



安全理事会

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2026 年 6 月 5 日刚果民主共和国问题专家组给安全理事会主席的信

经安全理事会第 2783(2025)号决议延长任务期的刚果民主共和国问题专家组的成员谨根据该决议第 6 段的规定随信转递关于其工作的最后报告。

本报告于 2026 年 5 月 8 日提交安全理事会关于刚果民主共和国的第 1533(2004)号决议所设委员会，委员会于 2026 年 6 月 5 日审议了报告。

专家组希望将本信和本报告提请安全理事会成员注意并作为安理会文件分发。

刚果民主共和国问题专家组

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刚果民主共和国问题专家组的最后报告

摘要

由于武装暴力持续不断且社会经济危机加深，刚果民主共和国的安全和人道主义局势依然严峻。冲突令数百万人流离失所，使 60%以上的人口陷入极端贫困和突发重度粮食不安全状态，并严重阻碍了卫生保健和教育服务的获取。与冲突有关的性暴力和招募儿童兵的情况达到了前所未有的程度。某些地区无法获得人道主义援助，这进一步加剧了脆弱性。

尽管所有武装行为体均实施了侵害行为，但刚果河联盟与受制裁的 3 月 23 日运动(刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”)(Cde.006)对最大比例的侵犯人权和违反国际人道法行为负有责任。

受制裁的民主同盟军成为了全球暴力程度第二高的伊斯兰国(达伊沙)附属团体。该团体继续袭击平民，并为应对乌干达和刚果部队的联合行动而大幅扩大了地盘。民主同盟军以暴力相威胁强行征税，刚果部队在对其进行打击时越来越依靠瓦扎伦多团体。

刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”在卢旺达国防军的持续支持下扩大了领土控制，于 2025 年 12 月夺取乌维拉，随后在国际压力下撤出。该运动仍以政权更迭和联邦重组为目标，并通过建立替代性银行和保险机制巩固其平行行政体系。外交努力进展有限；停火和撤军承诺仅得到部分履行，卢旺达国防军和刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”的撤军实质上只是战术性调兵。刚果民主共和国未履行消灭受制裁的解放卢旺达民主力量(Cde.005)的承诺，后者仍与刚果民主共和国武装部队并肩作战，对抗刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军的军事侵略与占领。

无人驾驶航空系统的使用日益增多，反映出军事战术的重大演变。刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军展现出更强的纵深打击能力，包括多次对基桑加尼机场发动无人机袭击。刚果民主共和国武装部队对刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”高层人物实施了定点打击，击毙了其发言人威利·恩戈马。远程打击能力的使用增加，使战场范围扩展到了前线之外，增加了平民面临的风险。卢旺达国防军继续采用干扰和欺骗技术，扰乱导航和通信，对民用航空构成严重风险。

刚果民主共和国武装部队继续依赖瓦扎伦多团体对抗刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军，同时试图加强对在北基伍和南基伍活动的各派系的控制。这包括努力将不同团体整合到更加统一的指挥架构下，以及向前线战斗人员支付月薪。私营军事承包商向刚果民主共和国武装部队提供战略规划和战术支援。

在采矿部门，由于半机械化冲积采矿的扩大，伊图里省的黄金产量急剧增加，产出数吨黄金，远远超出申报的出口量。采用氰化物浸出法处理手工采矿

尾渣的做法有所扩大，所产黄金大部分被走私至乌干达。与此同时，乌干达的黄金出口增加，但申报的贸易数据未体现这一增长。

2025 年，鲁巴亚周边由刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”控制的钶钽铁矿石矿区的开采活动大幅增加，同时伴随着系统性的征税、严格的运输管控以及与卢旺达供应链的整合。自第二季度起，卢旺达的钶钽铁矿石和锡石出口急剧上升，这一趋势无法通过国内产量得到支撑，并与刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”控制区的持续产出紧密吻合。

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* 附件仅以来件所用语文分发，未经正式编辑。

一. 引言

1. 刚果民主共和国问题专家组的任务期限于 2025 年 6 月 30 日经安全理事会第 [2783\(2025\)](#) 号决议延长。秘书长于 2025 年 9 月 2 日任命了专家组的五名成员(见 [S/2025/545](#))，第六名专家于 2026 年 2 月 23 日获得任命([S/2026/91](#))。
2. 专家组的最后报告根据第 [2783 \(2025\)](#) 号决议第 6 段提交。报告述及截至 2026 年 4 月 15 日进行的调查，包括对刚果民主共和国、布隆迪、肯尼亚和乌干达的实地访问。专家组与中非共和国、海地和青年党问题各专家组进行了情况交流。
3. 专家组对联合国组织刚果民主共和国稳定特派团(联刚稳定团)在本报告所述期间提供的更大力度支持与合作表示感谢。

方法

4. 专家组采用了以安全理事会制裁所涉一般性问题非正式工作组建议的证据标准(见 [S/2006/997](#))为基础的严谨方法。附件 1 详细阐述了专家组的方法。
5. 由于字数限制，专家组将部分证据、分析和结论放在附件中，附件是本报告不可分割的组成部分，应与主要结论和分析一并阅读。

二. 人道主义局势及对平民的影响

6. 在本报告所述整个期间，由于持续的武装暴力，刚果民主共和国东部省份，特别是伊图里、北基伍和南基伍的人道主义和社会经济状况依然严峻(见 [S/2025/446](#)，第 78 段和附件 41)。
7. 冲突各方均实施了侵犯人权和违反国际人道法的行为。联合国统计数据显示，刚果河联盟与受制裁的 3 月 23 日运动(刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”)是主要的非国家武装团体施害者(见 [S/2025/858](#)，第 80 段)，而刚果民主共和国武装部队是主要的国家施害者(见附件 2)。¹
8. 网络宣传和仇恨言论的增加使族裔紧张关系加剧。无人机作战的扩散使平民和民用基础设施面临更大风险(见第 161-172 段；[S/2024/432](#)，第 51 段)。
9. 2026 年 3 月，伊图里、北基伍和南基伍共记录有 340 万名境内流离失所者。² 这些省份超过 60% 的人口生活在极端贫困中。³ 平民生计遭到的破坏——包括因持续交火而无法进入农田以及对人道主义行动的限制——加剧了整个区域的粮

¹ 见 <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2026/03/deputy-high-commissioner-al-nashif-democratic-republic-congo-peace>。

² 见 <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-humanitarian-key-figures-31-march-2026>。

³ 见 <https://www.undp.org/fr/drcongo/publications/enquete-sur-les-conditions-de-vie-des-menages-ecvm>。

食不安全状况(见 S/2025/858, 第 42 段和附件 19)。⁴ 人道主义工作者的行动环境日益复杂(见附件 3)。冲突减少了获得安全饮用水、环境卫生和基本卫生服务的机会, 助长了疾病暴发。⁵ 在南基伍省的米内姆布韦, 战斗切断了获取必需品和人道主义援助的渠道, 导致穆伦格人与外界隔绝(见第 83-89 段)。⁶

10. 儿童受冲突影响尤为严重, 包括被武装团体招募, 遭受性暴力, 以及因学校被毁和遇袭等原因而导致教育中断。⁷

11. 联合国记录和核实的案件显示, 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”是与冲突有关的性暴力行为的主要实施者(见 S/2025/858, 第 80 段和附件 37)。人道主义行为体记录到, 自 2024 年以来, 此类暴力案件急剧增加, 对妇女和女童的影响尤为严重(见附件 4 和 5)。

三. 民主同盟军/“伊斯兰国中部非洲省”

12. 受制裁的民主同盟军(CDe.001)仍是刚果民主共和国东部最致命的武装团体之一, 2025 年因其导致的有记录平民死亡人数超过 1 000 人。针对平民的大规模、有系统袭击包括杀戮、绑架和性暴力, 妇女和儿童尤其受到影响。⁸ 民主同盟军继续打着“伊斯兰国中部非洲省”的旗号活动, 与伊斯兰国(达伊沙)保持着意识形态上的联系和交流(见 S/2025/446, 第 124 段), 并于 2025 年成为全球致死人数第二多的达伊沙附属团体(见附件 6)。

13. 民主同盟军面对联合“英勇”行动的军事压力表现出韧性和适应性(见 S/2025/446, 第 122-124 段), 消灭该团体或遏制其地理扩张的努力仍未取得成功(见第 21-22 段和 27-28 段)。

地理分布与组织

14. 民主同盟军已巩固其结构化部署模式(见 S/2024/969, 第 9、15-17、23 段; S/2025/446, 第 123 段), 该模式围绕固定据点、机动部队和指定补给汇合点或后勤地点组成的体系构建。民主同盟军主要活跃在贝尼县和卢贝罗县(北基伍省)以及伊鲁穆县和曼巴萨县(伊图里省), 并在乔波省东部有零星存在, 表明未来可能

⁴ 见 <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-key-message-update-season-1-begins-amid-continued-escalation-conflict-march-september-2026>。

⁵ 见 <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/rd-congo-situation-humanitaire-dans-la-province-du-nord-kivu-rapport-de-situation-4-21-avril-2026>; 以及 <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/rd-congo-situation-humanitaire-dans-la-province-de-lituri-rapport-de-situation-4-15-avril-2026>。

⁶ 联合国、人道主义组织和民间社会、国际非政府组织、非政府组织、媒体和研究人员。

⁷ 见 <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/republique-democratique-du-congo-cluster-education-situation-des-incidents-contre-leducation-au-28-fevrier-2026>。

⁸ 联合国; 民间社会; 军方、警方和情报机构; 司法当局; 人道主义组织; 研究人员; 民主同盟军前战斗人员; 被民主同盟军绑架者。

扩展。这种布局增强了民主同盟军的行动韧性，使其机动部队能够迅速撤退并重新集结。附件 7 详细描述了民主同盟军营地的结构、职能和位置。⁹

15. 位于偏远林区的两个固定营地——受制裁的民主同盟军领导人穆萨·巴卢库(Cdi.036)在伊图里的马迪纳司令部，以及其副手塞卡·乌马鲁¹⁰在卢贝罗西部的营地——聚集了最多的依附人员，并充当指挥、后勤和训练据点。¹¹

16. 机动据点由规模较小、高度灵活的战斗单位组成，执行侦察和袭击任务，其行动地点离固定营地有一定距离，以分散安全部队兵力，减少对核心领导阵地的军事压力(见 S/2024/969，第 15-17、22 段和附件 2)。¹² 其中两支此类部队——领导人分别是伊图里省的“姆泽”·梅亚·塞巴加拉，以及卢贝罗县的受制裁指挥官艾哈迈德·马赫穆德·哈桑(别名阿布瓦卡西(CDi.040))——对大多数造成大规模伤亡的袭击事件负有责任(见第 20-21 段)。

17. 补给汇合点——据记录位于包括 RN4 和 RN44 国道在内的主要交通和农业走廊沿线——将机动部队与外部支持网络相连接。这些地点便利了补给、新兵、装备、弹药和武器的转移，¹³ 并在行动结束后充当观察哨或临时撤退地点。它们由民主同盟军高层人物监督，包括姆泽·梅亚、阿布瓦卡西和穆罕默德·卡西班牙特(别名迪芬达或“捍卫者”)。¹⁴

18. 民主同盟军继续依靠由被胁迫或受利诱的当地投靠者组成的网络，这些投靠者提供后勤支助和情报，并协助开展非法贸易(见 S/2024/432，第 13-14 段)。¹⁵ 民主同盟军继续面临人力和后勤制约(见 S/2024/969，第 8 段)，严重依赖被强行征召的人员和被绑架者(包括儿童)，这些人缺乏忠诚度，且常试图逃跑。外国人员的招募规模依然有限(见附件 8)。¹⁶

行动态势与袭击

19. 民主同盟军的行动呈现出巩固与升级交替的周期性模式，这使其既能恢复作战能力，又能持续对“英勇”行动施压。¹⁷

⁹ 同上。

¹⁰ 见 S/2024/969，第 24 段及附件 7。

¹¹ 军事情报、司法当局、人道主义来源、研究人员、民主同盟军前战斗人员及被民主同盟军绑架者。

¹² 同上。

¹³ 联合国；民间社会；地方当局；军方、警方、情报及安全部门消息来源；司法当局；人道主义消息来源；研究人员；民主同盟军前战斗人员；被民主同盟军绑架者。

¹⁴ 军方、警方、情报及安全部门消息来源；司法当局；民主同盟军前战斗人员；民主同盟军投靠者；以及前补给汇合点行动人员。

¹⁵ 同上。

¹⁶ 联合国；军方、情报及司法部门消息来源；研究人员；民间社会。

¹⁷ 同上。

20. 2025 年 3 月至 6 月间，民主同盟军实施的大规模袭击暂时减少，该团体进入以地方创收和减少对军事行动的暴露为重点的巩固阶段(见第 37 段)。自 2025 年 7 月起，民主同盟军恢复大规模袭击，导致 2025 年下半年报告的平民死亡人数超过 650 人(见附件 9)。这一升级发生在“英勇”行动重新开始打击阿布瓦卡西相关据点并于 2025 年 7 月 6 日对马迪纳司令部发动袭击之后。在记录到的最严重事件中，2025 年 11 月，阿布瓦卡西的团体在恩图罗村屠杀了 71 名参加葬礼的平民。在伊图里，姆泽·梅亚团体的报复性袭击包括 2025 年 7 月 26 日在科曼达一座教堂屠杀 41 名平民。¹⁸

21. 民主同盟军的活动在 2026 年 2 月至 3 月初的斋月期间再次暂时减少，随后在 3 月中旬暴力再次升级，包括沿科曼达-曼巴萨公路(RN4)实施报复性袭击。此次升级发生在 2 月 23 日“英勇”行动针对马迪纳司令部的最新打击行动之后。“英勇”行动还于 2026 年 3 月中旬针对民主同盟军在卢贝罗的阵地发起打击(见第 30 段)。¹⁹ 在马迪纳遭到袭击后，阿布瓦卡西从卢贝罗调往曼巴萨县西部，²⁰ 该地位于“英勇”行动的正式行动区之外，阿布瓦卡西指挥的小组在那里发动了造成重大伤亡的袭击，包括 2026 年 3 月 12 日对穆查查矿区的袭击(见附件 9)。²¹ 随后，从 3 月中旬到 4 月，民主同盟军沿曼巴萨-尼亚尼亚轴线实施了一系列袭击，其威胁范围沿上韦莱省和乔波省边界向西大幅扩展。3 月死亡人数超过 90 人，为过去六个月来最高月度水平。²² 相应地，同一时期内在阿布瓦卡西此前的行动区卢贝罗没有记录到任何袭击事件。

22. 这一行动转移——民主同盟军的足迹从曼巴萨镇向西扩张 100 多公里，进入安全力量薄弱的地区——与阿布瓦卡西 2024 年 6 月向卢贝罗的扩张如出一辙(见 S/2024/969，第 17 段)，反映了民主同盟军的战略：即转移至治理薄弱的地区，同时对平民发动报复性袭击，以此转移军事压力(同上，第 9-11 段和 15-17 段；S/2025/446，第 123 段)。

