⁹ Ibid.

15. Two fixed camps located in remote forested areas – the Madina headquarters of sanctioned ADF leader Musa Baluku (CDi.036) in Ituri, and the camp of his deputy Seka Umaru¹⁰ in western Lubero – hosted the largest concentrations of dependants and served as strongholds for command, logistics and training.¹¹

16. Mobile positions consisted of smaller, highly flexible combat units conducting reconnaissance and attacks, operating at a distance from fixed camps to disperse security forces and reduce military pressure on core leadership positions (see [S/2024/969](#), paras. 15–17, 22 and annex 2).¹² Two such units, led by “Mzee” Meya Sebagala in Ituri Province and by sanctioned commander Ahmad Mahmood Hassan, alias Abwakasi (CDi.040) in Lubero territory, were responsible for most mass-casualty attacks (see paras. 20–21).

17. Supply rendezvous sites – documented along key transport and agricultural corridors, including national roads RN4 and RN44 – linked mobile units with external support networks. They facilitated the transfer of supplies, recruits, equipment, ammunition and weapons¹³ and served as observation positions or temporary fallback locations following operations. They were overseen by senior ADF figures, including Mzee Meya, Abwakasi and Muhammad Kasibante, alias Difenda or Defender.¹⁴

18. ADF continued to rely on a network of local collaborators – coerced or incentivized – who provided logistical support and intelligence and facilitated illicit trade (see [S/2024/432](#), paras. 13–14).¹⁵ ADF continued to face manpower and logistical constraints (see [S/2024/969](#), para. 8), relying heavily on forcibly recruited individuals and abductees, including children, who lacked loyalty and often sought opportunities to escape. Foreign recruitment remained limited in scale (see annex 8).¹⁶

Operational dynamics and attacks

19. ADF operated in cyclical patterns of consolidation and escalation, enabling it to regenerate operational capacity while sustaining pressure on Operation Shujaa.¹⁷

20. A temporary reduction in large-scale attacks between March and June 2025 coincided with a consolidation phase focused on local revenue generation and reduced exposure to military operations (see para. 37). From July 2025 onwards, ADF resumed large-scale attacks, resulting in over 650 reported civilian fatalities in the second half of 2025 (see annex 9). This escalation followed the resumption of Shujaa operations targeting positions associated with Abwakasi and strikes against Madina headquarters on 6 July 2025. Among the most severe incidents documented, Abwakasi’s group massacred 71 civilians attending a funeral in Nturo village in November 2025. In Ituri, retaliatory attacks by Mzee Meya’s group included the massacre of 41 civilians at a church in Komanda on 26 July 2025.¹⁸

21. Another temporary reduction in ADF activity coincided with Ramadan, in February to early March 2026, followed by renewed escalation in violence in mid-March, including retaliatory attacks along the Komanda-Mambasa road (RN4). This escalation followed

¹⁰ See [S/2024/969](#), para. 24 and annex 7.

¹¹ Military intelligence, judicial authorities, humanitarian sources, researchers, former ADF combatants and ADF abductees.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ United Nations; civil society; local authorities; military, police, intelligence and security sources; judicial authorities; humanitarian sources; researchers; former ADF combatants; and ADF abductees.

¹⁴ Military, police, intelligence and security sources; judicial authorities; former ADF combatants; ADF-collaborators; and former supply rendezvous point operatives.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ United Nations; military, intelligence and judicial sources; researchers; civil society.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

new Operation Shujaa strikes targeting Madina headquarters on 23 February. Operations also targeted ADF positions in Lubero in mid-March 2026 (see para. 30).¹⁹ Following the attack on Madina, Abwakasi redeployed from Lubero to western Mambasa territory,²⁰ outside the formal Shujaa operational zone, where his cell conducted high-casualty attacks, including on the Muchacha mining site²¹ on 12 March 2026 (see annex 9). This was followed by a series of attacks along the Mambasa–Nia-Nia axis from mid-March into April, significantly expanding the ADF threat westwards, along the border with Haut-Uélé and Tshopo Provinces. Fatalities in March exceeded 90, the highest monthly level over the past six months.²² Correspondingly, no attacks were recorded in Lubero, Abwakasi's previous area of operations, during the same period.

22. This operational shift – expanding the footprint of ADF over 100 km west of Mambasa town into areas lacking security presence – mirrored Abwakasi's June 2024 expansion into Lubero (see [S/2024/969](#), para. 17) and reflected the ADF strategy of relocating to weakly governed zones, combined with retaliatory attacks against civilians, to divert military pressure (*ibid.*, paras. 9–11 and 15–17; and [S/2025/446](#), para. 123).

23. Throughout 2025, attacks perpetrated under Abwakasi's command led to the killing of over 600 civilians, making it the deadliest ADF unit. These attacks resulted in the displacement of an estimated 25,000 people and the destruction of at least 26 villages and 9 mining sites. Meya's group was responsible for the killing of over 230 civilians, the displacement of over 9,000 people and the destruction of at least 36 localities.²³

Modus operandi

24. There has been no notable change in the modus operandi of ADF (see [S/2024/969](#), paras. 9–10; and [S/2025/446](#), para. 123). It continued to target small and relatively undefended areas and rely on asymmetric warfare designed to maximize impact while minimizing exposure to military response (see annex 10). Attacks were typically deliberate and intelligence driven, often perpetrated at night.²⁴

25. Frequent ambushes on FARDC and the Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF) units were recorded since the second half of 2025, with dozens of soldiers killed and significant military equipment looted. The primary source of ADF for securing weapons and ammunition was through battlefield capture (see [S/2025/446](#), para. 125) and secondarily through illicit purchases from Wazalendo, FARDC and UPDF elements. ADF also faced ammunition shortages.²⁵

26. Although it continued to experiment with new improvised explosive device construction methods (see [S/2024/969](#), annex 5), accessing new technology and technical know-how remained limited.²⁶

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Military and intelligence sources.

²¹ See [S/2021/560](#), annex 91.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ United Nations; civil society; local authorities; military, police and intelligence sources; judicial authorities; researchers.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Local authorities; military, police and intelligence sources; judicial authorities; researchers.

²⁶ Military, police, intelligence and security sources; judicial authorities; United Nations; former ADF combatants and ADF abductees.

Operation Shujaa impact and challenges

27. Following joint FARDC-UPDF Shujaa Operation evaluation meetings held in Fort Portal, Uganda, and Beni in mid-February 2026, offensive operations against ADF positions were relaunched in Mambasa and Irumu territories, including on Mr. Baluku's headquarters on 23 February 2026 (see para. 21). While important materiel was recovered – including over 200 kg of explosive materials, over 100 improvised explosive devices and several AK-type assault rifles – the operations failed to neutralize senior ADF leaders. The 23 February 2026 strike triggered a further displacement of the camp into more remote, forested areas north-east of Mambasa.²⁷

28. This reflected a recurring pattern since 2021 whereby Shujaa operations have contributed to the geographic dispersion of ADF, consistently displacing ADF further from the Ugandan border, expanding the threat to civilians (see S/2024/969, paras. 12–18). These and other challenges, including limited tactical intelligence, coordination challenges and insufficient resources, were discussed during a provincial peace forum on ADF, held in Beni from 23 to 25 February 2026, organized by the North Kivu provincial government (see annex 11).

29. FARDC counter-offensive operations were affected by troop shortages due to military offensives against AFC/M23 (see S/2025/446, para. 123).²⁸ FARDC therefore relied increasingly on Wazalendo armed groups, including the Union des patriotes pour la libération du Congo (UPLC) led by “General” Germain Kambale Mayani, as well as on elements from the Nduma défense du Congo–Rénové (NDC-R) of sanctioned individual Guidon Shimiray Mwissa (CDi.033) (see S/2024/969, para. 30) and on a local detachment of the Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS) led by “General” Fimbo. These groups were engaged in operations against Abwakasi's cell operating around Manguredjipa (Lubero territory) (ibid., para. 20)²⁹ and during operations at the Muchacha mining site in March 2026.³⁰

30. ADF commander Muhammad Kasibante, alias Difenda or Defender (ibid., annex 2; and S/2023/990, annex 12) reportedly died from injuries sustained during clashes with Shujaa forces on 14 March 2026 along the Lindi River (in Asangwa, Bapere sector), which divides Lubero territory from Tshopo Province.³¹ The Group of Experts could not independently confirm his death.

Links with Da'esh

31. ADF continued to seek recognition and support from Da'esh (see S/2024/969, para. 26 and annex 8). In a video published in September 2025, ADF rejected the name “Allied Democratic Forces”, stating its preference for “ISCAP” (see para. 34).³² The systematic dissemination of ADF attack imagery through Da'esh media platforms underscored the continued ideological alignment of ADF with Da'esh and its effort to project operational relevance (see S/2024/969, para. 26). Da'esh publications continued to frame ADF activities as a “crusade against Congolese Christians” by the “soldiers of the Caliphate”.³³

32. Improved connectivity through the increased use of Starlink devices allowed ADF to transmit images of attacks to Da'esh for publication (see S/2024/960, annex 5). The frequency and content of these publications denoted regular, rapid and

²⁷ Military, intelligence and United Nations sources.

²⁸ Wazalendo sources; military, intelligence and judicial sources; researchers; local authorities.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Wazalendo commander, FARDC.

³¹ FARDC, United Nations, researchers.

³² Video on file with the Secretariat.

³³ Da'esh publications accessed on SITE Intelligence Group website.

fairly accurate communication with Da'esh.³⁴ While Mr. Baluku maintained regular communication with Da'esh, Meddie Nkalubo, alias Punisher (see [S/2023/431](#), para. 38), was responsible for managing communications for propaganda purposes.³⁵

33. Since mid-2025, the ADF communications strategy incorporated direct propaganda dissemination via social media. Under the “Guardians of the Truth TV” branding, ADF established a presence on platforms including TikTok, Facebook and YouTube, with the potential to significantly expand the reach of its ideological messaging and recruitment efforts.³⁶

34. In September 2025, Da'esh disseminated a propaganda video attributed to ISCAP, aimed at facilitating recruitment. The video portrayed ADF as a well-equipped and organized force, in contrast with evidence of difficult living conditions within camps. At the time of reporting, no measurable impact on recruitment had been identified (see annex 12).

35. While financial support from Da'esh has declined, Da'esh continued to provide ideological validation and strategic guidance, including encouragement to prioritize local revenue generation.³⁷

Financing

36. ADF expanded localized taxation practices,³⁸ likely resulting from the cumulative impact of intensified Shujaa operations that weakened the group (see [S/2024/969](#), paras. 7–11 and 22), alongside sustained counter-terrorism pressure on its external sponsor, Da'esh³⁹ in Somalia.⁴⁰

37. To compensate diminishing external financing (see [S/2024/432](#), para. 15), in addition to pillaging, armed robbery and kidnapping for ransom (see [S/2021/560](#), paras. 12, 21, 32–38), ADF focused on strengthening locally generated revenue, including through taxation in Irumu, Mambasa and Lubero territories. They issued tokens serving as movement authorization (labelled “Dubius”), or as proof of taxation on cocoa producers (labelled “Amani na Upendo” or “Delivrance Cacao”) (see annex 13). Taxation was predominantly coercive. In a propaganda video, ADF member Bonge la Chuma (see [S/2022/967](#), para. 23)⁴¹ stated that individuals were required to either convert to Islam, pay taxes or face being killed or expelled from ADF-controlled areas (see annex 14).

38. ADF also resorted to kidnapping for ransom (see [S/2024/432](#), annex 15). Several incidents occurred between January and February 2026 along the Komanda–Luna axis and around Mamove, involving group abductions followed by executions of individuals unable to pay the ransom. Abducted civilians were screened based on their perceived ability to pay, used for forced labour during captivity and released following negotiated payments. Payments often ranged between \$2,000 and \$5,000 (see annex 15).

³⁴ Da'esh publications and claims consulted on SITE Intelligence Group website. See also [S/2026/44](#), para. 32.

³⁵ Military intelligence sources, judicial authorities, researchers, former ADF combatants and ADF hostages.

³⁶ United Nations, researchers.

³⁷ See [S/2026/44](#), para. 31.

³⁸ Intelligence and security sources, civil society, United Nations, researchers.

³⁹ See [S/2024/969](#), para. 26; and [S/2022/967](#), paras. 27–28.

⁴⁰ See [S/2026/44](#), para. 8.

⁴¹ Video on file with the Secretariat.

IV. Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars crisis

A. Diplomatic and security developments

39. Diplomatic initiatives under the Washington, D.C. and Doha frameworks (see [S/2025/858](#), para. 7) saw limited implementation, and attempts to harmonize parallel mediation efforts did not advance. Successive ceasefire initiatives failed to hold, with parties breaching commitments and intensifying armed confrontation (see annex 16). The terms of Security Council resolution [2773 \(2025\)](#) remained unimplemented.

40. On 4 December 2025, the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda signed the Washington Agreement,⁴² aimed at de-escalation and cessation of hostilities.⁴³ However, in the days preceding its signature, the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) and AFC/M23 launched a coordinated military offensive in South Kivu, taking control of Uvira on 10 December 2025 (see paras. 72–76).⁴⁴ Following diplomatic pressure, RDF and AFC/M23 troops withdrew from Uvira on 18 January 2026 but redeployed to other strategic locations across South Kivu, where fighting continued (see paras. 77–79).

41. The conflict further escalated since January 2026, characterized by an increased reliance on aerial warfare. Drone attacks by AFC/M23 and RDF targeted the strategic Bangoka Airport in Kisangani, Tshopo Province, a key logistical hub for FARDC air operations (see para. 166), while FARDC drone strikes targeted enemy positions and leadership figures, strategic road axes and sites linked to illicit economic activities in North and South Kivu (see paras. 162–165).⁴⁵

42. In early March 2026, the United States of America sanctioned RDF and four senior RDF officers over their direct operational support to AFC/M23 (see annex 17).

Attempts to implement the Washington Agreement

43. Following this escalation, a meeting in Washington, D.C. on 17 and 18 March 2026 between representatives of the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and the United States resulted in commitments defined in an “initial steps plan” to advance the implementation of the concept of operations under the Washington Agreement (see [S/2025/858](#), para. 8).⁴⁶

44. The plan included coordinated steps to de-escalate tensions, commitments to sovereignty and territorial integrity, Rwanda’s disengagement from defined areas in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, efforts by the Democratic Republic of the Congo to neutralize the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), restrictions on drone strikes and civilian protection without discrimination. The plan foresaw the withdrawal of both RDF and AFC/M23 “personnel and equipment” and Rwanda’s commitment to influence AFC/M23 to cease attacks against Democratic Republic of the Congo positions, providing further indications of Rwanda’s command and control over AFC/M23 (see [S/2025/446](#), paras. 18, 44).

45. The plan referenced six areas of interest in North and South Kivu Provinces, coinciding with reported FDLR presence as defined in the operational order (see [S/2025/858](#), paras. 8, 14). The Parties agreed to undertake sequential actions: Rwanda would reposition its personnel and equipment by the end of March from identified

⁴² See <https://cd.usembassy.gov/signing-of-the-washington-accords-for-peace-and-prosperity-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-rwanda/>.

⁴³ See [S/2025/858](#), paras. 8–9.

⁴⁴ United Nations, civil society, intelligence sources, researchers.

⁴⁵ United Nations, military intelligence, civil society, humanitarian sources.

⁴⁶ Copy of the plan consulted by the Group of Experts.

frontline areas in Lubero, Masisi and Walikale to Rwandan territory; while FARDC would launch operations to neutralize FDLR. Such neutralization was conditioned upon the full withdrawal of AFC/M23 and RDF forces from the defined areas (see S/2025/858, para. 7; and S/2024/969, para. 48). Annex 18 provides further details about agreed actions and areas of interest.

Limited implementation

46. At the time of drafting, commitments remained only partially implemented. Both Parties pursued their strategic objectives amid ongoing hostilities.

47. Withdrawals by RDF and AFC/M23 from frontlines in North Kivu began on 23 March but fell short of agreed terms and deadlines. Withdrawals – barely exceeding 15 to 20 km – represented limited strategic and territorial concessions. Movements amounted to tactical repositioning and reinforcement of other strategic areas (see S/2023/431, paras. 44–45; and S/2025/446, para. 12). RDF personnel, heavy artillery and sophisticated equipment (jamming, spoofing and other air defence systems) were redeployed from Lubero to the Masisi-Walikale axis, violating Rwanda's commitment to withdraw personnel and equipment directly to its territory.⁴⁷

48. At the time of writing, RDF and AFC/M23 had retained control over most withdrawal-designated localities and maintained operational focus on Pinga and Walikale. In April, intense clashes over territorial control persisted along the Walikale-Masisi border, between AFC/M23 and RDF on the one side and FARDC, Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie (VDP)/Wazalendo and FDLR on the other. RDF continued anti-FDLR operations in the Bwito *chefferie* in Rutshuru territory to dislodge FDLR from their strongholds (see S/2025/858, paras. 36–45).⁴⁸

49. In South Kivu, no RDF or AFC/M23 troop withdrawals were documented and fighting continued. Additional RDF reinforcements from Rwanda arrived in April, including sophisticated weaponry and anti-aerial man-portable air defence systems.⁴⁹ RDF-operated drone strikes targeted FARDC positions, notably between 10 and 19 April (see para. 168).

50. Sources close to Rwandan authorities and AFC/M23 sources, as well as public statements by the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, that “defensive measures” also included troop deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, indicated that Rwanda did not intend to disengage and, in the absence of a favourable outcome through dialogue, was prepared to escalate through “any means necessary” (see annex 19). AFC/M23 representatives announced that no withdrawal was taking place, describing movements as routine troop rotations.⁵⁰

51. On 29 March 2026, FARDC announced the launch of an operation to neutralize FDLR around Pinga-Walikale and deployed additional troops from Kisangani to Walikale for these operations.⁵¹ However, the commitment of FARDC remained questionable (see S/2024/969, paras. 67–73) since at the time of writing no anti-FDLR operations had taken place and FDLR remained engaged in operations against AFC/M23 and RDF in Masisi and Walikale. FDLR sources reported having received assurances from certain FARDC officers that they would not be attacked (see paras. 135–136).

⁴⁷ Military and intelligence sources, United Nations, Wazalendo and AFC/M23 sources, researchers.

⁴⁸ United Nations, military intelligence, civil society, humanitarian sources.

⁴⁹ United Nations, military intelligence, diplomatic sources, researchers.

⁵⁰ See https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/2037994145567166671?s=46&t=_n75XfLAiYYaxKQtM7ZzVg.

⁵¹ FARDC sources.

Doha process talks in Switzerland

52. Talks between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and AFC/M23, as part of the Doha process (see [S/2025/858](#), paras. 7, 10–11), took place in Montreux, Switzerland, between 13 and 17 April 2026, with modest outcomes. The talks led to the signing of a memorandum of understanding on the operationalization of the ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism and a joint statement on humanitarian access and the release of prisoners (see annex 20).

B. Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars objectives, structure and territorial control

Objectives and organization

53. The objectives of AFC/M23 continued to combine political, economic and military aims, including territorial expansion and consolidation, the entrenchment of parallel governance structures and the pursuit of formal recognition through negotiations (see [S/2025/858](#), paras. 13–14). Overthrowing the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, alternatively, the establishment of an autonomous region in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo remained the movement's maximalist and more limited objectives, respectively (see [S/2025/446](#), para. 11 and annex 4).⁵² These objectives were taught during ideological trainings, as confirmed by former recruits.⁵³

54. AFC/M23 leaders continued to advocate for the establishment of a “Federal Republic of the Congo” and rejected the previous claim to integrate AFC/M23 combatants into FARDC (see [S/2025/446](#), para. 11), proposing that AFC/M23 build and lead the new armed forces of the federal State (see annex 21).⁵⁴

55. Increasingly, the protection of Tutsi, Banyamulenge and Hema from ethnic cleansing and genocide took centre-stage in public statements justifying AFC/M23 military intervention and demands.⁵⁵

56. AFC/M23 continued to privilege military expansion, escalating military operations with the objective of taking Walikale, Kisangani, Kalemie and Beni. Since the start of the Doha process in March 2025 (see [S/2025/446](#), annex 5), AFC/M23-occupied territories expanded by over 35 per cent,⁵⁶ in violation of Security Council resolution [2773 \(2025\)](#).

Links with Joseph Kabila

57. The position of AFC/M23 was shaped by its increasingly closer public association with the former President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Joseph Kabila (ibid., paras. 9–10), who travelled frequently to AFC/M23-controlled territory from May 2025 and held meetings with senior AFC/M23 leadership.⁵⁷ In September 2025, the Military High Court of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

⁵² AFC/M23 elements, former AFC/M23 recruits, public statements.

⁵³ At Rumangabo, Tchanzu and Nyongera (see [S/2025/446](#), annex 50).

⁵⁴ See <https://x.com/bbisimwa/status/1994820683516580189?s=20>.

⁵⁵ https://x.com/cnangaa/status/2000638408075448464?s=46&t=_n75XfLAiYyaxKQtM7ZzVg; https://x.com/onenationradio3/status/2049805208100725075?s=46&t=_n75XfLAiYyaxKQtM7ZzVg; and https://x.com/conspiracygl/status/2030302769781920249?s=46&t=_n75XfLAiYyaxKQtM7ZzVg.

⁵⁶ United Nations, intelligence and diplomatic sources, researchers.

⁵⁷ AFC/M23 combatants, intelligence sources, individuals close to AFC/M23 leadership, sources close to the Rwandan Government, former RDF source, United Nations sources.

sentenced Mr. Kabila to death in absentia, including for treason and organizing an insurrection, accusing him of collaborating with AFC/M23.

58. At the time of writing, multiple AFC/M23 and intelligence sources reported that a comprehensive reshuffle of AFC/M23 leadership and structure was forthcoming – including a change of the movement’s name – and that Mr. Kabila was expected to assume a prominent position.⁵⁸

59. The increased prominence of Mr. Kabila – and his potential claim of leadership, cited by President Kagame (see annex 19) – appeared intended to obscure Rwanda’s role, reinforcing the narrative that AFC/M23 was a “Congolese movement” addressing a “Congolese problem” (see S/2024/432, para. 25). In an exclusive interview conducted in Goma and symbolically published on 23 March, Mr. Kabila reiterated his opposition to the Kinshasa Government.⁵⁹ Mr. Kabila’s “Sauvons la RDC” platform and called for a popular uprising, signalling support for a regime change, which aligned with AFC/M23 objectives (see para. 53).⁶⁰

60. Moïse Nyarugabo – a former Congolese senator and key member of Mr. Kabila’s inner circle (see annex 22) – rose to increasing prominence within the movement.⁶¹ He was a key figure in the Mouvement révolutionnaire pour la défense du peuple/Twirwaneho (MRDP/Twirwaneho), without holding a formal position (see S/2021/560, annex 113; and S/2025/446, para. 177), and represented MRDP/Twirwaneho interests in high-level meetings with Mr. Kabila and AFC/M23 leadership.⁶² As former vice-president of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie–Goma (RCD-Goma), he had had close ties with sanctioned individual Sultani Makenga (CDi.008), who served as RCD-Goma battalion commander (2003–2004), and with Bernard Byamungu, a RCD-Goma officer in 2002 (see S/2009/603, annex 124).⁶³

Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars organization and strength

61. Overall military command of AFC/M23 remained with “General” Makenga, although his position became increasingly contested within the movement and by Rwanda (see annex 23).⁶⁴

62. Bertrand Bisimwa and Corneille Nangaa remained the political leaders. Both the military and political leadership continued to receive instructions and support from the Government of Rwanda and its intelligence services (see paras. 98–100, and S/2025/446, para. 8).

63. Tensions between the political and military wings of AFC/M23 persisted (see S/2025/446, para. 9). While prominent political figures like Mr. Nangaa and Mr. Kabila harboured ambitions to seize power in Kinshasa, most M23 leaders opposed participating in military operations beyond North and South Kivu.⁶⁵ M23 senior leadership also clashed over access to and distribution of resources.⁶⁶ Sources

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ See <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/30/world/africa/he-led-congo-for-18-years-now-hes-a-hunted-man.html>.

⁶⁰ See <https://sauvonslardc.org/2026/04/12/communique-final-2e-conclave-du-mouvement-sauvons-la-rdc/>.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Former RCD/Goma officer, former RDF source and intelligence sources. See also <https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/icg/1998/en/95628>; <https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/irin-update-870-great-lakes>; and https://sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/archive-files/francois_ngolet_crisis_in_the_congo_the_rise_abook4you.pdf, pp. 12, 34, 74, 83 and 126–128.

⁶⁴ Intelligence and AFC/M23 sources.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ AFC/M23 and intelligence sources, United Nations, researchers.

also pointed to grievances regarding the preferential treatment of Tutsi officers and combatants.⁶⁷

64. AFC/M23-occupied territories were divided into three “defense zones”, led respectively by “General” Baudoin Ngaruye (first zone, covering Nyiragongo, Rutshuru and Lubero territories), “Brigadier-General” Justin Gacheri Musanga (second zone, covering Masisi and Walikale) and “General” Byamungu (third zone, covering South Kivu).⁶⁸

65. The estimated combat strength of AFC/M23 was around 30,000 elements.⁶⁹ These figures were derived from aggregating the “core” M23 – comprising former members of the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) and the first iteration of M23 (see S/2012/843, para. 3) – with recruits mobilized since 2021, including from the diaspora and refugee camps in Rwanda (see S/2024/969, annexes 14–15). They also included thousands of recently graduated FARDC, Congolese national police and Wazalendo elements who were either captured or who volunteered following the fall of Goma, as well as local defence forces and newly formed police units (see S/2025/446, annexes 12 and 14; and S/2025/858, annex 11).

Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars recruitment and training

66. AFC/M23 continued to forcibly or voluntarily recruit adults and minors (see S/2025/858, para. 22).⁷⁰ Former recruits denounced systematic torture and executions in training camps, notably in Rumangabo.⁷¹ Leon Kanyamibwa continued to be identified as AFC/M23 commander responsible for all training centres (see S/2025/446, para. 24).

67. AFC/M23 was affected by high defection rates, mainly attributable to forcibly recruited individuals, specifically former FARDC.⁷² The Group of Experts also documented concerted efforts to bribe FARDC officers and Wazalendo leaders to trigger mass defections towards AFC/M23.⁷³

Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars military operations

68. Throughout the reporting period, AFC/M23 conducted targeted, simultaneous operations across multiple frontlines in North and South Kivu, consolidating territorial control (see S/2025/858, paras. 34–55). It employed advanced weaponry and technological capabilities, enabled by critical RDF support (see paras. 49, 76 and 153–160).

North Kivu

69. AFC/M23 and RDF continued anti-FDLR operations in Bwito and Bwisha *chefferies*, in Rutshuru territory, also targeting civilians associated with FDLR or affiliated armed groups (see S/2025/858, paras. 36–45), including through systematic killings, destruction of livelihoods and burning of villages. Similarly, violence against civilians by FDLR-Forces combattantes Abacunguzi (FOCA), Rassemblement pour l’unité et la démocratie-Urunana (RUD-Urunana) and other affiliated groups, such as Collectif des mouvements pour le changement-Forces de défense du peuple

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Military and intelligence sources, United Nations, diplomatic sources, civil society, researchers, AFC/M23 officers and combatants, Wazalendo combatants.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ AFC/M23 recruits, United Nations, military intelligence, researchers, civil society.

⁷¹ Interviews conducted with former AFC/M23 recruits.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ AFC/M23 members, intelligence sources.

(CMC-FDP), included killing of perceived AFC/M23 collaborators and frequent ambushes and robberies.⁷⁴

70. Throughout the reporting period, AFC/M23 and RDF prioritized capturing Pinga and Walikale. Since March, it also focused on the strategically significant Bunyakiri (Kalehe)–Ntoto (Masisi)–Hombo (Walikale) axis, which would allow an alternative, southern approach to Walikale (see paras. 47–48). However, it faced VDP/Wazalendo offensives and aerial bombardments by FARDC (see paras. 162–164).⁷⁵

71. Between January–March 2026, significant AFC/M23 and RDF troop reinforcements were documented at the Lubero frontline, raising concerns of an imminent offensive toward Butembo and Beni.⁷⁶ While it did not materialize, partially due to UPDF presence and Uganda’s refusal to grant them passage,⁷⁷ the reinforcements stretched FARDC capabilities and sustained strategic ambiguity regarding the timing and direction of future operations.

South Kivu operations and capture of Uvira

72. At the end of November 2025, AFC/M23 and RDF launched a major offensive along the Bukavu–Uvira (RN5) corridor and adjacent axes, aiming to seize the Ruzizi Plain and Uvira, to compel Burundi’s disengagement from the conflict (see [S/2025/446](#), paras. 179–181) and disrupt the use of Burundian territory as a logistical hub supplying Kinshasa-aligned forces in South Kivu (see para. 120). Simultaneous advances in Lemera and the Moyens Plateaux aimed to secure strategic positions, enabling further offensives toward Minemwbe, to relieve its encirclement by Force de défense nationale du Burundi (FDNB) and FARDC (see [S/2025/858](#), para. 53), and pressure the withdrawal of FDNB from Mwenga territory. Subsequent objectives included capturing Kalemie and the Hauts Plateaux and ultimately gaining control over South Kivu.⁷⁸

73. Public justifications for the offensive on Uvira – including statements by AFC/M23 spokespersons and affiliated social media networks – framed operations as a response to an alleged campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Banyamulenge community. Additional claims cited the presence of FDLR-FOCA elements operating alongside FARDC and FDNB. The Group of Experts did not identify evidence that such elements posed a direct threat to Rwanda justifying military intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see [S/2025/446](#), annex 24).

74. The capture of Uvira on 10 December 2025 and the rapid advancement of AFC/M23 and RDF forces southwards to Makobola, 20 km south of Uvira, represented a significant territorial expansion. Mutual allegations of cross-border shelling by Burundi and Rwanda heightened the risk of direct confrontation and regionalization of the conflict, prompting Burundi to close its borders and increase its defences.⁷⁹

75. The offensive on Uvira was conducted under the direct command of Mr. Makenga and Mr. Byamungu.⁸⁰ Retired RDF General James Kabarebe (see

⁷⁴ Civil society, United Nations, humanitarian sources, researchers, armed group members, including AFC/M23.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Military and intelligence sources, former AFC/M23, civil society, researchers, United Nations, diplomatic sources.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Military and intelligence sources, United Nations sources, diplomatic sources, civil society, researchers, AFC/M23 members and officers.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

para. 98)⁸¹ was identified as having played a key role in coordinating the offensive.⁸² AFC/M23 and RDF sources signaled since early October the intent of taking Uvira, pointing at a carefully planned operation by AFC/M23 and Rwanda.

76. Rwanda deployed over 8,000 RDF troops, including special forces, and transferred heavy, advanced military equipment to the frontlines on the Ruzizi Plain, including jamming systems, BM21-type multi-barrel rocket launchers, GPS-guided 120 mm mortars, kamikaze and first-person-view drones, aiming for a rapid victory. Heavy artillery and shelling were employed, including firing BM21 rockets from Kamanyola on 4 and 5 December. Cross-border shelling on 5 December has also caused civilian casualties in Cibitoke, Burundi.⁸³

Withdrawal from Uvira

77. After controlling Uvira for over a month – during which AFC/M23 forced the withdrawal of FDNB, captured large FARDC bases,⁸⁴ dominated the entire Ruzizi plain along the Burundian border and established a parallel administration – AFC/M23 and RDF troops eventually withdrew from Uvira on 18 January 2026, following sustained international diplomatic pressure (see annex 24).

78. Presented as a goodwill gesture, the withdrawal was a strategic move followed by the consolidation of AFC/M23 and RDF positions, as they redeployed to adjacent areas, in breach of withdrawal commitments (see paras. 44–45).⁸⁵ Coordinated redeployments aimed at securing key road corridors in South Kivu, including reinforcing positions in the Moyens and Hauts Plateaux (see annex 25). Until the time of reporting, AFC/M23 and RDF continued to reinforce in the Ruzizi Plain (see para. 49).

79. Other allied groups, notably the Résistance pour un État de droit au Burundi (RED-Tabara) and the Forces nationales de libération (FNL) (see [S/2022/479](#), paras. 162–168 and annex 81; and [S/2023/431](#), paras. 134–139), fought alongside MRDP/Twirwaneho and AFC/M23 (see annex 26).⁸⁶ Burundian authorities denounced their operational proximity, warning it could create conditions for cross-border destabilization.

Humanitarian impact of fighting in Uvira

80. Heavy artillery fire and shelling resulted in civilian casualties and significant population displacement from the Ruzizi Plain towards Burundi, where refugees faced precarious living conditions including famine and disease, and limited humanitarian assistance. As clashes subsided and AFC/M23 and RDF consolidated control throughout Uvira in early December, they conducted cordon-and-search operations that led to the killing of those suspected of affiliation with FARDC or Wazalendo.⁸⁷

81. Prior to their withdrawal in January 2026, AFC/M23 instructed the Banyamulenge community to leave Uvira, claiming that returning Wazalendo and FARDC forces would target them. This led to allegations, including from some

⁸¹ Sanctioned by the United States in 2025.

⁸² Intelligence, diplomatic and former RDF sources.

⁸³ Military and intelligence sources, United Nations, diplomatic sources, civil society, researchers, AFC/M23 members and officers.

⁸⁴ Including in Luvungi, Luberizi, and Kabunambo.

⁸⁵ Military and intelligence sources, United Nations, diplomatic sources, civil society, researchers, AFC/M23 insiders.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ United Nations, humanitarian sources, civil society, human rights defenders, human rights non-governmental organizations, researchers, diplomatic and intelligence sources.

members of the Banyamulenge community, that their movement was coerced with the aim of justifying claims of a genocidal threat on the community.⁸⁸

82. When Wazalendo groups re-entered Uvira on 18 January, they triggered widespread disorder, including looting, the destruction of civilian, humanitarian and State properties and the killing of individuals accused of collaborating with AFC/M23. Violence also affected members and properties of the Banyamulenge community, with churches and homes looted or destroyed across several neighbourhoods.⁸⁹ The Group of Experts did not document any targeted killings of Banyamulenge civilians. Multiple sources indicated that government authorities, including the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Félix Tshisekedi, instructed Wazalendo elements not to target civilians, particularly the Banyamulenge. FARDC placed 31 Banyamulenge families remaining in Uvira under its protection.⁹⁰ Investigations into reported incidents remain ongoing.

Fighting for control of Minembwe

83. In late January 2026, FARDC, with support from Wazalendo, FDNB and private military contractors (see paras. 143–144), launched an offensive from Uvira towards Minembwe against MRDP/Twirwaneho and AFC/M23, who reinforced MRDP/Twirwaneho in August 2025 and February 2026.⁹¹

84. The strength of MRDP/Twirwaneho was estimated at 2,500 to 3,000 combatants, led by Charles Sematama (see [S/2025/446](#), para. 176). RDF presence in the Hauts Plateaux was limited to sporadic, platoon-sized specialized elements and air support (see para. 168), likely due to the area's geographic isolation. MRDP/Twirwaneho and AFC/M23 elements consolidated around Banyamulenge population centres, including Minembwe, Mikenge and Muranvia.⁹²

85. Over several weeks, FARDC cut supply routes leading towards Minembwe. On 31 March, FARDC launched a major offensive on Minembwe following sustained gains across the Hauts Plateaux.⁹³ In response, RDF supported MRDP/Twirwaneho and AFC/M23 through drone strikes and aerial resupply.⁹⁴ Drone strikes in early to mid-April forced FARDC to withdraw from key positions, including Muranvia, temporarily halting their advance (see paras. 168–170).

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Diplomatic and military sources, intelligence sources, Congolese authorities, Banyamulenge civilians, civil society, researchers.

⁹¹ Military and intelligence sources, United Nations, AFC/M23 and Banyamulenge sources, researchers.

⁹² Military and intelligence sources, captured RDF soldiers, researchers.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Military and intelligence sources, United Nations, diplomatic sources, researchers, armed group sources.

Banyamulenge civilians trapped in Minembwe

86. The Banyamulenge population, concentrated in and around Minembwe, was trapped amid ongoing hostilities. Since mid-2025, Minembwe has effectively been encircled by FARDC and allied forces (see [S/2025/858](#), para. 53), resulting in severe obstacles for population movements, the entry of essential goods and humanitarian assistance. Since February 2026, access has been limited to air supply only.⁹⁵ All lines of communication were cut, further exacerbating the humanitarian situation.⁹⁶

87. Concomitantly, MRDP/Twirwaneho prevented civilians from leaving Minembwe, including through coercion and threats of violence, fearing defections and information leaks.⁹⁷ As previously reported, all boys between 10 and 12 years of age and all able-bodied men were compelled to join Twirwaneho and participate in combat, in violation of the prohibition on forced recruitment and the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict (see [S/2023/431](#), paras. 150–156).

88. Members of the Banyamulenge community have denounced both parties for trapping civilians in an active combat zone, calling on FARDC to lift the siege and establish a humanitarian corridor and on MRDP/Twirwaneho and AFC/M23 to allow civilians to leave safely.⁹⁸ Both conducts raise serious concerns under international humanitarian law, including the prohibition of using civilians to shield military objectives.

89. MRDP/Twirwaneho and AFC/M23 leaders alleged that FARDC and FDNB committed a premeditated, systematic and targeted campaign of extermination against the Banyamulenge population, including through aerial bombardments of densely populated areas.⁹⁹ While the civilian population in the Hauts Plateaux has been exposed to significant risks from ongoing hostilities, the Group of Experts did not substantiate their intentional targeting. In the context of frequent aerial operations since mid-2025, members of the Banyamulenge community, including human rights organizations, have reported three civilian deaths, including one teenage boy and two elderly individuals.¹⁰⁰

Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars parallel administration

90. AFC/M23 consolidated its parallel administrative and fiscal system (see annex 27; [S/2025/446](#) paras. 25–27; and [S/2025/858](#) paras. 16, 29–33). In major urban centres, including Goma and Bukavu, it extended control over key economic activities, including to the benefit of economic actors linked to Rwanda.

91. In early December 2025, AFC/M23 introduced a codified list of taxes mirroring Congolese State tax structures,¹⁰¹ including taxes on personal and corporate income (see annex 28).

92. AFC/M23 captured and consolidated all existing provincial tax and revenue-collection services into a unified structure responsible, under the AFC/M23 finance department, for the collection and enforcement of provincial taxes and levies (see

⁹⁵ In March and April 2026, several rotations of planes airdropping supplies in Minembwe were documented, as confirmed by military and intelligence sources, United Nations, Banyamulenge sources, researchers.

⁹⁶ Military and intelligence sources, United Nations, Banyamulenge sources, researchers, humanitarian sources, human rights defenders.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Representatives of the Banyamulenge community.

⁹⁹ Statements on X, including by Lawrence Kanyuka on 13 December 2025.

¹⁰⁰ Confidential sources.

¹⁰¹ Document on file with the Secretariat.

annex 29). Payments were made through the AFC/M23-iteration of CADECO (see annex 30; and [S/2025/858](#), paras. 31–32).

93. AFC/M23 extended control to public utilities, insurance and financial services. For example, the national water and electricity companies (SNEL and REGIDESO) were placed under the administrative authority of the AFC/M23-appointed governor and the financial oversight of the AFC/M23 finance department (see annex 31). In the insurance sector, AFC/M23 facilitated the replacement of the national insurance company SONAS with Imperial Assur, a private entity which began operations in mid-2025. By March 2026, Imperial Assur had a monopoly over much of the insurance sector, with enforcement mechanisms supported by AFC/M23 (see annex 32).

94. The Group of Experts documented the emergence of unlicensed financial service providers following the continued suspension of banking operations and payment systems by Congolese authorities (see [S/2025/446](#) paras. 32–33). For example, “Accès Finance S.A.”¹⁰² presented itself as a financial institution offering deposit, transfer and account-based services in Goma and Rubaya, with planned expansion to Bukavu (see annex 33).

C. Critical Rwanda Defence Force support to Alliance Fleuve Congo/ Mouvement du 23 mars

95. The Group of Experts documented the continued RDF presence and reinforcements in North and South Kivu and their engagement across multiple frontlines, including through the use of advanced military technology and equipment and aerial warfare (see [S/2024/969](#), paras. 51–55; [S/2025/446](#), paras. 45–52, 56; and [S/2025/858](#), paras. 36–48). RDF provided sustained operational support to AFC/M23, with capacity for the rapid deployment of highly specialized capabilities, including drones, electronic warfare and special forces (see paras. 153–160 and 166–170). RDF also targeted areas where no FDLR presence had been reported, including in Uvira,¹⁰³ calling into question the self-defence rationale used to justify military intervention under the guise of “defensive measures” (see [S/2024/969](#), para. 38).

96. In December 2025, RDF deployment in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo was conservatively estimated at 8,000 to 10,000 elements in South Kivu and 6,000 to 8,000 in North Kivu, with no evidence of significant withdrawals thereafter.¹⁰⁴ Subsequent movements consisted primarily of rotations and reinforcements, until the time of drafting (see paras. 49, 71).

97. As previously documented, RDF held strategic forward positions, leading advances and opening operational corridors for M23. Each M23 combat unit was supervised and supported by RDF (see [S/2024/969](#), para. 49). RDF personnel were integrated into mixed battalions alongside M23 elements, including commando units originating from Bigogwe, Rubavu and Cyangugu. Recently, RDF elements deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo began using M23 uniforms to avoid detection.¹⁰⁵ For the same reasons, troop movements were mostly conducted at night.

¹⁰² See <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1608550256803084>.

¹⁰³ Military and intelligence sources, United Nations, diplomatic sources, civil society, researchers, AFC/M23 sources.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. Interviews with detained RDF and former AFC/M23 recruits.

*Rwanda Defence Force command-and-control over Alliance Fleuve Congo/
Mouvement du 23 mars operations*

98. On 1 December 2025, President Kagame appointed retired General James Kabarebe as his Senior Defence and Security Advisor. On 29 January 2026, he appointed Brigadier-General Jean-Paul Nyirabutama¹⁰⁶ as deputy to Mr. Kabarebe.¹⁰⁷ Mr. Nyirabutama was directly involved in operational matters in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including handling communication channels with AFC/M23,¹⁰⁸ while Mr. Kabarebe acted as the principal liaison, ensuring coordination with AFC/M23 leadership and Mr. Kabila, with meetings often held in Gisenyi.¹⁰⁹

99. RDF deployments were coordinated through a structured chain linking senior leadership in Kigali to operational-level cooperation with M23 commanders through parallel channels (see S/2025/446, para. 8).¹¹⁰ General Vincent Nyakarundi, the RDF Army Chief of Staff who was sanctioned by the United States in March 2026,¹¹¹ oversaw operations in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹¹² Elements of the RDF 3rd and 4th Divisions were deployed in operations in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo:¹¹³ the 3rd Division, under command of Major General Eugene Nkubito,¹¹⁴ operated predominantly in North Kivu; and the 4th Division was mainly deployed in South Kivu, under the command of Brigadier General Vincent Gatama until his redeployment to Mozambique in late-2025.¹¹⁵ The 4th Division also incorporated a significant number of reserve forces.¹¹⁶ Both divisions were supported by special forces units, under the command of Brigadier-General Stanislas Gashugi.¹¹⁷ While Division commanders remained in Rwanda, brigade commanders occasionally deployed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹¹⁸ AFC/M23 recruits interviewed by the Group of Experts have all referred to the presence of RDF, notably special forces, involved in high-stake frontline operations.

100. The Government of Rwanda continued to dictate which territories to seize, hold or withdraw from, reflecting centralized operational control and hierarchical subordination of AFC/M23 (ibid., para. 18).

101. The Group of Experts wrote to the Government of Rwanda on 2 April 2026 to seek clarification regarding aspects of its support to AFC/M23 and looks forward to receiving a reply.

¹⁰⁶ Mr. Nyirabutama was the former deputy head of Rwanda's National Intelligence and Security Service.

¹⁰⁷ Mr. Kabarebe and Mr. Nyirabutama operated as a strategic interface between intelligence, military operations, and political decision-making.

¹⁰⁸ A direct interlocutor within AFC/M23 was Fred Ngenzi Kagorora (see annex 20).

¹⁰⁹ Intelligence sources including from Rwanda, former RDF, AFC/M23 sources.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ See <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0411>.

¹¹² Intelligence and AFC/M23 sources.

¹¹³ Intelligence, AFC/M23 sources, captured RDF soldiers, RDF-linked sources.

¹¹⁴ See <https://www.mod.gov.rw/docs-media/news-detail/rdf-command-and-staff-college-launches-international-relations-and-security-course>.

¹¹⁵ Intelligence sources. See also <https://www.kigalitimes.rw/2025/09/14/rwanda-deploys-fresh-troop-rotation-to-mozambiques-cabo-delgado/>; and <https://rwandainspirer.com/rwanda-to-rotate-troops-and-police-officers-deployed-in-mozambique/>. Vincent Gatama was referenced in late-2025 as the RSF Joint Task Force Commander in Mozambique, suggesting he was no longer acting as 4th Division Commander at that time, although no official communication identified a replacement. He has served as 4th Division Commander since 30 August 2023. See <https://web.archive.org/web/20250405091908/https://www.mod.gov.rw/news-detail/rdf-press-release-promotion-and-appointment-in-the-rwanda-defence-force>.

¹¹⁶ Commanded by Major-General Alexis Kagame. See S/2022/967, annex 32.

¹¹⁷ Intelligence sources, AFC/M23-elements, former RDF.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

D. Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo proxies

1. Wazalendo groups

Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie/Wazalendo coalitions in North Kivu

102. The VDP/Wazalendo armed groups in North Kivu remained engaged in combat against AFC/M23 and RDF (see [S/2025/858](#), paras. 73–76). The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo continued to provide funds, logistics and weapons to the VDP/Wazalendo, in violation of the sanctions regime (see [S/2025/446](#), para. 63).

103. FARDC attempts to unify VDP/Wazalendo groups in North Kivu continued, with the objective of improving internal discipline and strengthening FARDC command and control. VDP/Wazalendo nevertheless continued to commit violations against civilians (see [S/2025/858](#), para. 81; and [S/2025/446](#), paras. 87–91).

Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie/Wazalendo operations

104. VDP/Wazalendo maintained control over several areas in North Kivu, either independently or jointly with FARDC. They conducted operations, often on their own initiative, in and around areas controlled by AFC/M23 and RDF in Nyiragongo, Masisi, Rutshuru, Walikale and Lubero territories. Some VDP/Wazalendo elements were trained and employed as marksmen in support of drone attacks, notably for target identification and strike guidance (see para. 141). FDLR combatants remained embedded within several VDP/Wazalendo groups, notably CMC/FDP, Forces dévoués pour la défense de la patrie (FDDP) and APCLS, reinforcing their ranks while obscuring affiliation with FDLR. This practice was known and approved by several FARDC officers and Democratic Republic of the Congo authorities (see [S/2024/969](#), para. 41).¹¹⁹

Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie/Wazalendo “synergies” and Réserve armée de la défense

105. In December 2025, Kinshasa-based authorities and FARDC proposed the establishment of a “coalition nationale des Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie (VDP/Wazalendo)” following a general assembly held on 13 December 2025, with an elected leadership tasked with coordinating all armed factions involved in fighting AFC/M23 and RDF (see annex 34). However, VDP/Wazalendo disavowed this initiative, including the proposed leadership.¹²⁰

106. Provincial authorities and FARDC also urged VDP/Wazalendo factions to integrate the armed defence reserve (Réserve armée de la défense, RAD) training programme (see [S/2025/446](#), annex 34), with the dual objective of reinforcing FARDC operational capacity and legitimizing Wazalendo combatants. While some combatants joined the RAD training programme, most VDP/Wazalendo leaders preferred to postpone integration into RAD while fighting continued.¹²¹

107. Instead, VDP/Wazalendo groups established new, geographically organized coalitions called “synergies”, which coordinated their operations closely with one another and, when necessary, provided mutual support.¹²²

108. The “Synergie Front Grand Nord”, commanded by UPLC leader “General” Mayani, comprised 24 armed groups operating in Lubero and Beni territories.

¹¹⁹ FARDC, Wazalendo and government sources.

¹²⁰ FARDC, intelligence, Wazalendo sources.

¹²¹ Wazalendo commanders, combatants, FARDC and official authorities.

¹²² Wazalendo, FDLR and FARDC sources.

Headquartered in Kalunguta, it conducted joint operations against ADF in Manguredjipa/Bandulu (Lubero territory) and Muchacha (Ituri Province), alongside FARDC and UPDF (see para. 29).¹²³ It also fought against AFC/M23 and RDF in Kipese (Lubero territory).¹²⁴ The “Synergie Petit Nord”, covering Rutshuru and Nyiragongo territories, comprising 14 armed groups, was commanded by Jonas Bigabo, leader of CMC-Forces d’auto-défense du peuple congolais (CMC/PAPC). The “Synergie Masisi-Walikale”, comprising 17 armed groups, was led by APCLS leader Janvier Karahiri and sanctioned individual Guidon Shimiray Mwisa (CDi.033).¹²⁵ FDLR-FOCA combatants were integrated into the Masisi-Walikale and Petit Nord synergies.¹²⁶

Wazalendo dynamics in South Kivu

Disorganization prior to the takeover of Uvira

109. Following the occupation by AFC/M23 of Bukavu (see [S/2025/446](#), para. 17), many Wazalendo armed groups converged towards Uvira. Between 80 and 150 Wazalendo groups were reported active across South Kivu, with at least 70 self-proclaimed Wazalendo “Generals” operating in Uvira and its surroundings¹²⁷ (see annex 35). Mobilization and recruitment increased.¹²⁸

110. Prior to the takeover of Uvira (see para. 74), Wazalendo factions had operated as a loose coalition of a dozen competing “coordinations” that increasingly encroached on State prerogatives, including the control of border posts, taxation and police functions, and preyed on the civilian population (see [S/2025/858](#), para. 82).¹²⁹

111. A significant divide existed between “old” warlords actively engaged on the frontlines – including sanctioned individual William Yakutumba (CDi.043), Makanaki Kasimbira John, Delphin Ngomanzito, René Itongwa and Ilunga – and “new” Wazalendo leaders perceived as opportunistic entrants exploiting weakened State authority (see [S/2023/431](#), annex 74; and [S/2024/969](#), para. 109).¹³⁰ Divisions within Wazalendo were aggravated by alleged preferential treatment of certain factions by FARDC and disagreements among Democratic Republic of the Congo authorities over who should have responsibility for coordinating military operations in South Kivu.

112. Between August and December 2025, Wazalendo relations with FARDC deteriorated significantly. Wazalendo attacked some FARDC, accusing them of treason, and confiscated weapons and ammunition. By December 2025, Uvira had become the epicentre of tensions and clashes between FARDC and Wazalendo and among Wazalendo fighting over revenue from illegal taxation.¹³¹

113. After AFC/M23 and RDF occupied Uvira, Wazalendo retreated outside Uvira town or to their bases in Fizi and the Hauts and Moyens Plateaux.¹³²

¹²³ “General” Mayani, Wazalendo and FARDC sources, researchers.

¹²⁴ VDP/Wazalendo, FARDC, United Nations, intelligence and civil society sources.

¹²⁵ See [S/2023/431](#), paras. 75–78; [S/2023/990](#), paras. 33–40; [S/2024/432](#), paras.60–65; and [S/2025/446](#), paras. 65–67.

¹²⁶ FDLR, FARDC and Wazalendo sources, DRC authorities.

¹²⁷ Intelligence, armed groups, civil society, researchers.

¹²⁸ See [S/2024/969](#), paras. 107–110.