23. 2025 年全年，在阿布瓦卡西指挥下实施的袭击导致 600 多名平民被杀，使其成为最致命的民主同盟军部队。这些袭击导致约 25 000 人流离失所，至少 26 个村庄和 9 个矿区被毁。梅亚的部队造成 230 多名平民死亡，9 000 多人流离失所，至少 36 个地点被毁。²³

行动方式

24. 民主同盟军的行动方式未有显著变化(见 S/2024/969，第 9-10 段；S/2025/446，第 123 段)。该团体继续以防御薄弱的小型地区为目标，并依赖非对称作战，旨

¹⁸ 同上。

¹⁹ 同上。

²⁰ 军方和情报机构消息来源。

²¹ 见 S/2021/560，附件 91。

²² 同上。

²³ 联合国；民间社会；地方当局；军方、警方和情报机构消息来源；司法当局；研究人员。

在使影响最大化，同时尽量减少遭受军事反击的风险(见附件 10)。袭击通常蓄意实施，以情报为依据，并在夜间进行。²⁴

25. 自 2025 年下半年以来，记录到针对刚果民主共和国武装部队和乌干达人民国防军(乌国防军)的伏击事件频发，数十名士兵被杀害，大量军事装备被劫掠。民主同盟军获取武器和弹药的主要来源是战场缴获(见 S/2025/446，第 125 段)，其次是从瓦扎伦多、刚果民主共和国武装部队和乌国防军人员那里非法购买。民主同盟军还面临弹药短缺问题。²⁵

26. 尽管民主同盟军继续尝试新的简易爆炸装置制造方法(见 S/2024/969，附件 5)，但其获得新技术和技术知识的机会仍然有限。²⁶

“英勇”行动的影响与挑战

27. 继 2026 年 2 月中旬在乌干达波特尔堡和贝尼举行刚果民主共和国武装部队-乌国防军联合“英勇”行动评估会议后，针对民主同盟军阵地的进攻行动在曼巴萨和伊鲁穆县重新展开，其中包括 2026 年 2 月 23 日对巴卢库先生的司令部发动进攻(见第 21 段)。虽然收缴了重要物资——包括 200 多公斤爆炸材料、100 多个简易爆炸装置和多支 AK 型突击步枪——但行动未能消灭民主同盟军的高级领导人。2026 年 2 月 23 日的打击行动导致该营地进一步迁至曼巴萨东北方向更偏远的林区。²⁷

28. 这反映了自 2021 年以来反复出现的模式，即“英勇”行动促使民主同盟军在地理上扩散，不断将该团体推向远离乌干达边界的地带，同时扩大了对平民的威胁(见 S/2024/969，第 12-18 段)。2026 年 2 月 23 日至 25 日，北基伍省政府在贝尼举办了关于民主同盟军问题的省级和平论坛，期间讨论了这些挑战及其他挑战，包括战术情报有限、协调困难和资源不足等问题(见附件 11)。

29. 由于针对刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”的军事攻势，刚果民主共和国武装部队的反攻行动受到兵力短缺的影响(见 S/2025/446，第 123 段)。²⁸ 因此，刚果民主共和国武装部队越来越倚重瓦扎伦多武装团体，包括“将军”热尔曼·坎巴莱·马亚尼领导的解放刚果爱国者联盟和受制裁个人吉东·希米莱·姆维萨(CDi.033)领导的恩杜马保卫刚果民兵组织—革新派人员(见 S/2024/969，第 30 段)，以及“将军”菲姆博领导的自由主权刚果爱国者联盟的一支地方分遣队。这些

²⁴ 同上。

²⁵ 地方当局；军方、警方和情报机构消息来源；司法当局；研究人员。

²⁶ 军方、警方、情报及安全部门消息来源；司法当局；联合国；民主同盟军前战斗人员和被民主同盟军绑架者。

²⁷ 军方、情报机构及联合国消息来源。

²⁸ 瓦扎伦多消息来源；军方、情报及司法部门消息来源；研究人员；地方当局。

团体曾参与对在曼古雷吉帕(卢贝罗县)周边活动的阿布瓦卡西小分队的打击(同上, 第 20 段), ²⁹ 以及 2026 年 3 月穆查查矿区的行动。³⁰

30. 据报, 民主同盟军指挥官穆罕默德·卡西班特(别名迪芬达或“捍卫者”)(同上, 附件 2; 及 S/2023/990, 附件 12)于 2026 年 3 月 14 日在林迪河(位于巴佩雷区阿桑瓦, 该河是卢贝罗县与乔波省的分界线)沿岸与“英勇”行动部队交战时受伤, 后因伤势过重死亡。³¹ 专家组无法独立证实他已死亡。

与达伊沙的关联

31. 民主同盟军继续寻求达伊沙的承认和支持(见 S/2024/969, 第 26 段和附件 8)。在 2025 年 9 月发布的一段视频中, 民主同盟军拒绝使用“民主同盟军”这一名称, 表示倾向于使用“伊斯兰国中部非洲省”(见第 34 段)。³² 民主同盟军通过达伊沙媒体平台系统性地传播其袭击行动的影像, 突显了该团体与达伊沙在意识形态上的持续一致性, 以及其彰显行动相关性的努力(见 S/2024/969, 第 26 段)。达伊沙出版物继续将民主同盟军的活动描述为“哈里发国士兵”对“刚果基督徒的讨伐”。³³

32. 通过更多使用星链设备改善连通性, 民主同盟军得以向达伊沙传送袭击图像以供发布(见 S/2024/960, 附件 5)。图像的发布频率和内容表明, 民主同盟军与达伊沙保持着定期、迅速和相当准确的沟通。³⁴ 巴卢库先生与达伊沙保持定期联系, 而迈迪·恩卡卢博(别名“惩罚者”)(见 S/2023/431, 第 38 段)则负责管理宣传传播工作。³⁵

33. 自 2025 年年中以来, 民主同盟军的传播战略纳入了通过社交媒体开展的直接宣传。民主同盟军以“真理卫士电视”为品牌, 在 TikTok、脸书和 YouTube 等平台建立了存在, 从而有可能显著扩大其意识形态信息和招募工作的触达范围。³⁶

34. 2025 年 9 月, 达伊沙发布了一段据称由“伊斯兰国中部非洲省”制作的宣传视频, 以协助招募。该视频将民主同盟军描绘为一支装备精良、组织有序的部队, 这与证据显示的营地内艰苦生活条件形成反差。截至编写本报告时, 尚未发现对招募工作产生可衡量的影响(见附件 12)。

²⁹ 同上。

³⁰ 瓦扎伦多指挥官, 刚果民主共和国武装部队。

³¹ 刚果民主共和国武装部队、联合国、研究人员。

³² 秘书处存档视频。

³³ 达伊沙出版物通过赛德情报集团网站查阅。

³⁴ 达伊沙出版物及声明通过赛德情报集团网站查阅。另见 S/2026/44, 第 32 段。

³⁵ 军事情报消息来源、司法当局、研究人员、民主同盟军前战斗人员及被民主同盟军劫为人质者。

³⁶ 联合国、研究人员。

35. 虽然来自达伊沙的财政支持有所减少，但达伊沙继续提供意识形态认可和战略指导，包括鼓励优先进行地方创收。³⁷

筹资

36. 民主同盟军扩大了地方化征税做法，³⁸ 这可能是“英勇”行动加强后该团体逐渐被削弱(见 S/2024/969，第 7-11 段和 22 段)，以及外部赞助者达伊沙³⁹ 在索马里遭受持续反恐压力的共同结果。⁴⁰

37. 为弥补日益减少的外部资金(见 S/2024/432，第 15 段)，除掠夺、武装抢劫和绑架勒索(见 S/2021/560，第 12、21、32-38 段)外，民主同盟军重点加强地方创收，包括在伊鲁穆县、曼巴萨县和卢贝罗县征税。他们发放通行许可凭证(标有“Dubius”字样)或可可生产者纳税证明凭证(标有“Amani na Upendo”或“Delivrance Cacao”字样)(见附件 13)。征税主要以胁迫方式进行。在一段宣传视频中，民主同盟军成员邦格·拉楚马(见 S/2022/967，第 23 段)⁴¹ 声称，个人必须要么皈依伊斯兰教要么缴税，否则将面临被杀或被驱逐出民主同盟军控制区的命运(见附件 14)。

38. 民主同盟军还诉诸绑架勒索(见 S/2024/432，附件 15)。2026 年 1 月至 2 月期间，科曼达-卢纳轴线沿线及马莫韦周边地区发生数起事件，涉及群体性绑架，无力支付赎金者随后被处决。被绑架的平民根据绑匪对其支付能力的判断接受筛选，在囚禁期间被迫从事劳动，并在协商支付赎金后获释。赎金通常在 2 000 美元至 5 000 美元之间(见附件 15)。

四. 刚果河联盟/3 月 23 日运动危机

A. 外交与安全动态

39. 在华盛顿特区和多哈框架下开展的外交倡议(见 S/2025/858，第 7 段)仅得到有限落实，协调各项平行调解努力的尝试也未取得进展。历次停火倡议均未能维持，各方违背承诺并加剧武装对抗(见附件 16)。安全理事会第 2773(2025)号决议的规定仍未得到执行。

40. 2025 年 12 月 4 日，刚果民主共和国政府和卢旺达政府签署了《华盛顿协定》，⁴² 以缓和局势并停止敌对行动。⁴³ 然而，在签署前数日，卢旺达国防军与

³⁷ 见 S/2026/44，第 31 段。

³⁸ 情报和安全部门消息来源、民间社会、联合国、研究人员。

³⁹ 见 S/2024/969，第 26 段；S/2022/967，第 27-28 段。

⁴⁰ 见 S/2026/44，第 8 段。

⁴¹ 秘书处存档视频。

⁴² 见 <https://cd.usembassy.gov/signing-of-the-washington-accords-for-peace-and-prosperity-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-rwanda/>。

⁴³ 见 S/2025/858，第 8-9 段。

刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”在南基伍发动了协调一致的军事攻势，于 2025 年 12 月 10 日控制了乌维拉(见第 72-76 段)。⁴⁴ 经外交施压后，卢旺达国防军和刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”部队于 2026 年 1 月 18 日撤出乌维拉，但重新部署到了南基伍省的其他战略要地，战斗在这些地点继续进行(见第 77-79 段)。

41. 自 2026 年 1 月以来，冲突进一步升级，其特点是越来越依赖空中作战。刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军的无人机袭击以乔波省基桑加尼的班戈卡机场作为战略目标，该机场是刚果民主共和国武装部队空中行动的关键后勤枢纽(见第 166 段)；刚果民主共和国武装部队的无人机袭击则瞄准北基伍和南基伍两省的敌方阵地和领导层人物、战略道路干线以及与非法经济活动有关的地点(见第 162-165 段)。⁴⁵

42. 2026 年 3 月初，美利坚合众国对卢旺达国防军及其四名高级军官实施制裁，理由是他们向刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”提供直接行动支持(见附件 17)。

执行《华盛顿协定》的努力

43. 在上述升级之后，刚果民主共和国、卢旺达和美国政府代表于 2026 年 3 月 17 日和 18 日在华盛顿特区举行会议，会议成果是制定了一份“初步步骤计划”，其中明确了推进落实《华盛顿协定》行动构想的承诺(见 S/2025/858，第 8 段)。⁴⁶

44. 该计划的内容包括采取协调步骤缓和紧张局势、对主权和领土完整作出承诺、卢旺达从刚果民主共和国东部指定地区脱离接触、刚果民主共和国努力解除解放卢旺达民主力量(卢民主力量)的作战能力、限制无人机袭击以及不加歧视地保护平民。该计划设想，卢旺达国防军和刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”都将撤出“人员和装备”，卢旺达将承诺施加影响，使刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”停止袭击刚果民主共和国境内阵地，这进一步表明卢旺达对刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”具有指挥和控制权(见 S/2025/446，第 18 段和第 44 段)。

45. 该计划提及北基伍和南基伍两省的六个关切区，它们与行动命令中列明的卢民主力量据报驻扎地点相吻合(见 S/2025/858，第 8 段和第 14 段)。各方商定按顺序采取以下行动：卢旺达在 3 月底前将其人员和装备从卢贝罗、马西西和瓦利卡莱的指定前线地区撤回卢旺达境内；刚果民主共和国武装部队则将发起行动消灭卢民主力量。这一歼灭行动以刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军部队完全撤出指定地区为条件(见 S/2025/858，第 7 段；S/2024/969，第 48 段)。附件 18 进一步详细说明了商定的行动和关切区。

执行有限

46. 截至编写本报告时，承诺仅得到部分履行。双方在持续的敌对行动中继续追求各自的战略目标。

⁴⁴ 联合国、民间社会、情报机构消息来源、研究人员。

⁴⁵ 联合国、军事情报、民间社会、人道主义消息来源。

⁴⁶ 专家组查阅的计划副本。

47. 卢旺达国防军和刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”于 3 月 23 日开始从北基伍前线撤离，但未达到商定的条件和期限要求。撤离距离仅略超 15 至 20 公里，属于有限的战略和地盘让步。部队调动实为战术重新部署和对其他战略地区的增援(见 S/2023/431，第 44-45 段；S/2025/446，第 12 段)。卢旺达国防军人员、重炮和先进装备(干扰、欺骗及其他防空系统)从卢贝罗重新部署至马西西-瓦利卡莱轴线，违反了卢旺达关于将人员和装备直接撤回本国领土的承诺。⁴⁷

48. 截至编写本报告时，卢旺达国防军和刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”仍控制着大部分指定撤离地点，并继续将作战重点放在平加和瓦利卡莱。4 月，瓦利卡莱-马西西边界沿线围绕地盘控制权的激烈冲突持续不断，一方为刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军，另一方为刚果民主共和国武装部队、保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多和卢民主力量。卢旺达国防军继续在鲁丘鲁县布维托酋长领地开展打击卢民主力量的行动，以将卢民主力量逐出其据点(见 S/2025/858，第 36-45 段)。⁴⁸

49. 在南基伍，未记录到卢旺达国防军或刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”部队撤离的情况，战斗仍在继续。4 月，卢旺达国防军的更多增援部队从卢旺达抵达，先进武器和便携式防空系统也随之运抵。⁴⁹卢旺达国防军操控的无人机袭击以刚果民主共和国武装部队为目标，尤其是在 4 月 10 日至 19 日期间(见第 168 段)。

50. 接近卢旺达当局的消息来源和刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”消息来源均表示，卢旺达总统保罗·卡加梅关于“防御措施”包括在刚果民主共和国部署部队的公开声明也表明，卢旺达无意脱离接触，而且在无法通过对话取得有利结果的情况下，准备以“一切必要手段”升级局势(见附件 19)。刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”代表宣布，没有发生任何撤离，调动为例行部队轮调。⁵⁰

51. 2026 年 3 月 29 日，刚果民主共和国武装部队宣布在平加-瓦利卡莱周边发起消灭卢民主力量的行动，并为此从基桑加尼向瓦利卡莱增派部队。⁵¹然而，刚果民主共和国武装部队的承诺仍然令人质疑(见 S/2024/969，第 67-73 段)，因为截至编写本报告时尚未发生打击卢民主力量的任何行动，且卢民主力量仍在马西西和瓦利卡莱参与针对刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军的行动。卢民主力量消息来源报告称，已收到刚果民主共和国武装部队某些军官的保证，称不会对他们发动攻击(见第 135-136 段)。

⁴⁷ 军方和情报机构消息来源、联合国、瓦扎伦多及刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”消息来源、研究人员。

⁴⁸ 联合国、军事情报、民间社会、人道主义消息来源。

⁴⁹ 联合国、军事情报、外交消息来源、研究人员。

⁵⁰ 见 https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/2037994145567166671?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYyaxKQtM7ZzVg。

⁵¹ 刚果民主共和国武装部队消息来源。

在瑞士举行的多哈进程谈判

52. 作为多哈进程(见 S/2025/858, 第 7、10-11 段)的一部分, 刚果民主共和国政府与刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”之间的会谈于 2026 年 4 月 13 日至 17 日在瑞士蒙特勒举行, 但取得的成果有限。会谈后签署了一项关于落实停火监测和核查机制的谅解备忘录, 以及一项关于人道主义准入和释放囚犯的联合声明(见附件 20)。

B. 刚果河联盟/3 月 23 日运动的目标、结构和地盘控制

目标与组织

53. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”的目标继续融合政治、经济和军事目的, 包括扩张和巩固地盘、固化平行治理架构以及通过谈判寻求正式承认(见 S/2025/858, 第 13-14 段)。推翻刚果民主共和国政府以及在刚果民主共和国东部建立自治区, 仍分别是该运动的最大目标和较有限目标(见 S/2025/446, 第 11 段和附件 4)。⁵² 前被招募人员证实, 该运动在意识形态培训中灌输上述目标。⁵³

54. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”领导人继续主张建立“刚果联邦共和国”, 并推翻了此前关于将刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”战斗人员编入刚果民主共和国武装部队的要求(见 S/2025/446, 第 11 段), 转而提议由刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”组建并领导联邦国家的新武装部队(见附件 21)。⁵⁴

55. 在刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”为其军事干预及各项要求辩护的公开声明中, 保护图西人、穆伦格人和希马人免遭族裔清洗和种族灭绝日益成为核心论调。⁵⁵

56. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”继续优先进行军事扩张, 升级军事行动, 目标是夺取瓦利卡莱、基桑加尼、卡莱米和贝尼。自 2025 年 3 月多哈进程启动以来(见 S/2025/446, 附件 5), 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”的占领区扩大了 35%以上,⁵⁶ 违反了安全理事会第 2773(2025)号决议。

与约瑟夫·卡比拉的关联

57. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”与刚果民主共和国前总统约瑟夫·卡比拉的公开联系日益密切, 该运动的立场也随之受到影响(同上, 第 9-10 段)。⁵⁷ 自 2025

⁵² 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”成员、曾被招募加入刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”的人员、公开声明。

⁵³ 在鲁曼加博、Tchanzu 和尼永格拉(见 S/2025/446, 附件 50)。

⁵⁴ 见 <https://x.com/bbisimwa/status/1994820683516580189?s=20>。

⁵⁵ 见 https://x.com/cnangaa/status/2000638408075448464?s=46&t=_n75XfLAiYyaxKQtM7ZzVg; https://x.com/onenationradio3/status/2049805208100725075?s=46&t=_n75XfLAiYyaxKQtM7ZzVg; 以及 https://x.com/conspiracygl/status/2030302769781920249?s=46&t=_n75XfLAiYyaxKQtM7ZzVg。

⁵⁶ 联合国、情报和外交部门消息来源、研究人员。

⁵⁷ 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”战斗人员、情报机构消息来源、接近刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”领导层的人员、接近卢旺达政府的消息来源、卢旺达国防军前消息人士、联合国消息来源。

年 5 月起，卡比拉频繁前往刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”控制区，并与该运动高级领导层举行会晤。2025 年 9 月，刚果民主共和国军事高等法院以叛国和组织叛乱等罪名缺席判处卡比拉先生死刑，指控其与刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”合作。

58. 截至编写本报告时，刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”及情报机构的多个消息来源报告称，该运动即将对领导层和组织结构进行全面改组——包括更改运动名称——且预计卡比拉先生将担任重要职务。⁵⁸

59. 卡比拉先生日益突出的地位——以及卡加梅总统援引的卡比拉可能获得领导权的情况(见附件 19)——似乎意在掩盖卢旺达的作用，强化所谓刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”是解决“刚果问题”的“刚果运动”这一叙事(见 S/2024/432, 第 25 段)。在戈马进行的一场独家采访中(该采访象征性地于 3 月 23 日发布)，卡比拉先生重申了他对金沙萨政府的反对立场。⁵⁹ 卡比拉先生的“拯救刚果民主共和国”平台呼吁民众起义，示意支持政权更迭，这与刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”的目标相一致(见第 53 段)。⁶⁰

60. 莫伊兹·尼亚鲁加博——前刚果参议员、卡比拉先生核心圈的重要成员(见附件 22)——在该运动中的地位日益突出。⁶¹ 他是捍卫人民革命运动/特维瓦内霍的关键人物，虽未担任正式职务(见 S/2021/560, 附件 113; S/2025/446, 第 177 段)，但代表捍卫人民革命运动/特维瓦内霍的利益参加了与卡比拉先生及刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”领导层的高级别会议。⁶² 作为刚果民主联盟戈马派(刚果民盟戈马派)前副主席，他与曾任刚果民盟戈马派营长(2003-2004 年)的受制裁个人苏丹·马肯加(CDi.008)以及 2002 年曾任刚果民盟戈马派军官的贝尔纳·比亚蒙古关系密切(见 S/2009/603, 附件 124)。⁶³

刚果河联盟/3 月 23 日运动的组织与兵力

61. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”的总体军事指挥权仍由“将军”马肯加掌握，尽管他的地位在该运动内部及卢旺达方面日益受到质疑(见附件 23)。⁶⁴

⁵⁸ 同上。

⁵⁹ 见 <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/30/world/africa/he-led-congo-for-18-years-now-hes-a-hunted-man.html>。

⁶⁰ 见 <https://sauvonslarc.org/2026/04/12/communique-final-2e-conclave-du-mouvement-sauvons-la-rdc/>。

⁶¹ 同上。

⁶² 同上。

⁶³ 前刚果民盟戈马派军官、前卢旺达国防军消息来源和情报机构消息来源。另见 <https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/icg/1998/en/95628>; <https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/irin-update-870-great-lakes>; 和 https://sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/archive-files/francois_ngolet_crisis_in_the_congo_the_rise_abook4you.pdf, 第 12、34、74、83 和 126-128 页。

⁶⁴ 情报机构和刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”消息来源。

62. 贝特朗·毕西姆瓦和科尔内耶·南加仍担任政治领导人。军事和政治领导层都继续接受卢旺达政府及其情报机构的指示和支助(见第 98-100 段, 以及 S/2025/446, 第 8 段)。

63. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”政治派系与军事派系之间的紧张关系持续存在(见 S/2025/446, 第 9 段)。南加先生和卡比拉先生等知名政治人物怀有夺取金沙萨政权的野心, 但大多数“3·23 运动”领导人反对在北基伍和南基伍以外地区参与军事行动。⁶⁵ “3·23 运动”高级领导层在资源获取与分配问题上也发生冲突。⁶⁶ 消息来源还指出, 图西族军官和战斗人员受到优待一事引起了不满情绪。⁶⁷

64. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”占领的地盘被划分为三个“防区”, 分别由“将军”博杜安·恩加吕耶(第一区, 涵盖尼拉贡戈、鲁丘鲁和卢贝罗县)、“准将”朱斯坦·加舍里·穆桑加(第二区, 涵盖马西西和瓦利卡莱)以及“将军”比亚蒙古(第三区, 涵盖南基伍)领导。⁶⁸

65. 据估计, 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”的作战兵力约为 30 000 人。⁶⁹ 这一数字是“核心”“3·23 运动”人员(包括前全国保卫人民大会成员和第一代“3·23 运动”成员(见 S/2012/843, 第 3 段))与 2021 年以来动员的新兵(包括来自侨民群体和卢旺达难民营的新兵(见 S/2024/969, 附件 14-15))的合计总数。他们中还包括数千名新近受训完毕的刚果民主共和国武装部队人员、刚果国家警察和瓦扎伦多战斗人员, 他们要么被俘要么在戈马陷落后自愿加入, 以及地方防卫部队和新组建的警察部队人员(见 S/2025/446, 附件 12 和 14; S/2025/858, 附件 11)。

刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”的招募与训练

66. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”继续强迫或自愿招募成年人和未成年人(见 S/2025/858, 第 22 段)。⁷⁰ 前被招募者揭露训练营内存在有系统的酷刑和处决, 特别是在鲁曼加博。⁷¹ 莱昂·卡尼亚米布瓦继续被认定为负责所有训练中心的刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”指挥官(见 S/2025/446, 第 24 段)。

67. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”面临高叛逃率, 逃兵主要是被强迫招募者, 特别是前刚果民主共和国武装部队人员。⁷² 专家组还记录到为诱使人员大规模加

⁶⁵ 同上。

⁶⁶ 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和情报机构消息来源、联合国、研究人员。

⁶⁷ 同上。

⁶⁸ 军方和情报机构消息来源、联合国、外交消息来源、民间社会、研究人员、刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”军官及战斗人员、瓦扎伦多战斗人员。

⁶⁹ 同上。

⁷⁰ 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”新兵、联合国、军事情报、研究人员、民间社会。

⁷¹ 与曾被招募加入刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”的人员进行的访谈。

⁷² 同上。

入刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”而向刚果民主共和国武装部队军官和瓦扎伦多领导人行贿的协同行动。⁷³

刚果河联盟/3 月 23 日运动的军事行动

68. 在报告所述整个期间，刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”在北基伍和南基伍的多条前线实施了有针对性的同步行动，以巩固领土控制(见 S/2025/858，第 34-55 段)。该运动使用先进武器和技术能力，并得到了卢旺达国防军的关键支持(见第 49、76 和 153-160 段)。

北基伍

69. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军继续在鲁丘鲁县的布维托和布维沙酋长领地开展打击卢民主力量的行动，同时也将目标瞄准与卢民主力量或附属武装团体有关联的平民(见 S/2025/858，第 36-45 段)，包括进行有系统的杀戮、破坏生计和焚烧村庄。同样，卢民主力量-救世战斗军、团结和民主联盟-乌鲁纳纳及其他附属团体(如促进变革运动联合会/保卫人民力量)也对平民实施暴力行为，包括杀害其认为投靠了刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”的人员以及进行频繁的伏击和抢劫。⁷⁴

70. 在报告所述整个期间，刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军优先夺取平加和瓦利卡莱。自 3 月以来，他们还重点争夺具有战略意义的布尼亚基里(卡莱亥)—恩托托(马西西)—洪博(瓦利卡莱)轴线，该轴线将提供一条从南部进入瓦利卡莱的替代路线(见第 47-48 段)。然而，他们遭遇了保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多的攻势和刚果民主共和国武装部队的空中轰炸(见第 162-164 段)。⁷⁵

71. 2026 年 1 月至 3 月期间，据记录有大量刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军增援部队抵达卢贝罗前线，引发了对他们即将向布滕博和贝尼发动攻势的担忧。⁷⁶ 尽管攻势并未成为现实(部分原因是乌国防军的存在以及乌干达拒绝为其提供过境通道)，⁷⁷ 但这些增援部队牵制了刚果民主共和国武装部队的兵力，并使未来行动的时机和方向保持了战略模糊性。

南基伍行动和攻占乌维拉

72. 2025 年 11 月底，刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军沿布卡武-乌维拉走廊(RN5)及邻近轴线发动重大攻势，旨在夺取鲁齐齐平原和乌维拉，迫使布隆迪脱离冲突(见 S/2025/446，第 179-181 段)，使布隆迪领土不再被用作向南

⁷³ 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”成员、情报机构消息来源。

⁷⁴ 民间社会、联合国、人道主义消息来源、研究人员、武装团体成员，包括刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”成员。

⁷⁵ 同上。

⁷⁶ 军事和情报机构消息来源、前刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”成员、民间社会、研究人员、联合国、外交消息来源。

⁷⁷ 同上。

基伍省亲金沙萨部队提供补给的后勤枢纽(见第 120 段)。此外,在莱梅拉和中高原同时推进攻势,以巩固战略阵地,使后续能够向米内姆布韦发动进一步攻势,目的是解除布隆迪国防军和刚果民主共和国武装部队对其的包围(见 S/2025/858, 第 53 段),并迫使布隆迪国防军撤出姆文加县。后续目标包括夺取卡莱米和上高原,最终控制整个南基伍。⁷⁸

73. 为乌维拉攻势所作的公开辩解——包括刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”发言人和关联社交媒体网络上的声明——将行动描述为对据称针对穆伦格族群的族裔清洗运动的回应。另有说法称,此次行动是因为注意到卢民主力量-救世战斗军人员与刚果民主共和国武装部队和布隆迪国防军并肩作战。专家组未发现证据表明此类人员对卢旺达构成直接威胁,可据以证明在刚果民主共和国境内进行军事干预的正当性(见 S/2025/446, 附件 24)。

74. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军部队于 2025 年 12 月 10 日攻占乌维拉,并向南迅速推进至乌维拉以南 20 公里处的马科博拉,这标志着地盘的大幅扩张。布隆迪和卢旺达相互指控对方实施越境炮击,加剧了直接对抗和冲突区域化的风险,促使布隆迪关闭边界并加强防御。⁷⁹

75. 对乌维拉的进攻在马肯加先生和比亚蒙古先生的直接指挥下进行。⁸⁰已退役的卢旺达国防军将军詹姆斯·卡巴雷贝(见第 98 段)⁸¹被认定在协调攻势中发挥了关键作用。⁸²刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军消息来源自 10 月初即暗示其有意夺取乌维拉,表明刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达精心策划了此次行动。

76. 卢旺达部署了 8 000 多名卢旺达国防军士兵,包括特种部队,并向鲁齐齐平原前线调运重型先进军事装备,包括干扰系统、BM-21 型多管火箭发射器、GPS 制导 120 毫米迫击炮、自杀式无人机和第一人称视角无人机,旨在实现速胜。行动中使用了重炮和炮击,包括 12 月 4 日和 5 日从卡马尼奥拉发射 BM-21 火箭弹。12 月 5 日的越境炮击还在布隆迪锡比托克省造成平民伤亡。⁸³

撤出乌维拉

77. 在控制乌维拉一个多月期间,刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”迫使布隆迪国防军撤离,占领了刚果民主共和国武装部队的大型基地,⁸⁴控制了沿布隆迪边界

⁷⁸ 军方和情报机构消息来源、联合国消息来源、外交消息来源、民间社会、研究人员、刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”成员和军官。