¹²⁹ Intelligence, armed groups, civil society, researchers.

¹³⁰ Military and intelligence, armed groups sources, civil society, researchers.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Armed groups, intelligence sources, civil society and researchers.

Dynamics after the Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars retreat

114. Following the withdrawal of AFC/M23 and RDF from Uvira on 18 January 2026 (see para. 77), Wazalendo groups were the first to return, engaging in extensive looting and other violations (see para. 82). The situation gradually improved in the following days as provincial authorities, FARDC units, “Hiboux” special forces, members of the Republican Guard, police and some private military contractors redeployed to Uvira. The Governor convened all Wazalendo leaders and banned the presence of unauthorized armed elements, prohibited roadblocks or any substitution for government functions and arrested recalcitrant combatants. To reduce their presence in Uvira, Wazalendo were deployed to the front lines.¹³³

115. To consolidate authority over Wazalendo, the provincial government implemented a formal registration process and the payment of \$325 to each registered combatant. Payment became regular after February 2026, yet perversely led to a sharp increase in self-declared Wazalendo and rivalries over who was receiving more money.¹³⁴

Wazalendo coordinations in early 2026

116. In late January 2026, political actors such as Justin Bitakwira, known for his anti-Tutsi rhetoric (see [S/2024/969](#), paras. 108–109), and Willy Mishiki mobilized political support and advocated for increased logistical and financial assistance for the Wazalendo in South Kivu.¹³⁵

117. At the time of drafting, renewed efforts to establish a unified command had failed and the Wazalendo factions remained divided into at least three distinct coordinations:¹³⁶ one led by Yakutumba;¹³⁷ another by Alexis Mwamba Dunya, the RAD-appointed coordinator in South Kivu; and a third by Ngomanzito, who attempted to establish a “special unit” mobilized along ethnic lines, notably from the Bafuliro community. Each coordination comprised between 15 and 20 factions.¹³⁸

118. Several younger Wazalendo “generals”, unaffiliated with the three existing coordinating bodies, attempted to establish a new coordination, driven by the perception that existing structures received government funding from which they were excluded. They sought formal recognition and access to such support.¹³⁹

Collaboration with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Force de défense nationale du Burundi

119. Wazalendo groups often mounted the first lines of defence against AFC/M23 and RDF, including around Uvira. Between August and December 2025, they fought against AFC/M23 and RDF in Walungu, Kabare, Minembwe and Mwenga, on the outskirts of Uvira and Fizi. (see [S/2025/858](#), paras. 51–52). Wazalendo operations did not result in any major recovery of territories.¹⁴⁰

120. FARDC continued to supply war materiel to Wazalendo. On 22 August 2025, Brigadier-General Mwehu Lumbu Evariste, Commander of Sokola 2 operational

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ DRC authorities, Wazalendo sources, researchers.

¹³⁶ Ibid. During a meeting in late-December 2025 in Baraka, William Yakutumba was elected overall Wazalendo coordinator, to oversee the different coordinations in South Kivu. However, several Wazalendo leaders rejected his appointment.

¹³⁷ John Kisambura Makanaki served as administrative and logistics lead, René Itongwa as operations/intelligence lead.

¹³⁸ United Nations, Wazalendo sources, researchers.

¹³⁹ Democratic Republic of the Congo authorities, civil society and Wazalendo sources.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

sector in South Kivu, met with the main Wazalendo groups to define a counteroffensive strategy against AFC/M23 and RDF. Subsequently, FARDC transferred truckloads of weapons and ammunition to Wazalendo at several front lines, including Kiliba, Songe, Luvungi, Lubarika and Walungu.¹⁴¹ Wazalendo also received limited food rations (see annex 36).

121. Several Wazalendo factions also carried out joint operations with FDNB, which relied on them for intelligence and knowledge of the terrain. For example, FDNB operated with Yakutumba along the Uvira axis and the Ruzizi Plain prior to the AFC/M23 takeover and relied on Ngomazito elements as scouts in the Hauts Plateaux.¹⁴²

122. Since reclaiming Uvira, Wazalendo factions supported joint ground operations by FARDC and FDNB in Uvira, Fizi and Mwenga territories. In Fizi, the FARDC–Wazalendo–FDNB coalition, supported by air strikes, fought to maintain control over Point Zero and Tuwe Tuwe, while seeking to consolidate control over Minembwe,¹⁴³ Mikenge and the surrounding areas.¹⁴⁴ FARDC special forces and private military contractors refused to conduct joint front-line operations with Wazalendo (see para. 143).¹⁴⁵

Parallel governance by Yakutumba

123. Coalition nationale du peuple pour la souveraineté du Congo (CNPSC), led by Yakutumba (see para. 111), maintained a parallel administration it had established in areas under its control, particularly in Fizi territory (see S/2018/531, para. 60).

124. Since at least 2023, CNPSC has operated a government-like structure comprising delegates and sectoral “ministers”, including in the areas of justice, mines and geology.¹⁴⁶ In January 2026, CNPSC, through its “finance bureau”, published a comprehensive list of taxes across multiple sectors. The system foresaw a percentage of the taxes collected being paid to certain State services, reflecting an attempt to supplant revenue-collection by State services (see annex 37).

125. Since 2023, CNPSC has operated a parallel judicial system, comprising courts and tribunals, used primarily to adjudicate disputes related to mining activities.¹⁴⁷ This system has included magistrates, clerks and enforcement personnel, supported by detention facilities (see annex 38). Former detainees reported that release was conditioned on the payment of fines ranging between 2,000,000 and 5,000,000 Congolese francs, reflecting the exercise of coercive judicial authority.

2. Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda

Structure, strength and geographical distribution

126. At the time of writing, FDLR (Cde.005) was fragmented into three principal factions: FDLR-FOCA, FDLR-RUD and FDLR-Force de protection du peuple (FPP) (see S/2025/466, para. 92). All three factions had recently adopted alternative designations to obscure their FDLR affiliation: FDLR-FOCA was referred to as “Bataillon jungle”; FDLR-RUD as “FDP-R”; and FDLR-FPP as “FPP”.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴¹ Intelligence, armed groups sources, civil society, United Nations sources, researchers.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ FDNB was not deployed at Minembwe after January 2026.

¹⁴⁴ FARDC, intelligence sources, United Nations, Banyamulenge sources, researchers.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Mining administration officials, Wazalendo insiders, traders, civil society.

¹⁴⁷ Mine pit owners, mine workers, traders, mining administration officials, journalists.

¹⁴⁸ FDLR, Wazalendo, intelligence sources.

127. The leadership of the three FDLR factions were largely Rwandan nationals, while the rank-and-file was predominantly from the Congolese Hutu community.¹⁴⁹ “Major-General” Pacifique Ntawuguka (alias Omega Israel) (CDi.024) and “General” Gaston Iyamuremye (alias Victor Byiringiro) (CDi.003) remained, respectively, FDLR-FOCA military commander and political leader. The overall FDLR-RUD leader was “Brigadier-General” Emmanuel Nsengiyumva (alias Faida/Fayida Hakimu), and the FDLR-FPP leader was “Colonel” Dan Hategekimana (alias Dan Simplicite) (ibid., para. 92). The leadership of the three factions remained in constant communication.¹⁵⁰ Actively pursued by RDF, they remained in movement as dictated by both operational requirements and survival imperatives (see [S/2025/858](#), paras. 36–50).¹⁵¹

128. Although each group operated as a separate entity, Omega Israel was presented as the overall leader in all decisions and negotiations involving the three factions, which maintained regular coordination, had partially overlapping areas of operation and conducted joint operations against AFC/M23 and RDF (see para. 48).¹⁵²

129. The traditional FDLR-RUD area of operations was in the Bwisha and Bwito *chefferies*, Rutshuru territory. At the time of drafting, FDLR-RUD units were particularly active in Jomba, Binza, Busanza and Bukoma, overlapping with the FDLR-FPP area of operations in Rutshuru territory.¹⁵³ FDLR-FOCA, the largest FDLR faction, remained active on several major front lines in North Kivu, notably in Nyiragongo, Masisi, Rutshuru and Walikale territories.¹⁵⁴ The FDLR-FOCA special unit, known as the Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur (CRAP), reported to have active units on the outskirts of Goma and infiltrated in Goma town (see [S/2024/432](#), paras. 74–77).¹⁵⁵

130. FDLR sources representing different factions claimed that the group’s overall strength exceeded 10,000 combatants, with half active at the time of drafting and others ready for mobilization. FDLR-CRAP claimed their ranks exceeded 20,000 combatants. However, despite significant recruitment efforts since the onset of the AFC/M23-related crisis (ibid., para. 77) and the training of new recruits – mostly Congolese nationals – United Nations and intelligence sources estimated that the total FDLR strength was between 3,500 and 4,500 combatants, with FDLR-FOCA accounting for the large majority. The Washington Agreement estimated FDLR strength to be between 3,000 and 3,500 combatants.¹⁵⁶

131. Since FDLR combatants were considered among the best-trained fighters, FDLR and Wazalendo sources assessed that FARDC lacked the operational capacity or the will to neutralize them (see para. 51; and [S/2025/858](#), para. 77).¹⁵⁷

Political positioning and calls for dialogue

132. In a letter addressed to the President of the United States in July 2025, the FDLR leadership presented its mission as consisting of protecting the Rwandese refugee community in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It expressed support for peace initiatives, notably those facilitating the safe and dignified return of Hutu refugees to Rwanda (see annex 39; [S/2025/858](#), annex 7; and [S/2024/969](#), annex 42). FDLR and

¹⁴⁹ FDLR-FOCA, FDLR-RUD and FDLR-FPP sources, intelligence, FARDC, Wazalendo sources.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ FDLR, United Nations and intelligence sources.

¹⁵² FDLR-FOCA, FDLR-FURD, FDLR-FPP and CNRD sources.

¹⁵³ FDLR and Wazalendo sources.

¹⁵⁴ FDLR-CRAP, FARDC and intelligence sources.

¹⁵⁵ FDLR-CRAP and Wazalendo sources.

¹⁵⁶ Diplomatic and intelligence sources.

¹⁵⁷ FDLR, Wazalendo and intelligence sources.

its splinter group in South Kivu, the Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie (CNRD) (see [S/2024/432](#), paras. 182–183) insisted that their grievances lay with the Government of Rwanda for excluding FDLR and the broader refugee community from social and political participation.¹⁵⁸ Amid ongoing negotiations in Washington, D.C. and Doha, from which it remained excluded, the FDLR stated it would not disarm unless Rwanda accepted inclusive dialogue and warned that, in the light of AFC/M23 and RDF operations against it, the “war was on”.¹⁵⁹

Continued cooperation between the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda

133. Under the Washington Agreement, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo committed to fully implementing the concept of operations and corresponding operational order, which assigned sole responsibility for neutralizing FDLR to the Congolese authorities (see para. 44; and [S/2025/858](#), paras. 8 and 14–15). However, despite diplomatic commitments, FARDC continued to rely on FDLR and FDLR-aligned groups to fight AFC/M23 and RDF (see [S/2025/446](#), paras. 70–73). FDLR combatants – operating alone or jointly with VDP/Wazalendo and FARDC – remained active on many front lines in North Kivu, at times occupying the first line of defence.

134. To demonstrate commitment to the peace process, in January 2026, the FARDC Chief of Staff issued instructions prohibiting any form of collaboration with FDLR (see [S/2025/858](#), para. 77). The prohibition was extended to all VDP/Wazalendo, with non-compliant groups to be treated as hostile (see annex 40).¹⁶⁰ From 30 March, FARDC troops, including special forces – known as “Hiboux” or “jungle battalions” – deployed from Kisangani to Walikale to begin FDLR-neutralization operations.¹⁶¹

135. Despite these FARDC communiqués and deployments,¹⁶² officials in Kinshasa and FARDC officers on the ground reassured FDLR of continued cooperation (see [S/2025/858](#), para. 77) and indicated that the planned neutralization operations would not be genuine.¹⁶³

136. On 7 April, a confidential encounter between a high-level delegation from Kinshasa, including FARDC generals, and representatives of the FDLR-FOCA high command in Pinga decided, *inter alia*, that FDLR-FARDC cooperation would continue.¹⁶⁴

137. FARDC logistical support, including transfer of military equipment to FDLR, continued throughout the reporting period. In late March 2026, a FARDC helicopter landed in Pinga to deliver weapons to FDLR-FOCA units led by “Major-General” Uzabakiriho Cyprien (alias Kolomboka Niyo Tedium Mugisha) that had been engaged in fighting against AFC/M23 and RDF in Masisi territory. The equipment was collected by an FDLR-CRAP unit that had travelled from Walikale territory to Pinga and then returned to Masisi.¹⁶⁵ Similar transfers had taken place in late 2025, when an FDLR unit under commander “Togolais” operating in Bwito *chefferie* regularly collected logistical supplies and ammunition in Pinga. These transfers were executed by FARDC Colonel Moké on instructions from his superiors.¹⁶⁶

¹⁵⁸ FDLR, CNRD, intelligence and diaspora sources. Messages consulted by the Group.

¹⁵⁹ FDLR, CNRD, intelligence and diaspora sources.

¹⁶⁰ Wazalendo sources, researcher.

¹⁶¹ FARDC sources.

¹⁶² FDLR, Wazalendo, intelligence sources, FDLR-linked diaspora sources.

¹⁶³ Confidential sources.

¹⁶⁴ FDLR-FOCA, intelligence and United Nations sources.

¹⁶⁵ FDLR and intelligence sources.

¹⁶⁶ Wazalendo commanders, FDLR, FARDC, intelligence sources.

138. At the time of drafting, FARDC and Democratic Republic of the Congo authorities used FDLR liaison officers to coordinate FDLR-FARDC actions. These liaison officers remained in contact with FDLR leadership, notably Victor Byiringiro and Omega Israel.¹⁶⁷ Fidel Sebagenzi, the FDLR-FOCA liaison officer primarily based in Kinshasa, travelled regularly to North Kivu aboard FARDC military aircraft.¹⁶⁸ FDLR-FPP and FDLR-RUD liaison officers based in Beni and Kasindi, respectively, were in regular contact with Colonel Cyprien Sekololo, the FARDC-appointed liaison with VDP/Wazalendo (ibid., para. 75).¹⁶⁹

3. Private military companies and contractors

139. Foreign private military companies and contractors continued to operate in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in support of the FARDC (ibid., para. 78). Their activities included the operation of military air assets, logistical assistance, specialized military training (including drone piloting, radar operations, Sukhoi aircraft instruction and jungle warfare), operational planning support, intelligence-collection and analysis, tactical communications, and target identification. These entities were based in Kisangani, Kinshasa, Walikale, Kalemie and Kindu.¹⁷⁰

140. Testimonies revealed the continued implication of private military companies in military strategic and operational roles on the North and South Kivu front lines (see [S/2025/446](#), para. 75; and [S/2023/990](#), paras. 47–51). The chain of command through which instructions were conveyed to private military contractors involved in front-line operations remained unclear.

Training of Wazalendo

141. Several Wazalendo factions received training from foreign instructors in Walikale, North Kivu,¹⁷¹ and in Baraka, South Kivu,¹⁷² notably on target identification, geolocation of enemy positions and piloting of quadcopter reconnaissance drones.¹⁷³ Wazalendo sources indicated that selected trainees were individuals with a higher level of education. Some trainees subsequently operated as marksmen for FARDC in carrying out drone attacks.¹⁷⁴

142. Combatants led by sanctioned individual Guidon Shimiray (CDi.033) and CNPSC combatants led by sanctioned individual William Yakutumba (CDi.043) were among the beneficiaries of these trainings.¹⁷⁵ The provision of training to combatants under the command of sanctioned individuals constitutes prohibited technical assistance and therefore a violation of the sanctions regime.

Private military contractor involvement in combat

143. Between January and March 2026, private military contractors were engaged in operations alongside FARDC in South Kivu. Their involvement coincided with an intensification of locally coordinated drone attacks and ground offensives.¹⁷⁶ Wazalendo units were instructed to withdraw from areas in the Hauts Plateaux where

¹⁶⁷ Wazalendo, FARDC, FDLR sources, confidential sources.

¹⁶⁸ Wazalendo, FARDC, FDLR sources.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Intelligence, military and diplomatic sources, private military contractors and Wazalendo sources, United Nations, researchers.

¹⁷¹ NDC/R and APCLS combatants.

¹⁷² CNPSC combatants.

¹⁷³ Wazalendo and FARDC sources.

¹⁷⁴ Wazalendo sources.

¹⁷⁵ Wazalendo trainees; military and intelligence sources.

¹⁷⁶ Military, intelligence sources, civil society, Wazalendo sources.

FARDC special forces (“Hiboux”) and foreign private military contractor personnel operated.¹⁷⁷

144. Private military contractors provided highly specialized support in key, high-stakes operations and were not systematically deployed on all front lines. Operational support from private military contractors to FARDC in South Kivu included coordination of artillery and drone attacks, and intelligence assistance. Private military contractors accompanied FARDC when they entered in Uvira in January 2026 (see para. 40).¹⁷⁸ On 1 February 2026, multiple drone strikes conducted with the support of private military contractors targeted AFC/M23 positions around Minembwe.¹⁷⁹ Between 2 and 8 February 2026, private military contractors airdropped FARDC “Hiboux” special forces units at Point Zero (see para. 114).

Quantum Global and Vectus Global

145. As previously reported, in December 2024, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo concluded a five-year contract with an American private military contractor, Erik Prince. Through a complex scheme of enterprises, Mr. Prince committed to providing specialized military support to FARDC, alongside financial oversight and advisory services aimed at increasing revenue-collection in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from the mining sector¹⁸⁰ (see [S/2023/990](#), annex 31; and [S/2025/446](#), para. 75).

146. In June 2025, Mr. Prince’s Quantum Global Consulting entity, based in the United Arab Emirates, registered a new Congolese company, Quantum Global Consulting Africa, to serve as its legal entity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The company subsequently registered Vectus Global as another legal entity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹⁸¹ Vectus Global, whose operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are coordinated by a French-United States national, Christophe Sirot,¹⁸² signed a contract with the Ministry of Finance to strengthen State revenue capture in the extractive sector, addressing cross-border smuggling, corruption and fiscal evasion, including through the establishment of a “mining brigade”.¹⁸³ In late April 2026, the Ministry of Finance announced the establishment of a paramilitary “mining guard” to replace defence forces currently deployed in mining zones (see annex 41).

147. The Vectus contract also contained a covert military component,¹⁸⁴ initially intended to prioritize border security, including at the borders with Rwanda and Zambia.¹⁸⁵ The contract also included strategic military advice to FARDC, the acquisition and deployment of air assets and the recruitment of former foreign military personnel.¹⁸⁶ The objective was “to help FARDC become effective against strategic targets, such as Rwandan jamming” including through “training, advice and equipping”.¹⁸⁷ In late 2025, a Vectus staff member told the Group of Experts that ongoing hostilities had shifted the contract’s focus from revenue-collection to security. In February 2026, a Vectus Global representative informed the Group that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had requested its support

¹⁷⁷ Wazalendo sources.

¹⁷⁸ Military, intelligence, diplomatic and Wazalendo sources, United Nations, researchers.

¹⁷⁹ Confidential and diplomatic sources.

¹⁸⁰ Government, security and intelligence sources, Vectus Global staff.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Intelligence and diplomatic sources, private military contractor sources, Vectus Global staff.

¹⁸³ Vectus Global representatives.

¹⁸⁴ Intelligence, military, diplomatic and private military contractor sources, Vectus Global staff.

¹⁸⁵ Private military contractor sources.

¹⁸⁶ Intelligence and private military contractor sources, Vectus Global staff.

¹⁸⁷ Vectus Global staff.

in planning operations to retake Uvira and that Vectus staff had been deployed to eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo for this purpose.

148. During a March 2026 meeting with the Group of Experts, Mr. Sirot denied involvement in the contract's military aspects; however, multiple sources, including Vectus staff, confirmed his coordinating role.

Foreign private military contractors recruited in El Salvador

149. Salvadoran personnel, present in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since at least July 2025 (see [S/2025/858](#), para. 79), expanded their participation from logistical support in Kisangani to active front-line deployments, notably in Walikale, Baraka and Kalemie.¹⁸⁸

150. The Group of Experts identified Importaciones de Productos Americanos S.A. de C.V. as an intermediary company involved in recruiting at least 300 Salvadoran nationals for deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The company was registered in El Salvador under the names of retired army Colonel Juan Emilio Velasco Alfaro and retired Lieutenant Rodrigo Antonio Tejada Alvarengar (see annex 42).

151. Most recruits were former military and police personnel hired on one-year contracts starting in July 2025, with a promised monthly remuneration of \$4,225. Several recruits returned to El Salvador after delays or failures in salary payments or due to poor health conditions during deployment (ibid.).

152. The Government of El Salvador informed the Group of Experts it had no knowledge of its nationals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and that any such recruitment or deployment was not authorized by the State.

E. Use of advanced weapons systems, communications and uncrewed aerial vehicles

Rwanda Defence Force-operated equipment

153. The Group of Experts documented the continued use of advanced electronic warfare and military communications equipment in areas under AFC/M23 control, demonstrating RDF presence and critical support to AFC/M23 (see [S/2025/858](#), para. 71 and annex 33), in violation of the United Nations sanctions regime.

Electronic warfare systems in North and South Kivu

154. Several devices recovered in North and South Kivu were identified as electronic warfare and counter-uncrewed aerial system components designed to disrupt radio-frequency used by drones and to interfere with or intercept military communications.

155. On 21 October 2025, FARDC recovered several such systems in Kalembe locality, Masisi Territory (North Kivu), in an area previously occupied by AFC/M23. The devices, bearing the inscription "MINDMADE WB GROUP (POLAND)",¹⁸⁹ were manufactured by MindMade Sp. z o.o., a subsidiary of WB Group, marketed under the product families SKYctrl and FIELDctrl,¹⁹⁰ produced in Poland by Advanced Protection Systems (APS)¹⁹¹ (see annex 43).

156. Similar modules bearing identical manufacturer markings were recovered on 12 and 13 August 2025 in Mulamba, Walungu Territory (South Kivu) during military

¹⁸⁸ Intelligence, military sources, civil society, researcher.

¹⁸⁹ See <https://www.wbgroup.pl/en/mindmade>.

¹⁹⁰ See <https://www.mapledefence.com/product/skyctrl>.

¹⁹¹ See <https://apsystems.tech/en/about-us/>.

operations conducted against M23 and RDF (see annex 44). Comparable equipment, installed by RDF in Kibira along the Burundi–Rwanda border, was seized on 19 August 2025.¹⁹²

Military telecommunications equipment

157. In March 2025, Congolese security forces seized a Tadiran RT-7106 (PRC-710) tactical VHF/FM manpack radio from an RDF soldier in Masisi territory (see [S/2025/858](#), para. 71 and annex 34). The manufacturer confirmed that the radio had been officially exported to the Government of Rwanda in 2022 (see annex 45).

Global navigation satellite system jamming and interference affecting civil aviation

158. Global navigation satellite system interference and jamming by RDF and AFC/M23 continued, posing serious risks to civil aviation safety (see [S/2024/969](#), para. 54; and [S/2025/446](#), paras. 45–50).

159. On 13 January 2026, a Boeing 737 operated by Kenya Airways experienced signal disruption to its global navigation satellite system near Bujumbura airport during landing and takeoff, triggering emergency procedures (see annex 46). This prompted the Government of Burundi to request the International Civil Aviation Organization to investigate repeated navigation-system interference incidents recorded since October 2025 (see annex 47). Intelligence and military sources identified the source of the jamming as coming from Democratic Republic of the Congo territory, around Sange, where RDF was deployed. On 17 March 2026, the Group of Experts also documented interference with the global navigation satellite system at Bujumbura airport (see annex 48).

160. On 16 March 2026, a Royal Dutch Airlines-operated Airbus A330 flying from Amsterdam to Kigali experienced jamming effects directly over Goma. Flight tracking data showed anomalies and inconsistencies in the aircraft's reported altitude and speed, indicating continued signal interference (see annex 49).

Uncrewed aerial vehicle/drone operations

161. The use of uncrewed aerial vehicles across eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo increased, both in geographic scope and operational depth, targeting enemy troops, high-value individuals within command structures and strategic infrastructure. The combined employment of surveillance drones, armed uncrewed aerial vehicles and loitering munitions revealed a progressive sophistication in operational use, enabling precision or semi-precision strikes against targets located beyond immediate lines of contact. The proliferation of such sophisticated systems implied external technical or operational assistance.

Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

162. From mid-October 2025, FARDC intensified drone operations against enemy forces across North and South Kivu. It employed armed uncrewed platforms, including CH-4/CH-4B-type and TAI ANKA drones,¹⁹³ and foreign private military contractors to operate them (see [S/2024/432](#), para. 35).

163. Several FARDC drone operations affected civilian objects and populations. In Masisi territory, strikes in late October 2025 in Shoa and the Nyabiondo hills killed at least three civilians and caused displacement. On 2 January 2026, a drone strike in

¹⁹² United Nations; military, intelligence and security sources.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

Masisi centre damaged civilian and administrative buildings and the sub-base of the international humanitarian organization War Child, causing at least seven fatalities.¹⁹⁴

164. Frequent air strikes in the Hauts Plateaux of Minembwe exposed Banyamulenge-populated areas to heightened risk of collateral damage and prompted accusations of intentional targeting, which the Group of Experts did not substantiate (see paras. 80–82).

165. FARDC drone operations also targeted AFC/M23 leadership. On 14 January 2026, a drone strike targeted the “Blue Cat” bar-restaurant in the Kalundu district of Uvira, during a meeting of senior AFC/M23 and RDF officers, causing significant casualties. On 24 February 2026, a FARDC drone strike in Rubaya killed sanctioned individual “Lieutenant-Colonel” Willy Ngoma (CDi.044), the military spokesperson of AFC/M23.¹⁹⁵ On 7 March 2026, a strike in Mushaki targeted a house associated with a high-ranking AFC/M23 commander.¹⁹⁶

Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars and Rwanda Defence Force

166. AFC/M23 and RDF have employed uncrewed aerial vehicles, loitering munitions and kamikaze drones. On the night of 31 January to 1 February 2026, as well as on 5 February 2026 and 1 March 2026, Bangoka Airport in Kisangani was targeted in three distinct waves of kamikaze drone attacks, impacting areas near the control tower, runway and FARDC-operated drone infrastructure. On 2 February 2026, AFC/M23 claimed responsibility for the attack (see annex 50).

167. On 10 March 2026, FARDC elements shot down two Kamikaze drones in Mikenge, South Kivu. The following day, another kamikaze drone struck FARDC positions in the same area.¹⁹⁷

168. Between 1 and 14 April, RDF and AFC/M23 carried out at least nine drone attacks on FARDC positions in the Hauts Plateaux. FARDC and intelligence sources indicated that at least two attacks were conducted with a Bayraktar TB2 fixed-wing drone from Rwanda (see [S/2025/446](#), para. 52). The remaining attacks involved kamikaze drones (see annex 50).

169. The Group of Experts confirmed that the kamikaze drones shot down in the Hauts Plateaux and near FARDC positions were of the same type as the ones used in the Kisangani attacks. The Group assessed that these systems displayed identical design and manufacturing characteristics, not corresponding to commercial, branded drone manufacturing (see annex 48).

170. AFC/M23 and RDF attacks involving TB2 or kamikaze drones were used strategically against fixed FARDC defensive positions to disrupt command-and-control and reduce FARDC capabilities prior to or during ground operations (see annex 50). On 1 April 2026, an RDF drone, identified as a Bayraktar TB2 model (see [S/2025/446](#), para. 52 and annex 28), struck FARDC positions in Mikenge and Point Zéro in the Hauts Plateaux (South Kivu).¹⁹⁸

Drone strike in Goma

171. On 11 March 2026, two successive detonations were reported near a residential compound located in the Himbi neighbourhood in Goma. The second detonation impacted a residential compound resulting in the death of a United Nations Children’s

¹⁹⁴ United Nations, humanitarian, military, civil society, intelligence, diplomatic sources.

¹⁹⁵ Military and intelligence sources, United Nations, researchers.

¹⁹⁶ Military, intelligence, and diplomatic sources.

¹⁹⁷ Military, intelligence, and civil society sources.

¹⁹⁸ Military intelligence, FARDC sources.

Fund (UNICEF) staff member. M23 military personnel deployed to the scene shortly after the strike and removed all ballistic remnants (see annex 51).¹⁹⁹

172. The acoustic signature of at least one uncrewed aerial vehicle was detected immediately prior to the explosions, suggesting an aerial delivery mechanism.²⁰⁰ Damage to the house was consistent with a blast–fragmentation event, indicating the use of a high-explosive payload. AFC/M23 attributed the strike to FARDC, while Congolese authorities announced an investigation.²⁰¹ The Group of Experts' investigations into this incident continue.

Aircraft identification and tracing

173. The Group of Experts identified the aircraft destroyed by a FARDC airstrike on 27 March 2025 at the Kigoma airfield in Walikale, at the time under AFC/M23 control (see S/2025/446, para. 38 and annex 22). The aircraft was a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan²⁰² operated by Ocean Heights Aviation Training Centre (OHATC), a company based in Entebbe, Uganda.²⁰³ Before the strike, the aircraft conducted three logistical rotations between Entebbe and Kigoma between 21 and 27 March 2025,²⁰⁴ transporting military materiel. The Group is awaiting a response to an inquiry addressed to OHATC.

V. Ituri Province

A. Armed groups dynamics

174. Violence in Ituri Province continued despite the conclusion of a second Aru peace accord in June 2025 (see S/2023/990, paras. 72–75). All major armed groups participated except Convention pour la révolution populaire/Forces pour la révolution populaire (CRP/FRP). CRP/FRP had become the main driver of insecurity, while Coopérative pour le développement du Congo/Union des révolutionnaires pour la défense du peuple congolais (CODECO-URDPC) and Zaïre violence decreased.²⁰⁵

Coopérative pour le développement du Congo/Union des révolutionnaires pour la défense du peuple congolais

175. CODECO-URDPC remained active in Djugu territory (see S/2025/446, paras. 127–128). Although it adhered to several peace initiatives (see S/2023/990, paras. 72–75), it remained well armed and organized, entrenching control over mining areas and mobilising resources for its war efforts.²⁰⁶

176. CODECO-URDPC internal tensions persisted (see S/2025/446, para. 127). Since March 2025, disputes over revenues forced leadership reshuffles and the relocation in September 2025 of its headquarters from Kpandroma to Tsalaka, Walendu Tatsi sector. A former spokesperson, Bassa Zukpa Guershom, became its president. CODECO-URDPC leadership announced that it intended to transform the armed group into a political party.²⁰⁷

¹⁹⁹ Military, intelligence and diplomatic sources; United Nations; civil society; photographic and video evidence.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ See <https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2031921694588141646>.

²⁰² Registration N5165A.

²⁰³ Military, intelligence, diplomatic sources; civil society.

²⁰⁴ Military, police, intelligence, and security sources; United Nations; civil society.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

Attacks and operations

177. CODECO-URDPC engaged in fewer mass-casualty attacks, attacks on FARDC or clashes with rival armed groups (see [S/2025/446](#), annex 63).²⁰⁸ This was partially due to a weakened Zaïre (see para. 180), improved relations between CODECO-URDPC and provincial authorities and its intention to join RAD.²⁰⁹

178. Since October 2025, the first significant attack targeting civilians occurred on 11 March 2026, in Dhendro *groupement*, killing 25, including 7 children.²¹⁰ In April, CODECO-URDPC elements ambushed 12 trucks on RN27 on the on the Djadju–Ngura axis in Djugu. CODECO-URDPC leadership told the Group of Experts that these incidents had resulted from a failure to assert effective command-and-control over all its elements.

Zaïre

179. Since the staged demobilization process on 15 January 2025 (see [S/2024/432](#), para. 150; and [S/2025/446](#), para. 129), Zaïre has been affected by internal tensions due to differing opinions about its adherence to the peace process, alignment with AFC/M23 and joining CRP/FRP (see [S/2025/446](#), para. 129).

180. Following a Zaïre attack on a humanitarian convoy near Mabanga, Zaïre leader Baraka Maki Amos (ibid.) fled to Kampala in August 2025, where he met with sanctioned individual Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (CDi.007) to explore a potential alliance with CRP/FRP. Baraka Maki Amos died in a car crash in Uganda on 21 November 2025. Following his death, Zaïre remained without a leader and a significant number of Zaïre combatants and commanders joined CRP/FRP.²¹¹

181. In February and March 2026, FARDC discovered two important Zaïre weapons caches in Mabanga, comprising AK-pattern rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars (60 and 80 mm), VHF communication radios, improvised explosive devices and several thousand rounds of ammunition. Part of the materiel had been obtained through diversion from FARDC stockpiles and regional networks. Baraka Maki Amos bought some of the materiel with gold,²¹² confirming the Group of Experts' previous findings (see [S/2024/432](#), paras. 150–151; and [S/2024/969](#), paras. 88–89).

Convention pour la révolution populaire/Forces pour la révolution populaire

182. Since its official establishment on 10 January 2025, the politico-military movement CRP/FRP, led by Mr. Lubanga (see [S/2025/446](#), paras. 130–133) maintained an anti-governmental stance, continuing to advocate for regional autonomy. To align with broader regional dynamics and avoid isolation, Mr. Lubanga publicly endorsed AFC/M23 on 16 July 2025. However, at the time of reporting, no formal cooperation with AFC/M23 had been reported (see [S/2024/969](#), paras. 83, 87).²¹³

183. The CRP/FRP leadership included former warlords, political figures and community leaders from Ituri. Most were living in exile in Uganda, where some had registered as refugees. FRP was led by Lobho Gokpa Justin, a former FARDC colonel (see [S/2025/446](#), para. 130). A wave of recent defections among its leadership weakened the internal cohesion and support base of CRP/FRP (see annex 52).²¹⁴

²⁰⁸ See [S/2025/446](#), paras. 127–128.

²⁰⁹ United Nations, intelligence, armed groups, civil society, researchers.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² FARDC; Intelligence, former combatants, civil society, researchers.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Intelligence, former combatants, civil society, researchers.

184. In November 2025, the estimated strength of CRP/FRP was around 300 combatants. By the time of reporting, its strength had increased to 1,000. CRP/FRP recruited from the “G5” community (see S/2024/969, paras. 83–87), although most combatants hailed from the Hema community,²¹⁵ including former Zaïre combatants (see para. 180). CRP/FRP also recruited in internally displaced persons camps in Ituri and refugee camps in Uganda. From January 2026, sanctioned individual Innocent Kaina (Cdi.004) collaborated with CRP/FRP and recruited from refugee camps in Uganda, including former M23 combatants.²¹⁶

185. CRP/FRP has thus far failed to mobilize strong support from other armed groups and communities in Ituri (see S/2025/446, paras. 130–133). The FRP chief of staff attempted to recruit Lendu youth, with minimal success.²¹⁷

Bases and arsenal

186. Until late October 2025, CRP/FRP remained largely confined to the shores of Lake Albert, near Nyamamba. Subsequently, it established three main camps across Djugu territory, with its current headquarters in Bule, Mr. Lubanga’s home town.²¹⁸

187. CRP/FRP utilized regional trafficking networks between the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan and Uganda to procure weapons and ammunition (see S/2024/432, paras. 150–151). CRP/FRP also confiscated or diverted from FARDC stockpiles (see S/2023/431, paras. 104–112).²¹⁹

188. Consistent testimonies revealed transfers of war materiel from elements of UPDF to CRP. Early December 2025, UPDF elements delivered materiel to CRP in Kasenyi, Chomia, Bule, Jaiba and Fataki, coinciding with renewed combat between CRP and FARDC.²²⁰

Operations

189. Since August 2025, CRP/FRP frequently attacked FARDC along Lake Albert, seeking to control strategic areas in Djugu territory. FARDC responded with heavy weaponry and air strikes. Fighting resulted in casualties, including civilians. Since December 2025, fighting between CRP/FRP and FARDC in and around Bule resulted in massive displacement and attacks on civilians, worsening the security situation.²²¹

190. CRP/FRP established a voluntary as well as a coercive system of taxation to mobilize resources for its war efforts (see annex 53).

B. Uganda People’s Defense Forces deployment in Djugu and Mahagi

191. UPDF continued to reinforce in Mahagi and Djugu territories and deployed materiel, often without coordination or approval of Congolese authorities. To date, between 8,500 and 10,000 UPDF elements were deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,²²² exceeding the 4,000 (2,500 in Beni Territory and 1,500 in Ituri) agreed bilaterally (see S/2025/446, paras. 134–140). In early March 2026, provincial authorities issued a ban on UPDF troop and materiel movements into Ituri without prior notification and inspection (see annex 54).

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Intelligence, FARDC, Zaïre combatants, civil society.

²¹⁷ Former CRP combatants, intelligence sources, civil society, researchers.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Ibid.

192. UPDF did not participate in FARDC operations targeting CRP/FRP, reinforcing accusations of bias and questioning the intention and relevance of UPDF deployment in Djugu and Mahagi (see [S/2025/446](#), paras. 134–140). CRP/FRP combatants often sought refuge in UPDF camps, leading to clashes between UPDF and FARDC. UPDF airlifted wounded CRP combatants to Kampala for medical treatment at Lubaga Hospital in Kampala.²²³

VI. Exploitation of natural resources

A. Ituri

Measures to curb armed group control over gold mining

193. FARDC re-established State authority over gold-producing areas of Mabanga, Nizi and Iga Barrière through operations launched in mid-August 2025 (*ibid.*, para. 164).²²⁴ On 29 August 2025, the Governor of Ituri suspended semi-mechanized mining in areas of Irumu and Djugu territories to disrupt the revenue streams of Zaïre and CRP/FRP (see annex 55).

194. Gold mining operators denounced the uneven application of the measure. Notably, activities in areas historically associated with Zaïre were halted, while sites under CODECO-URDPC influence – such as Lodjo, Mongbwalu and Kobu – continued operations.²²⁵ Mining operators and civil society actors claimed that this disparity reflected an emerging dynamic of collaboration between CODECO-URDPC and provincial authorities following the emergence of their common adversary, CRP/FRP.

195. Following the October 2025 visit to Bunia of the Minister for Mines, provincial authorities initiated a case-by-case resumption of semi-mechanized operations, conditioned upon the payment of outstanding taxes and written commitments to cease payments to armed groups (see annex 56). By March 2026, four cooperatives had been authorized to restart operations in the Mabanga-Nizi area.²²⁶

Continued armed interference in Djugu's gold sector

196. Armed group interference and taxation in Djugu's mining sector continued despite recent FARDC successes in regaining control (see para. 193).

197. CODECO-URDPC continued to extort thousands of dollars monthly from semi-mechanized mining operators.²²⁷ They taxed miners and established protection rackets, offering private security for mining pits and interfering in commercial disputes between miners. Such practices were observed at Mongbwalu's principal gold mining sites (Camp Blanquette, Makala and Senzere) as well as sites in Kobu, Bambu and Licei (see annex 57) (see [S/2025/446](#), paras. 160–163).

198. Around Mabanga, artisanal miners continued to pay financial contributions to Zaïre (*ibid.*, paras. 164–165), and subsequently to CRP/FRP (see para. 180).²²⁸ Economic actors, including in the semi-mechanized mining sector, continued to make voluntary and forced contributions to the CRP/FRP (see para. 190).²²⁹

²²³ Military, intelligence, CRP sources, civil society.

²²⁴ Provincial authorities, United Nations sources, civil society, researchers.

²²⁵ United Nations, civil society, mining sector actors.

²²⁶ UMOJA, COMISARA, COMICO and Kerove. Source: provincial mining services.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

²²⁹ Armed group members, military intelligence, civil society.

Unprecedented surge in semi-mechanized gold production in Djugu territory

199. Despite commitments by semi-mechanized mining operators to regularize their activities and pay taxes to the Government, most production remained undeclared and smuggled abroad.

200. Two key semi-mechanized alluvial mining hubs operated in Djugu territory during the reporting period. A combination of empirical data and geospatial analysis enabled a conservative, evidence-based estimation of alluvial gold production for these operations, as detailed below.

201. The first hub was located along the Shari River, between Mabanga and Nizi.²³⁰ Minimum production estimates from March 2024 to March 2026 ranged between three and eight tons of gold, valued at approximately \$300 million to \$800 million at average 2025 market prices. Satellite imagery indicated around 50 per cent increase in mining activity in 2025, implying that most of this production took place that year (see annex 58).

202. The second alluvial mining hub was located approximately 25 km north-west of Mongwalu, along tributaries of the Ituri river near Yedi. Since early 2025, an area of approximately 12.5 km² has been visibly disturbed by alluvial mining. Even under highly conservative assumptions, cumulative production since the beginning of 2025 is estimated to have exceeded two tons of gold (see annex 59).

203. In addition, an increase in semi-mechanized mining activity was observed along the Ituri river and in the Banyali-Kilo collectivity. The number of active semi-mechanized mining camps in Djugu territory in 2025 doubled since the year prior, from 55 to 104. A relative improvement in the security situation in Banyali-Kilo led to eight operations starting production over the course of the reporting period (see annex 60).

204. Nevertheless, officially declared gold exports from Ituri in 2025 amounted to only 559 kg.²³¹ Of this total, 226 kg were attributed to semi-mechanized operations in Mambasa, while 292 kg were exported by DRC Gold Trading, which denied sourcing any gold from Djugu-based cooperatives.²³²

205. The surge in semi-mechanized mining correlated with a 14-ton increase in Ugandan gold exports in 2025. Based on higher yet still well-substantiated production estimates for Ituri, an increase in the range of 10 to 20 tons may reasonably be expected. Given extensively documented patterns of structural gold smuggling from Ituri to Uganda (see [S/2025/446](#), paras. 166–168), this correlation warrants close examination. For an analysis of the reported origins of Ugandan gold exports, see paragraph 212.

Cyanide-based leaching of gold

206. In Ituri, cyanide-based leaching of tailings from artisanal gold mining became a rapidly expanding sector since late 2022.²³³ Artisanal mining, often using mercury-based amalgamation, typically recovered only 30 to 50 per cent of total gold content, leaving tailings with significant residual gold that can be extracted through leaching. Cyanide use poses serious environmental and health risks and is conducted in violation of Congolese law (see annex 61).

²³⁰ The hub was within the area affected by the Governor-issued mining ban (see para. 193).

²³¹ Provincial mining statistics on file with the Secretariat.

²³² DRC Gold Trading representatives.

²³³ Civil society, mining services, mining sector actors, satellite imagery.

207. In Djugu territory, the two largest cyanide-based processing facilities were located south of Iga Barrière.²³⁴ Together, these hosted 388 leaching tanks with a diameter ranging between four and seven metres (see annex 62). The Group of Experts estimates that the two facilities produced between one and two tons of gold from mid-2023 to January 2026. Current output is assessed at approximately 30 to 70 kg of gold per month. These operations therefore represent a significant ongoing source of gold production. Detailed information on the methodology, its validation and limitations is provided in annex 63.

208. The main operator behind these leaching operations was the Société coopérative des exploitants de déchets d'exploitation artisanale (SOCOOMEDEA). Accredited by ministerial decree, it could only conduct artisanal exploitation activities. Cyanide leaching in artisanal mining is prohibited by law. Other operators engaging in illegal cyanide leaching included members of the Umoja cooperative (see [S/2025/446](#), para. 164).²³⁵

209. Cyanide-leaching operations were rapidly expanding throughout Djugu territory. In Mabanga, approximately 100 tanks were recently constructed with a combined maximum production capacity of around 20 to 50 kg per month (see annex 64). Similar, more rudimentary installations were observed around Kilo, Mongbwalu and Pluto (see annex 65).

210. Several facilities operated in, or procured tailings from, areas controlled by CODECO-URDPC, Zaïre and CRP/FRP, exposing operators to extortion and generating revenue for these groups. CODECO-URDPC commander Samuel “Kadogo” owned four cyanide-leaching tanks at the Liberia site in the Banyali-Kilo collectivity.²³⁶ Following the ousting of Zaïre from Mabanga, Iga barrière and Nizi areas in August 2025, their control over these operations diminished.²³⁷

211. Gold produced through cyanide-based leaching was overwhelmingly smuggled abroad. Production capacity from cyanide leaching was not reflected in official provincial production and export statistics.²³⁸

Increase in Ugandan gold exports

212. Uganda recorded gold exports of approximately 62 tons in 2025, valued at \$6.4 billion, marking the third consecutive year of record exports. This represented an approximate increase of 30 per cent in volume compared with 2024. Analysis of declared trade data revealed significant inconsistencies in declared countries of origin and in implied domestic production (see annex 66). Considering the contemporaneous increase in semi-mechanized gold production in Djugu territory (see paras. 199–205) and the documented patterns of structural smuggling of Congolese gold to Uganda (see [S/2025/446](#), paras. 166–168), the Group of Experts assesses that the surge in gold exports was largely attributable to gold originating from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

B. North Kivu

Rubaya

213. To verify allegations of increased mining activity around Rubaya controlled by AFC/M23 since 30 April 2024 (see [S/2024/969](#), para. 56), the Group of Experts

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Provincial mining services.

²³⁷ Civil society actors, mining services.

²³⁸ Provincial mining statistics, mining services, civil society. See annex 66.

generated a three-dimensional model of the main mining sites using high resolution satellite imagery from March 2026 (see annex 67). Comparison with activity observed one year earlier indicated a substantial increase in mining activity. Production levels are assessed to exceed 2024 estimates of approximately 120 tons monthly (see [S/2024/969](#), para. 64).

214. AFC/M23 continued to tax all actors involved in the production and supply chains. The most significant revenue was generated through a per-kilogram tax imposed at the point of commercialization,²³⁹ notably \$4 for coltan and \$2 for cassiterite. The tight control by AFC/M23 over extraction and transport enabled it to capture taxes on most of the production (see annex 68).

215. Minerals from Rubaya and other mining sites in Masisi continued to be smuggled to Rwanda at scale (see [S/2024/969](#), paras. 61–65; and [S/2025/446](#), paras. 109–121). Commissioners and exporters based in Kigali bought minerals directly from local traders and arranged for transport. Key local traders included Bazimazika Kabano Bazinga, who was also the AFC/M23-appointed coordinator for artisanal mining in Rubaya.²⁴⁰

216. Transport of minerals from Rubaya to Kigali operated through a tightly controlled system, using only transporters approved by AFC/M23, which incentivized transporters to comply with established procedures. Shipments from Masisi and Kalehe territories were inspected at a checkpoint in Mubambiro, near Goma, to prevent smuggling. Patrice Biraira oversaw coordination of these transport services.²⁴¹

217. AFC/M23 issued per-kilogram tax invoices in Rubaya and Mubambiro, which were paid after delivery in Rwanda. Once shipments were delivered in Rwanda, the transporter settled AFC/M23 tax payments by depositing the amounts in an Equity Bank account held by Patient Haba, the AFC/M23 provincial financial coordinator (see annex 69; and [S/2025/446](#), annex 16).

218. Since 2025, several newly established, Kigali-based exporting companies were involved in purchasing significant amounts of coltan from Rubaya. Rani Mining Ltd., through its main agent Gilbert Kabano, purchased several shipments until March 2026.²⁴² Company customs records indicated export volume exceeding 84 tons.²⁴³ Another recently established company, 3U Mining Supporters Ltd, also purchased coltan from Rubaya during the same period.²⁴⁴

219. Verified audio recordings and documentary evidence confirmed that Philbert Trading Minerals Ltd. purchased coltan from Rubaya until at least November 2025,²⁴⁵ when the International Tin Supply Chain Initiative suspended the company from its scheme.²⁴⁶ The sole owner, Viateur Sibomana, had already been suspected of deficient due diligence practices in 2011.²⁴⁷

220. Kanzamin Limited, another Kigali-based exporter, purchased and shipped tin, tantalum and tungsten from Masisi during the reporting period.²⁴⁸ Kanzamin Limited

²³⁹ Researchers, civil society, traders.

²⁴⁰ Traders, civil society.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Invoices and assaying results linked to shipments from Rubaya, audio recordings and testimonies on file with the Secretariat.

²⁴³ Customs records on file with the Secretariat.

²⁴⁴ Confidential documents and audio recordings on file with the Secretariat.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ International Tin Supply Chain Initiative.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Traders, civil society sources.

was at least partly owned by Dany Nzaramba,²⁴⁹ who was involved in the smuggling of tin, tantalum and tungsten from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2012 (see [S/2012/843](#), para. 175).²⁵⁰ Customs records indicated that Kanzamin Limited exported at least 70 tons of coltan throughout 2025.²⁵¹

221. These findings show that Rubaya's mine output increased during the reporting period, and that supply chains tightly controlled by AFC/M23 were integrated into the Rwandan tin, tantalum and tungsten market.

Rwanda's 2025 export growth indicative of illicit flows of tin, tantalum and tungsten

222. Production of tin, tantalum and tungsten in the main areas of North and South Kivu under AFC/M23 control continued, with significant volumes diverted to Rwanda (see paras. 215–220; and [S/2025/446](#), paras. 109–121).²⁵²

223. Increased Rwandan cassiterite and coltan exports were temporally and quantitatively consistent with increased smuggling from AFC/M23-controlled areas into Rwanda. Rwanda's cassiterite exports increased by 58 per cent in 2025, from 4,859 to 7,700 tons.²⁵³ This increase slightly exceeded South Kivu's officially recorded cassiterite production for 2024.²⁵⁴ Additionally, it coincided with the cessation of official State exports from Bukavu in February 2025, following the AFC/M23 takeover. Rwanda's coltan exports followed a similar, although less pronounced, upward trend (see annex 70).

224. Rwanda's largest cassiterite miner and the country's only tin refinery, which mainly sourced from seventeen mining sites, together accounted for around 60 per cent of cassiterite exports in 2024. Neither entity reported any significant increase in their export volumes in 2025.²⁵⁵ This implied that, to account for the observed surge in cassiterite exports solely through domestic production, output from the remaining, smaller Rwandan cassiterite producers would have had to triple. No material developments explaining such increase were reported in Rwanda's cassiterite sector.

225. On 2 April 2026, the Group of Experts submitted a request to the Government of Rwanda seeking clarification regarding the reported origins of increased cassiterite and coltan exports and is awaiting a response.

VII. Right to reply

226. In its 2025 final report, the Group of Experts reported that "Edmond Kasereka held shares in the microfinance bank T.I.D" (see [S/2025/446](#), para. 167). T.I.D and Mr. Kasereka sought an opportunity to respond. The Group is examining the matter and will address it in a subsequent report.

²⁴⁹ Researchers, industry sources.

²⁵⁰ Confidential company documents on file with the Secretariat.

²⁵¹ Customs records on file with the Secretariat.

²⁵² Civil society, mining sector actors, researchers.

²⁵³ See https://www.bnr.rw/documents/Monthly_Exports_1tRIAvE.xlsx.

²⁵⁴ Statistics of the provincial mining authorities on file with the Secretariat.

²⁵⁵ Communications on file with the Secretariat.