⁷⁹ 同上。

⁸⁰ 同上。

⁸¹ 2025 年受到美国制裁。

⁸² 情报机构、外交及前卢旺达国防军消息来源。

⁸³ 军方和情报机构消息来源、联合国、外交消息来源、民间社会、研究人员、刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”成员和军官。

⁸⁴ 包括在 Luvungi、Luberizi 和 Kabunambo 的基地。

的整个鲁齐齐平原，并建立了平行行政体系。此后，经持续的国际外交施压，刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军部队最终于 2026 年 1 月 18 日撤出乌维拉(见附件 24)。

78. 此次撤军被宣称为一种善意姿态，实则是一项战略举措，随后刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军部队违反撤军承诺，向邻近地区重新部署，从而巩固了其阵地(见第 44-45 段)。⁸⁵ 协调进行的重新部署旨在控制南基伍的关键公路走廊，包括加强在中高原和上高原的阵地(见附件 25)。截至编写本报告时，刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军继续在鲁齐齐平原增兵(见第 49 段)。

79. 其他盟友团体，特别是争取布隆迪法治抵抗运动(法治塔巴拉)和民族解放力量(民解力量)(见 S/2022/479，第 162-168 段和附件 81；S/2023/431，第 134-139 段)，与捍卫人民革命运动/特维瓦内霍和刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”并肩作战(见附件 26)。⁸⁶ 布隆迪当局谴责了这些团体在行动上的密切接触，警告这可能为跨境动荡创造条件。

乌维拉战斗的人道主义影响

80. 猛烈的炮击和轰炸导致平民伤亡，并造成大量人口从鲁齐齐平原流向布隆迪。难民在布隆迪面临饥荒和疾病等恶劣生活条件，获得的人道主义援助有限。12 月初，随着冲突缓和，刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军巩固对乌维拉全境的控制，实施封锁搜查行动，导致涉嫌与刚果民主共和国武装部队或瓦扎伦多有牵连者被杀害。⁸⁷

81. 在 2026 年 1 月撤出之前，刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”指示穆伦格族群离开乌维拉，声称瓦扎伦多和刚果民主共和国武装部队返回后将把穆伦格人作为攻击目标。这引发了一些指控，包括来自穆伦格族群部分成员的指控，称他们的迁移是被胁迫的，目的是为该族群面临种族灭绝威胁的说法提供依据。⁸⁸

82. 1 月 18 日瓦扎伦多各团体重新进入乌维拉引发了大规模骚乱，包括抢掠，毁坏民用、人道主义和国家财产，以及杀戮被指控与刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”合作的人员。暴力还波及穆伦格族群的成员和财产，多个社区的教堂和住宅遭到洗劫或毁坏。⁸⁹ 专家组未记录到任何针对穆伦格族平民的定点杀害事件。多个消息来源指出，包括刚果民主共和国总统费利克斯·齐塞克迪在内的政府当局指示瓦扎伦多人员不得以平民特别是穆伦格人为目标。刚果民主共和国武装

⁸⁵ 军方和情报机构消息来源、联合国、外交消息来源、民间社会、研究人员、刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”内部知情人。

⁸⁶ 同上。

⁸⁷ 联合国、人道主义消息来源、民间社会、人权捍卫者、人权非政府组织、研究人员、外交和情报机构消息来源。

⁸⁸ 同上。

⁸⁹ 同上。

部队将留在乌维拉的 31 户穆伦格人家庭置于其保护之下。⁹⁰ 对所报告事件的调查仍在进行中。

争夺米内姆布韦控制权的战斗

83. 2026 年 1 月下旬，刚果民主共和国武装部队在瓦扎伦多、布隆迪国防军和私营军事承包商的支持下(见第 143-144 段)，从乌维拉向米内姆布韦发动攻势，打击捍卫人民革命运动/特维瓦内霍和刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”，后者分别于 2025 年 8 月和 2026 年 2 月向捍卫人民革命运动/特维瓦内霍增派兵力。⁹¹

84. 据估计，捍卫人民革命运动/特维瓦内霍的兵力为 2 500 至 3 000 名战斗人员，由 Charles Sematama 领导(见 S/2025/446，第 176 段)。卢旺达国防军在上高原的存在仅限于零星的排级规模特种部队和空中支援(见第 168 段)，这可能是由于该地区地理位置偏僻。捍卫人民革命运动/特维瓦内霍和刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”人员在米内姆布韦、米肯盖和穆兰维亚等穆伦格人居民点周围集结。⁹²

85. 在数周时间里，刚果民主共和国武装部队切断了通往米内姆布韦的补给路线。3 月 31 日，继在上高原持续取得进展之后，刚果民主共和国武装部队对米内姆布韦发动了重大攻势。⁹³ 作为回应，卢旺达国防军通过无人机打击和空中再补给支援捍卫人民革命运动/特维瓦内霍和刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”。⁹⁴ 4 月初至中旬的无人机打击迫使刚果民主共和国武装部队撤出了包括穆兰维亚在内的关键阵地，暂时阻止了其推进(见第 168-170 段)。

被困在米内姆布韦的穆伦格族平民

86. 集中在米内姆布韦及周边地区的穆伦格族人口被困在持续的敌对行动中。自 2025 年年中以来，米内姆布韦实际上已被刚果民主共和国武装部队及其盟军包围(见 S/2025/858，第 53 段)，导致人口流动、必需品和人道主义援助的进入受到严重阻碍。自 2026 年 2 月以来，进入该地的通道仅限于空中补给。⁹⁵ 所有交通线均被切断，进一步加剧了人道主义局势。⁹⁶

87. 与此同时，捍卫人民革命运动/特维瓦内霍以胁迫和暴力威胁等手段阻止平民离开米内姆布韦，担心出现叛逃和情报泄露。⁹⁷ 如以往报告所述，所有 10 至

⁹⁰ 外交和军方消息来源、情报机构消息来源、刚果当局、穆伦格族平民、民间社会、研究人员。

⁹¹ 军方和情报机构消息来源、联合国、刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和穆伦格族消息来源、研究人员。

⁹² 军方和情报机构消息来源、卢旺达国防军被俘士兵、研究人员。

⁹³ 同上。

⁹⁴ 军方和情报机构消息来源、联合国、外交消息来源、研究人员、武装团体消息来源。

⁹⁵ 2026 年 3 月和 4 月，有记录显示多架飞机轮换在米内姆布韦空投物资，这一情况已得到军方和情报机构、联合国、穆伦格族消息来源以及研究人员的证实。

⁹⁶ 军方和情报机构消息来源、联合国、穆伦格族消息来源、研究人员、人道主义消息来源、人权维护者。

⁹⁷ 同上。

12 岁的男童和所有体格健全的男子均被迫加入特维瓦内霍并参加战斗，这违反了关于禁止强迫招募以及禁止在武装冲突中招募和使用儿童的规定(见 S/2023/431，第 150-156 段)。

88. 穆伦格族群成员谴责冲突双方将平民困在活跃作战区，呼吁刚果民主共和国武装部队解除包围并建立人道主义走廊，同时呼吁捍卫人民革命运动/特维瓦内霍和刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”允许平民安全离开。⁹⁸ 双方的行为均引起了国际人道法——包括禁止使用平民掩护军事目标——方面的严重关切。

89. 捍卫人民革命运动/特维瓦内霍和刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”领导人指控刚果民主共和国武装部队和布隆迪国防军对穆伦格人实施蓄意、系统性和有针对性的灭绝行动，包括对人口稠密地区进行空中轰炸。⁹⁹ 虽然上高原的平民面临着持续敌对行动带来的重大风险，但专家组未能证实他们被故意作为攻击目标的指控。在 2025 年年中以来频繁的空中行动背景下，穆伦格族群成员(包括人权组织)报告了三名平民死亡，包括一名十几岁的男孩和两名老人。¹⁰⁰

刚果河联盟/3 月 23 日运动的平行行政体系

90. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”已巩固其平行行政与财政体系(见附件 27；S/2025/446，第 25-27 段；S/2025/858，第 16、29-33 段)。在包括戈马和布卡武在内的主要城市中心，该运动扩大了对关键经济活动的控制，这也惠及了与卢旺达有关联的经济行为体。

91. 2025 年 12 月初，刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”出台了一份仿照刚果国家税收结构的成文税目清单，¹⁰¹ 其中包括个人所得税和企业所得税(见附件 28)。

92. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”接管了所有现有的省级税收部门，并将其整合为一个统一机构，在刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”财政部的领导下负责征收和执行省级税费(见附件 29)。付款通过被刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”据为己有并改版使用的刚果储蓄银行系统进行(见附件 30；S/2025/858，第 31-32 段)。

93. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”还对公用事业、保险和金融服务进行控制。例如，国家电力和供水公司(SNEL 和 REGIDESO)被置于刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”任命的长官的行政管辖之下，并接受该运动财政部的财务监督(见附件 31)。在保险业，刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”为 Imperial Assur 公司取代国家保险公司 SONAS 提供了便利。Imperial Assur 是一家私营实体，于 2025 年年中开始运营。到 2026 年 3 月，Imperial Assur 通过刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”支持的强制执行机制，已垄断了保险业的大部分业务(见附件 32)。

⁹⁸ 穆伦格族群代表。

⁹⁹ X 平台上的声明，包括劳伦斯·坎尤卡于 2025 年 12 月 13 日发布的声明。

¹⁰⁰ 保密消息来源。

¹⁰¹ 秘书处存档的文件。

94. 专家组记录到，在刚果当局持续暂停银行业务和支付系统后，出现了未经许可的金融服务提供商(见 S/2025/446，第 32-33 段)。例如，“Accès Finance S.A.”¹⁰² 以金融机构的身份出现，在戈马和鲁巴亚提供存款、转账和账户服务，并计划扩展至布卡武(见附件 33)。

C. 卢旺达国防军对刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”的关键支持

95. 专家组记录到卢旺达国防军在北基伍和南基伍的持续驻留及增兵情况，以及他们在多条前线的作战行动，包括使用先进军事技术和装备以及开展空中作战(见 S/2024/969，第 51-55 段；S/2025/446，第 45-52、56 段；S/2025/858，第 36-48 段)。卢旺达国防军向刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”提供了持续的行动支持，有能力快速部署高度专业化的能力，包括无人机、电子战和特种部队(见第 153-160 段和 166-170 段)。卢旺达国防军还针对据报没有卢民力量存在的地区(包括乌维拉)¹⁰³ 展开行动，这令人对所谓“防御措施”背后的自卫理由产生质疑——该理由被用来为军事干预提供正当性(见 S/2024/969，第 38 段)。

96. 2025 年 12 月，卢旺达国防军在刚果民主共和国东部的部署规模保守估计为南基伍省 8 000 至 10 000 人，北基伍省 6 000 至 8 000 人，此后无证据表明有大规模撤军。¹⁰⁴ 后续的部队调动，直至编写本报告时，均以轮换和增援为主(见第 49 段和第 71 段)。

97. 如先前记录所述，卢旺达国防军占据战略前沿阵地、引领进攻并为“3·23 运动”开辟行动通道。每个“3·23 运动”战斗单位均由卢旺达国防军监督并提供支持(见 S/2024/969，第 49 段)。卢旺达国防军人员与“3·23 运动”人员共同编入混合营，包括发源自比戈圭、鲁巴伍和尚古古的突击队。近期，部署在刚果民主共和国的卢旺达国防军人员开始穿着“3·23 运动”制服以避免被发现。¹⁰⁵ 出于同样原因，部队调动大多在夜间进行。

卢旺达国防军对刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”行动的指挥与控制

98. 2025 年 12 月 1 日，卡加梅总统任命退役将军詹姆斯·卡巴雷贝担任其高级国防与安全顾问。2026 年 1 月 29 日，他任命准将让-保罗·尼拉布塔马¹⁰⁶ 担任卡巴雷贝先生的副手。¹⁰⁷ 尼拉布塔马先生直接参与刚果民主共和国东部的行动事务，包括处理与刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”的沟通渠道，¹⁰⁸ 卡巴雷贝先生则

¹⁰² 见 <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1608550256803084>。

¹⁰³ 军方和情报机构消息来源、联合国、外交消息来源、民间社会、研究人员、刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”消息来源。

¹⁰⁴ 同上。

¹⁰⁵ 同上。与被拘留的卢旺达国防军人员和曾被招募加入刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”的人员的访谈。

¹⁰⁶ 尼拉布塔马先生曾任卢旺达国家情报和安全局副局长。

¹⁰⁷ 卡巴雷贝先生和尼拉布塔马先生在情报、军事行动与政治决策之间发挥战略衔接作用。

¹⁰⁸ 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”内部的直接对话者是弗雷德·恩根齐·卡戈罗拉(见附件 20)。

担任主要联络人，确保与刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”领导层及卡比拉先生的协调，会晤常在吉塞尼举行。¹⁰⁹

99. 卢旺达国防军的部署通过一个结构化的链条进行协调，这一链条将基加利高层领导与通过平行渠道同“3·23 运动”指挥官开展的行动层面合作对接起来(见 S/2025/446，第 8 段)。¹¹⁰ 2026 年 3 月被美国制裁¹¹¹ 的卢旺达国防军陆军参谋长樊尚·尼亚卡伦迪将军负责监督刚果民主共和国东部的行动。¹¹² 卢旺达国防军第 3 师和第 4 师的部队部署在刚果民主共和国东部参与行动：¹¹³ 第 3 师在少将尤金·恩库比托¹¹⁴ 指挥下主要在北基伍行动；第 4 师主要部署在南基伍，由准将樊尚·加塔马指挥，直至 2025 年底他被调往莫桑比克。¹¹⁵ 第 4 师还编入了大量预备役部队。¹¹⁶ 两个师均得到由准将斯塔尼斯拉斯·加舒吉指挥的特种部队的支持。¹¹⁷ 虽然师长留在卢旺达境内，但旅长偶尔会部署到刚果民主共和国。¹¹⁸ 专家组访谈的刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”被招募者均提及卢旺达国防军的存在，特别是特种部队，他们参与了高风险的前线行动。

100. 卢旺达政府继续决定占领、据守或撤出哪些地盘，反映出集中化的行动控制以及刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”的从属地位(同上，第 18 段)。

101. 专家组于 2026 年 4 月 2 日致函卢旺达政府，就其向刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”提供支持的各方面情况寻求澄清，并期待收到答复。

¹⁰⁹ 情报来源包括卢旺达、卢旺达国防军前成员及刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”消息人士。

¹¹⁰ 同上。

¹¹¹ 见 <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0411>。

¹¹² 情报机构和刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”消息来源。

¹¹³ 情报、刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”消息来源、被俘卢旺达国防军士兵、与卢旺达国防军有关联的消息来源。

¹¹⁴ 见 <https://www.mod.gov.rw/docs-media/news-detail/rdf-command-and-staff-college-launches-international-relations-and-security-course>。

¹¹⁵ 情报机构消息来源。另见 <https://www.kigalitimes.rw/2025/09/14/rwanda-deploys-fresh-troop-rotation-to-mozambiques-cabo-delgado/>；<https://rwandainspirer.com/rwanda-to-rotate-troops-and-police-officers-deployed-in-mozambique/>。2025 年底有消息称樊尚·加塔马担任卢旺达安全部队在莫桑比克的联合特遣部队指挥官，这表明他当时已不再担任第 4 师师长，尽管没有官方通告指明继任者。他自 2023 年 8 月 30 日起担任第 4 师师长。见 <https://web.archive.org/web/20250405091908/>；<https://www.mod.gov.rw/news-detail/rdf-press-release-promotion-and-appointment-in-the-rwanda-defence-force>。

¹¹⁶ 由亚历克西·卡加梅少将指挥。见 S/2022/967，附件 32。

¹¹⁷ 情报机构消息来源、刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”成员、前卢旺达国防军成员。

¹¹⁸ 同上。

D. 刚果民主共和国武装部队代理人

1. 瓦扎伦多团体

北基伍省保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多联盟

102. 北基伍省的保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多武装团体仍在与刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军作战(见 [S/2025/858](#), 第 73-76 段)。刚果民主共和国政府继续违反制裁制度, 向保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多提供资金、后勤和武器(见 [S/2025/446](#), 第 63 段)。

103. 刚果民主共和国武装部队继续试图统一北基伍省的保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多团体, 目标是加强内部纪律并加强刚果民主共和国武装部队的指挥和控制。然而, 保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多团体继续侵犯平民(见 [S/2025/858](#), 第 81 段; [S/2025/446](#), 第 87 至 91 段)。

保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多的行动

104. 保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多独立地或与刚果民主共和国武装部队共同保持对北基伍省几个地区的控制。他们往往主动在尼拉贡戈、马西西、鲁丘鲁、瓦利卡莱和卢贝罗等县由刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军控制的地区内和周围开展行动。一些保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多分子接受了训练并被雇用为神枪手, 以支持无人机的攻击, 特别是在目标识别和攻击指导方面(见第 141 段)。卢民主力量战斗人员仍然潜伏在几个保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多团体中, 特别是促进变革运动联合会/保卫人民力量、保卫祖国力量和自由主权刚果爱国者联盟, 加强了他们的队伍, 同时掩盖了与卢民主力量的从属关系。刚果民主共和国武装部队的几名军官和刚果民主共和国当局知道并批准了这种做法(见 [S/2024/969](#), 第 41 段)。¹¹⁹

保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多“协同部队”和国防预备役部队

105. 2025 年 12 月, 金沙萨当局和刚果民主共和国武装部队提议, 在 2025 年 12 月 13 日举行的大会之后, 成立“保卫祖国志愿者全国联盟(保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多)”, 由选举产生的领导人负责协调参与打击刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军的所有武装派别(见附件 34)。然而, 保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多否认了这一举措, 包括拟议的领导层。¹²⁰

106. 省当局和刚果民主共和国武装部队还敦促保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多派别编入国防预备役部队训练方案(见 [S/2025/446](#), 附件 34), 以实现加强刚果民主共和国武装部队行动能力和使瓦扎伦多战斗人员合法化的双重目标。虽然一些战斗

¹¹⁹ 刚果民主共和国武装部队、瓦扎伦多和政府消息来源。

¹²⁰ 刚果民主共和国武装部队、情报机构、瓦扎伦多消息来源。

人员加入了国防预备役部队训练方案，但大多数保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多领导人倾向于在战斗继续期间推迟编入国防预备役部队。¹²¹

107. 相反，保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多团体建立了新的、按地理位置组织的联盟，称为“协同部队”，彼此密切协调其行动，并在必要时提供相互支持。¹²²

108. 由解放刚果爱国者联盟领导人马亚尼“将军”指挥的“大北方阵线协同部队”由在卢贝罗县和贝尼县活动的 24 个武装团体组成。其总部设在卡伦古塔，与刚果民主共和国武装部队和乌国防军一道，在曼古雷吉帕/班杜鲁(卢贝罗县)和穆查查(伊图里省)对民主同盟军开展了联合行动(见第 29 段)。¹²³ 它还在基佩塞(卢贝罗县)与刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军作战。¹²⁴ 覆盖鲁丘鲁县和尼拉贡戈县的“小北方协同部队”由 14 个武装团体组成，由促进变革运动联合会-刚果人民自卫力量领导人乔纳斯·比加博指挥。“马西西-瓦利卡莱协同部队”由 17 个武装团体组成，由自由主权刚果爱国者联盟领导人让维埃·卡莱里和受制裁的个人吉东·希米莱·姆维萨(CDi.033)领导。¹²⁵ 卢民主力量-救世战斗军战斗人员被编入马西西-瓦利卡莱协同部队和小北区协同部队。¹²⁶

南基伍省的瓦扎伦多动态

接管乌维拉之前的组织混乱

109. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”占领布卡武(见 S/2025/446，第 17 段)后，许多瓦扎伦多武装团体向乌维拉集结。据报告，有 80 至 150 个瓦扎伦多团体活跃在南基伍省各地，至少有 70 名自称的瓦扎伦多“将军”在乌维拉及其周边地区活动¹²⁷ (见附件 35)。动员和招募活动增多。¹²⁸

110. 在接管乌维拉之前(见第 74 段)，瓦扎伦多各派系一直作为十几个相互竞争的“协调机构”组成的松散联盟运作，日益侵犯国家特权，包括对边境哨所、税收和警察职能的控制，并掠夺平民(见 S/2025/858，第 82 段)。¹²⁹

111. 活跃在前线的“老”军阀——包括受制裁的个人威廉·亚库通巴(CDi.043)以及马卡纳基·卡西姆比拉·约翰、德尔芬·恩戈曼齐托、勒内·伊通瓦和伊

¹²¹ 瓦扎伦多指挥官、战斗人员、刚果民主共和国武装部队和官方当局。

¹²² 瓦扎伦多、卢民主力量和刚果民主共和国武装部队消息来源。

¹²³ 马亚尼“将军”、瓦扎伦多和刚果民主共和国武装部队消息来源、研究人员。

¹²⁴ 保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多、刚果民主共和国武装部队、联合国、情报机构和民间社会消息来源。

¹²⁵ 见 S/2023/431，第 75-78 段；S/2023/990，第 33-40 段；S/2024/432，第 60-65 段；S/2025/446，第 65-67 段。

¹²⁶ 卢民主力量、刚果民主共和国武装部队和瓦扎伦多消息来源、刚果民主共和国当局。

¹²⁷ 情报机构、武装团体、民间社会、研究人员。

¹²⁸ 见 S/2024/969，第 107-110 段。

¹²⁹ 情报机构、武装团体、民间社会、研究人员。

隆加——与被视为利用被削弱的国家权力的机会主义者的“新”瓦扎伦多领导人之间存在巨大分歧(见 S/2023/431, 附件 74; 及 S/2024/969, 第 109 段)。¹³⁰ 据称刚果民主共和国武装部队偏袒某些派别, 以及刚果民主共和国当局对谁应负责协调南基伍省的军事行动意见不一, 加剧了瓦扎伦多内部的分歧。

112. 2025 年 8 月至 12 月期间, 瓦扎伦多与刚果民主共和国武装部队的关系显著恶化。瓦扎伦多袭击了一些刚果民主共和国武装部队, 指控他们叛国, 并没收了武器和弹药。到 2025 年 12 月, 乌维拉已成为刚果民主共和国武装部队和瓦扎伦多之间以及瓦扎伦多内部之间因争夺非法税收收入而关系紧张和发生冲突的中心。¹³¹

113. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军占领乌维拉后, 瓦扎伦多撤退到乌维拉镇外或撤退到其在菲齐、上高原和中高原的基地。¹³²

刚果河联盟/3 月 23 日运动撤退后的动态

114. 2026 年 1 月 18 日刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军从乌维拉撤军(见第 77 段)后, 瓦扎伦多团体首先返回, 进行了大规模抢劫和其他侵权行为(见第 82 段)。随后几天, 随着省当局、刚果民主共和国武装部队、“希布”特种部队、共和国卫队成员、警察和一些私营军事承包商重新部署到乌维拉, 情况逐渐好转。省长召集了所有瓦扎伦多领导人, 禁止未经授权的武装分子的存在, 禁止设置路障或任何替代政府职能的行为, 并逮捕了顽抗的战斗人员。为了减少瓦扎伦多在乌维拉的存在, 瓦扎伦多被部署到前线。¹³³

115. 为了巩固政府对瓦扎伦多的权力, 省政府实施了正式的登记程序, 并向每位登记的战斗人员支付了 325 美元。2026 年 2 月后, 付款定期进行, 然而, 这却反常地导致自称为瓦扎伦多的人数急剧增加, 并导致因谁收到的钱更多而出现争夺。¹³⁴

2026 年初瓦扎伦多的协调

116. 2026 年 1 月下旬, 以反图西人言论著称的贾斯汀·比塔奎拉(见 S/2024/969, 第 108-109 段)和威利·米希基等政治行为体动员政治支持, 并主张增加对南基伍省瓦扎伦多人员的后勤和财政援助。¹³⁵

¹³⁰ 军方和情报机构、武装团体消息来源、民间社会、研究人员。

¹³¹ 同上。

¹³² 武装团体、情报机构消息来源、民间社会和研究人员。

¹³³ 同上。

¹³⁴ 同上。

¹³⁵ 刚果民主共和国当局、瓦扎伦多消息来源、研究人员。

117. 在起草本报告时，建立统一指挥部的新努力宣告失败，瓦扎伦多各派仍然分成至少三个不同的协调机构：¹³⁶ 一个由亚库通巴领导；¹³⁷ 第二个由国防预备役部队任命的南基伍协调员亚历克西斯·姆万巴·邓亚领导；第三个由恩戈曼齐托领导，他试图建立一支按族裔动员的“特种部队”，主要是巴富利罗族。每个协调机构由 15 至 20 个派别组成。¹³⁸

118. 几名不隶属于三个现有协调机构的较年轻的瓦扎伦多“将军”试图建立一个新的协调机构，因为他们认为现有的各协调机构得到政府的资助，而他们被排除在外。他们寻求正式承认并获得此类支持。¹³⁹

与刚果民主共和国武装部队和布隆迪国家国防军的合作

119. 瓦扎伦多团体通常筑起针对刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军的第一道防线，包括在乌维拉周围地区。2025 年 8 月至 12 月期间，他们在乌维拉和菲齐郊区的瓦伦古、卡巴雷、米内姆布韦和姆文加与刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军作战。(见 [S/2025/858](#)，第 51 至 52 段)。瓦扎伦多的行动并未带来任何大片领土的收复。¹⁴⁰

120. 刚果民主共和国武装部队继续向瓦扎伦多提供战争物资。2025 年 8 月 22 日，南基伍省 Sokola 2 行动区指挥官 Mwehu Lumbu Evariste 准将会见了主要的瓦扎伦多团体，以确定针对刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军的反攻战略。随后，刚果民主共和国武装部队将几卡车的武器和弹药转运到瓦扎伦多的几个前线，包括 Kiliba、Songe、卢温吉、Lubarika 和瓦伦古。¹⁴¹ 瓦扎伦多还收到了有限的口粮(见附件 36)。

121. 瓦扎伦多的几个派别也与布隆迪国防军开展联合行动，布隆迪国防军依靠他们获得情报和地形知识。例如，在刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”接管之前，布隆迪国防军与亚库通巴一起沿着乌维拉轴线和鲁齐齐平原开展行动，并依靠恩戈曼齐托分子作为上高原的侦察兵。¹⁴²

122. 自从夺回乌维拉以来，瓦扎伦多各派支持刚果民主共和国武装部队和布隆迪国防军在乌维拉、菲齐和姆文加县的联合地面行动。在菲齐，刚果民主共和国武装部队-瓦扎伦多-布隆迪国防军联盟在空袭的支持下，努力维持对泽罗角

¹³⁶ 同上。在 2025 年 12 月下旬在巴拉卡举行的一次会议上，威廉·亚库通巴当选为瓦扎伦多的总协调员，负责监督南基伍省各协调方的工作。然而，几位瓦扎伦多领导人拒绝接受对他的任命。

¹³⁷ 约翰·卡西姆比拉·马卡纳基担任行政和后勤领导，勒内·伊通瓦担任行动/情报领导。

¹³⁸ 联合国、瓦扎伦多消息来源、研究人员。

¹³⁹ 刚果民主共和国当局、民间社会和瓦扎伦多消息来源。

¹⁴⁰ 同上。

¹⁴¹ 情报机构、武装团体消息来源、民间社会、联合国消息来源、研究人员。

¹⁴² 同上。

和 Tuwe Tuwe 的控制，同时寻求巩固对米内姆布韦、¹⁴³ 米肯盖和周边地区的控制。¹⁴⁴ 刚果民主共和国武装部队特种部队和私营军事承包商拒绝与瓦扎伦多开展联合前线行动(见第 143 段)。¹⁴⁵

亚库通巴的并行治理

123. 由亚库通巴领导的捍卫刚果主权全国人民联盟(见第 111 段)在其控制地区，特别是菲齐县维持了其建立的平行行政当局(见 S/2018/531，第 60 段)。

124. 至少自 2023 年以来，捍卫刚果主权全国人民联盟一直在运作一个类似政府的结构，由代表和部门“部长”组成，包括司法、矿业和地质领域的部门。¹⁴⁶ 2026 年 1 月，捍卫刚果主权全国人民联盟通过其“财政局”发布了一份涵盖多个行业的综合税收清单。该制度预见到一定比例的税收将支付给某些国家服务部门，这反映出试图取代国家服务部门的税收(见附件 37)。

125. 自 2023 年以来，捍卫刚果主权全国人民联盟一直在运作一个由法院和法庭组成的并行司法系统，主要用于裁决与采矿活动相关的纠纷。¹⁴⁷ 该系统包括治安法官、书记员和执法人员，由拘留设施提供支持(见附件 38)。前被羁押人员报告说，释放的条件是支付 200 万至 500 万刚果法郎的罚款，这反映了司法强制权力的行使。

2. 解放卢旺达民主力量

结构、兵力和地理分布

126. 在撰写本报告时，卢民主力量(Cde.005)已分裂为三个主要派别：卢民主力量-救世战斗军、卢民主力量-团结和民主联盟和卢民主力量-人民保护力量(见 S/2025/466，第 92 段)。所有三个派别最近都采用了替代名称来掩盖其与卢民主力量的隶属关系：卢民主力量-救世战斗军被称为“丛林营”；卢民主力量-团结和民主联盟称为“卢民主力量-联盟”；卢民主力量-团结和民主联盟称为“团结和民主联盟”。¹⁴⁸

127. 卢民主力量三个派别的领导人大多是卢旺达国民，而普通成员主要来自刚果胡图族。¹⁴⁹ Pacifique Ntawuguka “少将”(别名欧米茄·伊斯雷尔)(CDi.024)和加斯东·伊亚穆雷米耶“将军”(别名 Victor Byiringiro)(CDi.003)分别仍然是卢民主力量-救世战斗军部队军事指挥官和政治领导人。卢民主力量-团结和民主联