VIII. Recommendations

227. The Group of Experts makes the following recommendations:

To the Security Council:

(a) When renewing the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to Council resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#), consider including provisions that:

- (i) Request Member States to notify the Committee in advance of the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel to the Government of Rwanda, pending full compliance with the provisions of Council resolution [2773 \(2025\)](#) (see paras. 68, 71–78, 80, 83, 85, 95–101);
- (ii) Encourage Member States to apply enhanced due diligence, including end-user verification and post-shipment monitoring, in the transfer of advanced military and dual-use technologies to belligerent parties that violate the arms embargo, and to inform the Committee, as appropriate, of measures taken in this regard (see paras. 76, 153–160, 166–170);
- (iii) Call upon RDF and FARDC to cease all cooperation with and support to non-State armed groups, in particular the sanctioned M23 (CDe.006) and FDLR (CDe.005), respectively, in line with resolution [2773 \(2025\)](#) (see paras. 7, 39, 44, 48, 95–100, 131);

To the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#):

- (b) Remind Member States to ensure that non-State or auxiliary actors performing delegated military or law enforcement functions comply with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law (see paras. 7–8, 48, 83, 102, 114, 139–140, 143–144, 161–162);
- (c) Request clarification from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda on the measures taken to enhance transparency and traceability in the gold trade, including efforts to address inconsistencies between declared exports, imports and domestic production capacity, declared origin and supply chain actors, in line with paragraph 16 of resolution [2773 \(2025\)](#) (see paras. 199, 211–212, 223);
- (d) Request the secretariat of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to report on the implementation and effectiveness of the Regional Certification Mechanism and associated tools (see paras. 199, 211–212, 223).

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Annex 1 (para. 5)**Investigative methodology, particularly in contexts of insecurity and access denial****Méthodologie d'enquête, particulièrement dans des contextes d'insécurité et de refus d'accès**

The Group has operated in complex and often volatile environments, covering extensive areas of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in the course of its investigations. Access to remote or sensitive locations has frequently been constrained by logistical challenges, insecurity, or restrictions imposed by armed groups or official authorities. While such constraints have posed operational challenges, they have not prevented the Group from fulfilling its mandate since its establishment in 2004.

The absence of physical access to areas under the control of AFC/M23 constrained the Group's ability to verify certain specific incidents using standard investigative methods, including the examination of material evidence and on-site observations. Nevertheless, the Group was able to pursue its investigations by applying established methodologies tailored to non-permissive environments.

To mitigate such constraints, the Group has been applying established methodological practices consistent with United Nations sanctions monitoring and reporting in contexts where direct field access is restricted due to insecurity or denial of access by armed groups. In particular, the Group adopted a triangulation-based methodology²⁵⁶ relying on a combination of the following sources and techniques:

- Authenticated documents, photographs, and audio/video recordings.
- In-person interviews with individuals displaced from Goma or other relevant locations after having witnessed the events under investigation.
- Interviews with captured/detained or defected AFC/M23 and RDF elements.
- Remote interviews with victims, witnesses, members of armed groups, including AFC/M23, members of state armed forces, including RDF, trusted key informants, using secure communication platforms and only after rigorous identity verifications when the source was not previously met in person.
- Privileged reliance on primary witnesses and those directly involved or implicated participants in alleged circumstances.
- Triangulation of information across multiple, independent, and credible sources to corroborate facts and assess the reliability of testimony.
- Reliance on trusted and rigorously vetted intermediaries who have worked with the Group in the past.
- Cross-verification of testimonies from multiple independent sources.
- Analysis of satellite imagery, open-source information, and verified multimedia content.
- Use of imagery and third-party verified visual evidence to confirm the presence of military activity, destruction of infrastructure, or civilian impact.

²⁵⁶ [S/2006/997](#), pages 17-32.

- Confidential inputs from protection actors, researchers, and UN entities operating in adjacent or accessible areas.
- Documentation by UN agencies, NGOs, and other verified humanitarian or protection actors, including incident reports.
- Remote data collection, open-source intelligence, and secondary sources.
- Photographs of injuries suffered by victims of atrocities.
- Authentication of origin for all documentary evidence used.
- Credible media and civil society reporting.
- Studies or contemporaneous reports obtained from UN and other credible sources.
- Statements by the alleged sanctions violators.
- Statements published through official government channels or verified social media accounts.
- Verification of circumstantial evidence based on previously documented patterns.
- Analysis of systemic issues based on previously observed behaviors and documented practices.
- Systematic search for extenuating or exculpatory information.
- Conversations conducted in the presence of at least two experts taking notes and verifying relevant documents, photographs, or videos that confirm or contradict key allegations, independently of each other.

Given these limitations on direct documentation in certain geographical areas, the Group prioritized the verification of incidents for which corroboration could be obtained through multiple, independent, and credible sources. Consequently, the Group's findings in this context focused on substantiated patterns and trends of violations, exemplified through verified individual cases. While maintaining a high evidentiary threshold for the confirmation of specific incidents, the Group's inability to access key locations likely resulted in the underreporting of the full extent and severity of violations committed during the reporting period.

The methodology applied is consistent with international standards for documentation of grave violations in armed conflict settings, including guidance from OHCHR,²⁵⁷ the UN Office of Legal Affairs, and relevant jurisprudence from international accountability mechanisms.

²⁵⁷ OHCHR – Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Guidance and Practice, 2015;

Annex 2 (para. 7)

Overview of UN-verified Human Rights Violations and Abuses in DRC in 2025 and 2026

Aperçu des violations des droits de l'homme et des exactions constatées par l'ONU en RDC en 2025 et 2026

1. Main Types of Human Rights Violations and Abuses from January to December 2025

From 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025, the UN verified a total of 6,185 violations and abuses across the DRC. The main types of violations and abuses are depicted below:




Chart prepared using data provided by UN source.

2. Main Types of Human Rights Violations and Abuses from January through March 2026

From 1 January 2026 to 31 March 2026, the UN verified a total of 1,462 violations and abuses across the DRC. The main types of violations and abuses are depicted below:




Chart prepared using data provided by UN source.

Interpretive Note:

- extrajudicial or summary execution is a violation/abuse of the right to life;
- torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are a violation/abuse of the right to physical integrity;
- abduction is counted separately from other violations/abuses;

- sexual violence is counted separately from other violations/abuses;
- since one incident can involve multiple violations/abuses, the number of violations/abuses is not necessarily equal to the number of incidents.

3. Main Perpetrators of Violations and Abuses from January to December 2025

Of the 6,185 violations and abuses that were verified by the UN, non-state armed groups were responsible for 71 per cent, while state actors accounted for 28 per cent. The top 6 perpetrators are indicated below.




Chart prepared using data provided by UN source.

4. Main Perpetrators of Violations and Abuses from January through March 2026

Of the 1,462 violations and abuses that were verified by the UN, non-state armed groups were responsible for 68 per cent, while State actors accounted for 31 per cent. The top 6 perpetrators are indicated below:




Chart prepared using data provided by UN source.

5. Hate Speech

Article 20, paragraph 2 of the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights \(ICCPR\)](#) states that “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” Since limitations on freedom of expression should remain an exception, in 2011 and 2012 the UN Office of the High Commissioner for the Human Rights convened a series of expert workshops to assist States to define the high threshold that must be met to restrict freedom of expression.²⁵⁸ The resulting Rabat Plan of Action contains six criteria establishing a clear line between freedom of expression and incitement to hatred. The Rabat criteria are: (1) the social and political context; (2) status of the speaker; (3) intent to incite the audience against a target group; (4) content and form of the speech; (5) extent of its dissemination; and (6) likelihood of harm, including imminence.²⁵⁹

The Group previously alerted to the danger of hate speech targeting individuals perceived to be affiliated with AFC/M23 or Rwanda ([S/2025/446](#), para. 78). In 2025, the UN documented at least 13 allegations of hate speech directly targeting Rwandophone populations and members of the Banyamulenge community, six of which met the Rabat criteria for incitement to hatred.²⁶⁰

On 27 December 2025, FARDC spokesperson General Sylvain Ekenge made disparaging remarks about Tutsi women on RTNC (the DRC's national television broadcaster), which spread widely on social media.²⁶¹ The DRC government subsequently disavowed the remarks and suspended Ekenge from his functions.²⁶² On 29 December, the RTNC's General Directorate announced the preventive suspension of its interim Director of Television Information, Oscar Mbal Kahji, for allowing such statements to be broadcast.²⁶³

²⁵⁸ [UN Rabat Plan of Action](#).

²⁵⁹ [Rabat criteria](#).

²⁶⁰ UN source.

²⁶¹ [Video](#) on file with the Secretariat.

²⁶² Patrick Muyaya, [X post](#), 29 December 2025. Le Potentiel.cd, [FARDC : le général-major Sylvain Ekenge suspendu pour des propos jugés discriminatoires](#), 29 December 2025.

²⁶³ RNTC.CD, [X post](#), 29 December 2025.

Annex 3 (para. 9)


Security Incidents Affecting Humanitarian Workers

Incidents de sécurité touchant les travailleurs humanitaires²⁶⁴

Overview

Under international humanitarian law (IHL), humanitarian relief personnel and objects used for humanitarian relief operations must be respected and protected in armed conflict situations.²⁶⁵ In 2025 and early 2026, the operating environment for humanitarian workers in the eastern provinces of DRC became increasingly complex due to the escalation of the conflict.²⁶⁶ In 2025, OCHA DRC recorded a total of 626 security incidents affecting humanitarian workers, including thirteen deaths.²⁶⁷ This represented a 46 percent increase from 2024 when OCHA recorded a total of 428 security incidents, including nine deaths.²⁶⁸ In January and February 2026, OCHA recorded a total of 83 incidents, including one death.²⁶⁹ The geographic distribution of security incidents in 2025 and January and February 2026 is described below: the majority of recorded incidents occurred in North Kivu and South Kivu.

Figure 1: Geographic Breakdown of Security Incidents Affecting Humanitarian Workers for 2025



Source: The information in the chart was extracted from the OCHA Overview of incidents against humanitarian workers (Jan - Dec 2025).

²⁶⁴ OCHA groups security incidents into different categories: (a) burglaries, robberies, forced entries/intrusion in humanitarian compounds; (b) intimidation, threats, physical aggression, (c) interference or restriction of movement; and (d) other, including kidnappings and killings.


²⁶⁵ <https://casebook.icrc.org/highlight/humanitarian-action-and-ihl>

²⁶⁶ <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/ingo-forum-drc-strongly-condemns-strike-killed-unicef-aid-worker-gomamarch-2026>

²⁶⁷ <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-eastern-region-overview-incidents-against-humanitarian-workers-jan-dec-2025>

²⁶⁸ <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-overview-incidents-affecting-humanitarian-workers-1st-january-2020-31-december-2024>

²⁶⁹ <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-eastern-region-overview-incidents-against-humanitarian-workers-february-2026>

Figure 2: Geographic Breakdown of Security Incidents Affecting Humanitarian Workers for January and February 2026

Source: The information in the chart was extracted from the OCHA Overview of incidents against humanitarian workers (February 2026).

Drone strikes affecting humanitarian workers in Masisi and Goma

In late 2025 and early 2026, the armed conflict was marked by a rise in aerial warfare, in particular the use of drones. On 2 January 2026, a drone strike hit the office of the INGO War Child in Masisi, killing seven people and injuring 42 and others, mainly women and children (para. 163).²⁷⁰ On 11 March 2026, a drone strike hit a private residence in Goma, killing a female UNICEF staff (paras. 171-172).²⁷¹ The Group is continuing to investigate these incidents.

The Group notes that the use of drones by parties to the conflict must comply with the IHL principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution.²⁷²

- **Distinction:** parties must do everything feasible to verify that the targets to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects²⁷³ and are not subject to special protection (e.g. humanitarian relief personnel and objects used for humanitarian relief operations);²⁷⁴
- **Proportionality:** parties must ensure that the harm to civilians and civilian objects is not disproportionate to the military advantage the parties seek to achieve from the means and methods of warfare used;²⁷⁵ and
- **Precaution:** parties must take all feasible precautions with a view to avoiding and in any event minimizing harm to civilians and civilian objects.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁰ <https://www.warchild.org.uk/news/war-child-strongly-condemns-attack-its-office-masisi-eastern-drc>.

<https://www.sosmediasburundi.org/en/2026/01/04/north-kivu-at-least-7-civilians-killed-and-more-than-40-wounded-in-a-drone-strike-in-masisi-centre/>.

²⁷¹ <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/statement-unicef-killing-staff-member-democratic-republic-congo>

²⁷² <https://www.icrc.org/en/article/faq-international-humanitarian-law-drones-armed-conflict>

²⁷³ <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule7>

²⁷⁴ <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule31>; <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule32>

²⁷⁵ <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule14>

²⁷⁶ <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule15>

The Group further notes that pursuant to Resolution 2293 (2016), paragraph 7(e), sanctions can be imposed on individuals or entities for planning, directing, or committing acts that constitute human rights violations or abuses or violations of IHL.

Ambush of humanitarian convoy in Ituri Province

The Group documented that prior to the November 2025 death of Zaïre leader Baraka Maki Amos (para.180), he was involved in a July 2025 attack on humanitarian workers in Ituri. The humanitarians were travelling in a vehicle from Beni to Bunia to distribute humanitarian assistance when they were attacked in Mabanga, an area under the control of Baraka. All the humanitarian workers were killed, their vehicle destroyed, and USD 1.2 million stolen. Sources with knowledge of the matter informed the Group that the stolen money was shared among armed actors including Zaïre and CRP commanders. Sanctioned individual Thomas Lubanga (CDi.007), leader of the CRP, received USD 300,000. Following Baraka's death, his family decided to reimburse USD 900,000 to the humanitarian organisation.²⁷⁷

The Group notes that pursuant to Resolution 2293 (2016), paragraph 7(f), sanctions can be imposed on individuals or entities for obstructing the access to or the distribution of humanitarian assistance.

²⁷⁷ Intelligence, civil society, researchers, and armed groups sources.

Annex 4 (para. 11)**Conflict Related Sexual Violence in DRC****Violences sexuelles liées au conflit en RDC***Background*

1. Resolution [2293 \(2016\)](#), paragraph 7(e) provides that sanctions can be imposed on individuals or entities engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the DRC, including rape or other sexual violence. A related provision is paragraph 7(f), which provides that sanctions can be imposed for obstructing the access to or the distribution of humanitarian assistance.
2. Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) is a sub-set of sexual violence. The UN defines CRSV as rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage, and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls and boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict, e.g., through the profile of the perpetrator or the profile of the victim. It includes trafficking in persons for the purpose of sexual violence and/or exploitation, when committed in situations of armed conflict.²⁷⁸ CRSV occurs in many conflict settings.²⁷⁹
3. CRSV is a violation of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and Congolese domestic law.²⁸⁰
4. A common misconception is that there are many false claims of rape and other sexual violence. Research has shown that false claims are rare.²⁸¹ For diverse reasons – shame and stigma, fear of retaliation and lack of protection, fear of abandonment by one’s family or community, lack of trust in the legal system – victims may not wish to report incidents to state authorities for accountability purposes.²⁸² They may however report incidents to care providers to obtain medical and related assistance.
5. Care providers typically do not require perpetrator data, but they may document if the perpetrator was armed.²⁸³ This underscores the importance of data gathered by care providers when assessing the scale of sexual violence in a geographic area. It is acknowledged that in conflict settings, some individuals may make false claims to receive humanitarian assistance and therefore data gathered by care providers also has its limitations.²⁸⁴ Nonetheless, it is generally agreed by experts who are working in the field that the main challenge in DRC is not false reporting.²⁸⁵ It is underreporting.²⁸⁶

²⁷⁸ UN Secretary General Report on CRSV, July 2025, para. 3.

²⁷⁹ UN Secretary General Report on CRSV, paras. 19 – 71.

²⁸⁰ [International humanitarian law and policy on sexual violence](#). United Kingdom All-Party Parliamentary on International Law, Justice and Accountability and the International Bar Association Human Rights Institute, [Ad-Hoc Parliamentary Inquiry into the Responses to CRSV in the DRC](#), June 2025, pp. 39-42.

²⁸¹ Lisak, D., Gardinier, L., Nicksa, S. C., & Cote, A. M. (2010). [False allegations of sexual assault: An analysis of ten years of reported cases](#). *Violence Against Women*. *Violence against Women*, 16(12), 1318–1334. Government of Canada, [Sexual Misconduct Myths and Facts](#).

²⁸² UN Secretary General Report on CRSV, para. 25. [Ad-Hoc Parliamentary Inquiry into the Responses to CRSV in the DRC](#), pp. 16, 19, 37.

²⁸³ Confidential sources.

²⁸⁴ Paltermo T., Peterman A. (2011) [Undercounting, Overcounting and Flawed Estimates in Conflict](#), *Bulletin of World Health Organization*. 89(12), 924–925.

²⁸⁵ Confidential sources.

²⁸⁶ [DRC: Silence, a slow killer](#), August 2025.

2025 Marked by a Rising Level of CRSV in DRC

Documentation by Humanitarian actors

6. One humanitarian actor reported that between January and June 2025, nearly 28,000 victims of sexual violence sought care at facilities they supported in eastern DRC, noting that 75 percent of these attacks were committed by armed individuals.²⁸⁷ A second humanitarian actor recorded 90,000 cases of sexual violence nationwide between January and September 2025.²⁸⁸ The same actor noted that cases of CRSV under their response had increased by more than 35 percent compared to 2024, with some health zones reporting increases of up to 50 percent.²⁸⁹ During the same period, a third humanitarian actor logged 35,000 cases of sexual violence against children nationwide and observed that in the eastern provinces, CRSV had risen steadily since 2022.²⁹⁰ Taken together, these reports from multiple humanitarian actors indicate that sexual violence remained pervasive in DRC and in 2025, CRSV in eastern DRC intensified compared to previous years.

Investigations by the Group of Experts on DRC

1. The Group has verified a sharp escalation of cases of CRSV in South Kivu in areas under the control of the DRC Government and affiliated Wazalendo armed groups (S/2025/858, para. 82, annex 38). The Group also received information about but was not able to investigate new cases of CRSV in Ituri and North Kivu, in particular sexual slavery and forced pregnancy by ADF-ISCAP elements leading to the birth of children (S/2023/990, para. 21, annex 12).²⁹¹
2. The ongoing challenges experienced by the Group to investigate CRSV are outlined in previous reports (S/2024/432, para. 91, annex 60; S/2025/446, para. 150; annex 66; S/2025/858, paras. 2, 3).

UN Verified Information

3. Between January and December 2025, the UN in DRC verified at least 887 cases of CRSV affecting a total of 1,534 victims in conflict-affected provinces in eastern DRC. This represented an increase of 59 per cent in comparison to 2024 when 364 cases were verified. Among the victims were 854 women, 672 girls, four men, and four boys. North Kivu was the most affected province with 676 victims, followed by South Kivu with 537 victims and Ituri with 300 victims. The UN identified that DRC armed groups were responsible for cases affecting 75 per cent of CRSV victims. M23 ranked first followed by CODECO, Wazalendo and Mai-Mai factions. State agents were responsible for cases affecting 19 per cent of CRSV victims. FARDC soldiers ranked first followed by the PNC. Foreign armed forces – the UPDF and the FNDB – as well as foreign armed groups – RED-Tabara – were also responsible for CRSV cases.²⁹²
4. In January 2026, the UN in DRC verified at least 46 cases of CRSV affecting 61 victims in conflict-affected provinces in eastern DRC. This figure represented a 59 per cent decrease compared to December 2025. Among the victims were 39 women, 21 girls and one man. North Kivu was the most affected province with 33 victims (22 women and 11 girls), followed by South Kivu with 22 victims (13 women and nine girls) and Ituri with six victims (four women, one girl and one man). Individual rape (20 incidents) and gang rape (12 incidents) were the most

²⁸⁷ Statement to UN Security Council. 12 December 2025.

²⁸⁸ Advocacy Note: Securing Life-Saving Sexual and Reproductive Health (SRH) Services for Women and Girls in the DRC.13 March 2026.

²⁸⁹ Statement on the Situation for Women and Girls in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 21 October 2025.

²⁹⁰ The Hidden Scars of Conflict and Silence, 30 December 2025. See also UN Secretary General Report on CRSV, para. 15.

²⁹¹ Confidential sources.

²⁹² UN source. Information on file with the Secretariat.

frequent types of sexual violence. Armed groups continued to bear the main responsibility for CRSV and were responsible for cases affecting 52 per cent of victims. M23 committed most cases with 21 victims (13 women and eight girls), followed by the Nyatura with four victims (two women and two girls), the Raïa Mutomboki with three victims (two women and one girl), and the ADF with two victims, (both women). State agents were responsible for 46 percent of the cases. FARDC soldiers ranked first followed by the PNC and one official from Ministry of Mines and Energy.²⁹³

²⁹³ UN source. Information on file with the Secretariat.

Annex 5 (para. 11)

Obstruction by AFC/M23 of Access to and Distribution of Humanitarian Assistance to Victims of Sexual Violence in North Kivu**Entraves mises en place par l'AFC/M23 à l'accès et à la distribution de l'aide humanitaire aux victimes de violences sexuelles dans le Nord-Kivu***Obstruction of access to and distribution of humanitarian assistance to victims of sexual violence in North Kivu*

1. During the reporting period, the Group received information regarding the attempt by AFC/M23 to exert increased control over humanitarian actors operating in North Kivu (S/2025/858, annex 39), including in relation to the collection, management, and publication of data on sexual violence, with the risk of reducing access to and distribution of humanitarian assistance to victims of sexual violence in North Kivu.
2. Sources indicated that the AFC/M23 reacted negatively to the publication in 2025 by humanitarian actors of data on the level of sexual violence in eastern DRC, viewing the publication of such data as damaging to their reputation and not reflective of their commitment to address CRSV by prevention and punishment measures.²⁹⁴
3. The Group reviewed a document dated 11 February 2026 that the AFC/M23 distributed to multiple humanitarian actors involved in the provision of health care, including governmental and non-governmental organisations and international organisations. Entitled "Note Explicative," the document described institutional failures within the management of the AFC/M23-run North Kivu Provincial Health Department (Direction Provinciale de la Santé or DPS). It detailed alleged irregularities and infractions committed by civil servants within the provincial health system, singling them out by name. It also canvassed a range of broader systemic issues.²⁹⁵
4. Among other things, the note expressed concern regarding the DPS management of sensitive health data, particularly concerning sexual violence. It explicitly referenced data collected and published by two humanitarian actors, asserting that such external data should have been collected, analysed, and validated by the DPS to fulfill its role as the guarantor of reliable and transparent health information. The note recommended strengthening the role of DPS in validating and analysing sexual violence data to ensure the dignity of victims and the effectiveness of interventions.²⁹⁶
5. Following the distribution of this note, the AFC/M23-run Provincial Health Inspection Department (Inspection Provinciale de la Santé or IPS) initiated a series of inspections of the premises of humanitarian actors. IPS inspectors requested aggregate data on sexual violence incidents and access to confidential patient files containing names of victims and other personal information. They also requested access to consumption records for supplies such as PEP kits and dignity kits.²⁹⁷ While humanitarian actors had implemented measures to safeguard confidential patient data, these efforts were not entirely successful. In some instances, IPS inspectors indicated they would go into communities to cross-check information directly with victims. Some humanitarian actors were ordered to cease the distribution of dignity kits to curb the number of what they alleged to be "fake" victims seeking humanitarian assistance.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁴ Confidential sources.

²⁹⁵ Note Explicative. Document on file with the Secretariat.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ A PEP (post-exposure prophylaxis) kit is an emergency medical response given to a person who has been exposed to HIV to prevent possible HIV infection. A dignity kit consists of basic items that women and girls need to protect themselves and maintain hygiene. The contents are not standardized but generally include items like bath soap, underwear, sanitary napkins, detergent, toothbrush, toothpaste, and a flashlight. Some kits include a piece of cloth that can be used to cover oneself.

²⁹⁸ Confidential sources.

6. A joint meeting was held in late March 2026 between humanitarian actors and AFC/M23 at which the issue of sexual violence data was discussed. AFC/M23 officials present at the meeting included Colonel John Imani Nzenze, AFC/M23 Director of Intelligence and the AFC/M23 liaison with humanitarian actors, and Ms. Chantal Kayitaba Murekatete (S/2025/858, annex 39), Special Adviser on Gender, Family and Children, Education, and Social and Humanitarian Affairs. At the meeting, the AFC/M23 reprimanded humanitarian actors and accused them of inventing data. It affirmed that AFC/M23 did not tolerate sexual violence and criticised the lack of perpetrator data in patient files as this made it more difficult for it to punish perpetrators. Further meetings between the AFC/M23 and humanitarian actors were held in late March and April 2026, resulting in an agreement that only aggregate data on sexual violence would be shared in the future. The AFC/M23 expressed its intention to implement measures to increase oversight of the activities of humanitarian actors, but not to impede access to or provision of humanitarian assistance to victims.²⁹⁹
7. At the time of writing, discussions between the AFC/M23 and humanitarian actors about new modalities for engagement on sexual violence were ongoing.³⁰⁰
8. The Group notes that actions by AFC/M23 may have the effect of deterring victims of sexual violence from accessing humanitarian assistance and impede the ability of humanitarian actors to distribute assistance them. It may also reduce the number of recorded and published data on cases of sexual violence in eastern DRC in 2026.
9. Broader discussions on humanitarian assistance through the Doha peace process on the Protocol on Humanitarian Access and Judicial Protection were also ongoing (para. 52).³⁰¹

²⁹⁹ Confidential sources.

³⁰⁰ Confidential sources.

³⁰¹ [Joint Statement on Progress Between the Representatives of Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and of the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement \(AFC/M23\)](#), 19 April 2026.

Annex 6 (para. 14)**ADF/ISCAP as one of the most lethal affiliates of the Islamic State / Da'esh worldwide****ADF/ISCAP comme l'un des affiliés les plus meurtriers de l'État islamique / Daech à l'échelle mondiale.**

Da'esh ranked ADF/ISCAP as its second most violent affiliate, only surpassed by Somalia in the total claimed death toll in 2025.

On 3 January 2026, Da'esh-managed '*Amaq News Agency* published an Arabic-language infographic presenting aggregated figures for attacks, reported casualties and material losses over the preceding year. According to the infographic, a total of 1,218 operations were claimed across all affiliates, with Nigeria accounting for 368 operations, followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (221) and Somalia (176). Reported killed and wounded totalled 5,745, the majority attributed to Somalia (1,734), followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1,216), and Nigeria (1,121).³⁰²

These figures reflect Da'esh claims and were not independently verified by the Group.

³⁰² Site Intelligence Group website, consulted by the Group

Annex 7 (para. 14)

ADF camps - structure, function and locations

Camps de l'ADF – structure, fonction et localisation

1. ADF's structured deployment model (S/2024/969, paras. 9, 15-17, 23, and annex 2, and S/2025/446, para. 123) was organized around a tiered system of fixed positions, mobile units, and designated regrouping sites referred to internally as "RAV" (supply rendez-vous points) (paras. 24-29). Fixed positions served as semi-permanent strongholds used for command, logistics storage and training activities, typically established in remote forested areas. Mobile positions consisted of smaller, highly flexible combat units tasked with conducting attacks, reconnaissance and population control operations along key axes. The RAV sites functioned as temporary assembly and fallback locations, enabling dispersed elements to regroup, redistribute resources and re-establish command-and-control links following operations, or in response to military pressure.³⁰³
2. This configuration enhanced ADF's operational resilience, enabling rapid retreat and regrouping of mobile units, and hampering efforts to track and neutralize ADF command. ADF's resilience was also supported by extensive knowledge of the terrain,³⁰⁴ and by access to timely intelligence on adversary movements through local collaborators.
3. ADF continued to exploit remote and forested areas to preserve relative freedom of movement (S/2024/969, annex 2), and over the years has developed proficiency in jungle warfare. ADF continued using commercial reconnaissance drones to detect potential threats against their positions and deployed improvised explosive devices to protect camps from attacks (S/2024/969, annex 5). It has also invested in developing local intelligence networks, equipping chosen collaborators with motorcycles, vehicles, and phones to enhance information collection.³⁰⁵

Fixed ADF camps

4. In response to intensified military pressure from the joint Shujaa operations, ADF leadership implemented a strategy of fragmentation and geographic dispersion. This restructuring resulted in the establishment of two principal camps, located at significant distance from one another, one in Ituri Province and the other in North Kivu Province (S/2024/969, paras. 11, 15-17). One camp operated under the direct control of ADF leader Musa Baluku (CDi.036), while the second was commanded by his deputy, Seka Umaru (S/2024/969, para. 24 and annex 7). These two camps hosted the largest concentrations of dependents within ADF. Both adopted a deliberate low-profile posture, characterized by strategic cooperation with local economic actors and a pattern of non-aggression toward surrounding

³⁰³ UN sources; civil society, local authorities, military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities; humanitarian sources; human rights researchers; interviews with former ADF combatants, survivors of ADF abduction and witnesses.

³⁰⁴ ADF units have been known to return to areas where they had operated in the past.

³⁰⁵ UN sources; civil society, local authorities, military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities; humanitarian sources; human rights researchers; interviews with former ADF combatants, survivors of ADF abduction and witnesses.

civilian populations. This approach was intended to reduce exposure to military targeting, limiting pressure on the camps and decreasing the necessity for frequent relocation.³⁰⁶

5. In late 2024, Musa Baluku's Madina camp – serving as the headquarters of ADF (S/2024/969, paras. 14-15, S/2021/560, annex 3) – had relocated northwards across the Ituri River, establishing positions in the Apakwanga (also referred to as Pakango) forest area in Ituri Province,³⁰⁷ with smaller, “satellite” positions in forested areas around the main camp ensuring its defenses.³⁰⁸ Until February, Musa Baluku's camp was in Mambasa territory, in an area referred to as “Centrale,” situated between the Epulu and Ituri rivers, in an area of the Ituri Rainforest which hosts the Okapi Wildlife Reserve.³⁰⁹ Madina had relocated to “Centrale” in August 2025, following its displacement from the Apakwanga area³¹⁰ in July 2025 as a result of joint FARDC–UPDF operations.³¹¹ At the time of writing, Madina relocated further north as a result of the Shujaa attacks on 23 February 2026 (para. 27).
6. The strength of Musa Baluku's camp was estimated at approximately 1,500 individuals, including combatants who generally made up 20% of the larger camps. The remaining individuals were dependents, including family members of leaders, elderly or wounded fighters, and abductees undergoing indoctrination. The camp also hosted combatants with key technical and strategic functions, including operational planning and the maintenance of communication channels with Da'esh for coordination and the exchange of expertise. Sanctioned individual Mohamed Ali Nkalubo alias Meddie Nkalubo (CDi.042) remained in Baluku's camp, in charge of communication including with Da'esh for propaganda purposes (S/2024/969, annex 1).³¹²
7. The second large fixed camp, under the command of Seka Umaru, relocated to the remote and densely forested areas of the Bapere sector in north-eastern Lubero territory, North Kivu Province,³¹³ following Abwakasi's move to Lubero territory in the second half of 2024 (S/2024/969, para. 17). At the time of reporting, Seka Umaru's camp was located on Mundiale hill, approximately one day's walk-through dense forest from the village of Bilulu, on the right bank of the Lindi River in the Bapere sector.³¹⁴ The size of Seka Umaru's camp was smaller than that of Madina, and similarly included dependents, wounded fighters, abductees undergoing indoctrination, as well as individuals described as Da'esh emissaries assigned to provide training in improvised explosive devices.³¹⁵

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ In Babila Bakwanza chieftdom, approximately 25 kilometers north of Mungamba village. See also S/2024/969, paras. 15-16.

³⁰⁸ Military and intelligence sources, judicial authorities, UN sources, researchers; interviews with former ADF combatants, survivors of ADF abduction and witnesses.

³⁰⁹ Within the Andifele *groupement* of the Walese Karo chieftdom.

³¹⁰ Situated along the Mambasa–Epulu axis.

³¹¹ This new relocation reinforced the previously documented pattern of strategic withdrawal to sparsely inhabited zones with limited or no State security presence. ADF often used diversionary attacks to facilitate the relocation of its larger camps by carrying out violent incidents in other areas, the group draws security forces away, allowing it to withdraw in an organized manner, protect key leaders and assets, and establish new positions with reduced pressure (S/2024/969, para. 17).

³¹² Military and intelligence sources, judicial authorities, UN sources, local authorities, civil society, researchers. See also S/2026/44, para. 29.

³¹³ Including the Mundiale hill area and adjacent localities.

³¹⁴ Military and intelligence sources, judicial authorities, UN sources, researchers, civil society, Wazalendo combatants. The Lindi River forms part of the boundary between North Kivu and Tshopo Province, in the Bafwasende territory.

³¹⁵ Military and intelligence sources, judicial authorities, UN sources, researchers, civil society.

Mobile ADF camps

8. In addition to the two principal fixed camps, ADF deployed mobile units operating independently across North Kivu and Ituri Provinces. Unlike the fixed camps, these mobile units consisted predominantly of combatants (paras. 20 and 22). They performed offensive, defensive and logistical functions and remained in near-constant movement. Their primary role was to conduct attacks at distance from the fixed camps, thereby dispersing security forces and alleviating military pressure on core leadership positions (S/2024/969, annex 2).³¹⁶
9. In Ituri Province, one such mobile unit, led by “Mzee” Meya Sebagala. During the reporting period, the unit operated within a triangular area bordered by Mamove, Idohu and Mungamba villages in Mambasa territory, downstream of Ituri river. Meya’s camp was estimated to comprise approximately 180 combatants, organized in teams of 15 to 25 fighters tasked with operational missions. In addition, the unit comprised around 120 dependents, including women, children, and family members of leaders.³¹⁷ The unit operated in a highly mobile manner, targeting villages, population centers, major road axes and strategic points assessed to be weakly secured by the FARDC. It carried out ambushes and direct attacks, provoked population displacement and compelled security forces to redeploy significant resources to affected areas, thereby reducing pressure on Musa Baluku’s camp in Ituri Province.³¹⁸
10. The mobile camp led by Abwakasi operated in Lubero territory, North Kivu Province, with support from Muhammad Kasibante, alias Difenda or Defender³¹⁹ who relocated from Ituri to Lubero around April-May 2025.³²⁰ Abwakasi’s group operated within a triangular area covering approximately 80 square kilometers of forested terrain, formed by the villages of Bandulu, Minenye and Mayeba in north-eastern Lubero territory.³²¹ This area lies east of Bafwasende territory in Tshopo Province, south of Mambasa territory, west of the city of Butembo, and north-east of Manguredjipa town.³²² The group comprised an estimated 100-150 combatants, organized similarly into teams of 15 to 25 fighters (para. 20) tasked with conducting specific missions. The camp comprised around 80 dependents, primarily women and children.³²³
11. During the reporting period, Abwakasi’s group continued conducting subversive operations in Lubero territory (S/2025/446, para. 124, and S/2024/969, annex 2) both within and beyond areas covered by Operation Shujaa. It carried out mass killings, large-scale looting, destruction of villages and forced displacement of civilians. Abducted civilians were used as porters for looted goods and subsequently subjected to indoctrination; some were retained in the bush, while others were released and at times exploited as sources within populated areas.³²⁴ At the time of writing, Abwakasi was conducting reprisal and diversionary attacks in Mambasa territory (paras. 21-22).

³¹⁶ Ibid.³¹⁷ Military and intelligence sources, judicial authorities, researchers.³¹⁸ Ibid.³¹⁹ Also known as “Chauffeur”.³²⁰ Ibid.³²¹ This area lies at the intersection of *Mwenye groupement* in the Bapere Sector and *Manzya groupement*.³²² Military and intelligence sources, judicial authorities, UN sources, researchers, civil society.³²³ Ibid.³²⁴ Ibid.

12. Other smaller camps led by Tabani and Hadad³²⁵ (S/2024/969, para. 17) operated as mobile units at the peripheries of Lubero territory, with Tabani's group occasionally crossing into Bafwasende territory in Tshopo Province.³²⁶

RAV (“rendez-vous”) positions

13. The ADF maintained a network of positions commonly referred to as “RAV” (supply rendez-vous points), which functioned as liaison and logistical points between mobile units operating in the bush and external support networks.³²⁷ These sites were overseen by senior ADF figures and advisers close to Musa Baluku, including Meya, Abwakasi and Difenda.³²⁸
14. RAV positions typically comprised small groups of 15 to 25 fighters tasked with logistical support rather than direct combat. Their functions included the reception of food supplies and ammunition, the transfer of recruits, and meetings with collaborators based in nearby population centers. Fighters assigned to these posts were often young – including minors as young as 12 years of age³²⁹ – but experienced. They often established concealed positions in previously attacked or depopulated villages located near main supply routes, including the RN4 and RN44, as well as secondary agricultural roads and tracks.³³⁰
15. Multiple RAV positions were identified along the Butembo–Manguredjipa axis in North Kivu and along the RN4 between Komanda and Mambasa in Ituri Province. These sites were strategically located near bridges, villages and agricultural zones, facilitating discreet contact with collaborators and supply chains.³³¹
16. According to testimonies of arrested and surrendered ADF combatants as well as former hostages and collaborators, RAV operations typically occurred at dusk, when fighters established contact with suppliers to receive goods while minimizing detection. Security measures included advance positioning, the establishment of observation posts and careful monitoring of approaching contacts, whether on foot or by vehicle, to avoid interception. ADF elements stationed at RAV sites were instructed to avoid confrontation and withdrew if risks are identified. Weapons were used only in self-defense or if ordered by senior leadership.
17. The RAV network constituted a critical logistical and communication link between ADF elements in the bush and external sources of support. These positions facilitated the transfer of essential supplies, recruits, electronic equipment, ammunition and weapons, including materiel procured domestically and from abroad.³³²

³²⁵ Also referred to as Seka Dadi or Adadi, or Sheik Hadad, see S/2024/969, para. 17 and annex 2 (page 35).

³²⁶ Security and intelligence sources, researchers.

³²⁷ UN sources; civil society, local authorities, military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities; humanitarian sources; human rights researchers; interviews with former ADF combatants, survivors of ADF abduction and witnesses.

³²⁸ Military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities; interviews with former ADF combatants, including collaborators and former RAV operatives.

³²⁹ The Group interviewed a former ADF recruit who was assigned to “RAV” duties at the age of 12.

³³⁰ Military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities; interviews with former ADF combatants, including collaborators and former RAV operatives.

³³¹ Military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities.

³³² Ibid.

Annex 8 (para. 18)**Additional information on ADF recruitment****Informations supplémentaires sur le recrutement par l'ADF**

While ADF's leadership remained predominantly composed of Ugandan nationals, the majority of lower-ranking combatants were Congolese nationals, recruited forcibly, most frequently through abduction. As previously documented, foreign nationals were often recruited through false promises of employment ([S/2023/990](#), annex 12), with only a small fraction joining for ideological reasons. Recent arrests in 2025 of one individual from Mozambique, two from Tanzania and three from Burundi revealed continued efforts to recruit foreign fighters, although the number of foreign recruits remained low.³³³

³³³ Military and intelligence sources. See also S/2026/44, para. 31.

Annex 9 (para. 20)

ADF attacks since June 2025

Attaques de l'ADF depuis juin 2025

1. Following the period of relative lull between March and June 2025 (para. 20), during which no mass-casualty incidents were recorded, a marked escalation in both the frequency and intensity of attacks against civilians was observed from July 2025 onwards, exceeding 650 civilian fatalities at the time of reporting.³³⁴ The incidents outlined below represent some of the deadliest attacks recorded. However, they constitute only a small number of the hundreds of attacks carried out in a sustained and systematic manner during this period.

Attacks in Mzee Meya's operational area

2. In Ituri Province, elements led by Mzee Meya carried out an attack on a church in Komanda town on the night of 26 to 27 July 2025, between 21:00 and 23:00 hours. The attackers targeted Christian worshippers gathered at the Anuarite Catholic chapel during a prayer vigil marking the 25th anniversary of the parish, resulting in 41 fatalities, including 25 women and 16 men. Ten civilians were injured, including three girls and seven boys, and four persons were reported abducted. The assailants also looted and set fire to at least nine houses, including the targeted church, and burned two vehicles.³³⁵ On 29 July, the same group of assailants carried out an ambush along the road linking the villages of Akotano and Loya, approximately 15 kilometers south of Komanda, where they robbed and thereafter killed two civilians by slitting their throat.³³⁶
3. Throughout 2025, Meya's group was responsible for the killing of over 230 persons. Its operations led to the displacement of an estimated 9,000 people and the destruction of at least 36 villages and localities.³³⁷

Attacks in Abwakasi's operational area, in Lubero territory

4. In Lubero territory, Abwakasi's group was responsible for the majority of ADF killings.
5. On 15 August 2025 at approximately 05:00 hours, ADF elements carried out an incursion into the village of Mangoli, located approximately 15 kilometers north of Bandulu, Bapere sector, Lubero territory, killing at least 32 civilians using bladed weapons. An undetermined number of persons were abducted. The assailants also looted and set fire to at least 28 houses.³³⁸
6. On the night of 15 to 16 August 2025, between approximately 20:00 and 22:00 hours, ADF elements carried out an incursion into the town of Oicha, in the Mbimbi neighborhood. The attack resulted in the

³³⁴ UN sources; civil society, local authorities, military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities; humanitarian sources; human rights researchers; interviews with former ADF combatants, survivors of ADF abduction and witnesses.

³³⁵ UN sources; civil society, local authorities, military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities; researchers.

³³⁶ Ibid

³³⁷ Ibid. Villages attacked included Katere, Kareso, Mambalenga, Idohu, Ndalya, Oicha, Komanda, Eringeti, Boga, Mbau, Loya and Monge.

³³⁸ UN sources; civil society, local authorities, military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities; researchers.

killing of nine civilians and the injury of two others. The assailants set fire to 19 houses and burned five motorcycles.³³⁹

7. Among the most significant incidents attributed to Abwakasi's elements was the massacre of civilians attending a funeral in Ntuyo village, located approximately 6 kilometers east of Manguredjipa town, in Bapere sector, Lubero territory. The attack was carried out on the night of 8 to 9 September 2025, between approximately 19:00 and 23:00 hours. A total of 71 civilians, including men, women, and children, were killed. At least 36 houses were looted and set on fire, and the village was extensively devastated.³⁴⁰
8. On 15 November 2025, between approximately 19:00 and 23:00 hours, ADF elements carried out an incursion into the village of Byambwe, in Manzya *groupement*, Baswagha chiefdom, Lubero territory, killing 23 civilians, including 13 women and 10 men. Among the victims were women admitted to the maternity ward who were killed inside a Catholic Church-run health center. During the attack, four hospital pavilions housing patients were set on fire. The assailants looted and burned 27 houses, including the medical facility, from which equipment and medicines were taken. Several civilians were abducted and used as porters to transport looted goods.³⁴¹
9. Throughout 2025, the attacks perpetrated under Abwakasi's command led to the killing of over 600 persons, making it the deadliest of all ADF units. The attacks resulted in the displacement of an estimated 25,000 people and the destruction of at least 26 villages and 9 mining sites.³⁴²

New peak of violence in March-April 2026 along the RN4 axis

10. After the lull observed in February-early March, ADF attacks intensified in Mambasa territory in mid-March, culminating in the highest monthly fatality levels recorded in the past six months (over 90 reported deaths). Attacks were predominantly concentrated along the National Route 4 (RN4) corridor.³⁴³
11. On 12 March, ADF attacked Muchacha, a large, semi-industrial mining site (S/2021/560, annex 91)³⁴⁴ located 100 kilometers west from Mambasa town, along the RN4 national road (leading from Mambasa to Kisangani). Da'esh subsequently claimed responsibility for the attack, citing 17 civilians and seven FARDC killed,³⁴⁵ and around 100 individuals kidnapped. Photographs showed burning buildings and vehicles (trucks, excavating machines). A significant amount of weaponry was seized from FARDC (AK-47-type assault rifles, machine gun, RPGs, and ammunition).³⁴⁶ Imagery and video recordings of the unfolding attack at Muchacha showed women and children participating in the attack – some as porters, other children (estimated by the Group to be around 10-12 years of age) carrying weapons.³⁴⁷

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Ibid. See also <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statements/2025-11-22/statement-attributable-the-spokesperson-for-the-secretary-general-adf-attacks-against-civilians-lubero-territory>

³⁴² UN sources; civil society, local authorities, military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities; researchers.

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ The mining site was exploited by Chinese-owned MCC Resources and Kimia Mining.

³⁴⁵ FARDC were present at the site, guarding the concession. See S/2021/560, annex 91.

³⁴⁶ FARDC and intelligence sources, UN, researchers, Da'esh claims consulted by the Group on SITE Intelligence website.

³⁴⁷ Video footage obtained from Congolese security services on file with the Secretariat.

12. On the night of 1–2 April, militants carried out a large-scale attack in Bafwakoia village along the RN4,³⁴⁸ killing dozens of civilians and burning significant portions of the village. Preliminary reports indicate over 40 fatalities,³⁴⁹ but the Group could not yet independently verify the total death toll. The incident caused displacement and temporarily disrupted movement along the corridor. This attack formed part of a broader pattern of repeated, high-impact operations in the same geographic area, suggesting the group's ability to exploit persistent security gaps in rural zones.
13. On 6 April, ADF elements launched an attack south of Mambasa town, marking a notable shift in ADF's area of operations. The attack was initiated shortly after midnight in Arua 2, south of Mambasa town centre, along the Mambasa–Nduye–Mungbere road, triggering panic, looting of shops and pharmacies, before being repelled by FARDC.³⁵⁰ Although the Group has not yet been able to confirm exact casualty figures, the proximity of the incident to Mambasa center marked a significant development, indicating a shift in ADF violence from remote villages toward a significant urban area such as Mambasa, the territorial capital and an administrative and economic hub.
14. The location of the attacks in March-April 2026 represented a geographic extension of the ADF threat toward the borders with Haut-Uele and Tshopo Provinces.

³⁴⁸ Close to Nia-Nia town, near the border with Tshopo Province.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

Annex 10 (para. 24)**Further information on ADF *modus operandi*****Informations supplémentaires sur le mode opératoire de l'ADF**

ADF fighters attacked in small, highly mobile groups, at times comprising as few as three to five individuals, using mostly bladed weapons and sometimes assault rifles. In coordinated attacks, smaller elements were tasked with diversionary actions, while larger teams of approximately eight to ten fighters conducted the main attack.³⁵¹ ADF continued to target small and relatively undefended villages, with reduced likelihood of a rapid military response. Mass killings were followed by looting, kidnappings, and destruction of property.³⁵²

ADF maintained well-established observation positions in areas stretching from Mambasa to Komanda and Mukasila, as well as around Manguredjipa. These positions enabled advanced surveillance and the preparation of carefully planned operations. Opportunistic attacks were uncommon; movements were typically deliberate and intelligence-driven, often aimed at securing specific items such as medicines or supplies.³⁵³

While ADF did not conduct mass-casualty IED attacks during the reporting period, it continued to employ IEDs as traps to secure camp perimeters, deter intruders, and prevent defections.³⁵⁴ Congolese security and judicial sources reported a noticeable increase in the acquisition and movement of electronic components, including batteries, mobile phones, and other related equipment, suspected to be intended for IED fabrication. Most individuals apprehended in connection with these activities were found in possession of such components, with supply chains linked to Uganda and Butembo. The latter served as a key logistical hub for ADF-associated supply and support networks.³⁵⁵

³⁵¹ Military, police, intelligence, and security sources; UN sources, judicial authorities; researchers

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ Military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities; researchers.

³⁵⁴ UN source, Congolese intelligence and security sources; judicial authorities; former ADF captives interviewed by the Group; researchers.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

Annex 11 (para. 28)

Provincial Peace Forum on ADF held in Beni from 23 to 25 February 2026

Forum provincial de paix sur les ADF tenu à Beni du 23 au 25 février 2026

Shujaa Operation has been affected by persistent shortcomings, including limited access to timely and reliable tactical intelligence and the deployment of units insufficiently trained in jungle warfare (S/2024/969, para.11). Additional vulnerabilities included the limited infiltration capacity within ADF networks and insufficient availability of surveillance drones. FARDC elements reported that these challenges reflected broader weaknesses in the intelligence system. Gaps in intelligence analysis, inadequate intelligence-sharing and coordination with the UPDF (S/2024/969, para.13), and insufficient resources dedicated to counter-terrorism intelligence constrained the planning and implementation of effective operations.³⁵⁶

The Provincial Peace Forum on the ADF/MTM-ISCAP issue, held in Beni from 23–25 February 2026 under the patronage of President Félix Tshisekedi, aimed to establish a shared understanding of the ADF threat and mobilize coordinated action toward peace and stabilization in North Kivu.³⁵⁷ Convened by the Provincial Governor, Major-General Somo Kakule Evariste, the forum sought to analyze the evolution and impact of ADF activities, assess military and community responses, strengthen cooperation – including cross-border with Uganda – and generate recommendations for an integrated provincial strategy against terrorism and violent extremism.

The forum brought together a broad spectrum of stakeholders, reflecting a whole-of-society approach. Participants included national and provincial political authorities, FARDC and UPDF senior officers, MONUSCO leadership and UN agencies, members of the diplomatic corps, representatives from Ituri and Uganda, security services, local administrators, customary and religious leaders, civil society, private sector actors, youth and women's groups, as well as victims of ADF violence. This inclusive composition facilitated exchanges across security, governance, humanitarian, and community perspectives.

Key findings emphasized a consensus that the ADF constituted a transnational terrorist movement affiliated with the Islamic State, characterized by deception, manipulation, and reliance on civilian environments to conduct attacks. Participants acknowledged ongoing military pressure – particularly joint FARDC-UPDF operations (Shujaa) – as having degraded ADF capabilities, while stressing that the threat remains significant and requires sustained, multidimensional responses. A central conclusion was that collective awareness, community cooperation (notably intelligence-sharing), and trust between state and non-state actors were critical to success.

The forum underscored the need for an integrated approach combining military action with governance reforms, counter-radicalization, justice, victim support, and socio-economic development. It also highlighted risks posed by disinformation, weak local capacities, and cross-border dynamics. Recommendations focused on strengthening early warning systems, enhancing civil-military collaboration, improving regional cooperation, tracking financial flows, supporting deradicalization and reintegration, and developing a Provincial Integrated Action Plan against terrorism. Overall, the forum concluded that only a coordinated, multi-level strategy—linking local, national, and international efforts – can sustainably reduce the ADF threat and restore stability.³⁵⁸

³⁵⁶ Military, intelligence and judicial sources, UN sources, researchers.

³⁵⁷ FARDC sources, UN, civil society sources.

³⁵⁸ Final report on the Forum, on file with the Secretariat.

*ADF-published videos in reaction to the Forum held in Beni*³⁵⁹

In an apparent reaction to the Forum held in Beni, ADF-linked media channels disseminated two videos on 24 February in which members of the group commented directly on the proceedings. The footage showed small groups of ADF elements³⁶⁰ addressing the forum's discussions. Among those identified is Hamuli Banza Suleiman Zakaria, also known as "Bonge La Chuma," (S/2022/967, para. 23), a Congolese national and prominent ADF religious figure (para. 37).

The speakers addressed Congolese authorities, including the Military Governor of North Kivu, rejecting ongoing military operations by the Governments of DRC and Uganda. They framed the conflict in ideological and coercive terms, asserting that the conflict would only end under two conditions: the population's adherence to Islam as the sole religion, or compliance with payments described as "tokens" imposed by ISCAP (ADF). Failing this, they warned of a protracted and indefinite conflict.

One of the videos further referenced the establishment of a "token" system in the Lwemba area, under which, according to ADF, civilians who complied were permitted to continue their daily activities.

The timing of publication on 24 February, discussing reactions to the ADF-focused Forum that was still ongoing at that moment in Beni 23-25 February, further demonstrated ADF's enhanced level of connectivity. It further attested to ADF's deliberate efforts to expand its online presence and amplify its visibility.

³⁵⁹ Videos on file with the Secretariat.

³⁶⁰ Two individuals in the first video and three in the second.