¹⁴³ 2026 年 1 月之后，布隆迪国防军没有在米内姆布韦部署。

¹⁴⁴ 刚果民主共和国武装部队、情报机构消息来源、联合国、穆伦格人消息来源、研究人员。

¹⁴⁵ 同上。

¹⁴⁶ 矿业管理官员、瓦扎伦多内部人士、交易商、民间社会。

¹⁴⁷ 矿坑主、矿山工人、交易商、矿业管理官员、记者。

¹⁴⁸ 卢民主力量、瓦扎伦多、情报机构信息来源。

¹⁴⁹ 卢民主力量-救世战斗军、卢民主力量-团结和民主联盟和卢民主力量-人民保护力量消息来源、情报机构、刚果民主共和国武装部队、瓦扎伦多消息来源。

盟的总领导人是 Emmanuel Nsengiyumva “准将” (别名 Faida/Fayida Hakimu)，卢民主力量-人民保护力量的领导人是丹·哈特吉马纳“上校”(别名 Dan Simplicite)(同上，第 92 段)。三个派别的领导层持续保持沟通。¹⁵⁰ 在卢旺达国防军的积极追击下，出于行动需要和生存需要，他们仍在继续移动(见 S/2025/858，第 36-50 段)。¹⁵¹

128. 尽管每个团体都作为一个单独的实体开展行动，但欧米茄·伊斯雷尔在涉及三个派别的所有决定和谈判中被视为总领导者，这三个派别保持定期协调，行动区部分重叠，并对刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军开展了联合行动(见第 48 段)。¹⁵²

129. 卢民主力量-团结和民主联盟的传统行动区位于鲁丘鲁县的布威沙和布威托部落区。在起草本报告时，卢民主力量-团结和民主联盟的部队在琼巴、宾扎、布桑扎和布科马特别活跃，与卢民主力量-人民保护力量在鲁丘鲁县的行动区重叠。¹⁵³ 卢民主力量最大的派系卢民主力量-救世战斗军部队仍然活跃在北基伍省的几个主要前线，特别是尼拉贡戈、马西西、鲁丘鲁和瓦利卡莱县。¹⁵⁴ 据报告，卢民主力量-救世战斗军的特种部队——纵深搜索和行动突击队在戈马郊区有活动部队，并渗透到戈马镇(见 S/2024/432，第 74-77 段)。¹⁵⁵

130. 代表不同派别的卢民主力量消息人士声称，该组织的总兵力超过 1 万名战斗人员，其中一半在起草本报告时活跃，其他人已准备好动员。卢民主力量-纵深搜索和行动突击队声称他们的战斗人员超过 2 万人。然而，尽管自刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”相关危机爆发以来进行了大量招募工作(同上，第 77 段)并对新招募者(大部分是刚果国民)进行了训练，联合国和情报机构消息来源估计，卢民主力量的总兵力在 3 500 至 4 500 名战斗人员之间，其中卢民主力量-救世战斗军占绝大多数。《华盛顿协定》估计卢民主力量的兵力在 3 000 至 3 500 名战斗人员之间。¹⁵⁶

131. 由于卢民主力量战斗人员被认为是最为训练有素的战斗人员，卢民主力量和瓦扎伦多消息人士评估称，刚果民主共和国武装部队缺乏解除他们作战能力的行动能力或意愿(见第 51 段；及 S/2025/858，第 77 段)。¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁰ 同上。

¹⁵¹ 卢民主力量、联合国、情报机构消息来源。

¹⁵² 卢民主力量-救世战斗军、卢民主力量-团结和民主联盟和卢民主力量-人民保护力量和全国振兴和民主委员会消息来源。

¹⁵³ 卢民主力量和瓦扎伦多消息来源。

¹⁵⁴ 卢民主力量-纵深搜索和行动突击队、刚果民主共和国武装部队和情报机构消息来源。

¹⁵⁵ 卢民主力量-纵深搜索和行动突击队和瓦扎伦多消息来源。

¹⁵⁶ 外交和情报机构消息来源。

¹⁵⁷ 卢民主力量、瓦扎伦多、情报机构信息来源。

政治定位和对话呼吁

132. 在 2025 年 7 月致美国总统的一封信中，卢民主力量领导层提出其使命包括保护刚果民主共和国境内的卢旺达难民群体。它表示支持和平倡议，特别是那些促进胡图族难民安全、有尊严地返回卢旺达的倡议(见附件 39；S/2025/858，附件 7；S/2024/969，附件 42)。卢民主力量及其在南基伍省的小分化团体全国振兴和民主委员会(见 S/2024/432，第 182-183 段)坚称，他们的不满在于卢旺达政府将卢民主力量和更广泛的难民社区排除在社会和政治参与之外。¹⁵⁸ 在华盛顿特区和多哈正在进行的谈判中，卢民主力量仍然被排除在外。卢民主力量表示，除非卢旺达接受包容各方的对话，否则它不会解除武装，并警告说，鉴于刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军对其采取的行动，“战争已经开始”。¹⁵⁹

刚果民主共和国武装部队与解放卢旺达民主力量的继续合作

133. 根据《华盛顿协定》，刚果民主共和国政府承诺全面执行行动构想和相应的行动命令，其中将解除卢民主力量作战能力的全部责任交给了刚果当局(见第 44 段；S/2025/858，第 8 段和第 14 至 15 段)。然而，尽管做出了外交承诺，刚果民主共和国武装部队仍然依赖卢民主力量与卢民主力量结盟的团体来打击刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军(见 S/2025/446，第 70-73 段)。卢民主力量战斗人员——单独行动或与保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多和刚果民主共和国武装部队联合行动——仍然活跃在北基伍省的许多前线，有时占据第一道防线。

134. 为了表明对和平进程的承诺，2026 年 1 月，刚果民主共和国武装部队参谋长发布指示，禁止与卢民主力量进行任何形式的合作(见 S/2025/858，第 77 段)。该禁令扩大到所有保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多人员，不遵守禁令的团体被视为敌对团体(见附件 40)。¹⁶⁰ 从 3 月 30 日起，刚果民主共和国武装部队，包括被称为“希布”或“丛林营”的特种部队，从金沙萨部署到瓦利卡莱，开始解除卢民主力量作战能力的行动。¹⁶¹

135. 尽管刚果民主共和国武装部队发表了这些公报和进行了这些部署，¹⁶² 金沙萨官员和刚果民主共和国武装部队实地军官向卢民主力量保证将继续合作(见 S/2025/858，第 77 段)，并表示计划中的解除卢民主力量作战能力的行动不属实。¹⁶³

¹⁵⁸ 卢民主力量、全国振兴和民主委员会、情报机构和侨民消息来源。该团体查询的信息。

¹⁵⁹ 卢民主力量、全国振兴和民主委员会、情报机构和侨民消息来源。

¹⁶⁰ 瓦扎伦多消息来源、研究人员。

¹⁶¹ 刚果民主共和国武装部队消息来源。

¹⁶² 卢民主力量、瓦扎伦多、情报机构信息来源、与卢民主力量有联系的侨民消息来源。

¹⁶³ 保密消息来源。

136. 4月7日，包括刚果民主共和国武装部队将军在内的金沙萨高级代表团与平加的卢民主力量-救世战斗军最高指挥部代表进行了一次秘密会面，除其他外，决定卢民主力量与刚果民主共和国武装部队的合作将继续下去。¹⁶⁴

137. 在本报告所述期间，刚果民主共和国武装部队继续提供后勤支持，包括向卢民主力量转移军事装备。2026年3月下旬，刚果民主共和国武装部队的一架直升机在平加降落，向 Uzabakiriho Cyprien “少将” (别名 Kolomboka Niyo Tedium Mugisha) 指挥的卢民主力量-救世战斗军部队运送武器，这些部队在马西西县与刚果河联盟/“3·23运动”和卢旺达国防军部队作战。这些装备是由卢民主力量-全国振兴和民主委员会的一支部队收集的，该部队从瓦利卡莱县前往平加，然后返回马西西。¹⁶⁵ 2025年底也发生过类似的转运，当时在布威托部落区行动的指挥官“多哥人”领导下的一个卢民主力量部队定期在平加收集后勤物资和弹药。这些转运是由刚果民主共和国武装部队莫凯上校根据上级的指示执行的。¹⁶⁶

138. 在起草本报告时，刚果民主共和国武装部队和刚果民主共和国当局使用卢民主力量联络官协调卢民主力量与刚果民主共和国武装部队的行动。这些联络官仍与卢民主力量领导层保持联系，特别是 Victor Byiringiro 和欧米茄·伊斯雷尔。¹⁶⁷ 主要驻扎在金沙萨的卢民主力量-救世战斗军联络官 Fidel Sebagenzi 经常乘坐刚果民主共和国武装部队军用飞机前往北基伍省。¹⁶⁸ 分别驻扎在贝尼和卡辛迪的卢民主力量-人民保护力量联络官和卢民主力量-团结和民主联盟联络官与刚果民主共和国武装部队任命的与保卫祖国志愿者/瓦扎伦多联络员西普里安·塞科洛洛上校保持定期联系(同前，第75段)。¹⁶⁹

3. 私营军事公司和承包商

139. 外国私营军事公司和承包商继续在刚果民主共和国开展行动，以支持刚果民主共和国武装部队(同上，第78段)。他们的活动包括军事航空资产的运营、后勤援助、专业军事训练(包括无人机驾驶、雷达操作、苏霍伊飞机指导和丛林战)、行动规划支持、情报收集和分析、战术通信和目标识别。这些实体的总部位于基桑加尼、金沙萨、瓦利卡莱、卡莱米和金杜。¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁴ 卢民主力量-救世战斗军、情报机构及联合国消息来源。

¹⁶⁵ 卢民主力量和情报机构信息来源。

¹⁶⁶ 瓦扎伦多指挥官、卢民主力量、刚果民主共和国武装部队、情报机构消息来源。

¹⁶⁷ 瓦扎伦多、刚果民主共和国武装部队、卢民主力量消息来源、机密消息来源。

¹⁶⁸ 瓦扎伦多、刚果民主共和国武装部队、卢民主力量消息来源。

¹⁶⁹ 同上。

¹⁷⁰ 情报、军方和外交消息来源、私营军事承包商和瓦扎伦多消息来源、联合国、研究人员。

140. 证词显示，私营军事公司继续在北基伍和南基伍前线发挥军事战略和行动作用(见 S/2025/446，第 75 段；S/2023/990，第 47 至 51 段)。向参与前线行动的私营军事承包商传达指令的指挥链仍不清楚。

对瓦扎伦多的训练

141. 几个瓦扎伦多派别在北基伍省瓦利卡莱¹⁷¹和南基伍省巴拉卡¹⁷²接受了外国教官的培训，特别是关于目标识别、敌方阵地地理定位和驾驶四轴无人侦察机的培训。¹⁷³瓦扎伦多消息人士表示，选定的受训人员都是受教育程度较高的个人。一些受训人员随后成为刚果民主共和国武装部队开展无人机袭击的神枪手。¹⁷⁴

142. 受制裁个人吉东·希米莱(CDi.033)领导的战斗人员和受制裁个人威廉·亚库通巴(CDi.043)领导的捍卫刚果主权全国人民联盟战斗人员都是这些培训的受益者。¹⁷⁵向受制裁个人指挥的战斗人员提供培训构成被禁止的技术援助，因此违反了制裁制度。

私营军事承包商参与战斗

143. 2026 年 1 月至 3 月期间，私营军事承包商与刚果民主共和国武装部队一起在南基伍省开展行动。他们的参与正值当地协调的无人机袭击和地面攻势加剧之际。¹⁷⁶瓦扎伦多部队奉命撤出刚果民主共和国武装部队特种部队(“希布”)和外国私营军事承包商人员活动的上高原地区。¹⁷⁷

144. 私营军事承包商在关键的高风险行动中提供高度专业化的支持，并且没有系统地部署在所有前线。私营军事承包商对在南基伍省的刚果民主共和国武装部队的行动支持包括协调火炮和无人机袭击以及情报援助。2026 年 1 月，私营军事承包商曾陪同刚果民主共和国武装部队进入乌维拉(见第 40 段)。¹⁷⁸2026 年 2 月 1 日，在私营军事承包商的支持下，针对米内姆布韦周围的刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”阵地进行了多次无人机袭击。¹⁷⁹2026 年 2 月 2 日至 8 日期间，私营军事承包商在泽罗角空投了刚果民主共和国武装部队“希布”特种部队(见第 114 段)。

¹⁷¹ 恩杜马保卫刚果民兵组织-革新派和自由主权刚果爱国者联盟战斗人员。

¹⁷² 捍卫刚果主权全国人民联盟战斗人员。

¹⁷³ 瓦扎伦多和刚果民主共和国武装部队消息来源。

¹⁷⁴ 瓦扎伦多消息来源。

¹⁷⁵ 瓦扎伦多受训人员；军方和情报机构消息来源。

¹⁷⁶ 军方、情报机构消息来源、民间社会、瓦扎伦多消息来源。

¹⁷⁷ 瓦扎伦多消息来源。

¹⁷⁸ 军方、情报、外交和军事情报消息来源、联合国、研究人员。

¹⁷⁹ 保密和外交消息来源。

Quantum Global 和 Vectus Global

145. 据此前报道，2024 年 12 月，刚果民主共和国政府与美国私营军事承包商埃里克·普林斯签订了一份为期五年的合同。普林斯先生通过复杂的企业计划，致力于向刚果民主共和国武装部队提供专门的军事支持，同时提供财务监督和咨询服务，旨在增加刚果民主共和国采矿部门的收入(见 [S/2023/990](#)，附件 31；¹⁸⁰ [S/2025/446](#)，第 75 段)。

146. 2025 年 6 月，普林斯先生位于阿拉伯联合酋长国的 Quantum Global 咨询公司实体注册了一家新的刚果公司 Quantum Global 非洲咨询公司，作为其在刚果民主共和国的法律实体。该公司随后将 Vectus Global 注册为在刚果民主共和国的另一家法律实体。¹⁸¹ Vectus Global 在刚果民主共和国的业务由法裔美国人克里斯托夫·西罗¹⁸² 协调，该公司与财政部签署了一项合同，以加强国家在采掘部门的税收，解决跨境走私、腐败和逃税问题，包括为此建立一个“采矿队”。¹⁸³ 2026 年 4 月下旬，财政部宣布成立准军事“矿业警卫队”，以取代目前部署在矿区的国防部队(见附件 41)。

147. Vectus 合同还包含秘密军事部分，¹⁸⁴ 最初旨在优先考虑边境安全，包括与卢旺达和赞比亚的边境的安全。¹⁸⁵ 该合同还包括向刚果民主共和国武装部队提供战略军事咨询、购买和部署航空资产以及招募前外国军事人员。¹⁸⁶ 其目标是“帮助刚果民主共和国武装部队有效对抗战略目标，例如卢旺达的干扰”，包括通过“训练、建议和装备”。¹⁸⁷ 2025 年底，Vectus 的一名工作人员告诉专家组，持续的敌对行动已将合同的重点从税收转向安全。2026 年 2 月，Vectus Global 的一名代表告知专家组，刚果民主共和国政府要求其支持夺回乌维拉的行动规划，Vectus 工作人员已为此部署到刚果民主共和国东部。