Annex 12 (para. 34)

Da'esh-disseminated ADF propaganda

Propagande de l'ADF diffusée par Daech

Propaganda video aimed at encouraging foreign recruitment

In September 2025, Da'esh disseminated an 18-minute propaganda video attributed to Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) through a Telegram channel.³⁶¹ No comparable propaganda video linked to ISCAP had been published since 2022 (S/2022/967, para.28).

A video entitled “Jihad and Da’wah”, was disseminated online and assessed by the Group to be targeting foreign recruitment, calling on supporters to join the group in the DRC. The video explicitly discouraged the continued use of the name “Allied Democratic Forces” and instead promoted the designation “Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP)”, aiming to reinforce affiliation with Da’esh. It included religious references, prayers and sectarian messaging, and claims regarding the forced conversion of Christian civilians.

The video featured footage of alleged ADF combatants and statements by senior ADF commanders and religious figures. The inclusion of speakers identified as originating from the DRC, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda appears intended to underscore the group’s regional dimension and broaden its appeal to a transnational audience.

The video falsely portrayed ADF as a professional and well-equipped armed force, showing fighters in uniform carrying advanced weapons and displaying Da’esh symbols. This portrayal contrasts with evidence that ADF combatants are poorly equipped, lack standardized uniforms and often only possess rudimentary weapons or no firearms. The footage does not reflect living conditions within ADF camps, which are characterized by severe hardship, including food shortages and limited access to medical care.

The video included a compilation of recent and archival footage depicting combat scenes, executions of captured individuals, including members of UPDF and the FARDC, and images from the burial ceremony in Komanda following the 26 July 2025 massacre by ADF. It contained messages targeting what was described as “Western-influenced” actors and included accusations against international Christian and missionary organizations operating in the region, accompanied by imagery of United Nations insignia and humanitarian vehicles. The segment also referenced military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia, and included a direct threat to Operation Shujaa.

To date, the Group has not identified evidence that the dissemination of the video has resulted increased foreign recruitment or observable operational shift.

³⁶¹ Video on file with the Secretariat.

Annex 13 (para. 37)**Taxation and ADF-issued tokens (“jeton”)****Taxation and jetons émis par ADF**

Since March 2025, ADF progressively expanded its taxation system across multiple localities in Ituri Province. In cases documented by the Group, both tokens marked “Dubius” and “AMANI NAPEO – Delivrance cacao” were collected by ADF elements. Taxation was conducted in villages and agricultural areas, in some instances including local authorities, and was enforced within ADF security zones under threat of displacement or execution.

ADF issued token (“jeton”) marked with the inscription “Dubius”.

Between March and December 2025, ADF elements implemented a standardized taxation system across Mambasa and parts of Irumu territories. This system included the imposition of a USD 10 payment on individuals operating within ADF-controlled or contested areas, including farmers, traders and persons engaged in timber-related activities. In exchange of payment, ADF issued tokens (“jetons”) bearing the inscription “Dubius”, which functioned both as proof of payment and as authorization for movement within ADF-controlled areas.

Corroborated testimonies indicated that collection was conducted directly in villages and agricultural zones, including through engagement with local authorities and on-site distribution of tokens. These practices were enforced within ADF security zones, where civilians were compelled to comply under threat of violence, displacement or execution.

The Group received tokens from various unrelated sources in different locations, indicating the broader geographical distribution of these practices.



Token received from farmers, military intelligence and civil society in Irumu.

Cocoa-related taxation / Taxation liée au cacao

ADF - issued tokens marked with the inscription “AMANI NA UPENDO– Délivrance Cacao”.

The taxation for which these tokens were issued targeted specific economic sectors, particularly cocoa production. The tax consisted of an annual payment of USD 15 imposed on cocoa producers per hectare or per field, referred to as “AMANI NA UPENDO – Délivrance Cacao”. Collection was carried out directly in agricultural fields by groups of 10 to 20 ADF elements.

These practices indicated a shift from episodic looting of agricultural production to the establishment of recurring and organized revenue streams linked to a high-value commodity sector.



Tokens received from farmers and identified by Wazalendos fighters, judicial authorities, and civil society.

Annex 14 (para. 37)

Video footage of Bonge La Chuma promoting adherence to ADF taxation system

Vidéo de Bonge la Chuma promouvant l'adhésion au système de taxation de l'ADF

Video footage received by the Group in September 2025 depicted a known ADF operative, Bonge la Chuma ([S/2022/967](#), par. 23) stating that individuals were required either to convert to Islam or to pay taxes, and that those who refused would be killed or forced to leave the territories in which ADF operated ([S/2021/560](#) para.29-31).³⁶² Bonge la Chuma was based at ADF's Musa Baluku's headquarters.³⁶³ This messaging indicated that ADF taxation was embedded within a broader coercive framework combining ideological justification with territorial control.



Screenshot from video received from confidential source.

³⁶² Video authenticated by the Group on file with the Secretariat.

³⁶³ Military and intelligence sources, judicial authorities, UN sources, researchers.

Annex 15 (para. 38)**Kidnaping for ransom by ADF****Enlèvements contre rançon par l'ADF**

The Group documented ADF hostage-taking as a source of financing in Irumu (Ituri Province) and Beni (North Kivu Province) territories. According to testimonies, abductees were systematically screened and categorized based on their perceived ability to pay ransom. Those considered able to pay were generally spared, while those unable to pay were executed.

In several documented cases, ADF released hostages prior to launching attacks on villages, as documented in Tchani Tchani and Mamove. During captivity, hostages were used for forced labour while negotiations were ongoing. ADF elements established temporary positions in areas with internet access to facilitate communication with families during ransom negotiations. In some instances, families paid ransom in instalments, using contact details provided by ADF.

Testimonies received by the Group indicated that some payments ranged between USD 4,000 and USD 5,000.

Kidnapping incidents (January–February 2026)

- In early January 2026, in Bwana Sura and Mamove (Irumu territory, Ituri), ADF conducted large-scale incursions resulting in the abduction of dozens of civilians. Some victims who were unable to pay ransom were later found executed.
- On 16 February 2026, 26 hostages abducted in January in Bwana Sura and Mamove were released in Monge, Walesse Vonkutu chefferie (Irumu territory), following ransom payments.
- On 23 January 2026, during an attack in Kazaro (approximately 15 km west of the RN4 axis, Komanda–Luna), ADF abducted several civilians from fields and killed three men. The ADF elements subsequently moved towards Mamove with additional hostages, including a Muslim woman.
- On 17 February 2026, an additional 27 civilians were released after negotiations, with victims confirming to local authorities that ransom payments had been made through their families. Victims reported that ADF initially demanded approximately USD 5,000 per hostage. In most cases, families paid between USD 2,000 and USD 3,000, sometimes in instalments, using contact details provided by ADF. Releases occurred following negotiations.
- On 26 February 2026, in Ofay (capital of Walese Vonkutu chefferie), audio evidence related to the release of 12 civilians indicated that some hostages paid up to USD 4,500. One elderly hostage had been abducted in Tchani-Tchani (Beni territory).

Annex 16 (para. 39)

Update on peace initiatives related to the AFC/M23 crisis

Mise à jour des initiatives de paix liées à la crise de l'AFC/M23

1. Since the drafting of the Group's midterm report, the diplomatic initiatives under the Washington and Doha frameworks have produced formal commitments but recorded limited tangible implementation on the ground (S/2025/858, para. 7). The terms of the UN Security Council resolution 2773 (2025) were not implemented. The developments documented by the Group highlighted a persistent pattern in which formal diplomatic commitments were systematically undermined by simultaneous military reorganization or advances on the ground, thereby weakening confidence in negotiated processes and exposing civilian populations to persistent insecurity (S/2025/858, paras. 8-9; 10-11 and S/2025/446, para. 13, and Annex 5).
2. Representatives of the DRC Government and AFC/M23 agreed to a ceasefire and signed the Terms of Reference of the Ceasefire Oversight and Monitoring Mechanism in Doha, Qatar, on 14 October 2025 (S/2025/858, para. 11). However, military operations, including clashes and drone attacks impacting civilians, military build-up by both sides, as well as troop reinforcements and territorial expansion by AFC/M23 continued.³⁶⁴
3. The operationalization of the ceasefire monitoring through the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region-Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (ICGLR-EJVM+) was delayed (S/2025/858, para. 11, and annex 5), and eventually signed in April 2026 (para. 52).
4. The capture of Uvira in December 2025 represented a significant territorial expansion occurring in flagrant breach of the bilateral agreement signed in Washington, intended to halt hostilities.³⁶⁵ This sequence of events also heightened the risk of an open confrontation between Rwanda and Burundi.³⁶⁶

Calls for an inclusive dialogue among DRC actors and the African Union as a potential coordination body

5. Calls increased for an inclusive internal dialogue – parallel to the ongoing diplomatic initiatives – among local actors³⁶⁷ to link up external mediation initiatives to domestic causes of chronic instability. In early January 2026, the calls for internal dialogue gained momentum partly due to the lack of progress in the peace process and the worsening security situation on the ground. Consequently, the President of Angola and the outgoing chair of the African Union, João Lourenço, proposed an internal and inclusive dialogue which sought to provide the framework for social, political, and armed groups to address structural and systemic causes of chronic instability in the DRC.³⁶⁸
6. While several Congolese political parties, civil society organizations and armed movements manifested their willingness to participate in the dialogue, they raised concerns over its credibility, inclusivity, and the Government's commitment to implement subsequent resolutions. In letters sent to President João

³⁶⁴ Political, diplomatic, civil society and intelligence sources.

³⁶⁵ UN, Civil society, intelligence sources, researchers.

³⁶⁶ Ibid.

³⁶⁷ Political actors, civil society, churches, armed groups

³⁶⁸ Political, diplomatic, civil society and intelligence sources.

Lourenço, AFC/M23 (see document “A” below) and the “Sauvons le Congo” movement of former President Joseph Kabila (see document “B” below) requested clarification on the relationship between the proposed initiative and the Doha process, including whether it would constitute a new or parallel process.

Lome meeting 16-17 January 2026

7. On 16 and 17 January 2026, the President of the Council of the Republic of Togo and appointed AU mediator, Faure Gnassingbé, convened a meeting in Lomé. According to the final communiqué issued at the end of the meeting (see document “C” below), the AU mediation stated objective was to reinforce harmonization, cohesion, and coordination among all peace initiatives, to capitalize on existing synergies and to avoid any fragmentation of mediation efforts likely to undermine peace and stability in the eastern region of the DRC. The meeting intended to establish a consolidated architecture articulated around three main organs, including President Faure Gnassingbé as a mediator and coordinator of the overall peace process, a panel of five facilitators, each with areas of responsibility and an independent joint secretariat to provide technical assistance to the panel.
8. The initiative was regarded as essential for the AU as the continental organization to ascertain its leadership in the peace process, providing political support and legitimacy to the various peace initiatives and the implementation of key decisions.³⁶⁹


Luanda initiative and proposed ceasefire, February 2026

9. On 9 February, a meeting in Luanda between presidents Félix Tshisekedi, João Lourenço, Faure Gnassingbé and Olusegun Obasanjo called for a ceasefire in eastern DRC, with the aim of accelerating the implementation of the Doha verification mechanisms and ensure compliance with existing agreements and UN Security Council resolutions. On 11 February, Angola proposed that a ceasefire between the DRC Government and AFC/M23 take effect on 18 February. The GoDRC subsequently accepted the ceasefire framework. However, AFC/M23 rejected the initiative, stating it had not been consulted, and accused the GoDRC of continued military operations and acting in bad faith.³⁷⁰ It also questioned Angola’s mediation role and indicated a preference to prioritize the Doha process.
10. On 18 February, the date when the proposed ceasefire was meant to formally take effect, hostilities were ongoing and even escalated in the following days.
11. These developments further highlighted the limited coordination between the different mediation tracks and their minimal impact, amid persistent mistrust between the parties.

³⁶⁹ Government authorities, Diplomatic and Civil society sources. Also see <https://www.radiookapi.net/2026/02/02/emissions/dialogue-entre-congolais/dialogue-national-felix-tshisekedi-pose-les-conditions>.

³⁷⁰ AFC / M23 Coordinator, Corneille Nangaa, claimed the GoDRC in fact undermined mediation efforts by multiplying parallel diplomatic initiatives. Nangaa further accused the GoDRC of violating its own ceasefire declarations by military offensives, the use of “mercenaries”, and by conducting “indiscriminate bombardments”. See https://x.com/cnangaa/status/2022325018902884491?s=46&t=_n75XfLAiYyaxKQtM7ZzVg.

(A) Reactions by AFC/M23 and “Sauvons le Congo” on the inter-Congolese Dialogue proposed by Angola



3. Nous souhaitons rappeler, avec le plus grand respect, à la haute attention de Votre Excellence que l'Alliance Fleuve Congo / Mouvement du 23 Mars (AFC/M23) demeure pleinement engagée dans la recherche sincère d'une solution pacifique, globale et durable à la crise congolaise.

4. À cet égard, nous tenons à rappeler que notre Organisation a proclamé, de manière volontaire et unilatérale, un cessez-le-feu le 7 mars 2023 à Luanda, dans un esprit de responsabilité et de confiance à l'égard du processus politique alors engagé. Force est toutefois de constater que ce cessez-le-feu n'a jamais été respecté par le Gouvernement de Kinshasa, lequel a fait le choix assumé de privilégier l'option armée, entraînant une succession d'escalades militaires dont il porte l'entière responsabilité.

5. Nonobstant notre attachement constant au respect strict de cet engagement de cessez-le-feu unilatéral, et en dépit des violations répétées commises par les forces gouvernementales et leurs alliés, l'AFC/M23 n'a été contrainte de recourir à des mesures de défense que pour assurer la protection de ses positions et de ses populations, en l'absence de toute autre alternative.

6. Nous tenons à souligner avec clarté que, tant que notre Organisation ne fera pas l'objet d'attaques, l'AFC/M23 continuera de respecter rigoureusement les termes du cessez-le-feu, fidèle à son engagement invariable en faveur d'un règlement politique négocié, fondé sur le dialogue, la bonne foi et la recherche d'une paix véritable.

Excellence, Monsieur le Président,

7. Votre Haute Autorité n'est pas sans savoir que le Gouvernement de la République Démocratique du Congo et l'Alliance Fleuve Congo / Mouvement du 23 Mars (AFC/M23) sont, l'un comme l'autre, pleinement et résolument engagés, depuis le 30 mars 2024, dans un processus de négociation conduit à Doha, sous l'égide de l'État du Qatar, avec la Médiation active de partenaires régionaux et internationaux, notamment les États-Unis d'Amérique, ainsi que de l'Union Africaine, à travers le Médiateur désigné, Son Excellence Monsieur Faure Gnassingbé, Président du Conseil des Ministres de la République du Togo. Ce processus a été engagé dans le but clair et partagé de parvenir à la résolution des causes profondes du conflit par des négociations politiques.

8. Nous tenons respectueusement à rappeler à Votre Excellence que ce processus demeure pleinement en cours et qu'il a, malgré les difficultés inhérentes à toute négociation de cette nature, progressivement et laborieusement abouti à des résultats substantiels, concrets et reconnus. En effet, grâce à la constance, à la persévérance, à la neutralité et au professionnalisme de la Médiation, les parties ont pu avancer de manière significative et conclure cinq instruments majeurs à portée internationale, constituant autant de jalons essentiels du processus de paix, à savoir :

- Le Communiqué conjoint du 24 avril 2025, signé entre l'AFC/M23 et le Gouvernement de la République démocratique du Congo ;
- La Déclaration de principes du 19 juillet 2025 ;



- Le Mécanisme pour la libération des détenus par les parties du 10 septembre 2025 ;
- Le Mécanisme de Surveillance et de Vérification du Cessez-le-feu du 14 octobre 2025 ;
- L'Accord-Cadre de Doha pour un accord de paix global, signé le 15 novembre 2025 entre le Gouvernement de la République démocratique du Congo et l'AFC/M23.

Excellence Monsieur le Président,

9. Les processus de résolution des conflits armés sont, par essence, complexes, exigeants et progressifs. Ils requièrent du temps, de la patience, de la constance et une construction graduelle de la confiance. Dans ce cadre, chaque avancée, même mesurée, constitue un acquis précieux qu'il convient de préserver.

10. À cet égard, les accords conclus à Doha doivent être considérés non comme des étapes secondaires, mais comme des acquis structurants et irréversibles du processus de paix, appelant à être pleinement protégés, consolidés et mis en œuvre.

11. Nous souhaitons également souligner qu'à ce jour, aucune des parties engagées dans le processus de Doha n'a remis en cause ni dénoncé ce cadre de dialogue. Tant le Gouvernement de la République Démocratique du Congo que l'AFC/M23 demeurent formellement et explicitement engagés dans ce processus.

12. Concomitamment, les Médiateurs et Facilitateurs poursuivent, avec constance, responsabilité et détermination, la mobilisation des efforts, des garanties et des mécanismes nécessaires en vue de l'aboutissement d'un accord de paix global, durable et définitif, au service de la stabilité, de la réconciliation nationale et de la paix régionale.

Excellence Monsieur le Président,

13. Tout en exprimant notre très haute considération pour les initiatives récemment évoquées à Luanda, que nous tenons à qualifier de louables dans leur principe, l'Alliance Fleuve Congo / Mouvement du 23 Mars (AFC/M23) se permet, avec le plus grand respect, de soumettre à votre haute appréciation quelques interrogations essentielles, dans le souci de dissiper toute ambiguïté et de préserver la cohérence des efforts de paix en cours.

14. À cet égard, nous souhaiterions être éclairés sur la nature exacte de la démarche envisagée : s'agit-il de l'ouverture d'un nouveau processus de négociations, de la mise en place d'un processus parallèle à celui actuellement conduit à Doha, ou d'une initiative complémentaire appelée à s'inscrire dans la continuité et le renforcement du processus de Doha ?



15. Dans la perspective d'une éventuelle rencontre entre les parties à Luanda, nous souhaiterions également connaître, dans ce cadre précis, le statut qui serait réservé au processus de Doha, ainsi que les modalités envisagées pour son articulation ou son devenir, afin d'éviter toute remise en cause implicite des acquis déjà obtenus.

16. Enfin, nous serions reconnaissants de bien vouloir nous préciser si la Médiation Qatarie est appelée à être associée à cette éventuelle rencontre, et, le cas échéant, à quel titre et dans quel rôle, compte tenu de son implication centrale, constante et déterminante dans le processus en cours.

Excellence Monsieur le Président,

17. Depuis l'ouverture des différents cadres de discussions, nous avons observé avec une attention soutenue une tendance récurrente à la multiplication des initiatives de paix autour d'une même crise. Une telle dynamique, lorsqu'elle n'est pas clairement articulée, est susceptible d'engendrer des chevauchements, des enchevêtrements et parfois des contradictions, au détriment de la clarté, de la cohérence, de la constance et, in fine, de l'efficacité des efforts déployés.

18. De manière plus structurelle, le processus de négociation a souffert, dès ses prémices, d'une instabilité méthodologique et institutionnelle peu propice à la consolidation d'une trajectoire de paix. Engagées initialement à Nairobi, les discussions ont été transférées vers Luanda sans concertation formelle préalable avec la partie Kényane, alors même que le processus était en cours. De façon analogue, alors que les échanges se poursuivaient à Luanda, un nouveau déplacement du cadre de négociations vers Doha est intervenu sans information préalable ni coordination avec les autorités Angolaises. Par ailleurs, parallèlement au processus de Doha, une demande distincte de médiation américaine a été formulée par le Président Félix TSHISEKEDI, introduisant ainsi un canal supplémentaire qui n'a pas été formellement intégré au dispositif existant.

19. La succession de cadres, de médiations et de formats ainsi observée, en l'absence de clarification préalable, d'articulation institutionnelle explicite et de continuité politique clairement assumée, ne saurait réunir les conditions minimales de confiance, de prévisibilité et de crédibilité indispensables à toute négociation de paix sérieuse. Elle tend, au contraire, à fragiliser les mécanismes de médiation, à brouiller les responsabilités, à affaiblir les garanties offertes aux parties et à entretenir une incertitude persistante quant au cadre de référence effectif du dialogue.

20. Dans un tel contexte, aucune négociation, aussi sincère soit-elle, ne peut raisonnablement prétendre aboutir à un accord global et durable. La multiplication de forums non coordonnés, l'absence de cohérence stratégique et la superposition de médiations concurrentes constituent des faiblesses structurelles majeures, incompatibles avec les exigences de stabilité, de confiance mutuelle et de continuité politique que requiert tout processus de paix crédible et soutenable.



AFC/M23 communiqué of 9 January 2026, received from a confidential AFC/M23 source.

(B) Reaction by “Sauvons le Congo”, 14 January 2026:






**Communiqué du Mouvement Sauvons la R.D.C
au sujet du dialogue**

Ayant été consulté à deux reprises, par les hautes autorités de la République d'Angola, à leur initiative, au sujet d'un éventuel dialogue entre congolais, **le Mouvement Sauvons la RDC**, salue l'implication personnelle de **Son Excellence João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço**, Président de la République d'Angola, dans la recherche de la paix en République Démocratique du Congo et réaffirme, pour sa part, son attachement et son engagement au dialogue comme meilleur moyen de règlement des conflits.

Il tient néanmoins à exprimer, ci-après, ses préoccupations et observations en rapport avec cette nouvelle initiative.

1. Le succès de tout dialogue repose d'abord et avant tout sur la sincérité, la bonne foi des parties, ainsi que sur leur constance dans le respect des engagements. Pas sur le nombre de voyages effectués, de capitales visitées ou de médiateurs de haut rang invités à s'impliquer. Le changement sans arrêt de lieux et de médiateurs auquel nous assistons - de Nairobi à Luanda, de Luanda à Doha, de Doha à Luanda, en passant brièvement par Bujumbura, Kampala, Lomé et tant d'autres capitales, consacre l'instabilité de la vision, laisse un goût d'inachevé et semble voulu, beaucoup plus, pour donner le tournis que l'assurance attendue du pouvoir qu'il aurait finalement compris - mieux vaut tard que jamais, le bien-fondé d'une solution politique à la crise. Bien plus, l'instabilité de la parole d'Etat, les ambiguïtés stratégiques, les contradictions quant au choix des options pour la résolution de la crise, l'instrumentalisation des processus politiques, et la manipulation de ceux-ci afin de faire triompher sa cause et non celle du pays, ont fini par enlever toute fiabilité aux discours tenus et engagements pris par le Président Tshisekedi et son régime, à l'intérieur comme à l'extérieur du pays.
2. La volonté politique se prouve par le respect des engagements pris et des accords déjà signés. En l'espèce, il s'agit notamment et principalement de ceux portant sur la libération des prisonniers, la décrispation du climat politique et l'observance du cessez-le-feu souscrits par le Gouvernement. Contrairement à ces accords et engagements, le Gouvernement du Président Tshisekedi continue à arrêter et/ou enlever, contraindre à l'exil des opposants politiques, des généraux et autres officiers, des journalistes, des activistes des droits de l'homme ainsi que tous ceux qui, au nom de la liberté d'opinion qui est constitutionnellement reconnue à tous les citoyens congolais, se permettent d'émettre un son discordant par rapport à celui du pouvoir. De la même manière, toutes les fois que le Président Tshisekedi prend son avion pour, soi-disant, aller à la recherche de la paix, il laisse derrière lui des instructions pour de grands mouvements des troupes, des attaques massives sur des localités densément peuplées, ainsi que des bombardements des civils par des drones et des avions de combat.

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Documents obtained from civil society sources

(C) African union mediation Final communique of the high-level meeting on coherence and consolidation of the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes Region, 16 & 17 January 2026:



MEDIATION DE L'UNION AFRICAINE

COMMUNIQUE FINAL DE LA REUNION DE HAUT NIVEAU SUR LA COHERENCE ET LA CONSOLIDATION DU PROCESSUS DE PAIX EN REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO ET DANS LA REGION DES GRANDS LACS

Lomé, 16 & 17 janvier 2026

1. À l'invitation de **Son Excellence Faure Essozimna GNASSINGBE**, Président du Conseil de la République togolaise et Médiateur de l'Union africaine dans le cadre des efforts pour le règlement du conflit et de la situation sécuritaire à l'Est de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC), une Réunion de Haut niveau s'est tenue le 17 janvier 2026 à Lomé, en République togolaise, sur la cohérence et la consolidation du processus de paix en République démocratique du Congo et dans la région des Grands Lacs.
2. La Réunion de Haut niveau a été présidée par **Son Excellence Faure Essozimna GNASSINGBE**. Ont pris part aux travaux les personnalités suivantes :
 - **Son Excellence Olusegun OBASANJO**, ancien Président de la République fédérale du Nigeria, membre du Panel des Facilitateurs ;
 - **Son Excellence Uhuru KENYATTA**, ancien Président de la République du Kenya, membre du Panel des Facilitateurs ;
 - **Son Excellence Catherine SAMBA-PANZA**, ancienne Présidente de la République centrafricaine, membre du Panel des Facilitateurs ;
 - **Son Excellence Mokgweetsi MASI**, ancien Président de la République du Botswana, membre du Panel des Facilitateurs ;
 - **Son Excellence Sahle-Work ZEWDE**, ancienne Présidente de la République fédérale démocratique d'Éthiopie, membre du Panel des Facilitateurs.
3. Les Ministres des Affaires étrangères et des représentants de la République démocratique du Congo, de la République du Rwanda, de la République d'Angola, de la République du Burundi, de la République d'Ouganda, des États-Unis d'Amérique, de l'État du Qatar, de la République française et de la République togolaise ont également pris part à la Réunion.
4. Le Président de la Commission de l'Union africaine, **Son Excellence Mahmoud Ali Youssouf**, des représentants des Nations Unies, de la Communauté d'Afrique de l'Est (CAE), de la Communauté de développement de l'Afrique australe (SADC), de la Conférence internationale sur la région des Grands Lacs (CIRGL), du Groupe de contact international pour la région des Grands Lacs, ainsi que de nombreux partenaires internationaux et représentants de la société civile ont participé aux travaux.
5. La Réunion de Haut niveau a passé en revue les efforts diplomatiques déployés aux niveaux africain et international au cours des douze (12) derniers mois en vue de rouvrir les espaces de dialogue entre les protagonistes du conflit et d'accélérer la dynamique vers la désescalade et des solutions négociées.
6. Elle a rappelé les conclusions de la réunion tenue par le Médiateur avec le Panel des Facilitateurs le 17 mai 2025 à Lomé, et salué les efforts conjugués de la Médiation conduite par la République togolaise, de la CAE et de la SADC, en faveur du retour à une paix durable à l'Est de la RDC et du renforcement de la stabilité dans la région des Grands Lacs.
7. La Réunion de Haut niveau a salué les efforts diplomatiques des États-Unis d'Amérique ayant permis la signature de la Déclaration de principes de

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Washington, du 25 avril 2025, de l'Accord de paix de Washington du 27 juin 2025 et d'un accord du Cadre d'intégration économique régionale du 7 novembre 2025 et des Accords de paix de Washington du 4 décembre 2025 entre la RDC et le Rwanda. Elle a également salué les pourparlers de Doha conduits par l'État du Qatar qui ont conduit à la Déclaration de principes de Doha du 19 juillet 2025, suivie de l'Accord-cadre de Doha pour un accord de paix global assorti de huit Protocoles thématiques, signé le 15 novembre 2025.

8. La Réunion s'est également réjouie de la tenue, le 30 octobre 2025 à Paris, de la Conférence de soutien à la paix et à la prospérité dans la région des Grands Lacs.
9. Le Médiateur a réaffirmé sa disponibilité à travailler de manière concertée avec les États-Unis d'Amérique et l'État du Qatar ainsi que toutes les parties prenantes, dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre des accords signés et de la poursuite des négociations de Doha entre le Gouvernement de la RDC et l'AFC/M23.

I. CONSOLIDATION DE LA COHÉRENCE DES EFFORTS DE MÉDIATION

10. La Réunion de Haut niveau a souligné la nécessité de renforcer l'harmonisation, la cohérence et la coordination de l'ensemble des initiatives de paix, afin de capitaliser sur les synergies existantes et d'éviter toute fragmentation des efforts de médiation au détriment de la paix et de la stabilité à l'Est de la RDC.
11. À cet égard, la Réunion a acté la révision de l'architecture de la Médiation, avec le Secrétariat Conjoint Indépendant en appui technique au Panel des Facilitateurs.
12. La Réunion a réaffirmé le rôle du Panel des Facilitateurs comme mécanisme central d'appui politique à la Médiation, agissant de manière coordonnée, complémentaire et dans le strict respect des mandats confiés par le Médiateur.
13. La Réunion a insisté sur la nécessité d'assurer une harmonisation étroite avec les initiatives internationales, afin de garantir la cohérence des messages, le respect du séquençage politique et l'alignement des appuis extérieurs sur les priorités définies dans le cadre de la Médiation.

II. CONSOLIDATION DU PROCESSUS DE PAIX À L'EST DE LA RDC, TENANT COMPTE DES ÉVOLUTIONS RÉCENTES

14. La Réunion de Haut niveau a invité les Parties à accélérer la mise en œuvre de bonne foi de leurs engagements respectifs et à privilégier des moyens pacifiques dans la gestion et le règlement du conflit.
15. La Réunion a réaffirmé son plein soutien au processus de Doha et exhorté les Parties à une reprise sans délai des pourparlers afin de conclure les négociations sur les six (6) protocoles restants.

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16. Elle a souligné l'importance d'un suivi africain structuré de la mise en œuvre des accords et de l'évolution du processus de paix.

III. DÉCISIONS DE LA RÉUNION DE HAUT NIVEAU

17. Les décisions ci-après ont sanctionné les travaux de la Réunion de Haut niveau :
 - a. L'alignement sur le principe de la centralité de la Médiation conduite par la République togolaise ;
 - b. L'harmonisation de la compréhension et de l'appropriation du processus unifié de médiation à l'échelle africaine ;
 - c. L'alignement des acteurs autour de l'architecture révisée de la Médiation ;
 - d. L'adoption d'un document-cadre de la Médiation, fondé sur l'état des lieux et l'analyse des dynamiques du processus de paix ;
 - e. L'adoption du Plan de travail des Facilitateurs en tant qu'instruments opérationnels guidant l'action coordonnée du Panel ;

IV. DIVERS ET PROCHAINES ÉTAPES

18. Les participants ont exprimé leur profonde appréciation au Gouvernement et au peuple de la République togolaise pour l'accueil chaleureux et les facilités mises à la disposition des délégations, ainsi que pour l'engagement constant du Togo en faveur de la Médiation.
19. Les participants ont réaffirmé leur détermination collective à poursuivre, dans un esprit de cohérence, de coordination et de responsabilité partagée, les efforts engagés afin de consolider durablement le processus de paix et de promouvoir la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité en République démocratique du Congo et dans la région des Grands Lacs.

Fait à Lomé, le 17 janvier 2026

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Annex 17 (para. 42)

The United States Treasury sanctioned RDF and Rwandan Officials, condemning blatant violations of Washington Peace Accords

Le Département du Trésor des États-Unis a sanctionné les RDF et des responsables rwandais, condamnant des violations flagrantes des Accords de paix de Washington

On 2 March 2026, the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) and four senior commanders, citing their direct involvement in destabilizing eastern DRC.³⁷¹

According to the U.S. Treasury, the Rwanda Defence Force was “actively supporting, training, and fighting alongside” M23, including through troop deployments, provision of advanced military equipment, and direct participation in territorial offensives. This included the capture of Uvira—days after the signing of the Washington Peace Accords—a strategic urban centre near the Burundi border, which heightened regional tensions and posed a potential cross-border security risk despite the subsequent withdrawal of RDF and M23 elements.

The Treasury assessed that RDF actions materially enabled M23’s capture of key urban centres and mining areas, and contributed to widespread human rights abuses and mass displacement. It further determined that M23’s offensives would not have been possible without the active support and complicity of the RDF and senior officials. This included the deployment of thousands of RDF troops in eastern DRC, their direct engagement in combat operations, and the introduction of advanced military capabilities, including GPS jamming systems, air defence equipment, and drones. The RDF was also reported to have trained M23 fighters at its military facilities and supported recruitment efforts, including among refugee populations.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control concluded that such conduct constituted material support to a sanctioned armed group and actions threatening the peace, security, and stability of the DRC, in violation of the Washington Peace Accords and broader international de-escalation efforts, and called for the immediate withdrawal of RDF troops, weapons, and equipment from DRC territory.

Accordingly, Vincent Nyakarundi, Chief of Staff of the RDF; Major-General Ruki Karusisi, commander of the RDF 5th Infantry Division and former Special Operations Force Commander; General Mubarakh Muganga, Chief of Defence Staff; and Stanislas Gashugi, Special Operations Force Commander since 15 March 2025, were designated for their leadership roles within the RDF.

³⁷¹ <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0411>

Annex 18 (para. 45)**Commitments made by the Governments of DRC and Rwanda during 17-18 March 2026 meeting in Washington DC****Engagements pris par les gouvernements de la RDC et du Rwanda lors de la réunion des 17 et 18 mars 2026 à Washington DC.**

Representatives of the Governments of the DRC and Rwanda met in Washington DC on 17–18 March 2026, to advance the implementation of the Washington Accords and agree on concrete steps to de-escalate the conflict.³⁷²

According to a Joint Statement on Advancing the Washington Accords issued on 18 March 2026 by the Governments of Rwanda, DRC, and U.S.,³⁷³ both Rwanda and DRC agreed on a set of coordinated measures aimed at de-escalating tensions and advancing progress on the ground, including:

- Mutual commitment to specific measures to support each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- The scheduled disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures in designated areas within DRC territory;
- Time-bound and intensified efforts by the DRC to neutralize the FDLR;
- The protection of all civilians.

The Group consulted a copy of the agreement, titled "Initial Steps Plan" (Plan), which referenced a map of North and South Kivu Provinces identifying six areas of interest: five located in North Kivu, and one in South Kivu. These corresponded to areas (Named Area of Interest or "NAI") defined in Operational order (OPORD) (S/2025/858, paras. 8 and 14), broadly overlapping with areas of known FDLR presence.

The Plan agreed upon during the 17-18 March 2026 meeting required both parties to undertake sequential action in the areas identified: RDF and AFC/M23 to withdraw its forces and equipment, and FARDC to subsequently neutralize FDLR, including "through kinetic action against any and all FDLR members present in the designated areas." FARDC operations against the FDLR would thus require the prior withdrawal of RDF elements from the area.

The Plan defined actions and timelines for NAI 1 and 2 (located in North Kivu, specifically around Pinga-Mpeti-Lukweti), and NAI 3 (situated in the Hauts Plateaux of South Kivu, excluding Minembwe).

The Plan also required RDF withdrawal from the Lubero frontline (Alimbongo, Kasegbe and Kayna), even though this area was not marked as a "NAI" on the OPORD map.

The Plan established the following timeline and actions:

- **By 18 March 2026:** Rwanda to ensure the absence of RDF and AFC/M23 personnel and equipment in NAI-2 (Mpeti-Lukweti-Kimoho axis, extending until Mweso);
- **By 23 March 2026:** Rwanda to withdraw all RDF personnel and equipment from Lubero territory (Alimbongo, Kasegbe and Kayna) to Rwandan territory;
- **By 31 March 2026:** The DRC to initiate operations against the FDLR in NAI-1 along the Pinga-Lukweti axis, and to cease any collusion, communication or co-location between FARDC and FDLR elements;
- **By 31 March 2026:** Rwanda to ensure the absence of RDF and AFC/M23 personnel and equipment in NAI-3;

³⁷² Diplomatic, intelligence and governmental sources.

³⁷³ <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/03/joint-statement-by-the-governments-of-the-united-states-of-america-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda-on-advancing-the-washington-accords/>

- **By 31 March 2026:** The DRC to submit to the United States a proposal for operations to neutralize the FDLR and affiliated groups in NAI-3;
- **By 15 April 2026:** The DRC to commence operations to neutralize the FDLR in NAI-2, including through kinetic action, unless it determines the continued presence of RDF or AFC/M23 personnel or equipment in the area;
- **By 15 April 2026:** The Parties to invite the United States to assess the presence of RDF and AFC/M23 elements in NAI-2;
- **In April 2026:** A Joint Oversight Committee (JOC) meeting to be convened in Washington on or before 25 April 2026, with both parties to submit plans regarding Ruzizi no later than seven days prior;
- **In September 2026:** Full implementation of the CONOPS.

The Plan outlined additional commitments, including:

- Rwanda to refrain from conducting drone strikes in DRC territory, and the DRC to refrain from conducting drone strikes in Rwandan territory;
- The DRC to refrain from conducting drone strikes or attacks against RDF personnel and equipment departing the identified zones;
- The DRC to refrain from launching offensive operations against AFC/M23 positions in Lubero;
- The DRC to ensure the absence of collusion, communication or co-location between FARDC and FDLR elements;
- Surrendering FDLR elements to be handed over to MONUSCO;
- The Parties to request a report from MONUSCO on FDLR repatriations between 27 June 2025 and 18 March 2026;
- The Parties to ensure the protection of civilian populations without discrimination across the DRC territory, and to instruct associated forces to do the same.

At the time of drafting, there was only limited implementation of the agreed actions and the timelines were not respected (paras. 46-51).

In Lubero, at the time of reporting, RDF and AFC/M23 still at Alimbongo, i.e. 20 km south of Lubero. Kasegbe and Kayna were not vacated.³⁷⁴ RDF did not withdraw its equipment to Rwanda, as foreseen in the agreement, but rather redeployed them to Rutshuru territory and the Masisi-Walikale axis, including heavy artillery, jamming, spoofing and other air defense capabilities.

While RDF and AFC/M23 withdrew a few kilometers from Mpeti³⁷⁵ and Mindjenje (located within NAI-2, at the border between Walikale and Masisi territories) towards Kalembe (approximately 15 kilometers) but remained within artillery-strike distance from these localities. During the second half of April operations were ongoing to retake these localities.³⁷⁶ Additionally, despite having vacated Mpeti and Mindjenje – which relieved offensive pressure on Pinga – RDF and AFC/M23 still controlled and maintained operations along southern axis leading to Pinga, via Lukweti and Nyabiondo,³⁷⁷ facing FARDC supported by APCLS, FDLR-FOCA, NDC/R, ANCDH and other Wazalendo groups.³⁷⁸

³⁷⁴ Military, diplomatic and intelligence sources, UN sources, civil society, researchers, AFC/M23 elements, Wazalendo combatants.

³⁷⁵ Less than 15 kilometers from Mpeti.

³⁷⁶ Military, diplomatic and intelligence sources, UN sources, civil society, researchers, AFC/M23 elements, Wazalendo combatants.

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

Most of the villages vacated by M23/RDF were occupied by the Wazalendo, FARDC, and Congolese state authorities progressively returned to some of the localities – such as in Kipese, Lubero territory, and Mpeti and Minjenje.³⁷⁹ Clashes continued in and around the vacated areas, and some of the initially vacated areas were subsequently reoccupied by AFC/M23.

RDF and AFC/M23 continued to occupy and control large parts of Masisi and Walikale territories, as well as Rutshuru and Nyiragongo territories and significant portions of South Kivu. At time of drafting, there was no evidence of RDF withdrawals from North and South Kivu to Rwanda.³⁸⁰

On the contrary, new RDF troop and materiel reinforcements with new troops and materiel reinforcements were documented in April passing through Nyangezi-Kamanyola towards Ruzizi Plaine, Lemera in the Moyens Plateaux, and others towards the Hauts Plateaux of Uvira and Mwenga. RDF positioned sophisticated weaponry, including anti-aerial defense systems (MANPADS) and conducted attacks with kamikaze and armed drones, notably between 10 and 19 April (paras. 168-170).³⁸¹

³⁷⁹ FARDC and Wazalendo sources; UN and researchers.

³⁸⁰ Military, diplomatic and intelligence sources, UN sources.

³⁸¹ Ibid.

Annex 19 (para. 50)

Paul Kagame interview published in Jeune Afrique

Entretien de Paul Kagame publié dans Jeune Afrique

In an exclusive interview granted to Jeune Afrique on 26 March 2026,³⁸² President Paul Kagame addressed questions about Rwanda's role in the ongoing conflict in the DRC, the US sanctions and the RDF's expected withdrawal from the DRC.

Kagame rejected Rwanda's responsibility in the DRC conflict, portraying the conflict as a Congolese internal issue and attributing escalation to Kinshasa's actions, including alleged collaboration with FDLR, which he claimed was as a long-standing and unresolved security threat to Rwanda. He minimized the relevance of FDLR force size, emphasizing instead their ideology and alleged backing by the DRC Government as the primary concern.

Kagame characterized Rwanda's actions as defensive measures, asserting that operations beyond its borders – which he admitted including deployment of troops, materiel, and coordination with AFC/M23 – were justified measures to neutralize this threat, even if conducted 5–20 km inside DRC territory.

Kagame indicated no intention to withdraw or scale down Rwanda's military posture, stating that defensive measures would remain in place until the perceived threat was addressed, by any means necessary, conditioning progress on reciprocal implementation of agreements by the DRC. He dismissed international sanctions as insulting, unjustified and politically motivated, arguing that Rwanda was being penalized for safeguarding its security. He described the fall of Uvira as “inevitable”, a necessary consequence of the situation on the ground, claiming that it should not have come as a surprise to any of the parties, including the US, since they were informed on a daily basis of the “evolution of the situation”.

On allegations of human rights and international humanitarian law violations by AFC/M23, Kagame dismissed such accusations, arguing that conditions in areas under M23 control (including Goma and Bukavu) had improved compared to the period prior to their takeover. He suggested that criticism of M23's conduct was selective and overlooked previous instability, implicitly rejecting claims of abuses and portraying the group as contributing to improved security conditions.

Kagame stated Joseph Kabila's association with M23 proved that the latter was not a Rwandan movement, but a Congolese movement now known as AFC/M23: “the issue posed by this movement is a Congolese political problem, which must find a Congolese political solution.” Kagame distanced himself from direct involvement with Kabila, stating that Kabila's association with AFC/M23 and his presence in M23-controlled areas reflected his own political choices. He framed Kabila as part of a broader Congolese political dynamic, indicating that individuals seeking to contribute to stability in the DRC were “welcome” in Rwanda, and denied that Rwanda was directing or sponsoring his actions.

On his future relations with President Tshisekedi, Kagame remained ambiguous and stated being comfortable with the “status quo”. He stated that there is “still a great deal of work to be done, both in the East and in the Congo as a whole, so that neither poses a threat to its neighbors, particularly Rwanda. That is why we will be uncompromising when it comes to the security of our border—by all means.”

³⁸² <https://youtu.be/jBTZKT2uTe4?si=EnIcd0KXXfHbXPYA>;
<https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1784913/politique/paul-kagame-nattendez-pas-de-moi-que-je-leve-nos-mesures-de-defense-alors-que-vous-laissez-felix-tshisekedi-faire-ce-quil-veut/>

Annex 20 (para. 52)**Doha talks in Montreux, Switzerland, 13-17 April 2026****Pourparlers de Doha à Montreux, Suisse, du 13 au 17 avril 2026**

Building on the Declaration of Principles, discussions focused on improving humanitarian access including by reopening the Goma and Kavumu airports, the operationalization of the ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism, and the exchange of prisoners³⁸³ (S/2025/858, paras. 7, 10-11).

On 14 April, representatives of the DRC Government, AFC/M23 and the International Conference on the Great Lakes (ICGLR) signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the operationalization of the ceasefire monitoring through the ICGLR-Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (ICGLR-EJVM+)³⁸⁴ (annex x, and S/2025/858, para.11). Discussions on a humanitarian protocol only resulted in the issuing of a joint statement on 17 April, stating the intention to facilitate access and freedom of movement for humanitarian personnel, to begin ceasefire monitoring activities and to proceed with the release of prisoners. The parties undertook to continue negotiations on the remaining protocols.

The AFC/M23 was represented by six delegates, and five “experts”. The delegates were Jean-Paul Shaka, AFC advisor;³⁸⁵ Benjamin Mbonimpa, AFC permanent secretary and M23 executive secretary; René Abandi Munyarugerero, chief negotiator for AFC/M23; Jean Pierre Alumba Lukamba Omokoko, advisor to AFC-Coordinator Corneille Nangaa; Lt. Col Donat Muganza, M23 military intelligence officer; and Major Fred Ngenzi Kagorora, AFC/M23 liaison officer for military and political coordination.³⁸⁶ Fred Ngenzi is a Rwandan-Congolese national, influential member of M23 since the movement’s first iteration in 2012, and a key liaison with Rwandan leadership and RDF, notably through Brigadier General Patrick Karurewa (S/2014/428, para. 65 and annex 41, S/2025/446, para. 8) and Jean Paul Nyirabutama, deputy advisor to President Kagame on defense and security (para. 98).

The five experts assisting the AFC/M23 team were Justine Mbabazi Rukeba, advisor on Human Rights, Gender, Peace Building, Legal and Judicial Reforms; Chantal Kayitaba Murekatete, AFC/M23 humanitarian focal point in Goma, and advisor on Humanitarian Affairs, Gender, Social Affairs; Cedric Fiema Pundu Yange, advisor on Banking, Insurance and Finance Sector; as well as Claude Ibalanky Ekolomba and Franck Mwe Di Malla Apenela as “external” advisors.³⁸⁷

(1) Memorandum of Understanding between the International Conference on the Great Lakes (ICGLR) and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo River Alliance / March 23 Movement – as Parties of the Doha Declaration of Principles on the Operationalization of EJVM Plus ICGLR

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), signed on 14 April 2026, established the operational framework for implementing the Doha ceasefire through the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM+), formalizing cooperation between the Government of the DRC, AFC/M23, and the ICGLR. It defined the structure, mandate, and functioning of the ceasefire monitoring system, including joint verification teams, equal representation of the

³⁸³ Diplomatic and confidential sources.

³⁸⁴ Ref annex x (on peacemaking initiatives)

³⁸⁵ Lawyer registered with the New York Bar.

³⁸⁶ UN, diplomatic and confidential sources.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

Parties, and the participation of observers (AU, Qatar, United States) and MONUSCO, with a focus on surveillance, investigation, and reporting of ceasefire violations.

The agreement further set out modalities for coordination, information-sharing, security guarantees, and access to areas of operation, alongside provisions on financing, reporting, dispute resolution, and liability. It underscored the commitment of the Parties to facilitate monitoring activities, ensure the safety of verification personnel, and resolve disputes through the Doha facilitation framework, with the aim of operationalizing a permanent ceasefire and reducing violations through structured oversight mechanisms.

See the full text of the MoU below.

REF: ICGLR/COVM/DRC/AFCM23 MOU/VER/0042026/EMM



MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN

THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE GREAT LAKES
REGION (ICGLR)

AND

GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
AND

CONGO RIVER ALLIANCE/ MARCH 23 MOVEMENT

AS PARTIES OF THE DOHA DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
ON THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE EJVM PLUS ICGLR

REF: ICGLR/COVM/DRC/AFCM23 MOU/VER/0042026/EMM

resolution to the current armed conflict in the DRC, including relevant articles of UNSC Resolution 2808 that gives to MONUSCO mandate to support the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism, and as well as applicable International Law.

NOTING the framework agreement between the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Rwanda, signed in Washington, on June 27, 2025 in its provisions recommending the Doha peace process;

REFERRING to the 19th Ordinary Meeting of the Ministers of Defence of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, held on November 8, 2025, in Kinshasa, DRC at points 6.11.8-10, convening a meeting of Defence Experts from the ICGLR to review the Terms of Reference, finalize a memorandum of understanding clarifying the roles, responsibilities, hierarchical lines, operational modalities, and the cost of monitoring by EJVM;

IN ACCORDANCE with the agreement that established the Ceasefire Oversight Verification Mechanism of October 14, 2025, in DOHA, QATAR between the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Congo River Alliance/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23), in favor of a path toward a permanent ceasefire agreement;

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Preamble

WHEREAS this Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter referred to as "MoU") is signed between the International Conference on the Great Lakes Regions (hereinafter referred to as "ICGLR") Secretariat and the GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC) AND CONGO RIVER ALLIANCE/ MARCH 23 MOVEMENT (AFC/M23) AS PARTIES OF THE DOHA DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (hereinafter referred to as "PARTIES OF THE DOHA PEACE PROCESS") for the purposes of operationalization of the EXPANDED JOINT VERIFICATION MECHANISM PLUS (EJVM+) in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter referred to as "DRC");

AIMING to define the terms, modalities, and operation framework for the rapid and full operationalization of the ICGLR through its technical body, the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM) in its capacity as a member of the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism (COVM). Established within the framework of the Doha Process, with the two signatory Parties;

IN ACCORDANCE with the Charter of the United Nations, the constitutive act of the African Union (AU), the fundamental principles of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions that recommend peaceful

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TAKING NOTE OF the DOHA framework agreement of November 15, 2025, between the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Congo River Alliance/March 23 Movement;

The Parties to DOHA PEACE PROCESS and the ICGLR Secretariat, each individually a "Party" and collectively, the "Parties", have agreed on the following.

Objectives of the MoU

The purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding is to establish a formal framework for collaboration between the Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification Mechanism of the Doha Framework Agreement and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), acting through its technical body, the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM), with the participation of the Parties, namely the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Alliance Fleuve Congo/Movement of March 23 (AFC/M23).

In accordance with their respective mandates, and with a view to ensuring the effective implementation of the permanent ceasefire, this MoU aims in particular to organize the modalities for the participation of the EJVM within the Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, and to establish effective mechanisms for information-sharing, operational coordination, and technical cooperation among the Parties;

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The Terms of Reference for the EJVM are attached hereto as Annex A and are incorporated by reference into this MoU.

SECTION II Implementation of the MoU

The parties agree as follows:

Composition: The Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism is composed of:

- (a) Three representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ("the Government") and three representatives of the Alliance Fleuve Congo/Movement of March 23 ("AFC/M23") (the "Parties");
- (b) Representatives of the African Union, the State of Qatar, and the United States may serve as observers;
- (c) The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region ("ICGLR"), through its Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism ("EJVM").

The EJVM+ shall comprise the EJVM, three representatives of the Government, and three representatives of the AFC/M23 (in a coordination role); and

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consolidated report and transmit it to the members of the Doha Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification Mechanism.

Finance. The parties shall mobilize resources for the activities of the mechanism. The EJVM shall propose a budget for the EJVM Plus.

Mission planning. Mission planning shall be conducted jointly between Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism and the EJVM.

Security. The parties shall ensure that the EJVM Plus is accorded secure and unimpeded access to both sides of the frontline for the purpose of facilitating their effective participation in the monitoring of the permanent ceasefire on the ground. Additionally, the parties commit to ensuring the safety of the experts at all times during verification missions.

Coordinating Meetings. Either party to the MOU may call for a meeting within a notice of 72 hours. The quorum of the meeting shall be realized when both parties are present with Observers.

Conduct and Discipline. Members of the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism shall abide by the cultural and legal considerations of the DRC.

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- (d) MONUSCO, as an additional participant.

Mission: The mission of the mechanism is to conduct surveillance, monitoring, verifying and reporting the implementation of the permanent ceasefire including the investigation on any alleged violation as well as taking necessary measures with the interested parties to avoid further violations.

Command: The leadership of the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism will be determined by the Parties. EJVM plus will be commanded by the Commander EJVM. For the duration of this MOU, the EJVM should not be commanded by a representative originating from a country involved in the conflict, either AFC/M23 representative.

Joint Verification: The verification shall be conducted by the Joint Verification Team appointed by the Commander EJVM which will be joined by equal representative of the Parties and where possible Observers.

Secretariat: The composition of the Secretariat shall be determined by the Parties.

Sharing of verification reports: The reports of the activities related to the verification of ceasefire violations shall be shared with the Commander EJVM or his representative. The Commander of the EJVM+ shall prepare a

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Liability and third-party claims provisions

Each Party shall assume responsibility for any damage, injury, disability, or death suffered by its own personnel in the course of the implementation of the MOU. However, the liability of the Party exercising control over the area may be incurred in cases of gross negligence, deliberate omission, or a serious breach of the agreed security measures;

Entry into force

This MoU shall enter into force on the date of its signature by the Parties ("Effective Date") for the period of the Ceasefire Oversight Verification Mechanism mandate unless earlier terminated in accordance with the terms of this MoU. If there is more than one date of signature, the latest date shall be the date from which this MoU shall enter into force.

Amendments

This MoU may be modified, supplemented, or amended at any time by written agreement between the Parties. Amendments to this MoU shall be made in writing and signed by the duly authorized representatives of the Parties. Such amendments shall become effective from the date of signature of the Parties.

Settlement of disputes

The Parties shall use their best efforts to promptly settle through direct negotiations any dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of the MoU or the interpretation, application, breach, termination or invalidity thereof by

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initially referring the matter to the facilitators of the DOHA peace process and the Executive Secretary of the ICGLR within (30) days.

Privileges and immunities

Diplomatic privileges and immunities remain fully in effect in all areas during execution of the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism.

Termination

This MoU may be terminated by either Party by giving thirty (30) days' written notice to the other that will become effective thirty (30) days from the date of its receipt. Where notice of termination is given, Parties of the DOHA peace process and ICGLR Secretariat will take immediate steps to bring any provision of support or joint activities to a close in a prompt and orderly manner. This MoU shall automatically terminate upon fulfillment of the mandate as described in the agreement on the ceasefire oversight verification mechanism. Upon termination of the MoU, the Parties shall cooperate to bring the agreements set forth in this MoU to an orderly conclusion. For the avoidance of doubt, any determination of this MoU shall not terminate the requirement to maintain confidentiality.

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IN WITNESS WHERETO the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have on behalf of the Parties hereto signed this MoU in Mwinda on this 14 Day of April, 2026

AGREED BY:

Samir Amine

Representative of the Republic of DRC

Benjamin MBO NIMPA

Representative of the AFC/M23

MURITA LUWABEWA

Executive Secretary of the ICGLR

Confidential source

(2) Joint DRC Government – AFC/M23 communiqué on humanitarian protocol and judicial protection, the operationalization of the joint ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism, and release of prisoners, 17 April

After difficult discussions on a humanitarian protocol – notably on the issue of reopening the Goma and Kavumu airports – no MoU was signed and parties agreed on issuing a joint communiqué statement instead, reflecting a reluctant compromise on the published language reflecting several operational and humanitarian priorities that were discussed linked to the implementation of the Doha framework.³⁸⁸

The Parties reported progress toward a protocol on humanitarian access and judicial protection, and reaffirmed their commitment to comply with international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and refugee law. They undertook to protect civilians and civilian objects, including critical infrastructure and essential services, and to refrain from attacks on goods indispensable to civilian survival. The communiqué also emphasized obligations to ensure safe, rapid, and unimpeded humanitarian access, safeguard humanitarian personnel and assets, prevent diversion of aid, and maintain the delivery of basic services and medical assistance to affected populations.

The Parties further agreed to operationalize ceasefire monitoring through the expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM+) and the Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CMVM), with initial verification missions to be launched within one week, with support from MONUSCO.

Confidence-building measures included a commitment to release 311 AFC/M23 detainees and 166 prisoners held by AFC/M23, within ten days in line with mechanism signed on 14 September 2025. The communiqué also underscored the intention to sustain momentum in the peace process by advancing remaining protocols under the Doha framework, while acknowledging the role of regional and international partners—including Qatar, the United States, the African Union, and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region—in facilitating implementation.

³⁸⁸ Diplomatic and confidential sources with knowledge of the discussions in Montreux.

Communiqué conjoint entre les représentants du Gouvernement de la République démocratique du Congo et de l'AFC/M23 sur les progrès réalisés concernant le protocole relatif à l'accès humanitaire et à la protection judiciaire, l'opérationnalisation du mécanisme de surveillance et de vérification du cessez-le-feu, ainsi que la libération de prisonniers

Le 17 avril 2026

La déclaration suivante est publiée par le Gouvernement de la République démocratique du Congo, ainsi que l'Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 Mars (AFC/M23), ainsi que les gouvernements de l'État du Qatar, des États-Unis d'Amérique, de la République togolaise (en tant que médiateur de l'Union africaine), l'Union africaine, de la Suisse, à l'issue des réunions qui se sont tenues du 13 au 17 avril à Montreux, en Suisse, concernant la mise en œuvre de l'accord-cadre de Doha pour un accord de paix global.

Début du texte de la déclaration :

Du 13 au 17 avril, des représentants du Gouvernement de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC) et de l'Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars (AFC/M23), ainsi que des États-Unis d'Amérique, de l'État du Qatar, de la République du Togo (en tant que médiateur de l'Union africaine), l'Union africaine et de la Suisse, se sont réunis à Montreux, en Suisse, pour discuter du protocole sur l'accès humanitaire et la protection judiciaire, conformément aux dispositions du accord-cadre de Doha pour un accord de paix global entre le gouvernement de la RDC et l'AFC/M23, signé à Doha le 15 novembre 2025.

Le gouvernement de la RDC et l'AFC/M23 (les Parties) ont convenu de l'importance cruciale d'assurer une aide humanitaire vitale à la population de l'est de la RDC et ont réalisé des progrès substantiels en vue de la conclusion d'un protocole sur l'accès humanitaire et la protection judiciaire.

Au cours des négociations, les Parties ont convenu de respecter l'ensemble des obligations qui leur incombent en vertu du droit international humanitaire, du droit international des droits de l'homme et du droit international des réfugiés, selon qu'ils sont applicables et de se référer aux principes fondamentaux de la Constitution de la République démocratique du Congo.

Les Parties ont aussi convenu de s'abstenir de toute attaque, destruction, enlèvement ou mise hors d'usage des biens indispensables à la survie de la population civile, y compris les denrées alimentaires, les zones agricoles destinées à la production de denrées alimentaires, les récoltes, le bétail, les installations et réserves d'eau potable et les ouvrages d'irrigation ainsi que les infrastructures et la fourniture de services de télécommunications et d'énergie, ainsi que les installations hospitalières et scolaires.

Les Parties ont reconnu que l'aide humanitaire comprend, sans s'y limiter, les activités et services liés à la fourniture de nourriture, de nutrition, de soins de santé, d'eau, d'assainissement et d'hygiène, d'abris, et à la garantie que la protection des civils reste primordiale pendant la conduite des hostilités. Cela inclut les activités de protection, y inclus celles visant à prévenir et à répondre à la violence, à l'exploitation et aux abus à l'encontre des civils, y compris des femmes et des enfants, et à promouvoir le respect du droit international humanitaire et droit international des droits de l'homme.

Les Parties ont convenu de respecter et protéger les acteurs humanitaires, y compris les intervenants locaux et les bénéficiaires, ainsi que les objets utilisés pour les opérations de secours humanitaires afin de leur permettre d'opérer en toute sécurité.

Les Parties ont convenu, chacune en ce qui la concerne, de tout mettre en œuvre pour empêcher que l'aide humanitaire ne soit ni détournée, ni pillée. Elles s'engagent en outre à ne pas indûment influencer la sélection de prestataires et de bénéficiaires.

Les Parties ont convenu de s'abstenir de toute action qui compromettrait la fourniture d'une aide humanitaire délivrée sur la base des principes humanitaires dans les territoires affectés par le conflit.

Les Parties ont convenu de faciliter un accès humanitaire rapide, sans entrave, sûr et durable, ainsi que la liberté de circulation du personnel humanitaire, des biens et des services, y compris pour la fourniture d'une aide humanitaire conforme aux principes fondamentaux aux populations dans le besoin, sur la base de besoins évalués de manière indépendante, sans distinction basée sur la religion, origine familiale, condition sociale, résidence, opinions ou convictions politiques, appartenance à une race, à une ethnie, à une tribu, à une minorité culturelle ou linguistique sur les territoires affectés par le conflit.

Les Parties ont convenu de faciliter le passage et de permettre la liberté de circulation du personnel humanitaire, des biens et des convois humanitaires.

Les Parties ont convenu de respecter, protéger et faciliter la fourniture continue de services essentiels à la population civile. Les Parties s'abstiendront de toute action qui compromet ces services et faciliteront l'accès de la population aux services sociaux de base (alimentation, eau, soins de santé, logement, éducation). Les Parties ont convenu, lorsqu'elles mettent en œuvre des mesures affectant les services sociaux de base, de tenir compte de l'impact humanitaire sur la population civile.

Dans toute la mesure du possible et avec le moins de retard possible, les Parties ont convenu de fournir les soins et l'assistance médicale requis par l'état des blessés et des malades, notamment en prenant toutes les mesures possibles pour rechercher, recueillir et évacuer les blessés et les malades. À cette fin, les Parties s'engagent à faciliter le transport de fournitures médicales et

d'aide humanitaire par des organisations humanitaires impartiales afin de soutenir le fonctionnement des établissements de santé et autres unités médicales dans les zones touchées par le conflit armé.

En plus de ces engagements, les Parties, en collaboration avec la Conférence internationale sur la région des Grands Lacs (CIRGL), ont signé un protocole d'accord qui met en œuvre le Mécanisme conjoint de vérification élargi Plus (MCVE+). L'opérationnalisation du MCVE+ permet au Mécanisme de surveillance et de vérification du cessez-le-feu (COVM), établi dans l'accord-cadre de Doha, de commencer à mener des activités de surveillance, de suivi et de vérification et à faire rapport sur la mise en œuvre du cessez-le-feu permanent entre les Parties. Les Parties et la CIRGL ont exprimé leur volonté de lancer, dans un délai d'une semaine, les premières missions de vérification du COVM, rendues possibles grâce au soutien logistique de la Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en RDC (MONUSCO).

Les parties ont également convenu de procéder, dans un délai de 10 jours, à la libération de prisonniers conformément au Mécanisme de libération des détenus signé le 14 septembre 2025 afin de continuer à renforcer la confiance. Les Parties remercient le CICR pour la fourniture des listes des détenus conformément aux procédures établies.

Les Parties ont convenu de maintenir la dynamique du processus de paix et à continuer de s'appuyer sur les progrès réalisés concernant le Protocole sur l'accès humanitaire et la protection judiciaire, tout en accélérant les négociations sur les protocoles restants, notamment en soumettant aux facilitateurs des propositions de plans concrets pour les prochaines étapes.

Le Gouvernement de la RDC et l'AFC/M23 expriment leur gratitude à l'État du Qatar, aux États-Unis, à la Suisse, à la République du Togo, l'Union africaine ainsi qu'aux Nations unies, notamment par l'intermédiaire de la MONUSCO, pour leur soutien indéfectible à la promotion de la paix et de la stabilité dans l'Est de la RDC et dans l'ensemble de la région des Grands Lacs.

Fin du texte de la déclaration.

Confidential source

Annex 21 (para. 54)

Statements by AFC/M23 leaders proposing federalism

Déclarations des dirigeants de l'AFC/M23 proposant le fédéralisme

Corneille Nangaa and Bertrand Bisimwa publicly promoted federalism as a model for DRC in late November 2025, including through social media statements.³⁸⁹

Statement by Corneille Nangaa, 27 November 2025:



#URGENT : le Coordinateur de l' **#AFC/ M23** **Corneille_Nanga** , annonce que la République Démocratique du Congo aura une nouvelle appellation celle de la République **#Fédérale** du Congo (**RFC**).

Video footage of Corneille Nangaa, received by the Group on 27 November 2025 from a confidential source, also posted on X:

Original French:

“ C’est notre terrain commun : le Congo, la République démocratique du Congo, que nous appelons encore République démocratique du Congo par conformisme. Mais nous, dans notre logique, nous n’avons pas peur d’aller à Naivasha. Nous nous sommes dit que nous nous battons au Congo et, dans notre projection en tant que mouvement, la République démocratique du Congo devra devenir la République fédérale du Congo. Et nous n’avons pas peur : c’est une option, c’est une vision. Car nous disons que le Congo est un intérêt primordial, mais le véritable intérêt, c’est le Congolais pris individuellement, où qu’il se trouve. C’est pour cela que nous nous battons.”

English translation [by the Group]:

³⁸⁹ <https://24newsagency.com/rdc-jose-makila-soppose-fermement-a-la-vision-federaliste-de-corneille-nangaa> ; Bisimwa: “We have always asserted and reasserted it at the negotiating table: integration (merging or mixing) within a defeated army is not our choice. We will build and lead the new Defense and Security Forces of the Federal Republic of Congo” https://x.com/bbisimwa/status/1994820683516580189?s=46&t=_n75XfLAiYaxKQtM7ZzVg

“This is our common ground: the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which we still call the Democratic Republic of the Congo out of conformity. But for our part, in our logic, we are not afraid to go to Naivasha. We have said to ourselves that we are fighting in the Congo and, in our projection as a movement, the Democratic Republic of the Congo should become the Federal Republic of the Congo. And we are not afraid: this is an option, this is a vision. For we say that the Congo is a primary interest, but the real interest is the Congolese individual, wherever they may be. That is what we are fighting for.”

This speech reflects earlier public statements by Nangaa, talking since 2024 about taking power by force and instating a federalist system.³⁹⁰

Statement by Bertrand Bisimwa

Bertrand Bisimwa posted on social media AFC/M23’s rejection of army integration (“brassage” or “mixage”), in favor of AFC/M23 building and leading the new armed forces of a the “Federal Republic of Congo”:



Source: [X account of Bertrand Bisimwa](#), posted on 29 November 2025

“We have always asserted and reasserted it at the negotiating table: integration (merging or mixing) within a defeated army is not our choice. We will build and lead the new Defense and Security Forces of the Federal Republic of Congo”

[English translation by the Group]

³⁹⁰ https://x.com/rdc_times/status/1773341807780266233?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYyaxKQtM7ZzVg, 28 March 2024.

Annex 22 (para. 60)**Moïse Nyarugabo, key member of Joseph Kabila’s inner circle signing the communique of Sauvons la RDC****Moïse Nyarugabo, membre clé du cercle rapproché de Joseph Kabila, signataire du communiqué de Sauvons la RDC**

Moïse Nyarugabo signed the final communiqué of Joseph Kabila’s Sauvons la RDC’s³⁹¹ second conclave held from 6–8 April 2026 as one of its “founding members” and “Coordinator of the Technical Secretariat (see full text below). It was the first time Nyarugabo was associated with the movement or that his signature appeared on a Sauvons la RDC communiqué or declarations.³⁹²

The communiqué constituted a sharp critique of the authorities in Kinshasa, challenging the constitutional and political legitimacy of existing institutions. It portrayed the regime as ineffective, oriented toward authoritarian control and political self-preservation, marking a shift toward dictatorship. It cited the systematic repression of opposition and the refusal of meaningful political dialogue as its defining features. Governance was characterized as predatory, serving regime continuity rather than public administration.

The communiqué concluded by situating Sauvons la RDC within the framework of constitutional resistance, invoking article 64 of the DRC Constitution related to the defense of the state. As such, the text was simultaneously a critique of the regime and a call for political mobilization.

³⁹¹ <https://sauvonslardc.org/2025/10/15/urban-renewal-loans-available/>

³⁹² <https://sauvonslardc.org/2025/12/05/declaration-relativev-a-la-signature-de-laccord-de-paix-entre-la-rdc-et-le-rwanda/> ; <https://sauvonslardc.org/2026/01/19/sauvons-la-rdc-denonce-et-exige-la-liberation-immediate-et-sans-condition-daubin-minaku-communique/>;



📞 📧 📱 @SauvsLaRdc1

2è Conclave du Mouvement Sauvs la RDC – Communiqué final

Les membres fondateurs du Mouvement Sauvs la RDC se sont réunis du 6 au 8 Avril 2026, sous la Présidence du Président de la République Honoraire, **S.E. Joseph Kabila Kabange**.

A cette occasion, ils ont examiné la situation politique, sécuritaire, économique et sociale du pays ainsi que les différentes initiatives régionales et internationales de recherche de solution à la crise qui prévaut en République Démocratique du Congo.

Au terme de cet examen, ils ont fait le constat que :

Le pouvoir en place a délibérément engagé le pays dans une dérive dictatoriale clairement assumée, caractérisée par une répression politique, systématique et brutale, un musellement violent de toute voix discordante et le refus de tout dialogue crédible pouvant mettre fin à la crise.

Bien plus, contrairement à ses engagements internationaux et aux aspirations de notre peuple à la paix, ce pouvoir a choisi la voie de la guerre, y compris contre les populations civiles qu'il est censé protéger, en violation du droit de la guerre.

Cela étant, les membres fondateurs :

1. Dénoncent les atteintes graves et répétées aux libertés publiques et aux droits fondamentaux, les bombardements indiscriminés des zones fortement habitées en mettant gravement en danger les populations civiles (Minembwe, Masisi, Goma), le recours à des assassinats et tentatives d'assassinats de personnalités qui refusent de se plier à la dictature, l'abandon total, aux ADF, des populations de l'Ituri et de la partie septentrionale de la Province du Nord Kivu, livrées à des massacres d'une cruauté indescriptible. Il en est de même de la population dans l'espace Grand Bandundu et dans la commune de Maluku, qui subit les horreurs des Mobondo.

Ces actes odieux contreviennent aux dispositions pertinentes de la Constitution et constituent des graves violations des règles et principes fondamentaux du droit international humanitaires ainsi que du droit de la guerre.

2. Expriment leur compassion et leur solidarité à l'endroit des hommes, des femmes, des jeunes et des vieux, victimes de cette barbarie d'État, ainsi qu'à leurs familles.

3. Déplorent la dégradation continue des conditions de vie sur l'ensemble du territoire national, marqué par une précarisation croissante des populations dont 64 millions d'entre elles vivent sous le seuil de pauvreté (Rapport INS 2025), la famine et l'insécurité chronique, faisant de la RDC la tête de liste des pays en extrême pauvreté.

4. S'agissant des initiatives de recherche de la paix, tout en saluant les efforts déployés par les uns et par les autres (Washington, Doha, Union Africaine, Luanda, Lomé, Nairobi, CENCO/ECC), ils notent qu'à cause de la mauvaise foi du pouvoir en place, les perspectives d'une paix durable s'éloignent de plus en plus.

Ce résultat décevant est aussi dû à ce que ces initiatives ont jusque-là, sciemment éludé ou gravement minimisé les causes profondes de la crise, à savoir le non-respect du pacte républicain de Sun-City, de la Constitution et des lois de la République, l'illégitimité des institutions, les choix désastreux du régime en place, une gouvernance prédatrice et la consolidation d'un système dictatorial, l'instrumentalisation de la justice à des fins politiques ainsi que l'exploitation du tribalisme et de la stigmatisation comme stratégies de division pour se maintenir au pouvoir.

5. Notent, avec préoccupation, l'opacité qui, comme dans le cas du deal minier, entoure les autres accords qui ont été conclus entre le régime de Kinshasa et le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, singulièrement l'Accord sanitaire qui viole l'éthique médicale et le droit à la protection des données personnelles, et l'Accord pour l'accueil des migrants refoulés de ce dernier pays.

A ce régime de Kinshasa qui est prêt à tout vendre, à brader les intérêts nationaux pour se ménager les faveurs de tous ceux qui peuvent garantir ou sécuriser sa survie, les membres fondateurs rappellent que la RDC et ses ressources ne sont pas son bien privé dont il peut disposer à sa guise mais bien un patrimoine commun appartenant à tous les Congolais.

Bien plus, La RDC est encore moins un dépotoir humain où les autres viendraient décharger tous ceux qu'ils n'ont pas envie de garder chez eux.

6. S'opposent à toute tentative de révision et de changement de la Constitution et s'engagent à y faire échec. De ce qui précède, ne pouvant se dérober au devoir que leur prescrit, comme à tout citoyen congolais responsable, la Constitution en son article 64, alinéa 1, les membres fondateurs du Mouvement Sauvons la RDC réaffirment leur détermination à poursuivre la lutte jusqu'à ce qu'il soit mis fin à cette dictature abjecte.

Fait le 08 avril 2026

Pour les Membres Fondateurs



Me Moise Nyarugabo

Le Coordonnateur du Secrétariat Technique.

Source: Sauvons la RDC website (<https://sauvonslardc.org/2026/04/12/communique-final-2e-conclave-du-mouvement-sauvons-la-rdc/>)

Annex 23 (para. 61)**Tensions affecting AFC/M23 leadership****Tensions affectant la direction de l'AFC/M23**

Internal tensions within AFC/M23 persisted, including divisions between AFC and M23 leadership, linked to differing objectives. While prominent political figures like Corneille Nangaa and Joseph Kabila harbored ambitions to seize power in Kinshasa, most M23 leaders were opposed to military operations beyond North and South Kivu.³⁹³ AFC/M23 sources reported that Makenga did not trust Kabila, and the two did not have a good relationship.

Tensions were also reported between certain M23 officers and Rwanda. Reports resurfaced that Rwandan authorities were considering Makenga's replacement, amid allegations that Makenga maintained close ties to Uganda and lacked trust in Rwanda.³⁹⁴ Sanctioned individuals Laurent Nkunda (CDi.022)³⁹⁵ and Baudoin Ngaruye (CDi. 019), both perceived as aligned with Rwanda, were expected to assume more prominent roles within M23 (S/2025/446, para. 9). This prospective restructuring favouring Rwanda-aligned AFC/M23 leaders deepened mistrust among commanders and combatants loyal to Makenga,³⁹⁶ historically associated with Uganda (S/2014/428, paras. 59-66, S/2025/446, para. 9, annex 3).

Tensions also affected M23 senior leadership, including over access to and distribution of resources.³⁹⁷ Historical and personal rivalries accentuated, notably between Makenga and Baudoin Ngaruye, who only tolerated each other because their external sponsor, Rwanda, imposed their cooperation.³⁹⁸

³⁹³ Ibid.

³⁹⁴ Intelligence sources, AFC/M23 sources.

³⁹⁵ AFC/M23 and intelligence sources, sources close to the Rwandan government, and a researcher reported the presence of Laurent Nkunda in Goma at the end of March 2026.

³⁹⁶ Including Bernard Byamungu and Imani Nzenze.

³⁹⁷ AFC/M23 and intelligence sources, UN, and researchers.

³⁹⁸ Ibid.

Annex 24 (para. 77)


Announcements of withdrawal from Uvira

Annonces du retrait d'Uvira

Initial withdrawal announcement on 15 December 2025

On 16 December, AFC coordinator Corneille Nangaa posted on his X account a statement in which he announced that AFC/M23, referring to the Doha process and the signing of the Doha Framework agreement on 15 November 2025, it will unilaterally withdraw its forces from Uvira “as per the United States' mediation request”.

AFC/M23 urged the “guarantors of the peace process” to establish conditions for the city’s administration following its withdrawal. These included the demilitarization of Uvira, protection of civilians and infrastructure, and the deployment of a neutral force to oversee the ceasefire. Given the practical difficulties associated with implementing the third requirement, it appeared more like a delaying tactic than a credible commitment to ceasefire monitoring.



Source: [Corneille Nangaa's official X account, posted on 16 December 2025](#)

Despite public claims of withdrawal, in practice, only a partial, staged withdrawal has taken place, amounting to a strategic repositioning of M23 and RDF forces (para. 77). Some elements repositioned north of Uvira other across the Hauts and Moyens Plateaux, linking up with Twirwaneho and Red Tabara elements. Thereby, AFC/M23 consolidated its presence in elevated positions overlooking the Ruzizi Plain, in anticipation of a full withdrawal.³⁹⁹ The town remained effectively under AFC/M23 and RDF control until January. AFC/M23 and RDF maintained a covert presence within Uvira, including through combatants dressed in civilian attire or their integration into local “police” units.⁴⁰⁰

AFC/M23 Letter addressed to the UN Secretary General, January 2026

In a letter addressed to the Secretary-General three days prior to its withdrawal from Uvira, AFC/M23 justified the withdrawal by citing its “sincere commitment to the ceasefire” and its intention to pursue a peaceful and political resolution of the conflict. It further indicated that it had requested MONUSCO to ensure civilian protection in Uvira and called for the deployment of a “neutral force”.

However, according to information obtained by the Group, an AFC/M23 delegate in Doha acknowledged that the capture of Uvira had overstretched coalition forces, suggesting that the withdrawal also constituted a tactical repositioning aimed at preserving leverage in ongoing negotiations.

³⁹⁹ Military and intelligence sources, UN, researchers, armed groups sources.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid.



Alliance Fleuve Congo
Peuple Uni, Digne et Prospère

COORDONNATEUR POLITIQUE

Goma, le 15 janvier 2026

N°réf 003/COORDO-POL/AFC-M23/CNY/TMC/2026

À **Monsieur António Guterres**,
 Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies à
 New York / États-Unis d'Amérique

Objet : Mise à la disposition de la communauté internationale de la ville d'Uvira

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

Faisant suite à notre décision du 15 décembre 2025, relative au retrait de nos forces de la ville d'Uvira, ainsi qu'à notre correspondance référencée 003/COORDO-POL/AFC-M23/CNY/JPAL/2026 du 12 janvier 2026 adressée à Madame la Représentante spéciale du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo, par laquelle nous avons formellement invité la MONUSCO à assurer la protection des populations civiles de ladite ville, conformément à son mandat,

Animée par le souci constant de lever toute ambiguïté quant à notre bonne foi, à notre attachement sincère au cessez-le-feu en vigueur, ainsi qu'à notre engagement résolu en faveur d'une résolution pacifique et politique à la crise,

Notre Organisation, l'Alliance Fleuve Congo / Mouvement du 23 mars (AFC/M23), a décidé, en ce jour, de placer officiellement la ville d'Uvira sous la responsabilité pleine et entière de la Communauté Internationale.

À compter de cette date, notre Organisation désengage l'unité d'observation et de monitoring qui attendait organiser la remise et reprise de la ville avec la force neutre et décline toute responsabilité quant à la sécurisation de cette importante agglomération de la province du Sud-Kivu.

Il incombe, désormais, à la Communauté internationale, dans le cadre de ses responsabilités et de ses engagements, d'assurer la protection des populations civiles, la préservation de la paix, ainsi que la sécurité de l'ensemble des habitants d'Uvira, sans aucune discrimination.

Nous attirons solennellement l'attention de la Communauté internationale sur le fait que l'armée Burundaise, les FDLR, les groupes armés dits Wazalendo, ainsi que les mercenaires soutenant les FARDC, constituent une menace manifeste pour la ville d'Uvira. Ces acteurs armés ne sont « parties » à aucun engagement issu d'un processus de paix.

À ce titre, leur présence et leurs activités représentent une menace directe et immédiate non seulement pour les populations civiles, mais également pour le processus de paix en cours et pour la stabilité régionale dans son ensemble.

Dans ce contexte préoccupant, il apparaît indispensable que la Communauté internationale assume pleinement ses responsabilités et veille au déploiement rapide d'une force véritablement neutre dans la ville d'Uvira, afin d'éviter que celle-ci ne bascule à nouveau dans le chaos, la désolation et la violence.

La présente démarche, entreprise en toute responsabilité, s'inscrit dans notre volonté claire de préserver les civils, de consolider le cessez-le-feu et de créer les conditions d'une paix durable, fondée sur le dialogue, le respect des engagements internationaux et les principes du Droit International Humanitaire.

Nous vous prions d'agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, l'expression de notre très haute considération.


Cornelle NANGAA YOBELU



2/3

Document received from diplomatic source

Annex 25 (para. 78)

AFC/M23 and RDF coordinated redeployments and operations in South Kivu after withdrawal from Uvira

Redéploiements coordonnés et opérations de l'AFC/M23 et des RDF dans le Sud-Kivu après le retrait d'Uvira

Disregarding calls by the United States at the Security Council for a withdrawal at least 75 kilometers north of Uvira,⁴⁰¹ AFC/M23 and RDF only withdrew until Sange, 35 kilometers north of Uvira, in the Ruzizi Plain, where it established its headquarters. In fact, strategic redeployments were aimed at ensuring control of strategic positions in the hills surrounding Uvira, as well as key axes and positions in the Moyens and Hauts Plateaux, which would allow them to project force for subsequent operations.⁴⁰²

The exact strength and geographic distribution of AFC/M23 and RDF deployments could not always be reliably determined. However, as noted in paragraphs 98-100, the RDF exercised operational control over AFC/M23 forces, including through mixed RDF–M23 units and the embedding of RDF officers within M23 units in operational command roles. Accordingly, overall troop estimates are presented on a conservative basis. Furthermore, no significant withdrawals of RDF or M23 personnel were observed, notwithstanding the requirements set out in Resolution 2773 (2025) and subsequent commitments (paras. 43-50).

Positions:

- Forces redeployed in several directions: one contingent advanced north toward Sange along the RN5 between Kamanyola and Uvira, where AFC/M23 established their South Kivu headquarters; another moved south toward Makobola; a third repositioned in the hills surrounding Uvira; and a fourth deployed to the Hauts Plateaux to reinforce Twirwano and Red Tabara combatants.⁴⁰³ Withdrawal included repositioning in, and control of the following areas/localities: Sange, Kamanyola, Lemera, Mulenge, Kahololo, Masango, Bishambo, Mikenge, Kamombo, Tuwe Tuwe, Point Zero, and Minembwe.⁴⁰⁴
- In March 2026, AFC/M23 and RDF forces also occupied the hills of Lemera, west of Sange, forming a corridor extending toward Minembwe (**see map below**).⁴⁰⁵ Continued reinforcements AFC/M23 were reported across the Hauts Plateaux of Fizi Territory and Uvira Territory, as well as on the Ruzizi Plain, throughout March 2026.
- RDF reinforced its presence and positioning on front lines in South Kivu. On 2 February 2026, approximately 25 trucks carrying RDF troops departed from Bugarama and Nyangezi in Rwanda, arriving in Kamanyola before continuing toward Luvungi and Sange along the RN5.⁴⁰⁶ One week later, around 15 additional trucks originating from Bukavu and Rwanda were also observed transiting Kamanyola towards southern positions. These reinforcements aimed to consolidate AFC/M23 positions around Sange and the axis leading to Minembwe in the Hauts Plateaux.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰¹ Request made by the US during an emergency session convened at the UN Security Council on 19 December 2025, following the takeover of Uvira and on the occasion of MONUSCO's mandate renewal, confirmed in Resolution 2808 (2025). See <https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2025/12/114214/security-council-renews-dr-congo-peacekeeping-mission-amid-renewed>.

⁴⁰² Military intelligence, diplomatic sources; UN; AFC/M23 sources; Wazalendo sources; Banyamulenge sources; sources close to RDF.

⁴⁰³ Ibid.


⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁶ Intelligence sources, civil society sources, researchers, and diplomatic sources.

⁴⁰⁷ Military intelligence, diplomatic sources; AFC/M23 sources; Banyamulenge sources and sources close to RDF.

- As of mid-February 2026, RDF deployments in South Kivu were as follows: approximately 1,800 troops along the Ruzizi Plain–Moyens Plateaux axis; 800 troops in the Hauts Plateaux; 1,800 troops along the Ngweshe–Mwenga axis; and an undetermined number elsewhere, including in direction of Fizi.⁴⁰⁸



Map showing positions and movements of the AFC/M23-RDF coalition after the retreat from Uvira – annotated by confidential source, February 2026.

Base map: MONUSCO

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

Operations:

- In late January 2026, the AFC/M23 coalition, including Twirwaneho combatants, launched an offensive and temporarily seized the strategic positions of Point Zero, Kanguli, and Tuwe-Tuwe along the Mwenga–Fizi road. Although FARDC-FDNB forces subsequently regained these positions on 29 January, continued fighting along the southern axis suggests that Baraka, Fizi, and potentially Kalemie remain exposed to further advances. At the time of drafting, intense fighting for control of Minembwe was ongoing.⁴⁰⁹
- In mid-February, the frontline stabilized north of Uvira. Fighting ceased on the Ruzizi Plain but persisted in the highlands. The line settled around Kabunambo (approximately 25 kilometers north of Uvira, south of Sange, where AFC/M23's forward headquarters was located) with a 10–15 kilometer buffer between the warring parties.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

Annex 26 (para. 79)**Résistance pour un État de droit au Burundi (RED-Tabara) and Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL) fighting alongside AFC/M23****Résistance pour un État de droit au Burundi (RED-Tabara) et Forces nationales de libération (FNL) combattant aux côtés de l'AFC/M23**

RED Tabara and FNL armed groups have been targeted by joint FDNB and FARDC attacks since 2023 (S/2023/431, paras. 134-140). Therefore, since the extension of the AFC/M23-crisis into South Kivu, both RED Tabara and FNL have allied themselves with Twirwaneho and AFC/M23. RED Tabara already had long-standing ties with Rwanda and RDF, with recruitment for the group ongoing in refugee camps in Rwanda - particularly Mahama camp - and the subsequent training of recruits occurring at the Gako, Gashora and Gabiro military facilities in Rwanda (S/2024/432, para. 103 and S/2025/446, annex 14).⁴¹⁰

During the reporting period, AFC/M23, Twirwaneho, RED Tabara and FNL, with RDF support, have conducted multiple joint operations, including the capture of key positions along the Mwenga-Fizi axis – notably Point Zero, Kanguli, and Tuwe Tuwe – and sustained operations in and around Minembwe in January and February 2026.⁴¹¹

RED Tabara had long-standing camps in Masango (Uvira territory), Magunda (Mwenga territory), and Kipupu (Mwenga territory). Although the RED Tabara leadership has repeatedly denied any links with AFC/M23, Red Tabara combatants have taken part in hostilities alongside AFC/M23, Twirwaneho, and RDF across several axes, including in including Muranvia and Bijabo, as well as along the routes leading to Minembwe.

FNL elements were present in the Nyaburunda forest (Uvira territory), in mountainous areas near Sange, and in Magunda, where they co-locate with Red Tabara units.

By mid-February 2026, RED Tabara and FNL combatants had physically joined the AFC/M23-RDF-Twirwaneho coalition in the Kamombo sector of the Hauts Plateaux.⁴¹² Intelligence sources also reported that additional RED Tabara and FNL combatants redeployed from the Hauts Plateaux of Fizi, Uvira and Mwenga toward the hills overlooking Sange along the Burundian border.

The proximity of RED Tabara and FNL combatants to the border and their involvement in hostilities alongside AFC/M23 and RDF worried Burundian authorities that the AFC/M23 coalition and Rwanda could use these rebel groups to destabilize Burundi.⁴¹³

Security concerns regarding the cross-border movement of armed actors led Burundi to close border posts with the DRC and designate several frontier areas as “military zones” on 9 December 2025. On 25 February 2026, Burundi reopened a number of crossings, citing economic, humanitarian, and operational/military considerations. This step did not reflect diminished security concerns but rather a transition from emergency closure measures to a system of controlled and securitized border management, characterized by increased patrols, enhanced military presence at key crossing points, and selective restrictions on cross-border movement.

⁴¹⁰ Military, intelligence, former recruits, family members of recruits, former refugees from Mahama refugee camp in Rwanda, armed group sources, and researchers.

⁴¹¹ Military, intelligence, armed group and Banyamulenge sources, and researchers.

⁴¹² Military, intelligence, armed group and Banyamulenge sources, and researchers.

⁴¹³ Burundian authorities.

Annex 27 (para. 90)

Additional information on the AFC/M23 governance structure

Informations complémentaires sur la structure de gouvernance de l'AFC/M23

In its previous reports, the Group documented the AFC/M23 parallel administration and provided details on nominations and newly installed local authorities, including security and intelligence actors (S/2024/432, annex 25; S/2022/967 annex 23; S/2024/969, paras. 40, 59-61; S/2025/446 annex 16).

New appointments following the takeover of Goma and Bukavu have been publicly announced in AFC/M23 communiqués (see below).

On 6 March 2026, AFC/M23 adopted Decision No. 021/COORD-PR/AFC-M23/2026, formalizing the structure of its Political Coordination and appointing senior administrative officials. Through this decision, AFC/M23 designated:

- Tshisola Kwasa Mukwenu Yannick as Chief of Staff of the Political Coordination (Tshisola was suspended on 16 March 2026; subsequently resigned and replaced by Vicky Ntumba in April 2026⁴¹⁴);
- Ruguduka Baleke Stanislas as Deputy Chief of Staff in charge of political, administrative, legal and diplomatic affairs;
- Nsengiyumva Kajombole Victor as Deputy Chief of Staff responsible for economic, financial and development matters, including resource mobilization.

The decision repealed any prior conflicting provisions and tasked the Permanent Secretary of AFC/M23 with its implementation. The decision was signed in Goma by Bertrand Bisimwa, President of M23 and Deputy Coordinator of AFC/M23 in charge of political, administrative, legal and diplomatic affairs.

Nord Kivu:

Under the same provincial order of 1 April 2026, AFC/M23 designated an extensive network of neighborhood-level authorities across the communes of Goma and Karisimbi, covering both primary and deputy positions.

In the **commune of Goma**, the following appointments were made:

- Dedesi Mitima Jean de Dieu as Chief of the Himbi neighborhood, with Kanane Daniel François as Deputy Chief;
- Fanta Sadiki Bella as Chief of Mapendo, with Mukubwa Rwicha Jean de Dieu as Deputy Chief;
- Mwaka Kubuya Jean as Chief of Lac-Vert, with Tshomba Nicolas as Deputy Chief;
- Namunganga Rahabu Françoise as Chief of Kyeshero I, with Rutagaramba Rugo Etienne as Deputy Chief;
- Ishara Nzabanita Emmanuel as Chief of Kyeshero II, with Zabika Zirirane Jonathan as Deputy Chief;
- Akiza Rwabahenda as Chief of Les Volcans, with Grace Faïda Grady as Deputy Chief;
- Habamungo Kadakala Désiré as Chief of Katindo, with Hategekimana Kabaje Jérémie as Deputy Chief;
- Kambale Sikulikyolo Théophile as Chief of Mikenso, with Safari Sambiri Joseph as Deputy Chief.

In the commune of **Karisimbi**, AFC/M23 appointed:

- Bilingo Masandi Annie as Chief of Mabanga-Nord, with Muhamed Batalingane Lucien as Deputy Chief;
- Nzadi Vikayilwira as Chief of Mabanga-Sud, with Matabaro Mastaki Justin as Deputy Chief;
- Bushu Bulenda Georges as Chief of Katoyi, with Anifa Kavira Mwenge as Deputy Chief;

⁴¹⁴ https://x.com/afcongo/status/2042173815896076509?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg

- Bahani Muchinya Sarah as Chief of Kasika, with Obedi Rwabika Léonce as Deputy Chief;
- Habaweze Maliro Germain as Chief of Majengo, with Kavada Balinda as Deputy Chief;
- Busanga Luutu Emile as Chief of Virunga, with Shako Tchomba Souverain as Deputy Chief;
- Nzoloko Akiba Claude as Chief of Mugunga, with Balume Nyirenge Nicodème as Deputy Chief;
- Bahati Lugere Jackson as Chief of Ndosho, with Sadiki Runiha Benjamin as Deputy Chief;
- Gabikire Maguru Ibrahim as Chief of Kahembe, with Mumbere Kavutirwake Michel as Deputy Chief;
- Masinisindano Serge as Chief of Murara, with Mukeyina Brigitte as Deputy Chief;
- Bahemuke Célestin as Chief of Bujovu, with Gafurura Gitsitsi Blaise as Deputy Chief.

Vu l'Arrêté Provincial n°01/005/CAB/GP-NK/2025 du 24 avril 2025 portant organisation et fonctionnement du Cabinet du Gouverneur de la Province du Nord-Kivu ;

Vu l'Arrêté Provincial n°01/007/CAB/GP-NK/2025 du 24 avril 2025 portant nomination des Membres du Cabinet du Gouverneur de la Province du Nord-Kivu ;

Considérant le besoin de doter les quartiers de la Ville de Goma des animateurs capables de répondre aux enjeux actuels de consolidation de paix ;

Vu la nécessité et l'urgence ;

ARRETE :

Article 1^{er} : Sont désignées Chefs de Quartiers et Chefs de Quartiers Adjoints dans la Ville de Goma, les personnes dont les noms, post-noms et prénoms repris ci-dessous en regard de leurs fonctions.

Il s'agit de :

I. COMMUNE DE GOMA		
N°	NOMS, POST-NOMS & PRENOMS	FONCTIONS
1	DEDESI MITIMA Jean de Dieu	Chef de Quartier HIMBI
2	KANANE DANIEL François	Chef de Quartier Adjoint HIMBI
3	FANTA SADIKI Bello	Chef de Quartier MAPENDO
4	MUKUBWA RWICHA Jean de Dieu	Chef de Quartier Adjoint MAPENDO
5	MWAKA KUBUYA Jean	Chef de Quartier LAC-VERT
6	TSHOMBA NICOLAS	Chef de Quartier Adjoint LAC-VERT
7	NAMUNGANGA RAHABU Françoise	Chef de Quartier KYESHERO 1
8	RUTAGARAMBA RUGO Etienne	Chef de Quartier Adjoint KYESHERO 1
9	ISHARA NZABANITA Emmanuel	Chef de Quartier KYESHERO 2
10	ZABIKA ZIRIRANE Jonathan	Chef de Quartier Adjoint KYESHERO 2
11	AKIZA RWABAHENDA	Chef de Quartier LES VOLCANS
12	GRACE FAIDA GRADY	Chef de Quartier Adjoint LES VOLCANS
13	HABAMUNGO KADAKALA Désiré	Chef de Quartier KATINDO
14	HATEGEKIMANA KABAJE Jérémie	Chef de Quartier Adjoint KATINDO
15	KAMBALE SIKULIKYOLO Théophile	Chef de Quartier MIKENO
16	SAFARI SAMBIRI Joseph	Chef de Quartier Adjoint MIKENO
II. COMMUNE DE KARISIMBI		
N°	NOMS, POST-NOMS & PRENOMS	FONCTIONS
1	BILINGO MASANDI Annie	Chef de Quartier MABANGA-NORD
2	MUHAMED BATALINGANE Lucien	Chef de Quartier Adjoint MABANGA-NORD
3	NZADI VIKAYILWIRA	Chef de Quartier MABANGA-SUD
4	MATABARO MASTAKI Justin	Chef de Quartier Adjoint MABANGA-SUD
5	BUSHU BULENDA Georges	Chef de Quartier KATOYI
6	ANIFA KAVIRA MWENGE	Chef de Quartier Adjoint KATOYI

Adresse : Avenue du Lac, Quartier Himbi, Commune de Goma, Goma/RDC
gouverneur@nk2025@gmail.com

7	BAHANI MUCHINYA Sarah	Chef de Quartier KASIKA
8	OBEDI RWABIKA Léonce	Chef de Quartier Adjoint KASIKA
9	HABAZEWE MALIRO Germain	Chef de Quartier MAJENGO
10	KAVADA BALINDA	Chef de Quartier Adjoint MAJENGO
11	BUSANGA LUUTU Emile	Chef de Quartier VIRUNGA
12	SHAKO TCHOMBA Souverain	Chef de Quartier Adjoint VIRUNGA
13	NZOLOKO AKIBA Claude	Chef de Quartier MUGUNGA
14	BALUME NYIRENGE Nicodème	Chef de Quartier Adjoint MUGUNGA
15	BAHATI LUGERE Jackson	Chef de Quartier NDOSHO
16	SADIKI RUNIHA Benjamin	Chef de Quartier Adjoint NDOSHO
17	GABIKIRE MAGURU Ibrahim	Chef de Quartier KAHEMBE
18	MUMBERE KAVUTIRWAKE Michel	Chef de Quartier Adjoint KAHEMBE
19	MASINI SINDANO Serge	Chef de Quartier MURARA
20	MUKEYINA Brigitte	Chef de Quartier Adjoint MURARA
21	BAHEMUKE Célestin	Chef de Quartier BUJOVU
22	GAFURURA GITSITSI Blaise	Chef de Quartier Adjoint BUJOVU

Article 2 : Sont abrogées toutes les dispositions antérieures contraires au présent Arrêté Provincial.

Article 3 : Le Directeur de Cabinet du Gouverneur de Province ainsi que le Maire de Goma sont chargés, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de l'exécution du présent Arrêté Provincial qui sort ses effets à la date de sa signature.

AFC/M22

Fait à Goma, le **01 AVR 2026**

= :BAHATI MUSANGA Erasto :=

Pour copie certifiée conforme à l'Original

Goma, le **01 AVR 2026**

Cabinet du Gouverneur de la Province du Nord-Kivu,

= : **NSANZAMAHORO TENGERA VINCENT** :=

Directeur de Cabinet

On 9 April 2026, the AFC/M23-appointed Governor of North Kivu, Bahati Musanga Joseph, also known as Bahati Erasto (S/2024/432, paras. 35, 36 and 102), adopted a provincial order reorganizing key administrative positions within the province. Citing the need to enhance efficiency and effectiveness within the public administration, the order reassigned several senior officials across territorial and municipal functions:

- Katembo Ndaliéni Julien, previously Mayor of Goma, was appointed Administrator of Lubero Territory,
- Kisuba Ngabo Désiré, formerly Deputy Mayor of Goma, was elevated to Mayor of Goma.
- Nshimimana Juvénal, previously head of mobilization and recruitment, was appointed Deputy Mayor of Goma.
- Katembo Isevisya, formerly Administrator in Lubero, was reassigned as Deputy Mayor of Goma.
- Radjabu Kwizera Elle, previously Assistant Territorial Administrator of Lubero, was appointed Deputy Mayor of the Karisimbi commune.
- Munyandekwe Fizi Innocent, formerly Mayor of Kirumba, was reassigned as Assistant Territorial Administrator of Lubero,
- Kavugho Jeanine, previously Deputy Mayor of Kirumba, was appointed Mayor of Kirumba.

2

Vu l'Arrêté Provincial n°01/001/CAB/GP-NK/2025 du 11 février 2025 portant nomination du Directeur de Cabinet du Gouverneur de la Province du Nord-Kivu ;

Vu l'Arrêté Provincial n°01/005/CAB/GP-NK/2025 du 24 avril 2025 portant organisation et fonctionnement du Cabinet du Gouverneur de la Province du Nord-Kivu ;

Considérant la nécessité de procéder à la permutation de quelques Cadres de l'Administration Publique dans la Province du Nord-Kivu pour des raisons d'efficacité et d'efficacité ;

Vu l'urgence et la nécessité ;

ARRETE :

Article 1^{er} : Sont permuetées de leurs postes d'attache les personnes ci-après dont les fonctions sont reprises en regard de leurs noms et post-noms.

Il s'agit de :

N°	NOMS ET POST-NOMS	ANCIENNE AFFECTATION	NOUVELLE AFFECTATION
01	KATEMBO NDALIENI Julien	Maire de GOMA	Administrateur du Territoire de LUBERO
02	KISUBA NGABO Désiré	Maire Adjoint de GOMA	Maire de GOMA
03	NSHIMIMANA Juvénal	Chef d'Equipe de Mobilisation et Recrutement	Maire Adjoint de GOMA
04	KATEMBO ISEVISYA	Administrateur du Territoire de LUBERO	Bourgmestre Adjoint de la Commune de GOMA
05	RADJABU KWIZERA Elle	Administrateur du Territoire Assistant de LUBERO	Bourgmestre Adjoint de la Commune de KARISIMBI
06	MUNYANDEKWE FIZI Innocent	Bourgmestre de la Commune de KIRUMBA	Administrateur du Territoire Assistant de LUBERO
07	KAVUGHO Jeanine	Bourgmestre Adjoint de la Commune de KIRUMBA	Bourgmestre de la Commune de KIRUMBA

Article 2 : Sont abrogées toutes les dispositions antérieures contraires au présent Arrêté Provincial.

Article 3 : Le Directeur de Cabinet du Gouverneur de Province est chargé de l'exécution du présent Arrêté Provincial qui sort ses effets à la date de sa signature.

Fait à Goma, le **09 AVR 2026**

= : BAHATI MUSANGA Erasto :=

Pour copie certifiée conforme à l'Original
Goma, le **09 AVR 2026**

Cabinet du Gouverneur de la Province du Nord-Kivu,

= : NSANZAMAHORO PENGHA VINCENT

Directeur de Cabinet


Adresse : Avenue du Lac, Quartier Himbi, Commune de Goma, Goma/ROC
E-mail : gouvmonatn2025@gmail.com

Order signed by the AFC/M23 appointed governor of North Kivu. Document received from an economic actor.

Annex 28 (para. 91)**Official records of AFC/M23 codified list of taxes applicable in areas under its control****Documents officiels relatifs à la nomenclature codifiée des taxes de l'AFC/M23 applicables dans les zones sous son contrôle.**

AFC/M23 published a Tax code distinguishing direct taxes ⁴¹⁵ – including on personal and corporate income – from other categories of taxes, and specified for each levy the taxable event, periodicity, and applicable rate. The code has set out a structured and comprehensive revenue framework for AFC/M23.

On 24 March 2026, in Goma, AFC/M23 officially launched the new fiscal nomenclature for territories under its control in North and South Kivu provinces.⁴¹⁶ The initiative was led by the AFC/M23's Coordination through its Finance Department, represented by the Deputy Head of Finance, Fanny Kaj Kayembe, in the presence of the Vice-Governor in charge of finance, economy and development, Chadrack Amani Bahati, as well as provincial financial sector authorities (customs, tax, etc.) and members of the Federation of Enterprises of the Congo (FEC).



Document received from AFC/M23 sources.


⁴¹⁵ The document is on file with the Secretariat.

⁴¹⁶ [GOMA: L' AFC M23 LANCE OFFICIELLEMENT UNE NOUVELLE NOMANCLATURE](#)

AFC/M23 information campaign for the dissemination of its tax code⁴¹⁷

Following the publication of its Tax code, AFC/M23 conducted large dissemination within the territories under its control in eastern DRC.

On 27 March, AFC/M23 Governor for South Kivu convened all Congolese States provincial directors and heads of divisions of public services, including mines, customs, tax, migration, agriculture, states water company (REGIDESO) and electricity (SNEL) companies, and AFC/M23 local authorities to attend a meeting dedicated to the presentation and dissemination of the AFC/M23 tax code. On 28 March 2026, in Bukavu, the Deputy Head of the AFC/M23 Finance Department, Fanny Kaj Kayemb, handed over the new tax nomenclature to the Governor of South Kivu, Busu Bwa Ngwi Shombo Patrick.⁴¹⁸



Document received from AFC/M23 sources.

⁴¹⁷ AFC-Alliance Fleuve Congo on X: "AFC/M23 : UNE RÉVOLUTION FISCALE EN GESTATION POUR LIBÉRER LA RDC DE L'ARBITRAIRE Pendant que l'ancien pouvoir de Kinshasa laissait prospérer une fiscalité chaotique, étouffante et gangrenée par les prélèvements fantômes, l'AFC/M23 pose aujourd'hui les bases d'une réforme <https://t.co/IgispB21Gu>" / X

⁴¹⁸ CONGO RÉVOLUTION on X: "Ce samedi 28 mars 2028 à Bukavu, la cheffe adjointe du département des finances de l'AFC/M23, @FannyKaj1, a remis au gouverneur du Sud-Kivu la nouvelle nomenclature. Sur 536 taxes et impôts de l'ancienne nomenclature, 225 sont maintenus, soit un écart de 311, ou 60 %. <https://t.co/I557YHscuT>" / X

Annex 29 (para. 92)

AF/M23 Finance department letter issued to a private company in Goma for the collection of taxes

Correspondance du département des finances de l'AFC/M23 adressée à une entreprise privée à Goma pour la collecte des taxes

The Group obtained a tax enforcement notice issued by the AFC/M23 provincial finance coordination in North Kivu through the Karisimbi-Nyiragongo revenue operations center. The notice instructed a private economic operator to present themselves within five days to declare and settle outstanding liabilities, including property tax, rental income tax, and other applicable duties and fees. It further indicated that failure to comply would result in ex officio tax assessment with penalties.