148. 在 2026 年 3 月与专家组的会议上，西罗先生否认参与合同的军事方面；然而，包括 Vectus 工作人员在内的多个消息来源证实了他的协调作用。

¹⁸⁰ 政府、安全和情报机构消息来源、Vectus Global 工作人员。

¹⁸¹ 同上。

¹⁸² 情报和外交消息来源、私营军事承包商消息来源、Vectus Global 工作人员。

¹⁸³ Vectus Global 代表。

¹⁸⁴ 情报、军方、外交和私营军事承包商消息来源，Vectus Global 工作人员。

¹⁸⁵ 私营军事承包商消息来源。

¹⁸⁶ 情报和私营军事承包商消息来源、Vectus Global 工作人员。

¹⁸⁷ Vectus Global 工作人员。

萨尔瓦多招募的外国私营军事承包商

149. 萨尔瓦多人员至少自 2025 年 7 月以来就驻扎在刚果民主共和国(见 S/2025/858, 第 79 段), 他们将参与范围从对基桑加尼的后勤支持扩大到积极的前线部署, 特别是在瓦利卡莱、巴拉卡和卡莱米。¹⁸⁸

150. 专家组确定美洲产品进口公司是一家中介公司, 参与招募至少 300 名萨尔瓦多国民部署到刚果民主共和国。该公司在萨尔瓦多以退役陆军上校胡安·埃米利奥·贝拉斯科·阿尔法罗和退役上尉·罗德里戈·安东尼奥·特哈达·阿尔瓦伦加的名字注册(见附件 42)。

151. 大多数被招募者是前军事和警察人员, 合同从 2025 年 7 月开始, 为期一年, 承诺每月薪酬为 4 225 美元。几名被招募者已返回萨尔瓦多, 因为薪酬支付出现拖延或未能支付, 或由于部署期间出现健康问题(同上)。

152. 萨尔瓦多政府告诉专家组, 它不知道刚果民主共和国境内有其国民, 任何此类招募或部署都未经该国授权。

E. 先进的武器系统、通信和无人驾驶航空器的使用

卢旺达国防军操作的设备

153. 专家组记录了在刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”控制区继续使用先进电子战和军事通信设备的情况, 证明卢旺达国防军的存在和对刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”的重要支持(见 S/2025/858, 第 71 段和附件 33), 违反了联合国制裁制度。

北基伍省和南基伍省的电子战系统

154. 在北基伍省和南基伍省发现的几个装置被确定为电子战和反无人飞行系统部件, 旨在干扰无人机使用的无线电频率并干扰或拦截军事通信。

155. 2025 年 10 月 21 日, 刚果民主共和国武装部队在马西西县(北基伍省)卡伦贝地区刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”以前占领的地区发现了几个此类系统。这些设备标有“MINDMADE WB GROUP(POLAND)”的字样,¹⁸⁹ 由 WB 集团的子公司 MindMade Sp.z o.o. 制造, 以 SKYctrl 和 FIELDctrl 产品系列销售,¹⁹⁰ 由先进保护系统在波兰生产(见附件 43)。¹⁹¹

156. 2025 年 8 月 12 日和 13 日, 在针对“3·23”运动和卢旺达国防军进行的军事行动中, 在瓦伦古县(南基伍省)穆兰巴发现了带有相同制造商标记的类似模块

¹⁸⁸ 情报、军方消息来源、民间社会、研究人员。

¹⁸⁹ 见 <https://www.wbgroup.pl/en/mindmade>。

¹⁹⁰ 见 <https://www.mapledefence.com/product/skyctrl>。

¹⁹¹ 见 <https://apsystems.tech/en/about-us/>。

(见附件 44)。2025 年 8 月 19 日，卢旺达国防军在布隆迪-卢旺达边境沿线的基比拉安装的类似设备被缴获。¹⁹²

军事电信设备

157. 2025 年 3 月，刚果安全部队在马西西县从一名卢旺达国防军士兵手中缴获了一台 Tadiran RT-7106(PRC-710)战术甚高频/调频便携式无线电(见 S/2025/858，第 71 段和附件 34)。制造商证实，该无线电已于 2022 年正式出口给卢旺达政府(见附件 45)。

影响民航的全球导航卫星系统干扰

158. 卢旺达国防军和刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”对全球导航卫星系统的干扰仍在继续，对民航安全构成严重风险(见 S/2024/969，第 54 段；S/2025/446，第 45 至 50 段)。

159. 2026 年 1 月 13 日，肯尼亚航空公司运营的一架波音 737 飞机在布琼布拉机场附近着陆和起飞时，其全球导航卫星系统信号中断，触发了应急程序(见附件 46)。这促使布隆迪政府请求国际民用航空组织调查自 2025 年 10 月以来记录的多次导航系统干扰事件(见附件 47)。情报和军事消息来源确定，干扰来自刚果民主共和国领土，在桑盖周围，卢旺达国防军部署在那里。2026 年 3 月 17 日，专家组还记录了布琼布拉机场全球导航卫星系统受到干扰的情况(见附件 48)。

160. 2026 年 3 月 16 日，荷兰皇家航空公司运营的一架从阿姆斯特丹飞往基加利的空客 A330 飞机在戈马上空遭受干扰。航班跟踪数据显示，飞机报告的高度和速度存在异常和不一致，表明信号干扰持续存在(见附件 49)。

无人驾驶航空器/无人机操作

161. 在刚果民主共和国东部，无人驾驶航空器的使用在地理范围和行动深度上都有增加，目标是敌军、指挥机构中的高价值人员和战略基础设施。无人侦察机、武装无人驾驶航空器和巡飞弹的结合使用揭示了作战使用的日益复杂性，能够对位于直接接触线以外的目标进行精确或半精确打击。此类复杂系统的激增意味着外部技术或行动援助。

刚果民主共和国武装部队

162. 从 2025 年 10 月中旬开始，刚果民主共和国武装部队加强了对北基伍省和南基伍省敌军的无人机行动。它使用武装无人平台，包括 CH-4/CH-4 B 型和 TAI ANKA 无人机，¹⁹³ 并雇佣外国私营军事承包商来操作这些无人机(见 S/2024/432，第 35 段)。

163. 刚果民主共和国武装部队的几次无人机行动影响了民用物体和民众。在马西西县，2025 年 10 月下旬对肖阿山和尼亚比昂多山的袭击造成至少 3 名平民死

¹⁹² 联合国；军方、情报及安全部门消息来源。

¹⁹³ 同上。

亡，并造成流离失所。2026 年 1 月 2 日，一架无人机袭击了马西西中心，损坏了民用和行政建筑以及国际人道主义组织“战争儿童”的分基地，造成至少 7 人死亡。¹⁹⁴

164. 米内姆布韦上高原频繁的空袭使穆伦格人居住的地区面临更大的附带损害风险，并引发了蓄意袭击目标的指控，但专家组没有证实这一指控(见第 80-82 段)。

165. 刚果民主共和国武装部队的无人机行动还针对刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”领导层。2026 年 1 月 14 日，一架无人机袭击了乌维拉卡伦区的“蓝猫”酒吧餐厅，当时刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军高级军官正在开会，袭击造成重大伤亡。2026 年 2 月 24 日，刚果民主共和国武装部队无人机对鲁巴亚发动袭击，炸死了受制裁的刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”军事发言人威利·恩戈马“中校”(CDi.044)。¹⁹⁵ 2026 年 3 月 7 日，穆沙基发生袭击，目标是与刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”高级指挥官有关联的一栋房屋。¹⁹⁶

刚果河联盟/3 月 23 日运动和卢旺达国防军

166. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”使用无人驾驶航空器、巡飞弹和神风无人机。2026 年 1 月 31 日夜间至 2 月 1 日凌晨，以及 2026 年 2 月 5 日和 2026 年 3 月 1 日，基桑加尼的班戈卡机场遭到三波不同的神风无人机袭击，影响到控制塔、跑道和刚果民主共和国武装部队操作的无人机基础设施附近的地区。2026 年 2 月 2 日，刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”宣称对此次袭击负责(见附件 50)。

167. 2026 年 3 月 10 日，刚果民主共和国武装部队分子在南基伍省米肯盖击落了两架神风无人机。第二天，另一架神风无人机袭击了同一地区的刚果民主共和国武装部队阵地。¹⁹⁷

168. 4 月 1 日至 14 日期间，卢旺达国防军和刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”对上高原的刚果民主共和国武装部队阵地进行了至少 9 次无人机袭击。刚果民主共和国武装部队和情报机构消息来源表示，至少两次袭击是由来自卢旺达的 Bayraktar TB2 型固定翼无人机发动的(见 S/2025/446，第 52 段)。其余袭击涉及神风无人机(见附件 50)。

169. 专家组证实，在上高原和刚果民主共和国武装部队阵地附近击落的神风无人机与袭击基桑加尼时使用的无人机类型相同。专家组评估认为，这些系统显示出相同的设计和制造特征，不符合商用品牌无人机制造(见附件 48)。

170. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”和卢旺达国防军使用 TB2 型或神风无人机对刚果民主共和国武装部队的固定防御阵地进行了战略性攻击，以在地面行动之前

¹⁹⁴ 联合国、人道主义、军方、民间社会、情报机构、外交消息来源。

¹⁹⁵ 军方和情报机构消息来源、联合国、研究人员。

¹⁹⁶ 军方、情报机构和外交消息来源。

¹⁹⁷ 军方、情报机构和民间社会消息来源。

或期间扰乱指挥和控制，削弱刚果民主共和国武装部队的能力(见附件 50)。2026 年 4 月 1 日，一架被确认为 Bayraktar TB2 型的卢旺达国防军无人机(见 S/2025/446，第 52 段和附件 28)袭击了刚果民主共和国武装部队在上高原(南基伍省)米肯盖和泽罗角的阵地。¹⁹⁸

戈马的无人机袭击

171. 2026 年 3 月 11 日，据报道，戈马 Himbi 社区的一处住宅区附近连续发生两起爆炸。第二次爆炸波及一个住宅区，导致一名联合国儿童基金会(儿基会)工作人员死亡。袭击发生后不久，“3·23 运动”军事人员就部署到现场，并清除了所有弹道残余物(见附件 51)。¹⁹⁹

172. 至少一架无人驾驶航空器的声音信号在爆炸前被探测到，表明存在空中投送机制。²⁰⁰ 房屋的损坏与爆炸碎片事件一致，表明使用了高爆炸力的有效载荷。刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”将此次袭击归咎于刚果民主共和国武装部队，而刚果当局则宣布展开调查。²⁰¹ 专家组对这一事件的调查仍在继续。

飞机识别和追踪

173. 专家组确认了 2025 年 3 月 27 日在瓦利卡莱的基戈马机场被刚果民主共和国武装部队空袭摧毁的飞机，当时该机场在刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”控制之下(见 S/2025/446，第 38 段和附件 22)。该飞机是一架 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan，²⁰² 由设在乌干达恩德培的海洋高地航空培训中心运营。²⁰³ 在袭击前，该飞机于 2025 年 3 月 21 日至 27 日在恩德培和基戈马之间进行了三次后勤轮换，²⁰⁴ 运送军用物资。专家组已向海洋高地航空培训中心提出问询，正在等待其答复。

五. 伊图里省

A. 武装团体动态

174. 尽管 2025 年 6 月缔结了第二个阿鲁和平协定，但伊图里省的暴力事件仍在继续(见 S/2023/990，第 72-75 段)。除人民革命公约/人民革命力量外，所有主要

¹⁹⁸ 军方和情报机构、刚果民主共和国武装部队消息来源。

¹⁹⁹ 军方、情报机构和外交消息来源；联合国；民间社会；照片和视频证据。

²⁰⁰ 同上。

²⁰¹ 见 <https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2031921694588141646>。

²⁰² 注册号 N5165A。

²⁰³ 军方、情报机构和外交消息来源；民间社会。

²⁰⁴ 军方、警方、情报及安全部门消息来源；联合国；民间社会。

武装团体都参加了该协定。人民革命公约/人民革命力量已成为不安全的主要驱动因素，而刚果发展合作社/保卫刚果人民革命联盟和扎伊尔暴力出现减少。²⁰⁵

1. 刚果发展合作社/保卫刚果人民革命联盟

175. 刚果发展合作社/保卫刚果人民革命联盟仍然活跃在朱古县(见 [S/2025/446](#)，第 127-128 段)。尽管它遵守了多项和平倡议(见 [S/2023/990](#)，第 72-75 段)，但它仍然装备精良，组织严密，巩固了对矿区的控制，并为其战争活动调动资源。²⁰⁶

176. 刚果发展合作社/保卫刚果人民革命联盟内部的紧张局势持续存在(见 [S/2025/446](#)，第 127 段)。自 2025 年 3 月以来，收入纠纷迫使领导层改组，并于 2025 年 9 月将总部从 Kpandroma 迁至瓦伦杜·塔奇区的察拉卡。前发言人巴萨·祖克帕·格尔肖姆成为其主席。刚果发展合作社/保卫刚果人民革命联盟领导层宣布，打算将该武装团体转型为一个政党。²⁰⁷

攻击和行动

177. 刚果发展合作社/保卫刚果人民革命联盟参与的大规模伤亡袭击、对刚果民主共和国武装部队的袭击或与敌对武装团体的冲突均出现减少(见 [S/2025/446](#)，附件 63)。²⁰⁸ 这部分是由于扎伊尔被削弱(见第 180 段)，刚果发展合作社/保卫刚果人民革命联盟与省当局之间的关系出现改善，以及它打算加入国防预备役部队。²⁰⁹

178. 自 2025 年 10 月以来，第一起针对平民的重大袭击于 2026 年 3 月 11 日发生在 Dhendro 居民区，造成 25 人死亡，其中包括 7 名儿童。²¹⁰ 4 月，刚果发展合作社/保卫刚果人民革命联盟分子在朱古 Djadu-Ngura 轴线上的 RN27 号公路上伏击了 12 辆卡车。刚果发展合作社/保卫刚果人民革命联盟领导层告诉专家组，这些事件是未能对其所有成员进行有效指挥和控制的结果。

2. 扎伊尔

179. 自 2025 年 1 月 15 日分阶段复员进程以来(见 [S/2024/432](#)，第 150 段；和 [S/2025/446](#)，第 129 段)，由于在坚持和平进程、与刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”结盟以及加入人民革命公约/人民革命力量等问题上存在不同意见，扎伊尔内部关系紧张(见 [S/2025/446](#)，第 129 段)。

180. 继扎伊尔在马班加附近袭击人道主义车队后，扎伊尔领导人巴拉卡·马基·阿莫斯(同上)于 2025 年 8 月逃到坎帕拉，在那里会见了受制裁的个人托马

²⁰⁵ 同上。

²⁰⁶ 同上。

²⁰⁷ 同上。

²⁰⁸ 见 [S/2025/446](#)，第 127-128 段。

²⁰⁹ 联合国、情报机构、武装团体、民间社会、研究人员。

²¹⁰ 同上。

斯·卢班加·迪伊洛(CDi.007)，以探讨与人民革命公约/人民革命力量的可能联盟。巴拉卡·马基·阿莫斯于 2025 年 11 月 21 日在乌干达死于车祸。他死后，扎伊尔仍然没有领导人，大量扎伊尔战斗人员和指挥官加入了人民革命公约/人民革命力量。²¹¹