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
DEPARTEMENT DES FINANCES

Goma, le 26 MARS 2026

COORDINATION PROVINCIALE DES FINANCES DU NORD-KIVU (CPF-NK)
Centre Opérationnel de Recettes de Karisimbi-Nyiragongo

N° [REDACTED] K-N/2026

TRANSMIS copie pour information à :

- Monsieur le Chef de Centre Opérationnel des Recettes de Karisimbi-Nyiragongo, à Goma.

Objet : Vos obligations déclaratives
Relance.

A Monsieur Le bailleur de [REDACTED]
à Goma.
Monsieur,

J'ai l'honneur de vous demander de vous présenter au Bureau du Centre Opérationnel des Recettes de Karisimbi-Nyiragongo sis sur Office 1, Quartier Murara, Commune de Karisimbi, Entrée Evêché, en diagonale de l'Institut Mama Mulezi, afin de déclarer et payer vos Impôts Fonciers (IF) et Impôt sur les Revenus Locatifs (IRL) ainsi que les Droits, Taxes et Redevances vous concernant et ce, pour les périodes non encore en ordre.

Pour ce faire, vous disposez d'un délai de **cinq (5) jours** pour passer à nos Bureaux en vue de régulariser votre situation. A défaut de vous conformer au délai ci-haut évoqué, l'Administration fiscale sera dans l'obligation de vous imposer d'office avec pénalités conformément à la loi.

de mes sentiments civiques et patriotiques.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur, l'expression

Le Coordonnateur Provincial Adjoint en Charge
des Finances Publiques et Impôts.

[Signature]

== : NDAYAMBAJE BIRAHIRA ==

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
DEPARTEMENT DES FINANCES
DIRECTION GENERALE DES FINANCES
DGF : I-K

Adresse : 12/18 Avenue M...

Document received from a confidential source.

Annex 30 (para. 92)

Examples of AFC/M23 issued receipts for taxes and fees

Exemples des reçus émis par l'AFC/M23 pour des taxes et autres paiements

1. AFC/M23 issued receipt through CADECO payment slips for “custom fees” payment

Payment fees delivered by the AFC/M23 following the issuance of a construction permit using a receipt of CADECO.

The image shows two documents. The top document is a CADECO payment slip, which is a receipt for payment of taxes and fees. It contains fields for 'Montant du Versement' (Amount of Payment) and 'Observation' (Observation). The bottom document is an AFC/M23 receipt, which is a receipt for payment of taxes and fees. It contains a table with 'X' marks and a section for '2. A REMPLIR PAR L'ORDONNATEUR' (To be filled by the Authorizing Officer) with handwritten text 'Favorable'.

Document obtained from confidential armed group source

2. AFC/M23 ticket for a traffic notice amounting to \$100 as per AFC/M23 tax code

The Group obtained a traffic violation notice issued by the AFC/M23 “Revolutionary Police” traffic unit in Goma, documenting the enforcement of road regulations. The notice recorded a fine of USD 100 imposed on a driver for driving under the influence of alcohol.

ALLIANCE FLEUVE CONGO / M23
POLICE DE REVOLUTIONNAIRE
POLICE DE CIRCULATION ROUTIERE
ESCADRON DE GOMA

CONTRAVENTION ROUTIERE / PCR/ESCG/20.....

1. IDENTIFICATION DU VEHICULE

Date:
Genre: TYPE Marque:
Plaque:
Propriétaire: Tél:
Conducteur: Tél:
Permis de conduire No Validité

2. DOCUMENTS SAISIS

3. INFRACTIONS CONSTATEES

1.
2.
3.

CONTRAVENANT AGENT QUALIFIE

Document illustrating traffic fine applied by AFC/M23, received from a confidential source.

3. AFC/M23 issued receipt illustrating exit visa fee from the DRC territory for seven days as per the provision of article I.2.1 of AFC/M23 tax code.



AFC/M23 issued token illustrating exit visa fee from the DRC territory as per article I.2.1(1) of AFC/M23 tax code.



Documents received from a confidential source.

Annex 31 (para. 93)

AFC/M23 took control of the national electricity (SNEL) water utility (REGIDESO) companies in territories under its control.

L’AFC/M23 a pris le contrôle de la société nationale d’électricité (SNEL) et de la Régie de distribution d’eau (REGIDESO) dans les territoires sous son contrôle

On 5 March 2026 in Goma, AFC/M23 Permanent Secretary and Head of the Executive, Benjamin Mbonimpa, convened the management of SNEL and REGIDESO, in the presence of the AFC/M23-appointed Governor of South Kivu and the deputy head of the finance department, to announce AFC/M23 take over both SNEL and Regideso.

AFC/M23 subsequently placed both SNEL and Regideso under the administrative authority of provincial governors and the financial oversight of its finance department, while mandating the centralizing and banking all revenues of these entities under a “single window” system.⁴¹⁹

⁴¹⁹ (163) L'AFC-M23 pour une réadaptation du mode de gestion technique et financière de la SNEL et la Regideso - YouTube

Annex 32 (para. 93)

AFC/M23-linked Imperial Assur Insurance company


Société d'assurance Imperial Assur liée à l'AFC/M23

AFC/M23 facilitated the replacement of existing insurance companies, in particular the National Insurance Company (SONAS) with new entities such as Imperial Assur,⁴²⁰ which began operations in mid-2025. The Group obtained copies of official notices issued by AFC/M23 mandating compulsory third-party liability insurance for all vehicles and transport operators. The notice in South Kivu designated Imperial Assur as the provider responsible for delivering insurance services and set a two-week compliance period, after which enforcement measures—including vehicle checks, immobilization, and impoundment—would be implemented.



Communiqué by the AFC/M23 appointed mayor of Bukavu. Document received from AFC/M23 source.

⁴²⁰ Sud-Kivu : Imperial Assur lance ses activités à Bukavu - Radio Maendeleo



Communiqué of the AFC/M23-appointed governor for North Kivu. Document received from AFC/M23 source.

Imperial Assur-issued administrative and commercial documents

The Group obtained a set of administrative and commercial documents evidencing the sequential process required for vehicle regularization in areas under AFC/M23 control. These included a receipt issued by the Congolese State provincial *Bureau d'Enregistrement et de Développement (BED)* for vehicle registration (USD 50), a corresponding registration certificate valid for one year, and insurance documentation issued by *Imperial Assur*. The registration certificate identified the vehicle, owner, and validity period.

Insurance documentation reviewed by the Group included payment receipts and certificates issued by *Imperial Assur* for multiple vehicles, indicating standardized third-party liability coverage ("responsabilité civile") for defined durations (typically three to six months). Premiums observed range between USD 107 and USD 690 depending on vehicle category and duration.

Receipts evidencing insurance coverage with Imperial Assur.

BED
Bureau d'enregistrement et de développement (BED)
Adresse: 141. AV. Patrice Emery LUMUMBA,
Q. Nderere, Commune d'IBANDA, Ville de BUKAVU
Email: bedcongoinfo@gmail.com / Tél: +243 849098277

REÇU N° [REDACTED]

En Chiffres [REDACTED]

REÇU DE: [REDACTED]

La somme de (en toute lettres) [REDACTED]

Pour: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Signature [REDACTED]

IDENTIFICATION DU CLIENT	
Nom [REDACTED]	Adresse Physique [REDACTED]
Prénoms [REDACTED]	Nature Document Identité [REDACTED]
Téléphone [REDACTED]	Nature Document [REDACTED]
Email [REDACTED]	

IDENTIFICATION DU VEHICULE	
Immatriculation [REDACTED]	Puissance Fiscale (CV) [REDACTED]
Numéro Chassis [REDACTED]	Matr. [REDACTED]
Marque [REDACTED]	Année de Fabrication [REDACTED]
Type de Véhicule [REDACTED]	Année de mise en circulation [REDACTED]
Modèle [REDACTED]	Couleur [REDACTED]
Nombre de sièges [REDACTED]	Usage [REDACTED]
	Durée (Mois) [REDACTED]

Annex 33 (para. 94)


AFC/M23 - Financial intermediation and emergence of parallel banking channels

AFC/M23 – Intermédiation financière et émergence de circuits bancaires parallèles

The Group documented the emergence of financial intermediation mechanisms operating within areas under AFC/M23 control, such as “Accès Finance S.A.”,⁴²¹⁴²²⁴²³ which presented itself as a financial institution offering deposit, transfer and account-based services. The company was operational in Goma and Rubaya, with planned expansion to Bukavu.

Account documentation from January 2026, including client identification details and account numbers, indicated that individuals were able to open and operate accounts through this entity. AFC/M23 promoted Access Finance S.A., expanding financial intermediation in areas under its control and potentially enabling oversight and capture of financial flows.⁴²⁴

No publicly verifiable evidence of regulatory authorization from the Central Bank of the Congo exists for this company, nor confirmation of its inclusion among licensed banks, microfinance institutions, or electronic money issuers. The activities of Accès Finance indicate the provision of financial services outside the State financial system, contributing to the development of parallel financial channels benefiting AFC/M23.



⁴²¹ Official / primary web presence: <https://accesfinance.africa> also appears as: <https://www.accesfinance.africa>)

⁴²² App distribution: Google Play listing:

<https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.banksoft.client.accessFinance>

⁴²³ LinkedIn: <https://cd.linkedin.com/company/acces-finance>

YouTube (example video): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5kOWihG3WPg>

Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/100067446540898/videos/-bonne-nouvelle-pour-la-population-de-goma-sous-l'autorit%C3%A9-de-lafem23-la-stabilit%C3%A9-1608550256803084/>

⁴²⁴ <https://www.facebook.com/m23twirwaneho/videos/rdc-rubaya-acces-finance-une-nouvelle-banque-op%C3%A9rant-dans-le-nord-kivu-territoire/1272577938091509/>

AF www.accesfinance.africa
www.accesfinances.net
contact@accesfinance.net
10, Boulevard Kanyamuhanga, Quartier
les Volcans, Commune de Goma, Ville Goma

AF **Accès Finance**
Votre partenaire Épargne-Répère

Nom du Compte : [REDACTED]
Code Client : [REDACTED]
Numero Compte : [REDACTED]
Date de creation: [REDACTED]

Merci d'avoir choisi Accès Finance SA. Votre confiance nous honore et nous
engage à être à vos côtés pour réaliser vos projets et bâtir ensemble
un avenir prospère.

Documents obtained from confidential source.

Annex 34 (para. 105)

Documents relating to the attempt to establish a « Coalition nationale des Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie » in December 2025

Documents relatifs à la tentative d'établir une « Coalition nationale des Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie » en décembre 2025

**COMMISSION PRÉPARATOIRE ELECTIVE DU DIRECTOIRE EXÉCUTIF
NATIONAL DE LA COALITION DES VDP- WAZALENDO EN RD CONGO**

Tél (+243)815807743/995546010/838806210

E-mail: coanatvdpwazalendo@gmail.com

À la particulière attention des Responsables des mouvements ou groupes des VDP –WAZALENDO de la RD Congo, Tous, avec pouvoir de Représentation par procuration spéciale ;

Qualité : Délégué à l'Élection / Membre de la Commission / Personnalité Invitée

Messieurs ou Mesdames les Responsables des mouvements ou groupes des VDP – WAZALENDO de la RD Congo, Tous, avec pouvoir de Représentation par procuration spéciale ;

Votre Commission Préparatoire électorale a l'honneur et l'urgence de vous convier à l'étape finale et historique de la mise en place de notre Directoire National.

Cette cérémonie marquera l'aboutissement de nos efforts d'unification derrière la vision du Chef de l'État, S.E. Félix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo, et condensera en trois heures les phases cruciales suivantes : l'Élection, la Proclamation des résultats et l'Installation des membres du Directoire Exécutif National.

Détails de l'événement	
Date	Samedi 13 Décembre 2025
Heure	12h00 précises (Clôture impérative à 18h00)
Lieu	Salle LA REINE DE LA PAIX, GOMBE, en diagonal de l'INRB, Huileries, Kinshasa
Tenue	Tenue de ville

Votre ponctualité est essentielle pour le bon déroulement du processus électoral (pour les postes compétitifs) et pour le respect du chronogramme serré.

Veuillez agréer, **Monsieur le Chef d'État-Major-Général des FARDC**, l'expression de notre très haute considération et de notre engagement patriotique.

Fait à Kinshasa, le 10/12/2025



Me Richard PALUKU, Président de la Commission Préparatoire Élective

CHRONOGRAMME DÉTAILLÉ FINAL DE L'ACTIVITÉ

Événement : Mise en place du Directoire Exécutif National de la Coalition VDP-WAZALENDO

Lieu : Kinshasa Période : 12h00 précises à 18h00

Heure (Début)	Heure (Fin)	Durée	Phase de l'Événement	Activité Principale	Responsable
12h00	12h25	25 min	1. ÉLECTION / VOTE	Accueil des Délégués et Participants, Remise de la Brochure de Présentation Institutionnelle Stratégique de la Coalition Nationale VDP/WAZALENDO et Démarrage immédiat du Vote pour les postes compétitifs.	Commission/P protocole
12h25	12h40	15 min	2. TRANSITION / ANALYSE	Clôture des opérations de vote, Mot de la Commission et lecture du Rapport Synthétique des travaux préparatoires.	Président de la Commission
12h40	13h10	30 min	3. PROCLAMATION DES RÉSULTATS	PROCLAMATION OFFICIELLE et définitive des 23 membres élus et désignés (y compris les postes par cooptation).	Secrétaire Rapporteur
13h10	13h40	30 min	4. INSTALLATION OFFICIELLE	Lecture des Actes d'Investiture et Cérémonie de Prestation de Serment des membres du Directoire.	Doyen d'âge
13h40	14h00	20 min	5. ORIENTATION	Discours d'Orientation du nouveau Président du Directoire Exécutif National. ¹⁰	Nouveau Président du Directoire ¹¹
14h00	14h45	45 min	6. TRAVAUX INITIAUX (Urgence)	Première session de travail : Adoption du Règlement Intérieur du Directoire.	Directoire Exécutif National
14h45	15h00	15 min	7. CLÔTURE OFFICIELLE	Lecture des résolutions (si nécessaire), Photos de Famille et Fin de la cérémonie formelle.	Président du Directoire
15h00	16h00	60 min	8. POINT DE PRESSE	Conférence de presse du nouveau Directoire Exécutif National (DEN) avec les médias nationaux et internationaux.	Porte-Parole du DEN
16h00	18h00	2h00	9. COCKTAIL & ÉCHANGES	Réception, cocktail et échanges protocolaires entre les membres du Directoire, les autorités invitées et les délégués.	Protocole/Organisation
18h00			FIN DE L'ÉVÉNEMENT	Clôture impérative du site.	

Fait à Kinshasa, le 10/12/2025

Me Richard PALUKU



Président de la Commission Préparatoire Élective

LISTE DES MEMBRES DU DIRECTOIRE EXECUTIF NATIONAL DE LA COALITION NATIONALE DES PATRIOTES (VDP/WAZALENDU) EN RDC.

Fonction / Rôle	Nom / Prénom et Contacts	Observations
MEMBRES DU CONSEIL D'ADMINISTRATION		
Président du Conseil d'Administration	Hon. Prince Willy MISHIKI BUIHINI	
MEMBRES DU DIRECTOIRE EXECUTIF NATIONAL		
Président National	Dashy Suleh Idi Emmanuel	
1 ^{er} Vice-Président National	WABWELWA KIWIILA Duhon	
2 ^{ème} Vice-Président National	OMBWA SHAFEPÉ MUNABAKASAMBE	
3 ^{ème} Vice-Président National	ENGÉ LOMBE Gérard	
Porte-Parole	ASSANDA MWENEBATU Joseph	
Porte-Parole adjoint	AKILI MAGAYANE KUAMBILIWA	

solidarité nationale, affaires humanitaire, genre, femme et famille		
Secrétariat National (SN) / Chargé des affaires coutumières, traditionnelle, culturelles et mystico- religieuse	SELEMANI BWAMI KITUNDA [REDACTED]	
Membre rattaché (Affaires coutumières)	KAKULE SAHANI MONILPH [REDACTED]	
Membre rattaché (Affaires coutumières)	JOSEPHINE MURIMANYA CIRUZA [REDACTED]	
Secrétariat National (SN) / Chargé de la Mobilisation, RH et Organisations des missions	NELIBIZI AIMABLE [REDACTED]	
Secrétariat National (SN) / Chargé des affaires politiques, relations avec les institutions, FARDC et PNC		
Membre rattaché (Affaires Politiques)	BWETSHIA KABENGELE HUGOR [REDACTED]	
Membre rattaché (Relation avec les institutions, FARDC et PNC)	GUSTAVO FRANCISCO KASONGO [REDACTED]	

Secrétariat National (SN) / Chargé des Affaires Juridiques	Me PALUKU MATOFALI GUY RICHARD SAMUEL [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Secrétariat National (SN) / Chargé des Relations Interprovinciales	Monsieur BUSHENYULA CIHEBEYE CHRISTIAN [REDACTED]	

Documents received from Wazalendo and DRC government sources

Annex 35 (para. 109)

Wazalendo armed groups and “generals” active in southern South Kivu in early December 2025

Groupes armés Wazalendo et « généraux » actifs dans le sud du Sud-Kivu au début du mois de décembre 2025.

2

I. EFFECTIFS DES COMBATTANTS ENGAGES AUX FRONTS

N°	GROUPE ARME	LOCALISATION	RESPONSABLE	GRADE	EFFECTIF
1	FPL	LUBARIKA	ALEXIS MWAMBA DUNIA	Lt Gén. -	3786
2	COPACO	ZIRALO	KIRIKICHO MIRIMBA	-	675
3	RM	BUNYAKIRI/KALEHE	MUNGORO MATOFALI	-	517
4	APL	LUSAMBO	MAYELE WILONDJIA RASHIDI	-	450
5	CNPSC	BABENGWA	AMURI WILLIAM YAKOTUMBA	-	362
6	CPLC/FABB	KABANJA	KALEMBE NGOMANZITO	-	1093
7	MPLC/FPLC	KALONGE	RENE MUKANDAMA ITONGWA	-	546
8	MNLC	KAGOGO	KASHUMBA MUSAGARA	-	254
9	UCAC	MUNANIRA	JEAN NALUBE	-	322
10	UPCB	MASANGO	ILUNGA RUSESEMA	-	1080
11	LPCC	MASANGO RUDEFU	MUHUBIRI MUSHOMBE PACIFIQUE	-	511
12	MPDAC	KAGOGO	OMARI NAMUTAGA	-	176
13	FPDP	KITALA	KURUNINGA VENANCE	-	112
14	MRPC	BUTUMBA	AMURI MAMADOU	-	234
15	FPCC	LUHITO	NYERERE BUNANA	-	256
16	MAIMAI NDONDI	KATOBO	NDONDI	-	121
17	URCOP	KIRAMBI	KASHOLOGOSI BIRASI JOHN	-	233
18	MDP	RUBANGA	MAKANAKI KASIMBIRA JOHN	-	123
19	MAIMAI PATRON	MASANGO 2	PATRON	-	125
20	FPC	LULAMBO	MCHINGWA	-	231
21	MAIMAI TORONTO	LWEBE	TORONTO	-	424
22	MAIMAI REUNION	MAKYAKA	REUNION	-	112
23	GPE DE JEUNES	MALINGI	MAMASA KAJIWEKA	-	343
24	MULC	KISEKE	MILENGE ISHIBONANE ZELAMBUMA	-	162

3

25	FCLP	NANINDI	E'A MUKINA CESAR	-	454
26	MAIMAI ISHIBWELA	KONGWE	ISHIBWELA WAELENGO	-	277
27	MAIMAI ANGULU	ACIKA	ICIMBOELO	-	124
28	MAIMAI AOCI	KIPOMBO	AOCI WITANDA	-	156
29	MCVA	LUBUMBA	ISSA MUTOKA NGUVU ZA MILIMA	-	378
30	MAIMAI LWISULA	MIKI	KWISULA KISALE C'ARRIVE	-	132
31	FPDC	KIPUPU	KIBUKILA MUTETEZI TRESOR	-	521
32	MAIMAI MUPEKENYA	MATHETA	LWIKO	-	241
33	FDCC	TUWETUWE	KAKOBANYA NAKALAMBI	-	345
34	MAIMAI NAKILIBA	KIGOGO	NAKILIBA MATEBURA	-	224
35	MAIMAI ACTION	MUHUZI	ACTION LEOPOLD	-	184
36	UPC	MUKUTU	RUMA HONDWA	-	134
37	RM	NYAMIBUNGU	IBANDA WABENGA	-	642
38	RM	CIRONGE	MUS MUBANGO SAFARI	-	321
39	APDC/RM	KASHESHI/KASHIMBA	GASTON LUKISA BLAISE	-	883
40	RM	MUPOKE	LUKOBANAMUNINGA	-	124
41	RM	LWAMBA	WINDELA KAFUMA	-	320
42	RM	MUMBILI	100 KILOS WABULA	-	123
43	RM	LUYULU	KIMBA MUSAFIRI	-	131
44	RM	MIGELE	MUKAMBA BOZY	-	89
45	RM	BWANA HALI	KABALA MUSUMBU	-	476
46	MAIMAI KIMPENZE	WAMITI	BIMPENZE MANZYA	-	454
47	MAIMAI	KITINDI	MAKINDU	-	467

48	MAIMAI SHUSHA	LWEKA	VANDAME	-	143
49	MPDAC	KAGOGO	RUKUMETA PIERRE	-	504
50	KIBALO KYETU	MASANGO	JULES MAVAZI	-	215
51	LANDA BANGO	KIRUNGU	HURUMA LANDA BANGO	-	118
52	MMK	SANGE	KAMAMA MBIGIRWA	-	1213
53	UPCN	LEMERA	JOGO BYAMUNGU	-	106
54	FABB-A	MIRIMBA	ASSANI MBAKANI	-	122
55	CPDC	LULENGE	MEDI YEREMIA	-	111
56	MPLC/SEBA	LUVUNGI	SEBASTIEN NAMULERHA	-	143
57	UPCRN	MINOVA	GENTIL TUUNGANE	-	345
58	GAM	SEBELE	OLIVIER KIZA	-	130
59	FPDP/RDC	NYAMUTIRI	EMMANUEL MBOLE	-	267
60	AFPDC	LUBERIZI	MAMAN CLAUDINE	-	127
61	CNL/FAP	LUBERIZI	MWENYEMALI YOSHUA	-	87
62	UPN	LUVUNGI	DORCAS NDAMUSO ABDOU	-	288
63	PNCN	MULENGE	TUNDWA EFESO	-	75
64	UCL	KAHANDA	KIJANGALA MUTONGA	-	61
65	FAP	LANGALA/LEMERA	NAKAMBOGO NDEGESHA	-	43
66	MALAIKA	MULANGABALA/KASO NGO	IMANI MANDEVU	-	470
67	MALAIKA	MACHAPANO/NAMO YA	KABALA SELEMANI	-	300
68	UPPD/RDC	KAZIBA WALUNGU	POUTINE RIZIKI	-	402
69	MCDPIN/RAD	KALEHE HAUTS PLATEAUX	HAGUMA RUKEBA MIKE MIKE	-	783
70	PDNC	MULUME MUNENE	OLAME CHRISTOPHE	-	251
71	M. MAHESHE	WALUNGU	MAHESHE	-	302
72	M. NYAMBABA	WALUNGU	JOSUE NYAMABA	-	301
73	APDC/RAD	KALEHE	BAHIGE/KALUME	-	854
74	UPDC/RM	WALUNGU	MAATABARO JESUS	-	600
75	RM	MWEMA	KALUME MUKANIWA KIWIS	-	256
76	MRPDP	KATOBO	MECHACK RADI	-	110
77	FARC	BIJOMBO/ISHENGE	SAMUEL MAYELE CLEVER	-	400
SOUS TOTAL					29744

Commentaire : Des ces effectifs comme l'indique le tableau ci-dessus, il y a dans les 29744 éléments engagés sur les lignes des fronts, quelques centaines des combattants venus du Maniema et du Tanganyika.

Document received from a confidential source.

Annex 37 (para. 124)


CNPSC – Structured taxation system and sectoral revenue framework

CNPSC – Système de taxation structuré et cadre sectoriel de génération de revenus


The Group obtained a circular issued by the “Bureau des finances” of the CNPSC, under the label “Réserve armée de défense” (RAD), outlining a coordinated system of taxation across areas under its influence. The document, presented as a formal fiscal directive, framed taxation as a contribution to the “effort de guerre” and was addressed to administrative structures at sector, groupement, and village levels, indicating an organized chain of dissemination and enforcement.

The taxation framework established fixed and standardized tax across a wide range of economic actors and sectors. These included commercial entities and service providers such as agencies (USD 1,000), motorcycle associations (USD 1,000), cooperatives and traders (USD 2,000–5,000), hotels and bars (USD 3,000), and transport-related actors, including tankers (USD 5,000). The system further targeted productive sectors and supply chains, including mining cooperatives (USD 2,000), gold processing equipment such as generators and crushing tools (up to USD 5,000), fishing-related activities, timber depots, and agricultural services.

In addition, the framework imposed sector-specific charges on essential and small-scale economic activities, including restaurants (USD 2,000), pharmacies (USD 1,000), hydraulic associations (USD 500), and waste management services (USD 5,000). The inclusion of both large-scale and subsistence-level actors suggests an effort to maximize revenue extraction across the full spectrum of local economic activity. The document also referenced a “50 per cent share” linked to “state services”..



1. AGENCE : 1.000 \$ Par Agence
2. ASSOCIATION DE MOTARD : 1.000 \$ Par Association
3. CONCASIER : En Générale : 5.000 \$
4. FEC : 5.000 \$
5. TRAITEMENT DE DECHETS : Par unité 5.000 \$
6. Les Négociants : 5.000\$
 - Machine pour bruler l'or en Général : 5.000 \$
7. MARTON PIQUEUR en Général : 5.000 \$
8. P.P.O : Selon le puits influant 1.000 \$
9. LES SERVICES DEL' ETAT 50 %
 - D agri : 500 \$
 - KAPATA : 500 \$
10. Bisima ya maji : 1.000\$
11. Association des Hydrauliques ; 500\$
12. BOITE et HOTEL en général : 3.000 \$
13. Grand Maisons négociants : 5.000\$ (Négociants)
14. Police Routière : 1.000 \$
15. D.MAP : 1.000 \$ (Voir Pablo)
16. Coopératives Minières : 2.000\$
17. Kasomba en Général: 2.000\$
18. Lotéristes : 3.000\$
18. Tankiers en Général : 5.000\$



Document obtained from confidential Wazalendo source, military intelligence, mine operators, and mining services.


Annex 38 (para. 125)

CNPSC – documents evidencing the exercise of quasi-judicial authority


CNPSC – documents attestant l'exercice des fonctions quasi judiciaires

1. Closure orders evidencing sustained judicial enforcement and regulatory control over mining activities (December 2023–August 2026)

The Group obtained official “closure orders” (“ordres de fermeture”) issued by the CNPSC’s “Bureau de la justice”, directing the suspension of mining activities at identified sites in areas under its influence, including locations in Ngoma and Misisi, in Fizi territory. The documents identified responsible individuals, specified the affected mining sites, and indicated dates of enforcement spanning multiple years (including 18 December 2023 and 23 August 2026), suggesting continuity in the exercise of authority over time. The orders further state that all extraction activities had to cease immediately and warned that any violation would result in arrest and referral to CNPSC “justice” authorities.



Document obtained from confidential mine pit owners and Wazalendo source



Document obtained from confidential mine pit owners and Wazalendo source.

2. CNPSC “Justice” - Official summons (“invitation”) issued to a mine pit owner.


The Group obtained an official summons (“invitation”) issued by the CNPSC under its “Justice” structure, requiring a named individual to appear before a judicial office in Ngoma on a specified date (18 December 2024).



Document obtained from confidential source.

3. Judicial records evidencing the exercise of quasi-judicial authority

The Group obtained multiple handwritten judicial documents issued under the authority of the CNPSC “Department of Justice,” including a formal judgment relating to a dispute between private individuals. The documents identified the parties involved, outlined the facts of the case, and recorded findings following an investigation conducted by CNPSC-affiliated authorities. They included references to evidentiary elements, witness statements, and the reasoning underpinning the decision, and were signed by designated judicial officials, with references to a “High Council” authority. The documents had official stamps and indicated dates and locations of issuance (e.g., Ngoma, April 2022).



Document obtained from confidential source.

Annex 39 (para. 132)

Letter from Victor Byiringiro the FDLR “President” addressed to the U.S. President, and FDLR manifest received in April 2026

Lettre adressée par Victor Byiringiro, « Président » des FDLR, au Président des États-Unis, et le manifeste FDLR reçu en avril 2026

(1) Letter addressed to the U.S President by the president of FDLR



BUREAU DU PRESIDENT / IBIRO BYA PEREZIDA / OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Homepage: <https://urugaga.org> Tel: +243 858 820 862 Email: fdlr2020@proton.me

A Son Excellence Monsieur le Président des États-Unis d'Amérique
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington, DC 20500
USA

Le 02 Juillet 2025

Objet : Contribution des Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda pour ramener la paix dans la Région des Grands Lacs Africains.

Monsieur le Président

Permettez-nous de vous adresser, avec tout le respect dû à votre haute fonction, nos sincères félicitations pour la signature de l'Accord de paix de Washington intervenue le 27 Juin 2025 entre la République Démocratique du Congo et la République du Rwanda. Vous avez brillamment réussi dans les délais record où d'innombrables acteurs ont échoué pendant trois (3) décennies d'insécurité à l'Est de la République Démocratique du Congo.

Les Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) accueillent favorablement et soutiennent toutes les initiatives sincères visant à ramener une paix véritable et durable dans la Région des Grands Lacs Africains (RGLA) en mettant fin définitivement aux conflits armés récurrents qui ravagent la Région depuis plus de trois décennies et qui avaient déjà coûté la vie à plus de dix (10) millions d'êtres humains en RDC (ex-Zaïre) en 2010 (cfr le rapport Mapping de l'ONU, 2010, toujours classé sans suite et le rapport Gersony).

Les FDLR remercient toutes les personnes physiques ou morales qui ont œuvré pendant ces trois décennies passées à trouver les voies et moyens pour résoudre l'épineux problème de l'insécurité persistante dans la RGLA. Elles remercient particulièrement le Président américain M. Donald TRUMP qui s'y est investi personnellement et dont les efforts ont abouti à l'Accord de paix du 27/06/2025 entre la RDC et le Rwanda. Elles remercient aussi la SADC, la Communauté Sant'Egidio, l'Eglise du Christ au Congo, l'Union Africaine, l'Union Européenne, la Communauté des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Est (EAC) et l'ONU pour leurs efforts inlassables dans la recherche d'une paix juste et durable dans la Région.

Les FDLR soulignent néanmoins que, contrairement à la propagande du régime rwandais et ses soutiens politiques, elles n'ont jamais été une menace pour le Peuple Rwandais dont elles sont par ailleurs l'émanation et pour lequel elles luttent.

De même, contrairement au narratif que le régime rwandais ne cesse de chanter pour tromper l'opinion publique internationale, les FDLR ne sont pas une organisation génocidaire ou terroriste. Kigali tient ce narratif afin que l'opinion internationale détourne son regard des crimes contre l'humanité, des crimes de guerre et crimes de génocide dont il est coupable dans la Région.

En effet, dès sa création en Mai 2000 par des réfugiés rwandais disséminés à travers le monde, et après le calvaire inédit vécu par les survivants des différents massacres commis par le Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR-Inkotanyi) au Rwanda et en RDC, et abandonnés à leur triste sort après le désengagement des institutions internationales en charge des réfugiés, le mouvement « Les Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, FDLR en sigle » s'est donné pour mission de protéger les réfugiés rwandais rescapés, contre les récurrentes menaces d'extermination proférées et exécutées par les forces du FPR-INKOTANYI sans discontinuer depuis trois décennies.

Par ailleurs, les FDLR se sont impliquées activement, et ont toujours manifesté leur volonté de participer dans toutes les initiatives visant à ramener la paix et la stabilité dans la Région.

Parmi ces initiatives il y a lieu de citer:

- le désarmement et le cantonnement des combattants à Kamina et la destruction des armes devant la Communauté Internationale à Kinshasa en 2001 ;
- la déclaration de Rome par les FDLR devant la Communauté Internationale et sous la facilitation de la Communauté Sant'Egidio (Mars/Avril 2005) ;
- les rencontres de Chambucha et de Ntoto avec les représentants de la RDC sous les auspices de l'Eglise du Christ au Congo (2007 et 2011) ;
- la rencontre de Nyabiondo entre les représentants du Gouvernement de la RDC, de la MONUSCO et des FDLR sous la facilitation de l'Eglise du Christ au Congo (2008) ;
- la contribution à la Conférence de Goma (2008) ;
- le désarmement de plus de 1500 combattants, la remise de leurs armes à la SADC/MONUSCO et le cantonnement des combattants désarmés et de leurs dépendants dans les camps de Kisangani, Kanyabayonga et Walungu (2014), en présence de la Communauté Internationale et des journalistes internationaux ;
- la participation à la réunion de Rome en 2014 sous la médiation de la Communauté Sant'Egidio représentée par Monseigneur Matteo Maria Cardinal ZUPPI, réunissant des représentants des USA (Sénateur Russell D. FEINGOLD, envoyé spécial des USA dans la RGLA), M. Martin KOBLER, Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire-Général des Nations Unies en RDC, les représentants des Etats de l'UE et des représentants de la RDC.

En réponse à toutes ces initiatives de paix auxquelles les FDLR ont répondu présentes, le Rwanda a brillé par son absence et son sabotage, tandis que la Communauté Internationale n'a pas respecté ses engagements d'accompagner positivement et activement ces initiatives.

C'est ainsi que les engagements pris par la RDC et la Communauté Internationale à Rome en 2005 et en 2014 ont été jetés aux oubliettes en prônant et encourageant plutôt la destruction des FDLR par le feu des armes.

Par ailleurs, de 2009 à 2015, les FARDC, en collaboration avec les forces spéciales des Forces Rwandaises de Défense (RDF) et de la MONUSCO ont mené des opérations militaires contre les

FDLR à l'Est de la RDC. Ces opérations ont fait plusieurs centaines de milliers de morts et de déplacés au sein des populations Congolaises et des réfugiés Rwandais.

Il s'agit des opérations:

- UMOJA WETU (Nord-Kivu, Janvier 2009)
- KIMIA I et II (2009)
- AMANI LEO (FARDC/MONUSCO 2010)
- AMANI KAMILIFU (MONUSCO/FARDC Février 2012)
- SOKOLA II (FARDC Nord et Sud-Kivu, 2015)

Dans un souci de mise en application des préconisations des maîtres à penser dans la création du chaos et le sabotage des processus de paix dans le monde, certains membres de la Communauté Internationale ont planifié et mis en exécution dès 2007 la décapitation par tous les moyens du leadership des FDLR.

C'est ainsi que le Président des FDLR M. Ignace MURWANASHYAKA, le Vice-Président M. Straton MUSONI et le Secrétaire-Exécutif M. Callixte MBARUSHIMANA ont été arrêtés et mis en prison en Allemagne et en France, puis trainés devant les tribunaux nationaux et internationaux pour leur « rôle présumé » dans les crimes de guerre et crimes contre l'humanité commis dans les provinces du Nord et Sud-Kivu (RDC) en 2009.

Il sied de noter que le Président Ignace MURWANASHYAKA est mort en prison en Allemagne en 2019 dans des circonstances non élucidées, que le Vice-Président Straton MUSONI a été condamné en Allemagne à une peine de 8 ans puis libéré et déporté au Rwanda où il est souvent exhibé comme un trophée de guerre et que le Secrétaire-Exécutif Callixte MBARUSHIMANA a été relaxé en 2011 par la Cour Pénale Internationale faute de preuves. Le Général Sylvestre MUDACUMURA, feu-Commandant des forces des FDLR, quant à lui, a été froidement abattu dans un raid coalisé des FARDC et des RDF en 2019.

Enfin, en 2018, la RDC avec la complicité de Kigali, a décidé unilatéralement de rapatrier de force et dans des conditions inhumaines, après une longue période de privations alimentaires avec risques d'inanitions délibérées, les ex-combattants des FDLR et leurs dépendants cantonnés à Kisangani, Walungu et Kanyabayonga. Certains d'entre eux ont été recyclés par le régime rwandais et retournés en RDC pour combattre dans l'armée rwandaise (RDF). La situation actuelle des autres n'est pas connue.

Il n'est pas inopportun de signaler que, dans une tactique d'accusation en miroir dont le régime rwandais est passé maître, les exactions imputées faussement aux FDLR par le FPR-INKOTANYI et ses thuriféraires sont plutôt celles délibérément commises par ses propres forces qui les font endosser aux FDLR afin de les discréditer et ainsi salir leur image.

En guise d'illustration, pour ne citer qu'un cas, en Février 2021, le FPR a assassiné dans une embuscade tendue sur la route Goma-Rutshuru l'Ambassadeur italien M. Luca Attanasio et s'est empressé d'attribuer ce forfait aux FDLR.

Les FDLR déclarent que le projet visant à les neutraliser n'a pour objectif que de décimer les réfugiés rwandais présents à l'Est de la RDC, survivants des massacres successifs orchestrés depuis 1990 par les forces du Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR-Inkotanyi) au pouvoir à Kigali.

La neutralisation des FDLR ne résoudra pas le problème de fond qui est d'essence politique et qui, par conséquent, ne peut se résoudre que politiquement à travers des pourparlers francs, sincères et inclusifs entre toutes les parties concernées. C'est ce que les FDLR sollicitent depuis des années.

Les FDLR restent convaincues et déclarent haut et fort qu'elles ne sont en rien impliquées dans la déstabilisation de la RGLA, et que s'il y a une force nuisible à neutraliser dans la Région, c'est bel et bien les Forces de Défense Rwandaises (FDR) qui sèment la mort et la désolation au sein des populations de la Région et sont à l'origine de l'insécurité persistante au Rwanda, en RDC et dans toute la Région depuis 1990 dans l'intérêt de piller des richesses immenses de la RDC et massacrer des Bantous de la RGLA.

Les FDLR réaffirment leur ferme attachement à la paix et sont convaincues que l'ouverture de l'espace politique libre et sécurisé au Rwanda, et un dialogue franc, constructif et hautement inclusif entre toutes les parties sont et restent la seule voie viable pour la recherche d'une paix durable dans la Région.

Les FDLR restent attachées à la paix et réaffirment leur plein engagement à toutes les initiatives visant à ramener la paix, la sécurité et la prospérité dans la RGLA et l'épanouissement harmonieux de tous les peuples frères auxquels elles seront conviées.

Les FDLR restent déterminées à mener à bien leur mission de protéger les populations rwandaises réfugiées à l'Est de la RDC jusqu'à leur retour définitif dans leur mère-patrie le Rwanda en toute sécurité et dignité.

Veillez agréer, Excellence Monsieur le Président, l'expression de notre très haute considération.

Victor BYIRINGIRO

Lt-Général



Président ai des FDLR

CPI à:

- Monsieur le Président de la République Démocratique du Congo
- Monsieur le Président de la République du Burundi
- Madame la Présidente de la République Unie de Tanzanie
- Monsieur le Président de la République de l'Ouganda
- Monsieur le Président en exercice de l'Union Africaine
- Monsieur le Président de l'Angola
- Monsieur le Président de la République Sud-Africaine
- Monsieur le Président du Rwanda
- Monsieur le Secrétaire Général de l'ONU
- Monsieur le Président de l'Union Européenne
- Monsieur le Président en exercice de la SADC
- Monsieur le Président en exercice de la Communauté des États de l'Afrique de l'Est
- Monsieur le Président en exercice de la Conférence Internationale sur la Région des Grands Lacs

*(2) Manifest shared with the Group by an FDLR source in April 2026:***MANIFESTE – PROGRAMME ET STATUTS DES FORCES DEMOCRATIQUES DE LIBERATION DU RWANDA (FDLR)****I. MANIFESTE – PROGRAMME.****PREAMBULE**

Le problème rwandais relève de l'histoire.

En effet, le système de clientélisme de type féodal dit "UBUHAKE" basé sur le complexe de supériorité et d'infériorité que le régime féodo-monarchique a inculqué dans la vie quotidienne du citoyen rwandais a fait que le HUTU était réduit au rang d'esclave et le TUTSI élevé au rang de "seigneur". Cette mentalité fut bannie et éradiquée par la Révolution Populaire de 1959.

C'est ce genre d'UBUHAKE que le Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR – INKOTANYI) cherche à raviver en opérant un lavage de cerveau de la population rwandaise en organisant des séminaires et des campagnes d'intoxication et d'endoctrinement (genre ingando) en vue de la dépersonnalisation totale du citoyen rwandais. C'est de ce système que cherche à se libérer le peuple rwandais dans son ensemble.

Depuis l'éclatement de la guerre lancée le 01 Octobre 1990 par le FPR – INKOTANYI à partir de l'Ouganda, le Rwanda vit un drame sans précédent. Cette guerre d'invasion a fait basculer le Rwanda dans un abîme de souffrances et de tragédies. Les estimations les plus crédibles, à l'intérieur du Rwanda, font état de plus de trois (3) millions de morts, de plusieurs centaines de milliers de blessés et mutilés, de plusieurs centaines de milliers de prisonniers et disparus sans compter de nombreuses victimes dans les camps des déplacés.

A l'extérieur du Rwanda, principalement dans les pays limitrophes, le FPR-INKOTANYI a massivement massacré les réfugiés Hutu rwandais. Selon le "Mapping Report du 01 Octobre 2010" de l'Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU), les massacres commis en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) par le FPR-INKOTANYI sont susceptibles d'être qualifiés de génocide par un tribunal compétent.

La situation née de la prise du pouvoir par le FPR- INKOTANYI en Juillet 1994 en violation flagrante de l'Accord de Paix d'Arusha du 04 Août 1993 est d'une extrême gravité.

Le bilan du FPR – INKOTANYI reste extrêmement négatif pour le Rwanda sur le plan politique, juridique, socio-économique, intellectuel et moral. L'édifice institutionnel bâti depuis l'indépendance du Rwanda en 1962 s'est effondré. Le Rwanda et son peuple se retrouvent de nouveau soumis à un pouvoir sans partage.

Sur le plan politique, la monopolisation du pouvoir par une poignée de militaires, d'intellectuels et d'hommes d'affaires issus d'une seule ethnie minoritaire Tutsi, l'instauration d'un Etat totalitaire, révèlent le mépris du régime en place envers le peuple rwandais considéré comme mineur et incapable de faire des choix politiques et de les assumer.

Sur le plan économique, tous les indicateurs montrent que les richesses du pays sont inégalement réparties. La corruption ainsi que la spoliation des biens meubles et immeubles publics et privés ont été institutionnalisées. Non seulement les principaux circuits économiques et financiers sont entre les mains d'une clique qui contrôle tout le pouvoir, mais on assiste aussi à une véritable perte de souveraineté nationale suite à une privatisation irresponsable des entreprises publiques.

Sur le plan social, le paysan rwandais connaît une chute vertigineuse de son niveau de vie et une aggravation dangereuse de la fracture sociale suite au phénomène de paupérisation, à l'absence de services de santé publique et d'éducation, à la marginalisation et à la dépravation de la jeunesse.

La politique de la haine interethnique et d'idéologie raciale prônée par le régime en place et les associations extrémistes ne cessent d'élargir le fossé entre les composantes de la société rwandaise.

La famille, noyau du développement socio-économique du pays, a vu son unité et sa cohésion complètement démantelées.

Sur le plan des droits de l'homme, l'échec du régime mis en place par le FPR – INKOTANYI est tout aussi désolant. Les éliminations massives à caractère ethnique, les exactions et arrestations arbitraires, la persécution de l'Eglise chrétienne, les exécutions sommaires individuelles et collectives, les enlèvements et les disparitions, les tortures, les viols et d'autres formes d'atteintes aux droits de la personne humaine ont été institutionnalisés dans le but de briser tout espoir de justice et de liberté du peuple rwandais.

La dictature du FPR-INKOTANYI étend ses atrocités dans toute la Région des Grands Lacs Africains ; une situation qui risque d'entraîner le Rwanda et la Région toute entière dans un abîme encore plus profond.

En utilisant la tragédie rwandaise comme fonds de commerce, de manipulation et d'extorsion, le régime du FPR – INKOTANYI s'adonne à une extermination planifiée d'une partie du peuple rwandais pour sauvegarder les privilèges et perpétuer la domination d'une élite corrompue et de mâter un peuple qui n'a jamais accepté la tutelle de l'oligarchie en place. Cette politique de répression n'est pas aveugle. Elle s'inscrit dans le cadre d'une stratégie bien élaborée qui vise à éliminer tout projet, réel ou potentiel, de résistance à son ordre établi par force, et à paralyser la population par la douleur et la peur afin d'inhiber en elle toute velléité de contestation.

Convaincus que la crise politique, économique, sociale et morale qui ronge la société rwandaise n'est pas une fatalité;

Convaincus qu'il est grand temps de combattre cette stratégie de la violence afin de permettre au peuple rwandais d'être le principal acteur de son propre destin;

Persuadés qu'aucun citoyen rwandais, épris de paix et d'amour pour son pays et pour son peuple, ne peut demeurer spectateur indifférent du désastre en cours depuis Octobre 1990;

Avons décidé de créer les Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, FDLR en sigle.

La création des FDLR est une réponse légitime du peuple rwandais au mépris, à l'arrogance et à la répression impitoyable et sanguinaire que le FPR – INKOTANYI a préféré opposer à diverses initiatives faites en vue du dialogue politique, de l'ouverture démocratique et du respect des droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine.

Les FDLR constituent donc une Organisation de libération qui vise à redonner l'espoir d'une nouvelle ère de paix et de reprise en mains, par le peuple rwandais, de son avenir et de ses destinées.

L'objet du présent "Manifeste – Programme et Statuts" est d'exposer les éléments qui permettront au peuple rwandais de sortir du désarroi qui l'accable depuis plusieurs années.

Les FDLR regroupent les personnes qui ont fermement décidé de se lever comme un seul homme pour:

- Mettre fin au génocide perpétré par le FPR – INKOTANYI depuis Octobre 1990;
- Œuvrer au rétablissement d'une paix durable, au développement intégral et à la concorde nationale et internationale;
- Réhabiliter le peuple rwandais dans ses droits;
- Œuvrer au rétablissement d'un Etat de droit visant à aider la société rwandaise à se réconcilier avec elle-même, à travailler pour son propre progrès socio-économique et son plein épanouissement;
- Réaliser les objectifs définis par leurs statuts.

1. PRINCIPES DIRECTEURS.

La recherche de solutions au conflit rwandais doit se fonder sur une analyse minutieuse des causes profondes qui l'ont généré et sur les leçons tirées des événements tragiques qui ont marqué l'histoire du Rwanda.

A cet égard, les FDLR estiment que :

- Le conflit rwandais est d'essence politique et la solution doit être politique;
- Toute démarche sincère de négociation ou d'arbitrage visant à résoudre ce conflit doit être soutenue;
- Le respect des droits fondamentaux du citoyen et de ses valeurs morales et culturelles demeure un principe sacré devant être sauvegardé;
- Une solution politique n'est viable que si elle est juste, équitable et préserve les intérêts légitimes de toutes les composantes de la société rwandaise;
- L'unité nationale et la sauvegarde des acquis de la Révolution Sociale de 1959 demeurent les piliers de la société rwandaise.

Les FDLR considèrent que toute perspective d'une solution durable à la crise actuelle doit être fondée sur un certain nombre de principes communément partagés par le peuple rwandais et fondés sur la culture rwandaise et la déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme.

Parmi ces principes, l'on peut citer notamment:

- Respect et promotion de la dignité humaine et des droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine, des libertés fondamentales individuelles et collectives;

- Respect des droits des minorités et protection des identités culturelles;
- Promotion de l'état de droit, des valeurs démocratiques et républicaines;
- Respect d'un vrai multipartisme politique, d'un vrai pluralisme social et économique;
- Séparation, indépendance et complémentarité des pouvoirs exécutif, législatif et judiciaire;
- Egalité devant la loi;
- Droit du peuple à une justice équitable garantissant à tout citoyen une vie digne;
- Respect des valeurs morales et culturelles du peuple rwandais;
- Préservation de la souveraineté de l'Etat rwandais et respect de l'intégrité territoriale des pays voisins;
- Etablissement des relations de bon voisinage et de coopération dans le cadre du respect mutuel de la solidarité avec les partenaires rwandais;
- Lutte contre l'aliénation du pays;
- Instauration d'une loi fondamentale basée sur les principes ci-dessus.

2. PROGRAMME.

Les FDLR se proposent notamment de:

2.1. Politique intérieure

- Promouvoir l'instauration dans le pays d'un pouvoir ayant comme responsabilité première de protéger et rassurer chaque citoyen, sans aucune distinction;
- Combattre toutes les causes et les situations conduisant à l'état de réfugié;
- Concourir au bien-être, à la cohésion et à la réconciliation des Rwandais;
- Instaurer et promouvoir un pouvoir fondé sur les principes universels de l'Etat de droit, la démocratie basée sur le pluralisme politique, les élections libres et transparentes ainsi que d'autres valeurs républicaines;
- Asseoir les valeurs morales dont le respect de la vie et la dignité humaine, le respect et l'amour du prochain, la tolérance, la justice, l'honnêteté, la vérité, l'égalité, l'émancipation de l'individu;
- Respecter les droits des minorités et assister les groupes vulnérables.

2.2. Politique extérieure

- Œuvrer au rétablissement d'une paix durable et de la stabilité dans la Région des Grands Lacs Africains;
- Promouvoir une politique active de bon voisinage, de coopération et d'échanges avec les Etats voisins en vue d'une intégration dans les marchés régionaux;
- Intensifier les rapports avec les partenaires étrangers et les organismes internationaux;
- Redorer l'image du pays et du peuple rwandais auprès de la Communauté Internationale;
- Œuvrer en faveur de l'intégration économique et politique au niveau régional et international.

2.3. Economie et développement.

- Construire un pays moderne et prospère;
- Lutter contre la corruption et le pillage du patrimoine national;
- Satisfaire les besoins de base de la population en matière d'habitat, alimentation, santé, éducation et formation, information, culture et loisirs;
- Encourager la femme rwandaise à jouer pleinement son rôle dans le développement du pays;
- Promouvoir l'initiative privée;
- Réduire les dépenses liées à l'armement;
- Améliorer le bien-être et la qualité de la vie des Rwandais tout en protégeant l'environnement.

2.4. Justice

- Mettre en place une commission nationale indépendante de vérité et réconciliation;
- Œuvrer pour la mise en place d'un tribunal international neutre et traduire devant la justice tous les responsables de la tragédie rwandaise sans distinction.
- Poursuivre et punir, sans aucune distinction tous les coupables de la tragédie rwandaise;
- Réhabiliter toutes les victimes innocentes (personnes physiques ou morales) de la tragédie rwandaise;
- Garantir le droit et la sécurité pour le retour digne des réfugiés au Rwanda;
- Protéger les droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine.

2.5. Sécurité.

- Sauvegarder la sécurité nationale;
- Garantir l'épanouissement et la sécurité des personnes et des biens;
- Mettre en place une armée nationale et des services de sécurité dans lesquels se retrouvent toutes les composantes de la population rwandaise;
- Lutter contre le terrorisme national et international.

Annex 40 (para. 134)

FARDC telegrams prohibiting FARDC collaboration with the FDLR and with VDP/Wazalendo groups linked to it

Télégrammes des FARDC interdisant toute collaboration avec les FDLR ainsi qu'avec les groupes VDP/Wazalendo qui leur sont liés

TELEGRAMME

EXT-URGENT **GROUPE-DATE-HEURE**
051355A JAN 26

DE : CHEFEMG FARDC

POUR : PROGOU MIL (TOUS) - COMD ZDEF (TOUS) - COMD RGN
MIL (TOUS) - COMD SECT OPS (TOUS)

INFO : VPM/MDNAC - CHEF MM - IG FARDC - CHEFEM FORCES
(TOUS) - SCHEFEM (TOUS)

SEC : SECRET N°01/00005 /EMG/DEPT OPS/26

VOUS INFORME (-) IL ETRE STRICTEMENT INTERDIT (-) TOUT
ENTRETIEN RELATION AVEC FDLR (-) ET TOUTE COLLABORATION
AVEC VDP AYANT LIENS AVEC FDLR (-) EN OUTRE (-) VOUS DEVOIR
(-) SENSIBILISER VDP (-) DANS ZRESP RESPECTIVES (-) NE PAS
COLLABORER AVEC FDLR (-) EXECUTION CORRECTE (-) ACK (-) (-)

PARAPHE : SCHEFEM OPS *pc 26*
CHEFEMG ADJT ADM-LOG *pc 26*
CHEFEMG ADJT OPS-RENS

KABANDA WA KABANDA
Lt Gen
Chaf EMG Adjt Adm-Log

BANZA MWILAMBWE JULES
LTGEN
CHEFEMG FARDC

TELEGRAMME

EXT-URGENT

GROUPE-DATE-HEURE
081305 A JAN 26

DE : CHEFEMG FARDC
POUR : SCHEFEM RENS
INFO : VPM/MDNAC - CHEF MM - IG FARDC
SEC : SECRET N°01/00014 /EMG/DEPT OPS/26

DES RECEPTION PRESENT MSG (-) VOUS DEVOIR (-) FOURNIR RENS
(-) SUR VDP AYANT LIENS AVEC FDLR (-) POUR DIPO UTILES (-)
EXECUTION CORRECTE (-) ACK (-) (-)

PARAPHE: SCHEFEM OPS
CHEFEMG ADJT ADM-LOG
CHEFEMG ADJT OPS-RENS

BANZA MWILAMBWE JULES
LTGEN
CHEFEMG FARDC

BANZA MWILAMBWE Jules
LTGen
ChefEMG FARDC

Documents received from FARDC source

Annex 41 (para. 146)

Establishment of paramilitary “Mining Guard”

Création de la Garde Minière, unité paramilitaire


COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE -Embargo jusqu'au lundi 27 avril 2026 à 08h 00 heure de Kinshasa-

L'Inspection Générale des Mines annonce la création de la Garde Minière, une unité paramilitaire dédiée à la sécurisation du secteur minier en République Démocratique du Congo

L'Inspection Générale des Mines (IGM) informe l'opinion publique nationale et internationale de la création officielle de la Garde Minière, une unité spéciale paramilitaire destinée à sécuriser l'ensemble de la chaîne d'exploitation des minerais en République Démocratique du Congo.

« La volonté du Président de la République, que nous mettons en œuvre, est d'assainir l'ensemble du secteur minier de la RDC, en éliminant les pratiques contraires à la bonne gouvernance à la transparence et à la traçabilité des minerais », a déclaré l'Inspecteur Général, Rafael Kabengele.

D'ici fin 2028, le déploiement progressif d'un effectif de plus de 20 000 gardes couvrant les 22 provinces minières dont l'IGM a la supervision est prévu. Le premier contingent sera composé de 2 500 à 3 000 agents, recrutés à l'issue d'un processus de sélection rigoureux.

Les recrues suivront un programme d'entraînement intensif de six mois, conduit en collaboration avec la Maison militaire, et seront dotées d'équipements de dernière génération.

Calendrier de mise en œuvre :

- mai 2026 : ouverture du recrutement, sans distinction de genre
- juin à décembre 2026 : formation de la première promotion de recrues
- décembre 2026 : déploiement du premier contingent opérationnel
- fin 2027 : couverture complète des besoins sécuritaires dans le Grand Katanga et la Grande Orientale
- fin 2028 : extension du dispositif à l'ensemble des provinces minières du territoire national

Le programme, financé à hauteur de 100 millions de dollars, s'inscrit dans le cadre de partenariats stratégiques avec les États-Unis et les Émirats arabes unis, et sera déployé au sein d'infrastructures d'entraînement déjà opérationnelles.

La Garde Minière aura pour principales missions :

- la sécurisation des sites miniers sur l'ensemble du territoire national
- le convoyage sécurisé des minerais, depuis les zones d'extraction jusqu'aux unités de traitement et aux postes frontaliers

-le remplacement progressif des éléments des forces de défense actuellement déployés dans les zones minières.

La mise en place de la Garde Minière permettra, à terme, d'optimiser la valorisation des ressources minières de la RDC et d'offrir un environnement sécuritaire fiable et stable, indispensable à la continuité des activités et à la protection des investissements.

À propos de l'Inspection Générale des Mines

Créée par le décret n°23/19 du 9 juin 2023, l'Inspection Générale des Mines est l'organe chargé du contrôle, de l'audit et de la lutte contre la fraude dans le secteur minier en République Démocratique du Congo.

Rafael Kabengele, Inspecteur Général, a pris ses fonctions à la tête de l'institution le 12 janvier 2026.

Contact presse :

Anasthasie Tudieshe +243815358310

Confidential source

Annex 42 (para. 150)**Deployment of Salvadoran PMCs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo****Déploiements de PMC salvadoriens en République démocratique du Congo**

The present annex consolidates documentary, photographic and communication material relating to the 2025 deployment of approximately 300 Salvadoran nationals to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The documentation reviewed includes communication screenshots, photographs of individuals identified in connection with the contractual structure, and a scanned professional business card associated with legal representation.

WhatsApp communications reviewed by the Group indicate that private military personnel were recruited under a one-year contractual framework offering a monthly remuneration of USD 4,225, with the first deployments commencing in July 2025. Subsequent exchanges, reproduced in **Figure 1** below refer to the early termination of contracts, the return of personnel to El Salvador, and alleged payment disputes involving partial settlement proposals of USD 300 conditioned upon signature of discharge documentation.

Health consequences were consistently referenced in the communication records, including confirmed cases of malaria among returnees and hospitalizations within the Salvadoran public health system (**Figure 2**).

Commercial registry records identified Importaciones de Productos Americanos (IMPROA S.A. de C.V.) as the locally registered entity, referenced in communications and media reporting as having managed contractual matters within El Salvador. Former El Salvador army Colonel Juan Emilio Velasco Alfaro is listed as legal representative of the company in official registry documentation. The declared corporate object of IMPROA does not explicitly reference overseas security recruitment, suggesting functional expansion beyond its formal commercial description (**Figure 3**).

From a financial perspective, for 300 individuals to be contracted at USD 4,225 per month, the gross monthly contractual exposure would approximate USD 1,267,500, corresponding to an annual exposure of approximately USD 15,210,000 under a full twelve-month implementation.

Figure 1:



WhatsApp communications allege the recruitment of approximately 300 Salvadoran former police and military personnel for deployment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo under a one-year contract, reportedly managed by IMPROA S.A. de C.V., with a monthly remuneration of USD 4,225.

Confidential source


Figure 2:



Photographic evidence indicates austere living conditions of Salvadoran PMC personnel in Kisangani, characterized by makeshift encampments with sandbag fortifications, rudimentary shelter, and limited infrastructure.

Confidential source

Figure 3



Screenshot of IMPROA S.A. de C.V. website displaying a contact interface referencing international security services in El Salvador. The page includes a direct contact email (jvelasco@improa.com), consistent with the identity of Juan Emilio Velasco Alfaro as legal representative.

Confidential source

Annex 43 (para. 155)

Electronic equipment seized in Masisi Territory

Équipements électroniques saisis dans le territoire de Masisi



Recovered electronic equipment seized in Masisi Territory, North Kivu Province, consisting of multiple ruggedized control units fitted with whip antennas, arranged for storage or field deployment.

Confidential source



Close-up of a MindMade WB Group ruggedized electronic module seized in Masisi, fitted with an RF connector and identification labels (QR code and serial markings).

Confidential source

Annex 44 (para. 156)**Electronic equipment seized on 12–13 August 2025 in Mulamba, Walungu Territory, South Kivu Province****Les équipements électroniques saisis le 12 et 13 août 2025 à Mulamba, dans le territoire de Walungu, province du Sud-Kivu**

Modules bearing identical MindMade WB Group manufacturer markings (see annex 43) recovered on 12–13 August 2025 in Mulamba, Walungu Territory, South Kivu Province.

Confidential source




Module bearing MindMade WB Group manufacturer markings, consistent with previously recovered equipment. This unit was documented as part of seizures conducted during field operations in Mulamba, Walungu Territory, South Kivu Province.

Confidential source

Annex 45 (para. 157)

Tadiran RT-7106 (PRC-710) Radio seized In March 2025 by Congolese security forces

Radio Tadiran RT-7106 (PRC-710) saisie en mars 2025 par les forces de sécurité congolaises



Confidential military sources

Annex 46 (para. 159)

Kenya Airways incident with Jamming/Interference and Flight Management System Control Display Unit (FMS CDU)

Incident de Kenya Airways avec brouillage/interférences et unité d'affichage de contrôle du système de gestion de vol (FMS CDU)

15th January, 2026.

Directeur Général
Direction Générale Autorité de l'Aviation Civile du Burundi
B.P. 694
Bujumbura, Burundi

Ref: OAT/OTH/2026/0050/0002

Dear Sir/Madam,

GPS INTERFERENCE/JAMMING

The following incident has been reported to our Flight Safety Office:

Date of Occurrence: 13/01/2026
Location: HBBA
Aircraft Type: B737
Registration: 5Y- CYF
Flight No: KQA460 NBO-BJM,
KQA461 BJM-NBO.
Phase: INITIAL CLIMB

SUMMARY

"Experienced GPS jamming/interference on both approach into and on departure climb out of Bujumbura.
GPS L INVALID & GPS R INVALID CDU messages.
GPS DATA UNRELIABLE QRH Checklist carried out & ATC informed."

Kindly investigate this further to avert a similar situation in the future. Your feedback on the occurrence will be highly appreciated.

Yours Sincerely,

Captain Haig Anyonyi,
Director, Corporate Quality, Safety and Environment,
Email: Haig.Anyonyi@kenya-airways.com
Cc: IATA Regional Office



Source: Military intelligence



Picture of a Flight Management System Control Display Unit (FMS CDU) of a plane landing in Bujumbura, indicating “position uncertain” following jamming on 13/1/2026.
Confidential source.

Annex 47 (para. 159)

Official request for assistance to investigate the safety of international civil aviation, and the response of the ICAO

Demande officielle d'assistance pour enquêter sur la sécurité de l'aviation civile internationale, et la réponse de l'OACI

REPUBLIQUE DU BURUNDI
Ministère des Infrastructures, des Logements
Sociaux, des Transports et de l'Équipement.

Bujumbura, le 22.01.2026


DIRECTION GENERALE

A Monsieur le Secrétaire Général de
l'Organisation de l'aviation civile
Internationale (OACI)
à
Montréal

N/Réf : 729/DG/0134/2026

Objet : Demande d'assistance urgente pour une enquête
de sécurité de l'aviation civile internationale

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

Je vous adresse avant tout mes salutations et mes vœux de bonheur et de prospérité pour l'année 2026.

En ce qui concerne l'objet en marge, je saisis l'occasion de vous informer que depuis le 19 octobre 2025, plusieurs cas de brouillage des équipements de navigation à bord des aéronefs, visiblement orchestrés à partir du territoire d'un pays voisin, ont été enregistrés dans l'espace aérien du Burundi, mettant en péril la navigation aérienne internationale.

A titre illustratif, je vous fais parvenir une copie du rapport d'incident officiel de la compagnie aérienne Kenya Airways nous transmis en date du 15 janvier 2026.

Face à cette violation de l'esprit et des principes de la Convention de Chicago, je vous demande instamment une assistance urgente en vue d'une enquête technique efficace, après laquelle des actions subséquentes sont à mener en vue de freiner cette atteinte délibérée à la sécurité des aéronefs et des personnes à bord.

Comptant sur votre sensibilité à la sécurité aérienne, je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, l'expression de ma haute considération.


LE DIRECTEUR GENERAL DE L'AUTORITE
DE L'AVIATION CIVILE DU BURUNDI
Lt COLONEL HAKERIMANA

C.P.L.A :
- Madame la Directrice Régionale du
Bureau ESAF de l'OACI
- Monsieur le Directeur à l'AACB (tous)

B.P 694 Bujumbura-Burundi Tél : +257 22203102 (Secrétariat);
Email: aacb@aacb.gov.bi ; aacbburundi@hotmail.com ; site.aacb.gov.bi

Confidential source



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Civil Aviation
Organization

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de l'aviation civile
internationale

Organización
de Aviación Civil
Internacional

Международная
организация
гражданской
авиации

منظمة الطيران
المدني الدولي

国际民用
航空组织

Eastern and Southern African Regional Office/Bureau régional Afrique orientale et australe

Réf.: ES AN 6/5 – 0040

30 January 2026

Lieutenant-Colonel Gervais HARERIMANA
Directeur Général
Direction Générale
Autorité de l'Aviation Civile du Burundi
Bujumbura - Burundi
Email: gaach@iaach.bi; harege04@gmail.com

Objet: Préoccupations en matière de sécurité de l'aviation relatives aux interférences visant le Système mondial de navigation par satellite (GNSS)

Monsieur le Directeur général,

J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser réception de vos lettres réf. 729/DG/0134/2026, datée du 20 janvier 2026, relatives aux activités de brouillage des équipements de navigation à bord des aéronefs et de leur rage visant le Système mondial de navigation par satellite (GNSS/GPS) signalées dans l'espace aérien du Burundi et la demande d'assistance technique pour mener une enquête efficace.

Par la présente, je voudrais vous confirmer que l'Organisation de l'aviation civile internationale (OACI) partage entièrement votre préoccupation sur ce phénomène regrettable que l'on observe de plus en plus récemment dans diverses régions du monde.

En effet, depuis 2003, l'OACI joue un rôle actif dans l'élaboration de recommandations et d'éléments indicatifs concernant le brouillage radiofréquence (RFI) du GNSS. Il y a lieu de rappeler la résolution A41-8 de l'Assemblée de l'OACI, appendice C, Assurer la résilience des systèmes et des services CNS/ATM de l'OACI, qui constitue la politique de l'OACI la plus récente en matière de résilience du GNSS.

À ce propos, par lettre circulaire réf. E 3/5-24/54 en date du 30 avril 2024 (dont une copie est ci-jointe), le Secrétaire général de l'OACI attirait l'attention des États sur la question cruciale des interférences visant le GNSS et les informait des résultats du Symposium EUR/MID sur la radionavigation qui s'est tenu du 6 au 8 février 2024, à Antalya (Turquie). Parmi les résultats importants du symposium figurent des recommandations pertinentes portant sur les efforts que toutes les parties intéressées sont appelées à poursuivre pour assurer la sécurité, la fiabilité et la résilience de la navigation aérienne.

.../2...

United Nations Office at Nairobi/Comptex, Ogani
P.O. Box 14291-01100 SPD
Nairobi, Kenya

Tel.: +254 20 7622395/6
Fax: +254 20 7621672/7622628

Email: icaonai@icao.int
Website: <https://www.icao.int/ESAF>

-2-

L'OACI note avec appréciation que votre État a pris des mesures d'atténuation diligentes en émettant rapidement un avis aux navigateurs aériens (NOTAM) sur la base des premiers comptes rendus d'incidents de brouillage radiofréquence du GNSS. Il est essentiel que les États garantissent la continuité de la fourniture de services de navigation aérienne sûrs, fiables et efficaces, même en cas de perturbations. La sécurité est une priorité absolue. Les États doivent également disposer de capacités de navigation et de procédures opérationnelles alternatives pour gérer efficacement les défaillances du GNSS.


Bien que l'OACI ne soit pas habilitée à mener l'enquête technique demandée sur les interférences GNSS, un mécanisme permettant de traiter les cas d'interférences transfrontalières a été mis en place dans le cadre d'un protocole d'accord avec l'Union internationale des télécommunications (UIT).

En vertu des dispositions d'un protocole d'accord, les cas d'interférence ayant un impact transfrontalier qui ne peuvent être résolus au niveau national ou international par des procédures habituelles doivent être signalés à l'UIT. Le rapport doit inclure des informations détaillées, telles que la description de l'interférence (service GNSS affecté, durée du problème, zone affectée et toute information sur la source présumée de l'interférence, autres détails). Pour plus d'informations sur la procédure de signalement, je vous invite à vous référer à l'Appendice F du Manuel du GNSS (OACI Doc 9849), ci-joint.

En vue d'assurer une surveillance continue et efficace de la situation actuelle, il y a lieu de recommander aux exploitants d'aéronefs d'élaborer une procédure selon laquelle l'équipage serait tenu d'informer le contrôle de la circulation aérienne (ATC) des incidents de RFI du GNSS, de même que les constructeurs d'équipement d'origine (OEM) de l'aéronef et de l'avionique.

Soyez assuré de la disponibilité de l'OACI, à travers son Bureau régional accrédité, à fournir l'appui nécessaire dans la mise en œuvre par votre État des mesures recommandées pour l'atténuation des vulnérabilités du GNSS, selon les besoins.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Vice-Premier Ministre, l'assurance de ma très haute considération.


Lucy Mbugua
Directrice régionale

Pièces jointes:

- Lettre aux États réf. E 3/5 – du Secrétaire général de l'OACI en date du 30 avril 2024
- Appendice F du Manuel du GNSS (OACI Doc 9849)

Copie:

- M. le Secrétaire général de l'OACI, Montréal, Canada


Confidential source.

Annex 48 (para. 159)

Cross-Border GNSS Drift: False Geolocation Between Bujumbura and Uvira

GNSS transfrontalière : géolocalisation erronée entre Bujumbura et Uvira

While attempting to determine location using mobile phone GPS services, the device utilized by the Group of Experts indicated a position in Sange, South Kivu Province, Democratic Republic of the Congo, despite the Group being physically present in Bujumbura, Burundi. The discrepancy persisted across multiple devices and was assessed as consistent with GNSS spoofing or jamming effects, affecting satellite navigation signals in the area at the time of the observation.



Screenshot of smartphone map interface showing the Bujumbura area displaying the user's location in Kiliba / Sange. The position marker appears across the border near the Uvira axis despite the device being physically located in Bujumbura.

Source: Map data ©2026 Google

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 49 (para. 160)

Indicative GNSS Interference Affecting KLM Flight KL537 in Eastern DRC

Interférence GNSS indicative affectant le vol KLM KL537 dans l'espace aérien Est de la RDC



Flightradar24 playback of KLM flight KL537 (Amsterdam–Kigali) shows a significant discrepancy between barometric altitude (38,975 ft) and GPS altitude (35,850 ft) while transiting the eastern DRC–Rwanda airspace. Such divergence is consistent with satellite navigation interference, including GNSS jamming or spoofing affecting aircraft positional data received by tracking systems.

Source: Flight Radar24 (<https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flights/kl537#3ec39cd0>)

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 50 (paras. 166-169)

Drone attacks on Kisangani airport and technical analysis

Attaques de drone sur l'aéroport de Kisangani et analyse technique

Attack on Bangoka airport Kisangani

Between the night of 31 January and 1 February 2026, as well as on 5 February 2026 and 1 March 2026 Bangoka Airport in Kisangani was hit by three distinct waves of fixed-wing, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV/drone) attacks. The incidents occurred in a structured temporal sequence, and involved multiple drones configured for one-way strike missions (kamikaze drones).

The first wave commenced at approximately 01:45 local time during the night of 31 January to 1 February 2026. Eight kamikaze drones were launched within a limited timeframe. According to available operational records, six kamikaze drones were intercepted or neutralized. Two were not recovered.

The second wave of kamikaze drone attacks occurred during the night of 4 to 5 February 2026. The first drone attack was at 01:07 local time, followed by a second drone at 04:30. Both drones were intercepted. The third strike occurred on 5 February 2026, at approximately 14:00 local time during daylight hours and was also intercepted.

On 1 March 2026, between 15:46 and 21:30, four kamikaze drones once again targeted Bangoka airport. The first drone impacted approximately 250 meters from the control tower, at 200 meters from a hangar used by FARDC for the operation of TAI Anka UAV systems.

The second drone approached the end of the runway in proximity to positions held by the Republican Guard. The third drone crashed directly in front of the TAI Anka hangar, narrowly missing a landing Airbus A330 aircraft, and destroying a generator supplying power to the UAV control system. The fourth drone fell into the Kagenge River, approximately 450 meters from the airport. All four UAVs failed to reach their intended targets, which may indicate a technical malfunction or inaccuracies in targeting coordinates.

Physical damage remained limited, with one fatality and one injured individual reported, with no recorded destruction of airport structural assets. The material evidence recovered and photographed confirms technical uniformity across the incidents .

The nocturnal employment of the system is consistent with an autonomous navigation architecture based on satellite-enabled positioning and inertial stabilization, rather than reliance on visual piloting. Across all three attacks, the technical characteristics observed remained consistent, **indicating the use of the same system configuration and operational profile throughout the attacks.**

Geographically, Kisangani is separated from several known front-line areas by approximately 400 kilometers. The propulsion and fuel-based configuration documented in the debris is consistent with medium-range one-way UAV capability within such operational envelopes. The fuel system components photographed indicate sufficient capacity for extended flight duration. The combination of lightweight composite airframe and two-stroke propulsion suggests endurance optimization.

Examination of the structural debris

The Group obtained access to the remnants of a drone that struck Bangoka Airport during the initial wave of attacks. The debris was examined on 9 February 2026, and the findings were comprehensively documented through photographic evidence (Figures 1-6). Finding and conclusions are detailed below.

Drone with fixed-wing composite construction, medium range, semi-industrial fabrication: Examination of the structural debris photographed (**Figure 1**) indicates a drone with a fixed-wing composite construction. Recovered fragments show layered fiberglass and carbon composite panels bonded with industrial epoxy resin (**Figure 2**). The absence of metallic airframe framing suggests a weight-optimized structure typical of medium-range loitering munition platforms. The internal rib structure visible in several photographs demonstrates CNC (Computer Numerical Control) cut composite reinforcement rather than improvised wooden bracing, indicating semi-industrial fabrication standards (**Figure 2**).

Catapult deployment: No landing gear assemblies, skid structures, or recovery mechanisms were identified in the documented debris. This confirms one-way strike configuration. The wing fragments photographed show mounting points consistent with catapult launch stress reinforcement. The leading-edge laminate thickness and reinforced root section indicate structural adaptation for rail or pneumatic catapult acceleration. The absence of abrasion patterns associated with runway take-off further supports catapult deployment.

Navigation module: A navigation module identified as Here4 (figure 3) an Australian-branded Cube Pilot product manufactured in Taiwan, was recovered intact and mounted on a dedicated metallic support bracket. The component bears the following markings: PN: 134600579, SN: 251000217, REV: 001. The module housing, fasteners, and labeling are consistent with industrial production standards.

Engine compatible with endurance-oriented UAV platforms: A high-torque digital servomotor identified as Savox SB-2270SG Taiwanese-origin product (Figure 3) was recovered and remains mounted to a rigid structural bracket. The unit displays industrial markings including a part number, serial number, and revision identifier. The servomotor is housed in a CNC-machined aluminum casing and is equipped with steel gear transmission.

The SB-2270SG is a brushless digital servo motor designed to operate on a 7.4–8.4 V DC supply, corresponding to a two-cell lithium-ion battery configuration. Such servos are designed for precise and repeatable angular positioning under sustained mechanical load. The construction and torque rating of the unit are consistent with applications involving aerodynamic control surfaces.

The propulsion system consists of a Dual-cylinder, air-cooled internal combustion engine with a finned cylinder head and aluminum crankcase. The engine casing bears the molded marking “DLE”, identifying the manufacturer as DLE Engines (Figure 4) Multiple subcomponents display individual part numbers and serial numbers, including PN: 173200007, PN: 172000013, and serial numbers beginning with the prefix 25, indicating recent production.

The engine architecture includes a diaphragm carburetor, aluminum intake and exhaust assemblies, and a direct-drive propeller interface. These characteristics are consistent with gasoline engines designed for UAV and heavy aeromodeling applications. DLE engines are manufactured in the People’s Republic of China and distributed globally as COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf) propulsion units.

Based on physical dimensions, mounting configuration, and associated propeller characteristics, the engine corresponds to a medium-displacement class, assessed within the range of approximately 40–55 cubic centimeters. Engines of this class are typically selected for endurance-oriented UAV platforms requiring sustained cruise performance rather than short-duration thrust.

Propeller: The recovered propeller (**Figure 5**) is manufactured from carbon-fiber composite, exhibiting a visible woven structure and reinforced blade root. The blade bears a yellow manufacturer logo consistent with Mejzlik Propellers manufactured in Czech Republic. The propeller hub incorporates a reinforced multi-bolt mounting interface designed for high-torque internal combustion engines.

Although the exact diameter and pitch markings are not visible on the recovered fragment, the blade geometry and hub configuration are consistent with propellers typically paired with engines in the 40–55 cc range.

These characteristics indicate the use of regulated power distribution and signal conditioning subsystems. The level of finish, serial traceability, and standardized connectors are **consistent with semi-industrial manufacturing practices and exclude ad hoc or improvised assembly**.

The examined components demonstrate a coherent and integrated UAV architecture based on **commercially available but professional-grade subsystems**. Navigation, actuation, propulsion, and power components originate from multiple international manufacturers and are integrated using standardized mechanical and electrical interfaces.

From an operational standpoint, the configuration also reflects weight optimization considerations. The explosive payload appears to have been limited to an estimated 4 to 6 kilograms, incorporating a fragmentation mechanism composed of metallic ball bearings. This type of payload design is indicative of an **anti-personnel effect, prioritizing lethality against individuals over destructive effects on infrastructure**.

The reported consequences of the three waves were one fatality and one injury. No structural destruction of airport infrastructure was recorded. No runway collapse, terminal damage, or fuel storage detonation occurred. This damage profile aligns with the limited warhead mass inferred from debris examination.

The selection and integration of components originating from multiple commercial product lines, readily available on the open market and through online procurement channels, confirm a **deliberate effort to fragment the supply chain and reduce traceability to a single manufacturer or point of origin**. This modular assembly approach is consistent with a **system produced on demand**, rather than through standardized industrial production.

Kamikaze drone attacks in South Kivu, March-April 2026

In March and April 2026, the Group documented a series of kamikaze drones attacks with the remnants of the drones bearing a high degree of similarity with those utilized in the strikes against Kisangani airport. Notably:

- On 10 March 2026, two one-way attack (“kamikaze”) drones were shot down over Mikenge in the Hauts Plateaux area.
- On 2 April at approximately 12:00 another kamikaze drone struck FARDC positions at Point Zéro in the Itombwe of Mwenga Territory.
- On 9 April at approximately 17:00, a kamikaze drone struck FARDC and Wazalendo positions along the Mikenge-2 axis in the Itombwe sector, Mwenga Territory.
- On 10 April at approximately 23:00, in the Kutundu axis within Kitundu groupement (Uvira area), a kamikaze drone struck positions of the FARDC 113th Infantry Regiment, causing multiple FARDC casualties. Approximately 30 minutes later, around 23:30, a drone strike targeted additional FARDC positions in Muranvya, Bijombo (Uvira Territory), affecting elements of the 22nd Simba Battalion. Shortly thereafter, around midnight, another drone strike hit FARDC positions in Mugeti, Bijombo.
- On 25 April, FARDC confirmed having shot down another kamikaze drone at Point Zero in Minembwe. The incident followed FARDC’s reported interception of another kamikaze drone in Kakenge, northern Minembwe, within the previous 48 hours.

Conclusion

The Group concludes that a comparative review of debris imagery and descriptions associated with the Kisangani incidents, the recent incidents between March and April 2026, indicates a high degree of technical commonality. Similarities include fixed-wing expendable airframes, compact rear-propulsion layouts, simplified launch-oriented construction, and the repeated use of the exact subcomponents integrated into a purpose-built one-way attack platform. These recurring characteristics **confirm manufacture within the same production ecosystem**.

The drones do not appear to correspond to any known mass-commercialized drone brand or openly marketed military model. Instead, the available indicators are more consistent with low-volume, contract-style production tailored for operational use. Such platforms appear **designed around deniability**, with generic airframes, non-distinctive electronics, modular commercial parts, and absent visible manufacturer markings. This architecture significantly complicates forensic tracing to a specific state company.

Debris of one of the drones that struck the airport of Kisangani photographed and analyzed by the Group of Experts on 9 February 2026



Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3



Figure 4



Figure 5



Figure 6

Photos of the debris of kamikaze drones shot down in the Hauts and Moyen Plateaux, received from FARDC sources



Source : Military intelligence sources.

Annex 51 (para. 171)

Drone strike on Goma on 11 March 2026

Frappe de drone à Goma le 11 mars 2026

On 11 March 2026, at around 4:00 a.m., two successive detonations were reported near a residential compound located in the Himbi neighborhood in Goma, with the second detonation impacting a residential structure. The Group conducted an analysis based on photographic and video evidence, complemented by testimonial and expert evidence.

The temporal spacing of approximately five minutes between the two detonations indicate either sequential targeting or a correction between initial and follow-on strike, which is consistent with loitering munition employment or remotely guided UAV-delivered munitions.

The structural damage patterns on the impacted house, including localized breaches, material displacement, and fragmentation impacts on surrounding surfaces, confirms the detonation of an explosive device designed to generate both blast overpressure and high-velocity fragments.

The structure is a two-stores residential building constructed of rendered masonry. The roof consists of a wooden frame covered with ceramic tiles. Observed damage is concentrated on the upper section of the façade and along the roofline (**Figure 1, 2**). A partial collapse of the wooden roof structure is visible, along with the outward projection of multiple roofing elements.

The façade exhibits a high density of small, localized impact marks. Most perforations are quasi-circular and relatively uniform in size, (Figure 5, 6) indicating the projection of high-velocity metallic fragments. This pattern is consistent with the effects of a high-explosive fragmentation (HE-FRAG) charge. The density of impacts is greatest around the first-floor windows and gradually decreases toward the lateral sections of the façade and the lower level (**Figure 4**).

The absence of a ground crater, combined with the concentration of damage along the roofline, suggests that the detonation occurred at the edge of the roof or slightly above it. The observed breakage of roof beams and the outward displacement of tiles indicate a release of explosive energy upon contact with, or immediately after impact on the structure (**Figure 3**).

The spatial distribution of impacts on the façade indicates a forward and downward-oriented fragmentation cone. This configuration is consistent with a descending attack trajectory. Based on the vertical dispersion of impacts, the angle of attack is estimated to be between 25 and 45 degrees.

The identified trajectory and the location of the detonation point are consistent with a munition delivered by an unmanned aerial system (UAS). The extent and intensity of the observed damage exceed those typically associated with light improvised munitions dropped from small drones, suggesting the use of an aerial munition specifically designed to produce a significant fragmentation effect.

The available information supports, as the leading working hypothesis, the use of a glide munition of approximately 70 mm caliber, carrying an explosive payload estimated at 5 to 10 kg, possibly combining incendiary and high-explosive fragmentation effects. According to witness accounts and damage analysis, the munition was delivered by a propeller-driven unmanned aerial platform approaching from over Lake Kivu. **The same platform has released two successive munitions:** the first producing a muffled explosion in the lake, and the second detonating on the house approximately 5 to 10 minutes later.

Confidential sources confirm the presence of a second drone, possibly in an observation role.

The detonation pattern is consistent with an airburst detonation triggered by a sensor before direct impact, at approximately the height of the upper section of the victim's bedroom window. On the basis of the observed blast effects (**Figure 4**) and witness accounts, the victim died instantly.



Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3



Figure 4




Figure 5



Figure 6

Confidential source

Annex 52 (para. 183)

Resignation letter from CRP/FRP members

Lettre de démission des cadres de la CRP/FRP

Kampala, le 18 Octobre 2025

**DECLARATION DES HAUTS CADRES FONDATEURS DU MOUVEMENT
POLITICO-MILITAIRE C.R.P
SUITE AUX ANTIVALEURS QUI ROUINENT LE MOUVEMENT**

Nous, hauts cadres et membres fondateurs du mouvement politico-militaire Convention pour la Revolution Populaire en sigle C.R.P, sommes très surpris, déçus et choqués de constater le ridicule qui a élu domicile dans le chef de celui dont nous avons désigné comme notre autorité politique du mouvement, à la personne de monsieur Thomas LUBANGA DYILO.

En effet, le mouvement C.R.P depuis sa création en date du 07 Janvier 2025, avait pour but d'apporter un changement radical en RDC sur tous les plans. Car qui dit changement, sous-entend le courage de combattre ses propres anciennes habitudes ou comportement, avant de prétendre imprimer un nouveau mode de vie ou de conduite à autrui. C'est ainsi que nous-mêmes avons pris un engagement courageux au péril de notre vie et celle de nos dépendants pour mener une lutte de libération au bénéfice de tout le peuple congolais.

Curieusement, avant même que la C.R.P ne totalise une année, nous nous sommes rendu compte que celui à qui nous avons donné le pouvoir, est une incarnation absolue de tous les antivaleurs que la C.R.P a toujours reproché aux gouvernants de la RDC tant au niveau national que provincial. Nous citons notamment :

1. La gestion autocratique : ceci est démontré par l'absence du débat, la confiscation des toutes les tâches dans un travail en vase clos, où il croit pouvoir tout faire et mieux faire seul au détriment des organes du mouvement et même les réunions sont convoquées au grès de son humeur ;
2. L'affairisme dans la révolution : à peine pris le control du centre de négoce IGA BARRIERE par les éléments de la FRP-CRP, monsieur Thomas LUBANGA alors Président du mouvement, a pris la décision unilatérale d'ériger un système de péage route sur la RN27 à travers ses représentants personnels méconnus par le comité, où chaque véhicule était obligé de payer la somme qui varie entre 50 et 100\$ avant de passer et cette pratique a duré près d'un mois. Une façon d'imposer encore de la souffrance à ceux dont on prétend libérer. Malgré tout cela, le fond collecté n'a jamais été présenté au comité directeur jusqu'à ces jours.
3. Manque de vision claire : il a confondu la révolution à une vacance dorée à Kampala sans la moindre intention de mener une lutte de libération au sens du terme.
4. L'escroquerie voire l'arnaque des opérateurs économiques de l'ituri au nom de la C.R.P: Menace des commerçants sous prétexte de la souscription à l'effort de guerre à échange d'une exonération future après coquette du pouvoir par la C.R.P et ce, à l'insu du collège de fondateurs et comité directeur ;

5. Le clanisme dans le fonctionnement : il ne donne de l'importance qu'aux orientations ou conseils prodigués par les ressortissants de son clan et c'est ces derniers qui se donne le luxe même de tracer la ligne maitresse de la C.R.P ;
6. L'extrême opacité dans la gestion financière : le Président Thomas LUBANGA a expressément ignoré le chargé des finances du mouvement, désigné le jour même de la création de la C.R.P, pour ainsi imposer sa propre petite sœur avec qui il vit dans la même maison. C'est pourquoi, la gestion financière échappe donc au contrôle de tous les membres du mouvement ;
7. L'arrogance en outrance et le mépris total à l'égard d'autres membres fondateurs du mouvement, etc.

Il ressort en outre que, l'initiative pour la création de la C.R.P et surtout sa désignation à la Présidence, n'aurait servi que de tremplin pour son encension politique et financière entant qu'un homme aux intentions sournoises, dont la vraie nature s'est révélée au fil du temps, malheureusement dans un virage éhonté et très dégoûtant, en dépit des véritables mobiles ayant concouru à la création de la structure aussi prestigieuse que la C.R.P, pour tenter de libérer le peuple meurtri, abandonné et oublié de l'ituri en particulier et ceux du reste du pays en général.

C'est pourquoi, face à ce comportement irresponsable de monsieur Thomas LUBANGA DYILO qui relève d'une délinquance politique démesurée, de vouloir à tout prix caporaliser tous les cadres en vue de les soumettre à sa petite volonté, nous avons pris la décision en ce jour, de nous désengager totalement de la C.R.P dont l'image est complètement souillée et qui visiblement s'est écartée de ses objectifs fondamentaux suite à l'avarice incontrôlée.

Par conséquent, nous interpellons la conscience des filles et fils ituriens, de ne plus jamais tenter d'apporter le moindre soutien à la C.R.P dans son format actuel et surtout pas à travers monsieur Thomas LUBANGA qui s'en sert au profit de ses besoins personnels tout en se moquant des victimes d'atrocités de l'ituri qui ont besoin d'une libération en urgence.

LES SIGNATAIRES

01. BUNGAMUZI KAKANI Charles 
02. Tunguza Basitako Vital 
03. Ung'yesho Birumyo-David : 
04. WEDUNGA NDARA BAUDOUIN 
05. DRANI DRILEBA J. Xavier 

Annex 53 (para. 190)**Additional information on CRP/FRP's resource mobilisation****Informations complémentaires sur la mobilisation des ressources du CRP/FRP**

CRP/FRP established a voluntary as well as a coercive system of taxation to mobilize resources for its war efforts ([S/2024/432](#), paras. 167-170, [S/2025/446](#), paras-158-159). Multiple sources reported that Hema community traders and businessmen made voluntary and coercive cash contributions, ranging between USD 10,000 to USD 50,000 each, while other provided foodstuffs to sustain the armed movement.⁴²⁵

CRP/FRP also mobilised resources through taxation at checkpoints. CRP/FRP sources reported that along the Nizi-Mongbwalu axis CRP/FRP charged USD 100 per heavy truck per movement, and USD 25 for light vehicles. The same sources indicated that the CRP/FRP raised between USD 15,000 to 18,000 per day. CRP/FRP had also deployed its elements to collect taxes at gold mining sites, which generated considerable resources to sustain the war efforts. The resources served to purchase weapons and ammunitions.

⁴²⁵ CRP ex-combatants, Intelligence, civil society and researchers sources

Annex 54 (para. 191)

Interdiction on UPDF movements into Ituri without prior notification and approval

Interdiction des mouvements de l'UPDF vers l'Ituri sans notification préalable et autorisation



Mahagi, le 04-103 /2026

N°324/053BUR/AT/MGI/2026

TRANSMIS copie pour information à :

- Son Excellence Monsieur le Gouverneur Militaire et Commandant des opérations de l'Ituri à **BUNIA**

OBJET : Instruction sur l'entrée
des éléments UPDF
Cl. : J.038

A Messieurs :
- Le Chef de Poste de la DGM ;
- Le Chef de Poste de l'ANR ;
- Le Chef de Poste de DSF ;
- Le Commandant Escadron Police des Frontières ;
(TOUS) à **MAHAGI**

Monsieur,

Sur instruction de Son Excellence Monsieur le Gouverneur Militaire et Commandant des opérations de Province de l'Ituri, il est strictement interdit de faire entrer sur notre Territoire par les frontières de ANZIDA et KAROMBO les éléments UPDF et leurs matériels sans l'aval de la hiérarchie.

Stricte application.



L'ADMINISTRATEUR MILITAIRE
DU TERRITOIRE,


[Signature]
« DISANOA-LALUA Jacques »
« Colonel/DSD »

Confidential source

Annex 55 (para. 193)

Suspension order semi-mechanized mining in parts of Djugu and Irumu territories

Ordre de suspension des activités semi-mécanisées dans une partie des territoires de Djugu et Irumu




Instruction sent by the military governor of Ituri, Gen. Johnny Luboya N'Kashama

Annex 56 (para. 195)

Conditioned resumption of mining activities in parts of Djugu and Irumu territories

Résomption partielle des activités minières dans des zones des territoires de Djugu et Irumu



Letter sent by military governor of Ituri, Gen. Johnny Luboya N'Kashama, to the provincial mining services enumerating the conditions under which semi-mechanized mining operators can be allowed to resume operations

Annex 58 (para. 201)

Estimates of semi-mechanized gold production along the Shari river, Djugu territory

Estimation de la production aurifère par des opérations semi-mécanisées le long de la Rivière Shari, territoire de Djugu

The Group assessed information provided by mining officials and civil society sources to derive conservative gold production estimates per production unit, typically composed of two to three excavators feeding a sluice, in Djugu territory, with a particular focus on operations along the Shari River. In parallel, detailed information was collected on the volume of gold-bearing gravel (“paydirt”) processed by each unit on a daily basis. Combining these daily production figures with estimated throughput allowed the Group to establish a conservative estimate of the recovered grade of the alluvial deposits along the Shari River. The total volume of material mined was then estimated on a six-monthly basis from March 2024 onwards using medium-resolution satellite imagery, complemented by average deposit depths derived from cross-checked interviews.

1. Context, assumptions and scope of the analysis

The typical alluvial mining setup in Djugu territory consists of 2–3 excavators working with a locally constructed sluice (commonly referred to as a “*drum*”). One to two excavators remove topsoil, prepare the site, and transport gold-containing gravel, also known as “paydirt”. The remaining excavator ensures that paydirt is continuously being fed into the sluice. A sluice is a channel that uses flowing water to separate gold from gravel.

According to concordant sources, a standard operation of this type in Djugu territory, assuming 12–20 effective workdays per month, can conservatively be expected to produce 1.8–3 kg of gold per month, equivalent to approximately 150 g/day on average.⁴²⁶ This aligns with other lower-bound estimates for profitable operations in the area.⁴²⁷

Along the Shari River, reported production levels are considerably higher. Observed daily yields per sluice typically reach 300 g/day, with peaks up to 500 g/day or more.⁴²⁸

As such, information on expected daily production per operating unit does not allow us to infer total alluvial production in a specific area over time. The number of days of production per operating unit varies widely throughout the year because of seasonal and idiosyncratic operational constraints. In addition, there are no reliable statistics available on the number of excavators operational in a specific area. The reported number of excavators per site is often an underrepresentation to evade the 4500 USD/year tax.⁴²⁹

This annex therefore presents a model to estimate alluvial production along the Shari River by assessing the average grade of the resource, i.e. grams of gold per m³ of gravel. The average grade in combination with the estimated total volume (in m³) of mined material over time allows us to estimate total gold production of the operation.

2. Estimated gravel throughput

To estimate the grade of the Shari River deposits, daily throughput is assessed alongside observed daily gold production. Throughput is the volume of paydirt processed by the operation. The average grade of the resource is then obtained by dividing the average daily gold production by the daily throughput. Two independent methods are used to crosscheck the estimates: the sluice processing capacity and the excavator feeding cadence. Combining both methods increases confidence in the result.

The sluices in use are generally described as having a “horizontal V”-shaped configuration. The upper sluice, measuring 3–4 m in length, performs initial washing and sorting. Finer material then passes to a second sluice of similar length positioned at an angle underneath the first (= the second leg of the V) equipped with gold matting. The most recurrent sluice widths

⁴²⁶ Mining officials, civil society actors, geologists.

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

range from 0.5–0.8 m.⁴³⁰ Some sluices used are considerably larger, but for the purposes of the current analysis we will be focusing on a standardized setup.

While sluice length influences gold recovery efficiency, sluice width primarily determines processing capacity. Industry references indicate that sluices of the aforementioned dimensions can typically process 22.5–36 m³ of paydirt per hour.⁴³¹

Whereas sluice capacity gives a first, but rather broad, range of estimate of expected throughput, data on excavator feeding cadence provides a more specific and independent estimate of throughput. Smaller excavators with a 300-kg bucket reportedly complete a loading cycle in ~30 seconds, corresponding to approximately 18 m³/hour (assuming a gravel density of 2 tons/m³). Larger excavators with 1.5 m³ buckets have turn-around times of 3–5 minutes, equating to roughly 22 m³/hour based on an average of 15 cycles per hour.⁴³²

These data points are internally consistent, showing a feeding rate between 18 and 23 m³/hour. Moreover, this throughput aligns with the lower end of the sluice's processing capacity, indicating that excavator feeding cadence rather than sluice capacity is the primary bottleneck. This is typical for semi-mechanized alluvial mining operations.

Knowing the hourly throughput rate, it is necessary to determine the effective number of operating hours per day to calculate the total daily throughput of paydirt. Although work is typically organized into three shifts totaling 21 hours, actual feeding of the sluice is periodically interrupted due to routine operational requirements, including excavator repositioning and ensuring sufficient stockpiled paydirt.⁴³³

For the purposes of this assessment, we will therefore consider an estimated 19 to 20 hours of effective daily production. In combination with the hourly feeding rate of 18 – 22 m³, this corresponds to an approximate daily throughput of 350 – 450 m³ of paydirt.

3. Estimating recovered grade from throughput and production

Based on this throughput, we can translate the observed daily gold outputs along the Shari River into indicative grade values. Considering a daily throughput of 400 m³ of paydirt and a gold production level of 300 g/day, this corresponds to roughly 0.75 g/m³, while 500 g/day corresponds to approximately 1.25 g/m³. Days with exceptionally high production can also reflect more continuous and optimized feeding, leading to a somewhat lower grade in practice.

	Daily production	Recovered Grade
Low	150 grams	0.38 g/m ³
Good	300 grams	0.75 g/m ³
Great	>500 grams	>1.25 g/m ³

4. Assessing plausibility using independent reference points

Several independent reference points support the plausibility of the estimated grade range for the Shari River deposits:

Rule-of-thumb grade used by mining authorities

Mining officials apply a rule-of-thumb grade of “1 g per (large) excavator bucket” for production estimates in Shari. This corresponds to 1 g per 1.5 m³, reflecting the approximate volume of a large excavator bucket. This equals 0.67 grams per m³. The shorthand is broadly consistent with an excavator feeding cadence of 15 cycles per hour (approximately 4 minutes per cycle) over an effective working period of 20 hours, yielding 300 grams per day.

⁴³⁰ Ibid.

⁴³¹ See eg. Robin Grayson, ‘Best available techniques for placer gold mines’, p. 671

⁴³² Mining officials, civil society actors, geologists

⁴³³ Ibid.

Comparison with global and Congolese alluvial benchmarks

Assuming a recovery rate of 60–80 percent⁴³⁴, the inferred true grades of the Shari river deposit can be compared against a placer (i.e. alluvial) deposit grade distribution model developed by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to provide an objective assessment of deposit quality.⁴³⁵ This comparison places the Shari resource within a global context and allows for a structured evaluation of its relative standing among documented placer deposits.

The table below presents recovered grades and their corresponding true grades and percentile ranges across the three recovery-rate scenarios:

Recovered Grade (g/m ³)	60% recovery rate		70% recovery rate		80% recovery rate	
	True grade (g/m ³)	Percentile	True Grade	Percentile	True Grade	Percentile
0.38	0.63	78-82	0.54	75-78	0.48	72-76
0.75	1.25	90-93	1.07	88-91	0.93	86-89
1.25	2.08	95-97	1.79	94-96	1.56	93-95

Overall, the USGS benchmarks place the estimated grade of the Shari resource broadly within the 80th–95th percentile of documented global placer gold deposits. At the time of writing, no detailed resource estimates or exploration reports were available for placer systems in Djugu territory to enable a more localized comparative framework. However, historical geological assessments from other Congolese alluvial gold hubs provide relevant reference points.

In Kampene (Maniema Province), historical records indicate placer deposit grades averaging approximately 1.6 g/m³ (with a reported range of 0.88–1.95 g/m³).⁴³⁶ Along the Kimbi river in Fizi territory (South Kivu Province), operations from the 1930s to 1950s reported recovered grades in the range of 0.5–0.93 g/m³.⁴³⁷ These values indicate that the estimated grades along Shari, including the inferred average of around 0.75 g/m³, fall well within the spectrum of known Congolese placer deposit grades and are not anomalous in a regional context.

The Kilo-Moto placer systems are widely regarded as high-quality deposits, and the Shari basin, situated along a paleo-channel and in proximity to primary mineralization, aligns with this geological profile. This suggests that certain stretches of the Shari deposit may yield recovered grades significantly higher than 0.75 g/m³.

Interpretation and limits of field pan sampling

Field identification of exploitable deposits is carried out through localized sampling at the base of the gravel column, with assessments relying largely on visual and intuitive evaluation by operators.⁴³⁸ A yield of ½–1 “tige” (0.1 g) per two 15-kg pans is considered promising. This corresponds to approximately 3.3–6.6 g/m³.⁴³⁹ However, these samples represent bottom-layer concentrations, which are typically several times richer than the overall deposit due to gravitational sorting and localized gold accumulation in bedrock traps. As a result, such sampling results are not reliable predictors of average grade, but they do provide a reasonable indication of mineralization intensity and economic viability.

Operating costs and influence on grade targeting

The Shari placer deposits are overlain by thick swampy sediments, requiring substantial efforts to reach the paydirt that can extend over several months. Given these high preparatory costs in fuel (400 liters per 21-hour working day per excavator) and manpower, it is reasonable that operators focus on areas with above-average expected yields, which helps explain why

⁴³⁴ Robin Grayson, l.c., p. 673

⁴³⁵ USGS, Grade and Tonnage Model of Placer Au-PGE, <https://pubs.usgs.gov/bul/b1693/html/bull421h.htm>;

⁴³⁶ The mentioned average is weighted by volume of the respective resource. Hattingh J. et Taylor C. B. (2007). A review of the South Kivu – Maniema Exploration permit and the Kampene Mining and concession areas - Democratic Republic of Congo. Wardell Armstrong International Limited. La Quinta Resources Corporation. Ref : 61-0441, as referenced by the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources, “[Evaluation Géologique et Economique des Gisements d’Or Alluvionnaire de Kampene, Maniema, RD Congo](#)”, April 2024, p.3;

⁴³⁷ G. Schaar, Les mines d’or du 5^{ième} parallèle, Académie royale des sciences coloniales, 1959, p. 39

⁴³⁸ Mining officials, civil society actors, geologists

⁴³⁹ Ibid.

reported Shari production levels consistently exceed the conservative baseline estimate of 150 g/day commonly used by mining services.

5. From observed mine footprint to cumulative production

Daily production cannot be extrapolated across the year because operations along the Shari River include extended periods of preparatory work, as mentioned above, as well as intermittent downtime for equipment maintenance and eventualities such as last year's administrative suspension. These factors vary and cannot be reliably quantified.

A more robust approach is therefore to infer cumulative production from changes in excavated surface area visible on satellite imagery. Semi-mechanized alluvial mining creates identifiable water-filled pits, tailings ponds, and reworked channels, allowing mined areas to be mapped over time. This method implicitly incorporates all operational interruptions.

Accumulated production is estimated by multiplying the mapped excavated area by the average paydirt thickness. Interlocutors report that economically attractive placer deposits in Djugu generally have 0.5–1.5 m of gravel, while major river systems such as the Shari exhibit thicker sequences.⁴⁴⁰ Observers estimate Shari paydirt at 2–3 m on average, with some zones up to 8 m.⁴⁴¹ However, grades decline toward the upper gravel layers because of gravitational sorting, so exceptionally thick zones contribute less to overall output than their thickness alone would suggest. For conservative estimation, an average paydirt thickness of 2 to 3 m is applied.

Alluvial mining along the Shari River provides a suitable case study due to the clear visibility of excavation activity on satellite imagery. The river basin and its successive expansions can be monitored effectively using 3-metre resolution imagery from Planet Labs PBC, allowing reliable tracking of spatial progression over time. Excavated sections are reused as water reservoirs and tailings ponds, resulting in a relatively orderly and easily identifiable mining footprint.

A key limitation relates to the temporal resolution of the satellite-based approach. Once an area is identified as excavated, its full estimated production potential is counted immediately, even though extraction within that area may still be ongoing. This can lead to over- or under-estimation at specific points in time, as the method does not distinguish between depleted sections, newly opened areas and those still in mid-extraction. However, these temporal discrepancies are expected to average out over longer observation periods, particularly when imagery is assessed at regular intervals.

A second limitation is the potential inclusion of non-productive features, such as artificial dams, sterile zones, or areas cleared but not mined, which may be captured within the mapped footprint. To take this limitation into account, a correction factor will be applied in the below calculations. Despite this, the most significant uncertainties remain the grade of the deposit and the average paydirt thickness, which exert a far greater influence on production estimates.

Although the methodology developed lends itself to replication in other semi-mechanized mining context in the DR Congo and beyond, it should be noted that not all such operations exhibit the same characteristics as those described for the Shari River. Extrapolating the methodology for instance to the semi-mechanized mining operations in the *Réserve de faune à Okapi* (See [S/2022/479](#), paras. 141-150) would not be valid. There, mining activity frequently reworks previously disturbed areas, producing a diffuse and shifting footprint that does not expand in a clear, cumulative manner. As a result, surface area progression cannot be reliably linked to incremental volume extracted, making production estimates derived from this approach considerably more uncertain.

6. Production estimates derived from spatial analysis

Planet Labs PBC satellite imagery with a 3-metre resolution was analyzed to quantify the expansion of mined surface area along the Shari river. Measurements were conducted twice yearly beginning in March 2024. The additional surface area identified in each interval is presented below (in thousand m²):

Period	Additional surface area mined (1000 m ²)
3/2024-09/2024	949

⁴⁴⁰ Mining officials, civil society actors, geologists

⁴⁴¹ Mining officials, civil society actors, geologists

09/2024-03/2025	1,156
03/2025-09/2025	1,586
09/2025-03/2026	1,525
Total	5,216

The cumulative mapped area over the two-year period is therefore 5.22 km². In line with a conservative analytical approach, we will correct for that part of the mining footprint that corresponds to the non-productive features. Considering the characteristics of mining along the Shari river, a correction factor of 80% will be applied. We will hence assume a total mined footprint of 4.2 km².

Using this total mined footprint and applying different assumptions for average recovered grade and average paydirt thickness, the resulting production estimates (in tons) are shown below:

Average recovered grade (g/m ³)	Avg. Paydirt Thickness (m)		
	2	2.5	3
0.38	3t	4t	5t
0.75	6t	8t	10t
1	8t	10t	13t
1.25	10t	13t	16t

These values represent cumulative gold production estimates for the period March 2024 – March 2026, based solely on observed excavation footprints and the stated grade and thickness assumptions.




Image © 2026 Planet Labs PBC, September 2024 (left) and March 2025 (right). Analysis by the Group of Experts






Image © 2026 Planet Labs PBC, September 2025 (left) and March 2026 (right)
Analysis by the Group of Experts

	Mined Surface_2403
	Mined Surface 2409
	Mined Surface_2503
	Mined Surface_2509
	mined Surface_2603




Above: IPIS and Mapbox map, showing location of Shari river section shown on the left (Image © 2026 Planet Labs PBC, March 2026).

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 59 (para. 202)

Alluvial Mining around Yedi, Djugu

Exploitation alluvionnaire autour de Yedi, Djugu



Source: (top) Near-Infrared Image with visible excavation highlighted, © Copernicus Sentinel Data, March 2026 and (bottom left and right) © Google Earth/Maxar Technologies, Airbus, Landsat and Copernicus, June 2025
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

A second alluvial mining area in Djugu territory that experienced a major expansion in 2025 is located around Yedi, a secluded locality approximately 25 km northwest of Mongbwalu. Mid-June 2024, mining operators began constructing a 55 km dirt road from Komanda to Yedi. By the last quarter of 2024, semi-mechanized alluvial mining became visible on EU Copernicus satellite imagery.

Since then, the pace of mine-site development has been exceptionally rapid. Within just over one year, approximately 12.5 km² of terrain have been visibly disturbed by alluvial mining activities. High-resolution satellite imagery shows extensive and fast excavation of small riverbeds, with shallow overburden and the continuous formation of gravel tailings fans. These patterns are characteristic of operations working directly in the active channel, where paydirt is relatively shallow; a conservative estimate places average paydirt thickness between 0.5 and 1.0 m. The spatial footprint of the workings is also relatively “clean”: excavated cells along the river are frequently reused as water reservoirs or tailings ponds, reducing the non-productive part of the footprint. The methodology developed in the previous annex can hence be applied.

Not all visibly disturbed ground represents actual excavation of paydirt. Applying a conservative correction factor of 70%, the effectively mined area is estimated at 8.75 km². Even under the most conservative assumptions for both grade and paydirt thickness, cumulative production over the past year likely reaches several tons of gold. It should be noted that no production was officially declared for this operation in 2025.⁴⁴²

The table below summarizes estimated production (in tons) across a range of conservative and plausible paydirt thicknesses and grades, including a minimum recovered grade of 0.35 g/m³:

Recovered grade (g/m ³)	Paydirt thickness (m)		
	0.5	0.75	1
0.35	1.5t	2.3t	3.1t
0.5	2.2t	3.3t	4.4t
0.75	3.3t	4.9t	6.6t
1	4.4t	6.6t	8.8t
1.2	5.25t	7.9t	10.5t
1.5	6.5t	9.8t	13.1t

⁴⁴² Ituri province production and export statistics, 2025, mining services, document on file with the Secretariat

Annex 60 (para. 203)

Analysis of active semi-mechanized mining camps in Djugu territory

Analyse des camps actifs d'exploitation semi-mécanisée dans le territoire de Djugu

To assess overall trends in semi-mechanized mining activity in Djugu territory, the Group used the number of identifiable mining camps active during the year as a proxy indicator. This approach was adopted for reasons of efficiency and feasibility. Mapping changes in mined surface area requires substantial resources, whereas the visual identification of mining camps provides a reliable first-order indication of the level of mining activity.

Mining camps display a distinctive and recurrent signature in medium-resolution satellite imagery. They are typically characterized by rectangular, man-made earthen embankments delineating the camp area and are situated near visibly exploited alluvial deposits. During periods of operation, high-reflectance features associated with corrugated iron roofing, metal containers and equipment are generally observable. These features disappear once a camp is abandoned (see below). EU Copernicus satellite imagery for 2024 and 2025 was systematically reviewed, and Planet Labs PBC imagery was used selectively to confirm the operational status of camps where required. As with any visual classification based on medium-resolution satellite imagery, some degree of over- or under-identification of likely mining camps cannot be excluded.



Left: active mining camp near Yedi; Center: abandoned mining camp near Yedi; Right: active mining camp along the Ituri river. Source: © Google Earth/Airbus, 2025

The use of mining camps as a proxy indicator reflects both the scale of material and manpower deployed and the spatial progression of alluvial exploitation along placer deposits. This relationship is indicative but not linear. The maps show camps that were active at some point during the reference year, rather than simultaneously. Some were abandoned shortly after establishment due to insufficient ore grades, while others ceased activity following resource depletion. In addition, smaller and more transient camps are likely associated with significantly lower levels of equipment and output than larger, longer-established camps. Accordingly, the results provide an indicative rather than exhaustive measure of mining activity over the period under review.



Position of active mining camps 2024 (left) and 2025 (right); Base layer: © OpenStreetMaps

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

A comparison of the maps indicates a marked increase in semi-mechanized mining activity in 2025. The expansion was particularly pronounced, though not exclusively so, in the aforementioned areas surrounding Yedi and along the Shari River. Nine mining camps commenced operations in southern Banyali-Kilo. Significant stretches of the Ituri River were also exploited and mining operators ventured into new areas, including around Makofi in the north.

In quantitative terms, approximately 55 mining camps were identified as having been active at some point during 2024, compared with 104 in 2025. Some of the camps highlighted on the maps are located just beyond the administrative boundaries of Djugu territory. Given their immediate proximity and linkage to mining activity within Djugu, these sites were included to present a more representative picture of overall trends.

The raw number of such camps for 2024 gives an inflated impression of semi-mechanized activity throughout that year. First, mining activity around Yedi only appeared in the last quarter of 2024. Moreover, after a significant lull in violence in Banyali-Kilo collectivity in 2023, there was a renaissance of semi-mechanized mining in the first half of 2024, especially around Abelkoso. This triggered a spate of particularly violent attacks by CODECO-URDPC, killing 126 civilians in incidents directly linked to control over mining activity, including six foreigners.⁴⁴³ Mining activity stopped overnight and the timid boom hence turned into a sudden bust. This alteration between interacting cycles of violence and semi-mechanized mining had been observed in Djugu before and therefore serves as a cautionary tale for the current gold rush in the area.

⁴⁴³ UN Sources

Annex 61 (para. 206)

Regulatory framework governing the use of cyanide in mining operations in the DR Congo

Cadre réglementaire sur l'utilisation de cyanure dans des opérations minières en RD Congo

The use of cyanide in combination with mercury is widely recognized as one of the most hazardous forms of artisanal gold mining, especially as their interaction results in the formation of stable, highly hazardous compounds. These substances contaminate soil and aquatic ecosystems, endangering the health and livelihoods of the local population.

Under Annex C of the Minamata Convention on Mercury, to which the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a State Party, cyanide leaching of mercury-bearing tailings is identified as a practice that should be eliminated as a matter of priority.⁴⁴⁴ Scientific and policy guidance issued under the Convention, including UNEP's guidance on sound tailings management in ASGM, further emphasizes that this practice represents a worst-case scenario.⁴⁴⁵ Consistent with these international commitments, the Democratic Republic of the Congo's National Action Plan under the Minamata Convention explicitly commits the Government to eradicating these practices.⁴⁴⁶

The *Règlement minier*, as amended by Decree n°18/024 of 8 June 2018, subjects the use of cyanide in mining activities to a prior authorization regime. Cyanide is treated as a hazardous chemical reagent whose use is restricted to mineral processing and transformation activities carried out in processing plants or workshops expressly authorized by the Minister of Mines. Unauthorized use of cyanide, including its use by artisanal miners, mining cooperatives, or unapproved processing units, is prohibited and exposes the operator to administrative sanctions, including withdrawal of authorization or *agrément* (art 238 *Règlement minier*).

Authorization to use cyanide is further conditioned on compliance with restrictive environmental impact management requirements. In accordance with articles 430 to 433 of the *Règlement minier*, any mining or processing activity involving hazardous substances must be covered by risk assessments and mitigation plans. These instruments must specifically target risks associated with the use, storage and disposal of cyanide.

While the *Règlement minier* governs the authorization to use cyanide, the requirement to obtain a prior licence for its importation derives the import licensing regime is established under *Ordonnance-loi n°83-033 du 12 septembre 1983 portant régime général du commerce extérieur*. Cyanide, as a dangerous chemical product, falls within the category of goods requiring prior authorization for importation. In practice, import licenses are issued only to operators able to demonstrate lawful end-use, notably possession of a valid ministerial authorization to use cyanide under the *Règlement minier*, and compliance with applicable environmental approvals. The only gold producer to which such authorizations are currently awarded is Barrick Gold, which operates the Kibali Gold Mine in Haut Uele province.⁴⁴⁷

⁴⁴⁴ https://minamataconvention.org/sites/default/files/documents/information_document/Minamata-Convention-booklet-Sep2019-EN.pdf

⁴⁴⁵ http://minamataconvention.org/sites/default/files/documents/information_document/4_INF6_ASGM_Guidance.English.pdf

⁴⁴⁶ https://minamataconvention.org/sites/default/files/documents/national_action_plan/RDC-NAP-2021-FR.pdf

⁴⁴⁷ Mining officials

Annex 62 (para. 207)

Satellite imagery of cyanide leaching operations near Iga Barrière

Images satellitaires des opérations de lixiviation au cyanure vers Iga Barrière







Annex 63 (para. 207)

A forensic production assessment of cyanide leaching operations

Analyse de la production fondée sur des indices matériels des opérations de lixiviation au cyanure

1. Introduction and summary

In cyanide leaching, crushed gold-bearing rock is mixed with a weak cyanide solution. The cyanide dissolves the gold out of the rock, releasing it into the liquid in a form that can be recovered.

To capture the dissolved gold, activated carbon is added to the solution. Gold sticks strongly to the carbon, so as the liquid flows past, the gold is absorbed onto the carbon grains, while the remaining waste rock and solution are removed.

Once the carbon is “loaded” with gold, it is separated from the slurry and treated with a hot chemical solution that washes the gold off the carbon. This gold-rich liquid is then processed further—typically by electrolysis or smelting—to produce metallic gold. There are currently three installations in Bunia where gold can be recovered from the activated carbon, although smuggling of activated carbon to Uganda remains prevalent as well.⁴⁴⁸

This assessment presents a methodology for estimating gold production capacity of cyanide-leaching operations by analyzing accumulated tailings and associated processing infrastructure visible in high-resolution satellite imagery. Because spent tailings accumulate and are not normally removed, they provide a cumulative and unavoidable physical record of past production. The approach combines estimates of accumulated tailings volumes with throughput modelling. The throughput model is derived from measurements of leaching tank dimensions and operating cycles, and gives an indication of the volumes of spent tailings that are expected to be added per month. Cross-checking these two independent indicators strengthens the reliability of the estimates and provides an external means of assessing the production of leaching operations.

The assessment is based on detailed 3D-modelling of the accumulated spent tailing heaps that are deposited next to the leaching tanks. The modeling was inferred by combining data from high resolution satellite imagery with known physical properties of the tailings, which consist of fine-grained quartz sand. The model indicates that approximately 180,000 tons of tailings were treated by January 2026, with an average grade ranging between five and ten grams of gold per ton, potentially more under less conservative assumptions.

2. Accumulation analysis

In the facilities under consideration, tailings generated through cyanide leaching are deposited adjacent to the processing vats. Over time, these deposits constitute a cumulative record of all ore processed since the beginning of operations. This feature, while incidental to the operation, has the effect of significantly enhancing transparency. By estimating both the physical volume of the tailings and the average grade of the ore, it is possible to infer total gold extraction volumes over the operational period.

Satellite imagery provides clear delineation of the horizontal footprint of these tailings. The primary challenge therefore lies in determining heap height, and hence volume, from these two-dimensional images.

The tailings consist of fine-grained quartz sand. Granular materials naturally stabilize at a characteristic angle of repose, defined as the angle at which gravitational forces balance the internal frictional resistance of the grains. In other words, it is the natural slope along which loose sand settles without collapsing. Hence, if we know how wide the heap is and how steep loose sand naturally piles up, we can estimate how tall the heap must be.

For dry quartz sand, this angle typically approximates 34°. ⁴⁴⁹ This allows us to calculate the approximate height of the heaps using basic geometry: the height is equal to the horizontal run of the slope (i.e. the horizontal distance from the base of the slope to its edge) times the tangent of the angle of repose.

⁴⁴⁸ Civil society sources, mining officials

⁴⁴⁹ See for instance: [H.M. Beakawi Al-Hashemi, O.S. Baghabra Al-Amoudi, A review on the angle of repose of granular materials, Powder Technology 330 \(2018\), p.399](#)


These estimates are approximate and intentionally conservative. This methodology provides a reasonable approximation for constructing three-dimensional models of the tailing heaps, but several limitations remain. The angle of repose may deviate from standard values, as the grain size and consistency of the quartz-rich tailings are not precisely known. Humidity of the spent tailings can also influence the angle of repose, although the tailings accumulated along the slope have typically dried out under direct sunlight. In addition, the heaps are often irregularly shaped, making contour delineation more challenging and introducing a degree of subjectivity into the modelling. Finally, the satellite imagery might contain off-nadir and terrain-related distortions, leading to some geometric inaccuracies.

2. Throughput analysis

In addition to the accumulation analysis whereby we calculate the total historical volume of processed ores via the geometry of the tailing heaps, we can also conduct a throughput analysis. Hereby the monthly processing capacity of the operation is calculated based on the dimensions and count of active treatment vats.

The maximum throughput of a cluster of leaching vats depends on the volume of the treated ore per vat and the duration of a treatment. Based on interviews with industry insiders, one treatment cycle at the Iga Barriere operation takes 14 days, excluding filling and emptying the tank.⁴⁵⁰

The volume of treated ore depends foremost on the volume of the tanks. For the tank volume, we need their diameter and depth. Tank diameter can easily be measured using high resolution satellite imagery, such as 30cm Airbus Neo Pleiades. To establish the depth of the tanks, satellite imagery can also be used by means of the shadow method. Hereby we look at the length of the shadow cast by the sun inside empty tanks. More specifically, the depth of the tank will be equal to the length of the shade times the tangent of the sun's elevation angle.



Images: © Airbus, 16.05.2023

On these images (Airbus, 16.05.2023), one can measure the length of the shade cast in the leaching vats to be approximately 0.75 meters. The sun elevation was 64.24°

$$\text{depth} = 0.75m \times \tan(64.24^\circ) \approx 1.5m$$

The tanks on the left of each image are visibly deeper, though they are not used to treat ore, but rather to collect and treat the gold-containing solution after leaching.

A depth of 1.5 meters is logical as the sand is shoveled out of the tanks by hand after treatment.⁴⁵¹ Deeper leaching tanks would therefore be highly impractical. Typical tank depth was further confirmed by analyzing other high resolution satellite

⁴⁵⁰ Mining officials, researchers, civil society actors

⁴⁵¹ Mining officials, researchers, civil society actors and satellite imagery analysis

imagery (Airbus January 2026) and by interviews.⁴⁵² An estimated two-thirds of the volume of the tank is filled with dry ore.⁴⁵³

3. Cross-checking and validation of model

To ensure the robustness and credibility of the production-estimation framework, a systematic cross-checking and validation process was applied. This process compares the theoretical maximum throughput of a cluster of leaching tanks with the 3D-modeled volume of the adjacent accumulated tailing heap. By analyzing multiple clusters and time periods, the method assesses whether observed tailings volumes fall within the expected range of throughput.

The following calculations apply the same basic method repeatedly across different clusters to test whether observed tailings volumes are consistent with plausible processing capacity. This dual-track validation serves to confirm the internal consistency of the model and to identify any anomalies requiring further investigation. It provides a transparent, repeatable mechanism for verifying production estimates.

Cluster 1

Throughput analysis



Images: © Airbus: May 2023 (left), April 2024 (center), August 2025 (right)

The maximum throughput of each these leaching tanks (6m diameter) per month is :

$$r^2 \times \pi \times d \times 65\% \text{ dry tailing content} \times 2 \text{ cycles} = \text{monthly volume per tank}$$

$$(3m)^2 \times \pi \times 1.5m \times 65\% \times 2 \text{ cycles} = 55.1m^3$$

Low resolution satellite imagery from Planet Labs PBC indicates that the cluster started operating in July 2023, when light, high-contrast quartz sand becomes visible and the footprint of the installation increases.

Between July 23 and April 2024, when the second high resolution image was taken, the maximum combined throughput of these tanks was :

$$55 m^3 \times 3 \text{ tanks} \times 9 \text{ months} = 1485 m^3$$

Between April 2024 and August 2025, the maximum combined throughput was:


$$55 m^3 \times 3 \times 16 = 2640 m^3$$

Accumulation analysis

When assessing the accumulated tailings for the April 2024 and August 2025 image respectively, we estimate the height by multiplying the horizontal run of the slope times the tangent of the angle of repose.

⁴⁵² Ibid.

⁴⁵³ Published studies report lower dry-weight fractions (40%) under faster processing conditions (i.e. days rather than weeks), these are hence not directly comparable to conditions in the operations in Iga Barrière. A higher proportion of dry-weight is expected in prolonged vat leaching, making a two-thirds assumption conservative in the absence of clearer operational data.




Images: © Airbus, April 2024 (left) and August 2025 (right)

For the April 2024 image, this is: $5.5m \times \tan(34^\circ) = 3.7m$
For the August 2025 image, this is: $11m \times \tan(34^\circ) = 7.5m$

Using QGIS, contours are manually digitized based on estimated slope heights, after which a 3D model is generated using the Triangular Irregular Network (TIN) tool. The Raster Surface Volume tool calculates the volume of the modeled tailings heap.

This gives the following results:




Images: © Airbus, April 2024 (left) and August 2025 (right)

	Maximum accumulated throughput (m^3)	Measured volume of tailings heap (m^3)	Measured/max throughput
April 2024	1485	1100	75%
August 2025	4125	3300	80%

The observed increase in tailings volume, equivalent to approximately 75–80 per cent of the maximum theoretical throughput, falls within the expected range. Variance from the maximum can be explained by the manual emptying and refilling of tanks between 14-day leaching cycles and the time required to source input material. The assumed two-thirds dry-material capacity per tank is also an estimate.

While this alignment provides initial validation of the model, further corroboration is required to ensure that the consistency observed is not coincidental and that the methodology remains reliable across all observed leaching operations. We will therefore assess three more randomly selected clusters that showed continuous operation during the period observed with high resolution satellite imagery.

Cluster 2



Images: © Airbus, April 2024 (left) and August 2025 (right)


The above images show a time comparison between April 2024 and August 2025. Low resolution imagery from Planet Labs indicates that production commenced mid-July 2024.

Using the aforementioned formulas, we calculate the maximum throughput of ore during that period, for a tank with measured diameter of 5 meters.

$$(2.5m)^2 \times \pi \times 1.5m \times 65\% \times 2 \times 13 \text{ months} = 498m^3$$

For five vats the total maximum throughput in that period is approximately $2500 m^3$

We will again calculate the volume of the accumulated tailings heap. The horizontal run of the slope (with visible gullies formed by rain) is 9m, with a resulting estimated height of around 6 meters.




The calculated volume of the tailings heap is 2100 m^3 . This will be 50-100 m^3 less, as the northern slope of the constructed laterite hill on which the tanks are located (see April 2024 imagery) is covered by the tailings heap.⁴⁵⁴

	Maximum accumulated throughput (m^3)	Measured volume of tailings heap (m^3)	Measured/max throughput
August 2025	2500	2100	80-85%

This demonstrates again a good correspondence between the accumulation and throughput analyses.


Cluster 3



Images: © Airbus, April 2024 (left) and August 2025 (right)

There are four tanks with a 5m diameter and four with a 6m diameter. This gives a total maximum monthly throughput of 373 m^3 .

⁴⁵⁴ For the constructed laterite slope, a 45° slope is assumed. Consequently, we can calculate its volume (V) by the following formula: $V = [(\text{horizontal run})^2 \times \text{length}] / 2$




Images: © Airbus, April 2024 (left) and August 2025 (right)

We again make a 3D model of the approximative volume, with a calculated height of around 4 meters in April 2024 and of 8 meters in August 2025. Based on Planet Labs PBC imagery, the first processed tailings were deposited mid-February 2024.

	Maximum accumulated throughput (m^3)	Measured volume of tailings heap (m^3)	Measured/max throughput
April 2024	932.5	900	96%
August 2025	6900	6000	87%

The measured tailings volume is likely slightly overstated, as a constructed laterite slope probably underlies part of the heap, although no imagery is available from the time of construction to confirm its dimensions.

Cluster 4



Images: © Airbus, April 2024 (left) and August 2025 (right)

There are 5 tanks with a diameter of 5.5 meters. Each tank has a maximum throughput of 46 m^3 , giving a combined total of 230 m^3 per month.

The estimated height of the heaps is 4 and 7 meters respectively. The calculated volume of the accumulated tailings in April 2024 is 900 and in August 2025 3500 m^3 .

For the period between April 2024 and August 2025, we have a maximum theoretical throughput of 3680 m^3 . The increase in estimated volume for that time is 2600 m^3 . This represents 71% of the maximum.

Validation of model

Across the four assessed clusters, the model demonstrates coherent and credible alignment between theoretical throughput and measured tailings volumes, providing strong initial validation of the methodology.

Certain limitations remain: maximum operational throughput is lower in practice due to the time required to empty, clean, and refill leaching tanks in between cycles. Terrain effects, such as constructed laterite platforms or natural downward slopes, cannot be fully incorporated into the volumetric modelling. Taken together, the results indicate that, despite these constraints, the methodology provides a reliable and sufficiently robust basis for assessing production volumes.


4. Generalization to entire production in cluster since 2023

Having confirmed that the method yields consistent results across multiple independent clusters, it is reasonable to apply the same conservative approach to all observed tailings heaps.

We proceeded to apply the same approach to the full set of tailings heaps associated with the leaching operation. 45 heaps were modeled in total. For each heap, we first inferred the approximate height by measuring visible slope features and manually delineating contour lines. This then provided the basis for constructing a three-dimensional surface using the TIN interpolation and Raster Surface Volume tools in QGIS.

It should be noted that, according to mining officials, the maximum height attained by these heaps is around 8 meters, which corresponds to the maximum height observed in our 3D-generated model. This provides additional validation of the latter.

While this process enables a structured and replicable volumetric estimation, it necessarily contains a degree of subjectivity in the placement and spacing of contour lines; in all cases, a conservative approach was adopted to avoid overestimation. Additionally, some tailings heaps lacked a clearly visible slope or exhibited irregular geometries that prevented reliable 3D modelling. These were hence not modelled. As a result, the calculated aggregate volume of tailings should be interpreted as a lower-bound estimate of total processed material since the start of operations.



Images: © Airbus, January 2026

The total calculated volume of the tailing heaps is approximately 120,000 m^3 . Given the specific density of quartz sand tailings, this corresponds to about 180,000 tons.

5. Indications of grade and total accumulated production estimates

To estimate total gold production, we combine the calculated tailings volume with estimates of average gold grade. Available qualitative evidence suggests that the material processed has a wide range of grades: ore purchased for cyanidation reportedly contains a minimum of 3–5 g/t, with 10 g/t considered to be a ‘decent’ working grade. Interviews and tailings-purchase price indications further imply that certain batches may have significantly higher grades, in some cases exceeding 20 g/t and exceptionally even reaching values up to 40 g/t.⁴⁵⁵

The information at hand is insufficient to derive a reliable grade distribution. In line with a precautionary analytical approach, two scenarios are therefore adopted: a baseline lower-bound scenario of 5 g/t, reflecting the minimum plausible average grade, and a conservative upper-bound scenario of 10 g/t, representing a cautious estimate of maximum average grade.

$$180,000 \text{ tons} \times \frac{5g}{\text{ton}} = 900 \text{ kg}$$

$$180,000 \text{ tons} \times \frac{10g}{\text{ton}} = 1,800 \text{ kg}$$

Based on the estimated accumulated tailings volumes and the assumed grade scenarios, total gold production since the onset of operations is estimated to be around one to two tons of gold, with the possibility of higher outputs under less conservative assumptions.

Recovery rates, i.e. the percentage of contained gold that gets effectively extracted, vary primarily with operator skill. Experienced chemists—often recruited from Tanzania or Kenya—can achieve recovery rates exceeding 95 per cent, consistent with both published literature and anecdotal observations from the operations at Iga Barrière. Recovery efficiency, however, tends to decline as vat size increases, due to less effective mixing and reduced control over process conditions.

6. Maximal theoretical processing capacity and monthly gold production

In January 2026, a total number of 338 tanks were observed, with an estimated average capacity of 27 m³ of ore each. In theory, this would give a maximum processing capacity of 9,126 m³ of tailings per month, corresponding to around 70 – 140 kg of gold per month (assuming an average grade of 5 – 10g/t and 1.75 cycles per month, effective recovery rate not taken into account).

Diameter (m)	Number of tanks	Approx. volume of contained ore (m3)	Approx. weight of ore per treatment per tank
4	16	12.25	18.5t
5	64	19.1	29t
6	188	27.5	41.3t
7	70	37.5	56.3t
	Total: 338	Weighted Avg: 26.9	

Estimating gold output by simply multiplying the number of tanks by their theoretical maximum processing capacity would result in a substantial overestimate of both current and past monthly production, particularly when viewed against the total gold yield inferred to date. While processing capacity has expanded rapidly over the past two years through the construction of additional tanks, satellite imagery and qualitative reporting indicate that clusters of tanks gradually fall into disuse, in part due to the accumulation of spent tailings around processing sites. In addition, it cannot be assumed that sufficient feedstock is continuously available to keep all tanks operating at full capacity at any given time.

In the following section, we will therefore make an estimate of the effective average utilization rate of installed capacity. Rather than assuming all tanks operated continuously at full capacity, we compare expected output under that assumption with actual accumulated tailings. This will allow us to give a better estimate of past and current monthly outputs.

7. Estimation of capacity utilization

⁴⁵⁵ Mining officials, civil society actors


Based on the observed number of tanks at four points in time between May 2023 and January 2026, we reconstruct how processing capacity at the facility evolved by assuming that tanks were added at a steady rate between each observation. This is supported by the roughly linear increase in number of vats observed at intervals during the period under consideration (see graph below). Using an average tank capacity of 27 m^3 and an operating rate of 1.75 processing cycles per month ($=47.25 \text{ m}^3/\text{month}$), we estimate the expected monthly production of depleted tailings as a function of the number of tanks in operation at any given time.

	Month number (t)	Observed number of tanks (N)	Inferred monthly increase in tanks between observations
May 23	0	49	
			5.3
March 24	11	107	
			10.4
August 25	27	274	
			12.8
January 26	32	338	

Let $N(t)$ denote the number of tanks in operation at time t (measured in months since May 2023), as reconstructed from the observed tank counts. If, as mentioned above, each tank produces on average $q = 47.25 \text{ m}^3$ of depleted tailings per month, the monthly tailings generation rate can be written as:

$$R(t) = q N(t)$$

The graph below shows the expected monthly increase in spent tailings volume, at full capacity utilization:



The maximum volume of tailings accumulated over the study period is then obtained by integrating this monthly rate over time:

$$T_{\text{expected}} = \int_0^{32} R(t) dt.$$

The integral can be evaluated exactly by summing the trapezoids formed between consecutive observation points:

$$T_{\text{expected}} = q \sum_i \frac{N_i + N_{i+1}}{2} (t_{i+1} - t_i),$$

where (t_i, N_i) denote the observed tank counts and their corresponding times.

Applying this formula yields an expected cumulative tailings volume of approximately 258,000 m³ by January 2026, assuming continuous full-capacity operation throughout the period under consideration.

In contrast, the satellite-based volumetric estimates indicate only about 120,000 m³ of accumulated tailings. This discrepancy suggests an effective capacity utilization coefficient of a little under 50%.

This is an approximation as in addition to the assumptions in this section, not all tailings heaps have been modelled and the limited amount of tailings produced prior to May 2023 has not been included.

8. Estimated monthly gold output

Based on a total of 338 tanks and a long-term capacity utilization coefficient of fifty percent, we get an estimated monthly throughput of around 4500 m³ (9,126/2) or 6750 tons in January 2026.

With an average grade of 5 – 10 grams of gold per ton, this gives a total of around 30 to 70 kg per month (not taking into account the effective recovery rate).

It should be noted, however, that according to the sources consulted, stocks of high-grade historical and artisanal tailings in the vicinity of Iga Barrière appear to be increasingly depleted.⁴⁵⁶ Operators have reportedly experienced growing difficulties in securing sufficient feed material, and accepted grades are said to have declined toward the 3–5 g/t range. These factors suggest that actual production is likely closer to the lower end of the estimated range.

At first sight, the fairly low capacity utilization seems to be at odds with the aggressive increase in processing capacity that has been observed. This can presumably be explained in part by (1) competition between operators, who want to secure and process as much of the limited high-grade feed-stock as possible, as well as by (2) tailing heaps becoming too high to be practical in use at around eight meters, leading to their being abandoned.

Integrating the estimated production rate $R(t)$ over the period $t=20$ to $t=32$ yields an expected maximum output of approximately 150,000 tons of tailings for 2025. Dividing this by the cumulative integral of approximately 258,000 tons over the full study period indicates that roughly 60 per cent of total production took place in 2025.

⁴⁵⁶ Mining officials and civil society actors

Annex 64 (para. 209)

Cyanide leaching installations at Mabanga

Installations de lixiviation au cyanure à Mabanga




Image: © Planet Labs PBC, February 2026

Note that the detailed image of the tanks indicates little to none accumulated tailings and that these were hence very recently constructed.

100 tanks are observed, with dimensions and built very similar to the operations in Iga Barrière. Assuming the same average tank volume and duration of processing cycles, we have a maximum monthly throughput capacity of around 5,000 m³. This indicates a maximum gold yield of 25 – 50 kg, assuming an average grade of 5-10 g/t. In practice, production will be considerably less as explained in detail in annex 63.


Annex 65 (para. 209)**Cyanide leaching installations in Mongbwalu (Sayo – Nzebi area) and Pluto****Installations de lixiviation au cyanure à Mongbwalu (Sayo – Nzebi) et Pluto**

Image: © Planet Labs PBC, April 2026

Note that most of the leaching “tanks” are not constructed out of concrete or cement, but rather excavated pits with yellow tarps.



Cyanide leaching operation in Pluto. Image: © Google Earth/Airbus, March 2025

Annex 66 (para. 212)

Analysis of 2025 Ugandan gold exports and imports


Analyse du commerce extérieur d'or ougandais en 2025

Ugandan authorities declared that gold imported in 2025 originated primarily from Tanzania and South Africa, with smaller volumes reported as originating from Ghana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Zambia, and Kenya. However, the official trade data of these countries do not declare any gold exports to Uganda over the past years⁴⁵⁷ – whereas they did declare significant exports to other countries.

The trade data implies approximately eight tons of gold exports from domestic origin, representing a four-fold increase since 2024. This increase in domestic production is not supported by any documented developments in Uganda's gold mining sector.

Consequently, the origins of most gold exported from Uganda in 2025 is not corroborated by any available trade data. This underscores the need for enhanced oversight of Uganda's gold trading and refinery sector, as well as strengthened due diligence measures for companies sourcing through Uganda.

1. Evolution in Ugandan gold exports



Source: Bank of Uganda


In 2025, the Bank of Uganda reported record levels of gold exports for the third consecutive year, reaching 62 tons, valued at USD 6.4 billion. This annex will analyze the reported origins of this gold by drawing on official trade data from Uganda and its trade partner countries.

⁴⁵⁷ Since 2021, only Tanzania reported gold exports to Uganda. These took place in 2021 and 2022, with a total of 175 kg.

Two key inconsistencies motivate this analysis. First, the gap between Uganda's reported gold exports and imports increased sharply in 2025, without any corresponding increase in domestic production. Second, the reported origins of gold imports are not supported by mirror export data from any of the partner countries. Taken together, these imply that Uganda's gold export boom is driven by external supply chains that are not accurately captured in official trade statistics.

The estimates should be interpreted as indicative ranges rather than precise point values.

2. Reported gold provenance in 2024



Source: UN COMTRADE and Bank of Uganda

According to UN Comtrade data reported by Uganda, gold imports in 2024 were primarily attributed to Tanzania, South Africa, Mozambique and Burkina Faso, with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) notably absent. Using these data, the difference between declared imports and exports implies residual ("implied domestic") production of approximately 1.8 tons. However, this estimate is sensitive to the data source used. When reconstructing imports based on Bank of Uganda (BoU) direction-of-trade data for 2024, the residual increases to around 3 tons.

These inconsistencies highlight structural discrepancies between COMTRADE and BoU statistics and suggest that neither dataset fully captures Uganda's reported gold trade flows.

3. Analysis of reported gold provenance in 2025

At the time of writing, UN COMTRADE had not yet published Uganda-reported trade data for 2025. In addition, the trade reports published by the Bank of Uganda (BoU) do not disaggregate trade with partner countries by commodity code. This poses methodological challenges in assessing the likely provenance of gold for 2025. These are addressed by combining several estimation approaches, selected based on (1) the nature of the trade relationship between Uganda and the specific partner country, and (2) complementary official data where available.

Mozambique, Mali, Burkina Faso and Cameroon

Using UN COMTRADE data reported by Uganda, we identify non-gold imports from these countries in 2024 by deducting gold-related imports from total imports. For Mozambique, Mali and Burkina Faso, non-gold imports were negligible.⁴⁵⁸ For Cameroon and Ghana, non-gold imports were also very limited, amounting to approximately USD 400,000 and USD 1.5 million respectively.

Under a *ceteris paribus* assumption, 2024 non-gold import levels are used as a baseline and deducted from total imports from these countries as reported by the BoU in 2025 to estimate the gold component.

These estimates should be interpreted with caution. Non-gold imports from some of these countries are subject to occasional spikes, with Uganda for example having recorded aircraft imports from Mali in 2023. This may distort the baseline and affect the resulting estimates.

This gives the following results:

	Estimated gold imports 2025 (mio USD)
Mozambique (other)	493
Mali	203
Burkina Faso	491
Cameroon	296
Ghana	360
Total	1843

South Africa

South Africa has already reported its 2025 export data to UN COMTRADE, allowing for a direct separation between gold and non-gold flows. We therefore deduct South Africa's declared non-gold exports to Uganda from the total imports reported by the Bank of Uganda (BoU) to estimate the gold component.

USD 780 million – 108 million = USD 672 million


Tanzania

Estimating gold imports attributed to Tanzania presents the most significant methodological challenge. Unlike the previously discussed countries, Tanzania is both a major reported gold supplier and a significant source of non-gold imports, which are subject to substantial fluctuations.

Tanzanian-reported UN COMTRADE data indicates that non-gold exports to Uganda ranged between USD 264 million and USD 314 million over the 2021–2024 period, with an average of approximately USD 295 million. However, Uganda-reported COMTRADE data for 2024 suggests a substantially higher figure of USD 432 million for non-gold imports, highlighting inconsistencies between datasets.

To resolve this, we estimate non-gold imports from Tanzania using Bank of Uganda data, drawing on a natural experiment created by Uganda's gold export tax policy. In mid-2021, Uganda introduced a 5 percent export tax on refined gold, leading refiners to halt formal exports. This resulted in the collapse of official gold trade, accompanied by a rise in informal, hand-carried shipments. The tax was subsequently repealed with the adoption of the 2023 Mining and Minerals Act, after which official gold trade resumed rapidly. To illustrate this dynamic, the evolution of declared imports from Tanzania is shown below.

⁴⁵⁸ Mozambique is listed under "other African countries" in the BoU data



Source: BoU

During the 2021–2023 tax period, both declared gold exports and imports from countries associated with gold supply chains declined sharply. As gold trade was effectively suppressed, this period provides a useful proxy for baseline non-gold imports.

BoU data for this period suggests that non-gold imports from Tanzania averaged approximately USD 300 million annually. This value is aligned with Tanzanian-reported COMTRADE data and therefore used as a baseline for estimating the gold component of Tanzanian imports in 2025.

As a result, an estimated USD 2757 million – 300 million = USD 2457 million of gold were officially imported from Tanzania in 2025.

Cross-check with aggregate mineral imports

To assess whether the sum of estimated gold imports from the identified partner countries corresponds to the total value of gold imports, we cross-check this aggregate against non-petroleum mineral imports reported by the Bank of Uganda (BoU). The BoU includes gold imports under this category, which also covers other mineral products such as cement and ores (HS codes 25 and 26). While the BoU category of non-petroleum mineral imports does not strictly correspond to HS codes 25, 26 and 7108, the close alignment between BoU totals and COMTRADE-based estimates suggests that, in practice, it is dominated by these categories in Uganda's case.

Based on COMTRADE data, these non-gold, non-petroleum mineral imports consistently amount to approximately USD 200 million per year. This is corroborated by BoU data for 2021–2022, when official gold imports were effectively suspended, as well as by 2024 Uganda-reported COMTRADE data, which recorded USD 211 million in such imports.

In 2025, the BoU reported USD 5,675 million in non-petroleum mineral imports. Assuming, *ceteris paribus*, that approximately USD 210 million of this total reflects non-gold imports, the remaining USD 5,465 million can be attributed to gold.

Comparing this estimate with the aggregated partner-country total of USD 4,972 million implies a residual of approximately USD 493 million. This residual likely reflects gold imports originating from partner countries not captured in the preceding analysis. The next section therefore examines potential origins of this remaining component.

Other potential source countries for 2025

Zambia

BoU-reported imports from Zambia increased from USD 21 to 244 million year-on-year. Historic COMTRADE trade data shows that previous spikes in imports from Zambia, such as in 2020, were not accompanied by an increase in non-gold imports from that country. Moreover, the yearly average non-gold imports are stable around 20 million USD.

We therefore conclude that, according to the official BoU data, Uganda presumably imported around USD 224 million in gold from Zambia over the course of last year.


Kenya

A relatively small residual amount of approximately USD 250 million remains to be accounted for. According to Bank of Uganda direction-of-trade data, this could be attributed to imports from either Egypt or Kenya, or an increase in non-gold, non-petroleum mineral imports. A combination of these factors is of course also a distinct possibility. Given previous reported gold imports from Kenya of a comparable magnitude, Kenya emerges as the most plausible source. This assumption is therefore retained as a working hypothesis for the residual component of Uganda's gold imports.

Consolidated overview of reported origins

This gives the following estimated values for Uganda's 2025 official gold imports. An average price of USD 100 per gram is applied, approximating the observed average export price net of an estimated 3 percent deduction to account for transaction costs and refinery margins.

	2025 Value (mio USD)	2025 Volume (tons)
Tanzania	2457	24.6
South Africa	672	6.7
Mozambique ("Other African")	493	4.9
Mali	203	2
Burkina Faso	491	4.9
Cameroon	296	3.0
Ghana	360	3.6
Zambia	224	2.2
Kenya	249	2.5
Total Imports	5445	54.4
Residual / implied domestic production	760	7.6
Total exports	6400	62



4. Inconsistencies in Uganda's gold trade: residual growth and absence of mirror data

A notable feature of the 2025 estimates is the sharp increase in the residual (i.e. implied domestic production), which rises from approximately 2–3 tons in 2024 to around 7–8 tons in 2025. This change cannot be readily explained by developments in Uganda's domestic mining sector. The only significant addition to production capacity during this period was the commissioning of the Wagagai gold mine in August 2025, with an expected annual output of approximately 1.5 tons. Even assuming immediate full-scale operation, this increase is insufficient to account for the observed jump in the residual. This suggests that the additional implied domestic production is not the result of genuine mining output, but rather reflects unrecorded gold inflows or misrepresented import flows within the statistical system.

A second striking feature of the data is the complete absence of corresponding mirror export flows. None of the countries identified as sources of Uganda's gold imports report any gold exports to Uganda in their own statistics. Since 2021, only Tanzania has reported such exports, amounting to a total of just 175 kg across 2021–2022, which is negligible relative to the scale of Uganda's reported imports. This systematic absence of mirror data indicates that the importer-reported origins do not correspond to formally recorded trade flows.

This pattern is particularly revealing when viewed in the context of these countries' broader export activity. All identified partner countries are significant exporters of gold to established ASM destination markets, notably the United Arab Emirates and India, with annual export values reported in UN COMTRADE often reaching hundreds of millions or even billions of USD. This demonstrates both the scale of their production and their ability to record large formal export flows of ASM gold.

Against this backdrop, the complete absence of reported exports to Uganda cannot be explained by capacity or reporting limitations and instead points to a structural disconnect between physical regional supply chains and Uganda's reported import origins.

The simplest and most consistent explanation for these combined observations is that Uganda's gold refining sector is predominantly supplied by gold originating from eastern DRC, with these flows largely absent from, and misrepresented in, official trade statistics.

Annex 67 (para. 213)

Continued high production levels in Rubaya's coltan mines – satellite assessment

Niveaux de production élevés dans les mines de coltan de Rubaya – évaluation par satellite

1. Introduction

This annex presents a comparative analysis of high-resolution imagery of the hill situated to the south-east of Rubaya, Masisi territory, an area identified as hosting the majority of coltan production in North Kivu. The hill lies in exploitation permit PE16159, which, according to records of the *Cadastre Minier* (CAMI), is currently attributed to the *Société aurifère du Kivu et du Maniema* (SAKIMA).

The analysis uses three-dimensional (3D) rendered imagery obtained from Google Earth/Airbus, dated 14 March 2025, and a 3D surface model generated by the Group with Planet Labs PBC imagery acquired on 26 March 2026.

The Group produced the 3D model in QGIS using PBC Planet SkySat imagery, in combination with elevation tiles from Mapzen/Nextzen. The latter derives its tiles from open-source datasets, including NASA Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM). The Planet PBC Skysat imagery has a resolution of 50 cm, whereas the resolution of the elevation tiles is roughly 30 m. This is adequate for the purpose of our analysis, which is to visually assess temporal changes in mine site features.

Comparison of the two datasets indicates a marked increase in mining-related activity across several principal sites within the concession, most notably along the western flank of the hill, including the sites commonly referred to as D4 Gakombe and D2 Bibatama. While progressive excavation is consistent with ongoing extraction, the observed changes go beyond mere continuity and indicate a significant increase in level of activity.

In particular, the imagery shows:

- a discernible increase in the number and density of mining pits;
- a significant expansion of ore washing and processing areas;
- the rehabilitation and apparent reactivation of several water reservoirs that, in earlier imagery, appeared degraded or non-operational; and
- a significant increase in the number of dwellings and auxiliary structures within settlements located along the hill ridge.

Taken together, these indicators suggest a substantial intensification of mining and associated human activity within PE16159 during the period under review. The observations are consistent across multiple vantage points within the 3D model, as will be further detailed below.



Source: © Airbus/Google Earth, 14.3.25

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

2. D2 Bibatama




Image: © Airbus/Google Earth, 14.3.25 (top) and © 2026 Planet Labs PBC, 26.03.26 (bottom)

The comparative imagery shows strong increase in erosion and excavation of the hillside




Image: © Airbus/Google Earth, 14.3.25 (top) and © 2026 Planet Labs PBC, 26.03.26 (bottom)

This imagery of the hill ridge above D2 Bibatama shows a significant increase in the number of dwellings on both the right and left of the image. In the middle, six large water reservoirs have been constructed. Part of the woods has also been logged, presumably to be used as construction material.

3. G4 Gakombe





Image: © Airbus/Google Earth, March 2025 (top) and © Planet Labs PBC, March 2026 (bottom)


The comparative overview shows a strong progression in mining activity, with an increase in number of pits (1), an increase in washing stations (bottom-left), the reparation of water reservoirs on the hilltop (2), as well as a significant growth in the number of dwellings on the hill ridge (3,4).

1. Repaired and newly constructed water reservoirs



Source: © Airbus/Google Earth, 14.3.25 (left) and © Planet Labs PBC, 26.03.26 (right)

2. Strong progression in excavation and increase in mining pits



Source: © Airbus/Google Earth, 14.3.25 (top) and © Planet Labs PBC, 26.03.26 (bottom)

The mining pits are covered with tarps, making them easy to identify and to compare on the above images.

3 and 4. Significant increase in number of dwellings along hill ridge




Image: © Airbus/Google Earth, 14.3.25 (top) and© Planet Labs PBC, 26.03.26 (bottom)

The same structures have been highlighted for reference



Images: © Airbus/Google Earth, 14.3.25 (left) and © Planet Labs PBC, 26.03.26 (right)

Annex 68 (para. 214)

AFC/M23 Mining-related taxes in Masisi and Kalehe territories – receipts and documentary evidence

Taxes liées aux activités minières de l'AFC/M23 dans les territoires de Masisi et de Kalehe – reçus et éléments de preuve documentaire

AFC/M23 continued to levy a range of taxes on all actors involved in the local production and supply chain. For instance, licenses for local traders cost USD 250 per year and for artisanal miners USD 25 (See S/2024/969, para. 60). In addition, AFC/M23 introduced a tax of FC 500 per day for day laborers, transporters and petty traders to access the site, with the receipts shown below.



Receipts for the “contribution to local development tax”, Source: confidential source

TARIF	
Coltan (T.A)	: 4\$
Cassitérite (SnO_2)	: 2\$
Déchet	: 2\$
Oriframe	: 2\$
Kuars	: 1\$
Monazite	: 0.07\$
Bellule	: 0.05\$
NIOBIUM	: 1.28\$
04006113071717	
<u>UWABAKENDE PATIENT Haba</u>	
D'Après NDAGIJE KAISIYI JOEL	

This document is displayed at the Rubaya centre de négoce by AFC/M23. It shows the applicable tax rates per kilogram and per mineral, as well as the account details for wiring the amounts due. Notably, Patient Saba, AFC/M23 Provincial Finance Coordinator, is indicated as the account holder. The account number and the holder also figure on the Equity

Bank receipts shown below.

Source: confidential source

❖ Propriétaire [REDACTED]
❖ Chauffeur [REDACTED]
❖ Plaque : [REDACTED]
❖ Qualité : *Spot*
❖ Quantité : [REDACTED]
Date : [REDACTED] *02.12.2026*
Nombre des colis : [REDACTED]
Nom & signature
MUGISHA ANTOINE
[Signature]

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ALLIANCE FLEUVE CONGO
PROVINCE DU SUD-KIVU
TERRITOIRE DE KALEHE
ANTENNE MINIERE DE NYABIBWE

AUTORISATION DE SORTIE DES MINERAIS

Date : [REDACTED] *01.12.2026*
Catégorie : *CASSITERITE*
Quantité : [REDACTED]
Provenance : [REDACTED]
Propriétaire : [REDACTED]
Moyen de transport : *MOTO & VEHICULE*
N° Plaque : [REDACTED]
NTARE FAUSTIN
[Signature]

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
TAXE EVACUATION
NORD-KIVU

NOM : [REDACTED]
MONTANT EN CHIFFRE [REDACTED]
MONTANT EN LETTRE [REDACTED]
N° PLAQUE : [REDACTED]
DETAILS : [REDACTED]
Fait à *Mubambiro* [REDACTED] 2026
NOM DU TAXATEUR : [REDACTED]
SIGNATURE *[Signature]*

DEPARTMENT
des Trésoriers

QR code


AFC/M23 Transport ‘permits’ and “invoices” for the “evacuation tax”, calculated as per the sheet above. Note that the exit authorization is issued in Nyabibwe, Kalehe territory, South Kivu, and that the “evacuation tax” invoice is issued in Mubambiro.

Source: confidential source

Annex 69 (para. 217)

Bank receipts for deposits of AFC/M23's mineral "evacuation" tax

Reçus bancaires pour les dépôts de la taxe " d'évacuation" minière de l'AFC/M23




Source: confidential source

Bank receipts for deposits of the 'evacuation tax' on the Equity Bank account of Patient Haba (see above). Note that the Equity Bank branches where the deposits were made are located in Kigali (Remera and Nyabugogo neighborhoods).

Annex 70 (para. 223)

Rwandan coltan and cassiterite export statistics

Statistiques d'exportation de coltan et de cassiterite rwandaises



Source: National Bank of Rwanda

In the second and third quarters of 2025, cassiterite exports were over 1600 tons, compared to 1215 tons on average per quarter in 2025. The strong spike in the last quarter of 2025 is caused by reported exports of 1460 tons in the sole month of October, as well as by very strong, though less anomalous, exports in November and December.

The previous time Rwandan cassiterite exports were comparably high was in 2013-2014. At that time, smuggling of 3T minerals from DRC to Rwanda was prevalent due to differences in the implementation of the ITSCI-traceability system and resulting price incentives. See for instance, [S/2014/42](#), para. 200.