181. 2026 年 2 月和 3 月，刚果民主共和国武装部队在马班加发现了两处重要的扎伊尔武器储藏处，包括 AK 型步枪、火箭推进榴弹、迫击炮(60 和 80 毫米)、甚高频通信无线电、简易爆炸装置和数千发弹药。部分物资是通过从刚果民主共和国武装部队库存和区域网络转移获得的。巴拉卡·马基·阿莫斯用黄金购买了一些物资，²¹² 证实了专家组之前的调查结果(见 S/2024/432，第 150-151 段；S/2024/969，第 88 至 89 段)。

3. 人民革命公约/人民革命力量

182. 卢班加先生领导的政治军事运动人民革命公约/人民革命力量自 2025 年 1 月 10 日正式成立以来，一直保持反政府立场(见 S/2025/446，第 130-133 段)，继续主张区域自治。为了与更广泛的区域动态保持一致并避免被孤立，卢班加先生于 2025 年 7 月 16 日公开支持刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”。然而，截至本报告编写时，尚未报告与刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”进行了正式合作(见 S/2024/969，第 83、87 段)。²¹³

183. 人民革命公约/人民革命力量领导层包括来自伊图里省的前军阀、政治人物和社区领导人。大多数人在乌干达流亡，有些人在那里登记为难民。人民革命力量由前刚果民主共和国武装部队上校 Lobho Gokpa Justin 领导(见 S/2025/446，第 130 段)。最近其领导层的一波倒戈削弱了人民革命公约/人民革命力量的内部凝聚力和支持基础(见附件 52)。²¹⁴

184. 2025 年 11 月，人民革命公约/人民革命力量的估计兵力约为 300 名战斗人员。截至本报告编写时，其兵力已增至 1 000 人。人民革命公约/人民革命力量从“G5”社区招募(见 S/2024/969，第 83-87 段)，但大多数战斗人员为赫马族，²¹⁵ 包括前扎伊尔战斗人员(见第 180 段)。人民革命公约/人民革命力量还在伊图里省的境内流离失所者营地和乌干达的难民营招募人员。自 2026 年 1 月起，受到制裁的个人 Innocent Kaina(Cdi.004)与人民革命公约/人民革命力量合作，从乌干达难民营招募，其中包括前“3·23 运动”战斗人员。²¹⁶

²¹¹ 同上。

²¹² 刚果民主共和国武装部队；情报机构、前战斗人员、民间社会、研究人员。

²¹³ 同上。

²¹⁴ 情报机构、前战斗人员、民间社会、研究人员。

²¹⁵ 同上。

²¹⁶ 情报机构、刚果民主共和国武装部队、扎伊尔战斗人员、民间社会。

185. 迄今为止，人民革命公约/人民革命力量未能动员伊图里省其他武装团体和社区的大力支持(见 [S/2025/446](#)，第 130-133 段)。人民革命力量参谋长试图招募伦杜族青年，但收效甚微。²¹⁷

基地和武器库

186. 直到 2025 年 10 月底，人民革命公约/人民革命力量仍然主要局限于尼亚曼巴附近的艾伯特湖岸。随后，它在朱古县建立了三个主要营地，目前总部位于卢班加先生的家乡布勒。²¹⁸

187. 人民革命公约/人民革命力量利用刚果民主共和国、卢旺达、南苏丹和乌干达之间的区域贩运网络采购武器和弹药(见 [S/2024/432](#)，第 150-151 段)。人民革命公约/人民革命力量还没收或挪用刚果民主共和国武装部队的库存(见 [S/2023/431](#)，第 104-112 段)。²¹⁹

188. 一致的证词显示，乌国防军成员向人民革命公约转移了战争物资。2025 年 12 月初，乌国防军分子在 Kasenyi、Chomia、布勒、Jaiba 和法塔基向人民革命公约运送物资，恰逢人民革命公约与刚果民主共和国武装部队之间重新爆发战斗。²²⁰

行动

189. 自 2025 年 8 月以来，人民革命公约/人民革命力量频繁袭击艾伯特湖沿岸的刚果民主共和国武装部队，试图控制朱古县的战略地区。刚果民主共和国武装部队以重型武器和空袭作为回应。战斗造成人员伤亡，其中包括平民。自 2025 年 12 月以来，人民革命公约/人民革命力量与刚果民主共和国武装部队在布勒及其周边地区发生战斗，导致大规模流离失所和对平民的袭击，使安全局势恶化。²²¹

190. 人民革命公约/人民革命力量建立了自愿和强制性的税收制度，为其战争努力调动资源(见附件 53)。

B. 乌干达人民国防军在朱古和马哈吉的部署

191. 乌国防军继续在马哈吉县和朱古县增援，并部署物资，通常未经刚果当局协调或批准。迄今为止，在刚果民主共和国境内部署了 8 500 至 10 000 名乌国防军人员，超过了双边商定的 4 000 人(贝尼县 2 500 人，伊图里 1 500 人)(见

²¹⁷ 前人民革命力量战斗人员、情报机构消息来源、民间社会、研究人员。

²¹⁸ 同上。

²¹⁹ 同上。

²²⁰ 同上。

²²¹ 同上。

S/2025/446, 第 134-140 段)。²²² 2026 年 3 月初, 省当局发布禁令, 禁止乌国防军部队和物资在没有事先通知和检查的情况下进入伊图里(见附件 54)。

192. 乌国防军没有参与刚果民主共和国武装部队针对人民革命公约/人民革命力量的行动, 这强化了有关偏见的指控, 并使乌国防军在朱古和马哈吉部署的意图和相关性受到质疑(见 S/2025/446, 第 134-140 段)。人民革命公约/人民革命力量战斗人员经常在乌国防军营地寻求庇护, 导致乌国防军和刚果民主共和国武装部队之间发生冲突。乌国防军将受伤的人民革命公约战斗人员空运到坎帕拉, 在坎帕拉的卢巴加医院接受治疗。²²³

六. 开采自然资源

A. 伊图里省

遏制武装团体对金矿开采控制的措施

193. 刚果民主共和国武装部队通过 2025 年 8 月中旬发起的行动, 重新建立了对马班加、尼齐和伊加巴里埃黄金产区的国家权力(同上, 第 164 段)。²²⁴ 2025 年 8 月 29 日, 伊图里省省长暂停了伊鲁穆县和朱古县地区的半机械化采矿, 以切断扎伊尔和人民革命公约/人民革命力量的收入来源(见附件 55)。

194. 金矿经营者谴责这一措施的适用不公平。值得注意的是, 在传统上与扎伊尔有联系的地区的活动已经停止, 而在刚果发展合作社/保卫刚果人民革命联盟势力范围内的地点——如洛卓、蒙格瓦卢和科布——继续运作。²²⁵ 采矿经营者和民间社会行为体声称, 这种差异反映了在共同对手人民革命公约/人民革命力量出现后, 刚果发展合作社/保卫刚果人民革命联盟与省当局之间正在出现的合作动态。

195. 矿业部长 2025 年 10 月访问布尼亚后, 省当局开始逐案恢复半机械化作业, 条件是支付未缴税款并书面承诺停止向武装团体付款(见附件 56)。截至 2026 年 3 月, 四家合作社已获准在马班加-尼齐地区重新启动作业。²²⁶

对朱古县黄金业的持续武装干预

196. 尽管刚果民主共和国武装部队最近成功重新夺回控制权, 但武装团体对该省采矿部门的干预和征税仍在继续(见第 193 段)。

²²² 同上。

²²³ 军方、情报机构、人民革命公约消息来源、民间社会。

²²⁴ 省当局、联合国消息来源、民间社会、研究人员。

²²⁵ 联合国、民间社会、采矿部门行为体。

²²⁶ 团结、COMISARA、COMICO 和 Kerove。资料来源: 省矿业服务部门。

197. 刚果发展合作社/保卫刚果人民革命联盟继续每月向半机械化采矿运营商勒索数千美元。²²⁷ 他们向矿工征税，收取保护费，为矿坑提供私人安保，并干预矿工之间的商业纠纷。在蒙格瓦卢的主要金矿开采地点(Blanquette 营、马卡拉和森泽雷)以及科布、Bambu 和 Licei 的开采地点都观察到了此类做法(见附件 57)(见 S/2025/446，第 160-163 段)。

198. 在马班加周边，手工采矿者继续向扎伊尔支付捐款(同前，第 164-165 段)，随后也向人民革命公约/人民革命力量捐款(见第 180 段)。²²⁸ 包括半机械化采矿部门在内的经济行为体继续向人民革命公约/人民革命力量提供自愿和强制捐款(见第 190 段)。²²⁹

朱古县半机械化黄金生产前所未有地激增

199. 尽管半机械化采矿经营者承诺规范其活动并向政府纳税，但大多数生产仍未申报并走私到国外。

200. 在本报告所述期间，朱古县有两个主要的半机械化冲积矿开采中心进行作业。实证数据和地理空间分析的结合使得能够对这些作业的砂金产量进行保守、基于证据的估计，详情如下。

201. 第一个中心位于马班加和尼齐之间的沙里河沿岸。²³⁰ 2024 年 3 月至 2026 年 3 月的最低产量估计为 3 至 8 吨黄金，按 2025 年平均市场价格计算，价值约为 3 亿至 8 亿美元。卫星图像显示，2025 年采矿活动增加约 50%，这意味着大部分生产发生在这一年(见附件 58)。

202. 第二个冲积矿床开采中心位于蒙格瓦卢西北约 25 公里处，沿着耶迪附近的伊图里河支流。自 2025 年初以来，约 12.5 平方公里的区域明显受到冲积矿床开采的干扰。即使按照高度保守的假设，自 2025 年初以来的累计产量估计也已超过两吨黄金(见附件 59)。

203. 此外，伊图里河沿岸和班亚利-基洛乡的半机械化采矿活动增多。2025 年，朱古县活跃的半机械化采矿营地数量比前一年翻了一番，从 55 个增加到 104 个。班亚利-基洛的安全局势相对改善，因此在本报告所述期间有八个生产作业开始进行(见附件 60)。

²²⁷ 同上。

²²⁸ 同上。

²²⁹ 武装团体成员、军事情报机构、民间社会。

²³⁰ 该中心位于受省长颁布的采矿禁令影响的地区内(见第 193 段)。

204. 尽管如此，官方宣布的 2025 年伊图里省黄金出口量仅为 559 公斤。²³¹ 其中，226 公斤来自曼巴萨的半机械化作业，292 公斤由刚果民主共和国黄金贸易公司出口，该公司否认从朱古的合作社采购任何黄金。²³²

205. 半机械化采矿的激增与 2025 年乌干达黄金出口增加 14 吨相关。根据伊图里较高但证据充分的产量估计，可以合理地预计产量将增加 10 至 20 吨。鉴于大量记录在案的从伊图里向乌干达结构性走私黄金的模式(见 S/2025/446，第 166-168 段)，这种相关性值得仔细审查。有关对所报告的乌干达黄金出口来源的分析，请见第 212 段。

氰化物沥滤提取黄金

206. 自 2022 年底以来，在伊图里省，利用氰化物沥滤处理手工采金产生的尾矿已成为一个迅速扩张的行业。²³³ 手工采金通常采用汞基汞齐化的方法，一般只能回收总含金量的 30%至 50%，导致尾矿中残留大量黄金，这些黄金可通过沥滤提取。使用氰化物构成严重的环境和健康风险，并且违反了刚果法律(见附件 61)。

207. 在朱古县，两个最大的氰化物加工设施位于伊加巴里埃以南。²³⁴ 这些设施总共设有 388 个沥滤池，直径在 4 至 7 米之间(见附件 62)。专家组估计，从 2023 年中期到 2026 年 1 月，这两个设施生产了一到两吨黄金。目前的产量估计为每月约 30 至 70 公斤黄金。因此，这些作业是黄金生产的一个重要且持续的来源。有关该方法、其验证和限制的详细信息见附件 63。

208. 这些沥滤作业的主要作业方是手工开采废物经营者合作社。该合作社获得部长令授权，只能进行手工开采活动。法律禁止手工采金中的氰化物沥滤。参与非法氰化物沥滤的其他作业方包括团结合作社的成员(见 S/2025/446，第 164 段)。²³⁵

209. 氰化物沥滤作业正在整个朱古县迅速扩大。在马班加，最近建造了大约 100 个沥滤池，总共的最大产能约为每月 20 至 50 公斤(见附件 64)。同样，在基洛、蒙格瓦卢和普卢托附近也观察到了更原始的装置(见附件 65)。

210. 一些设施在刚果发展合作社/保卫刚果人民革命联盟、扎伊尔和人民革命公约/人民革命力量控制的地区开展作业，或从这些地区采购尾矿，使运营商面临敲诈勒索，并为这些团体创造收入。刚果发展合作社/保卫刚果人民革命联盟指挥官 Samuel “Kadogo” 在班亚利-基洛乡的利比里亚作业点拥有四个氰化物沥滤

²³¹ 秘书处存档的省级采矿统计数据。

²³² 刚果民主共和国黄金贸易公司代表。

²³³ 民间社会、采矿服务部门、采矿部门行为体、卫星图像。

²³⁴ 同上。

²³⁵ 同上。

池。²³⁶ 2025 年 8 月，扎伊尔被赶出马班加、伊加巴里埃和尼齐地区后，他们对这些作业的控制减弱。²³⁷

211. 通过氰化物沥滤生产的黄金绝大多数被走私到国外。氰化物沥滤的生产能力没有反映在官方的省级生产和出口统计数据中。²³⁸

乌干达黄金出口增加

212. 2025 年，乌干达黄金出口量约为 62 吨，价值 64 亿美元，连续第三年创下出口纪录。与 2024 年相比，出口量约增加了 30%。对申报的贸易数据的分析显示，申报的原产国和不言而喻的国内生产之间存在重大不一致(见附件 66)。考虑到朱古县半机械化黄金生产同期增加(见第 199-205 段)以及有记录的向乌干达结构性走私刚果黄金的模式(见 S/2025/446，第 166-168 段)，专家组评估认为，黄金出口激增主要归因于原产于刚果民主共和国的黄金。

B. 北基伍省

鲁巴亚

213. 为了核实自 2024 年 4 月 30 日以来刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”控制的鲁巴亚周围采矿活动增加的指控(见 S/2024/969，第 56 段)，专家组使用 2026 年 3 月的高分辨率卫星图像生成了主要矿区的三维模型(见附件 67)。与一年前观察到的活动相比，采矿活动大幅增加。据评估，产量水平超过 2024 年每月约 120 吨的估计值(见 S/2024/969，第 64 段)。

214. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”继续对参与生产和供应链的所有行为体征税。最重要的收入来自商业化时征收的每公斤税，²³⁹ 特别是钶钽铁矿石 4 美元，锡石 2 美元。刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”对开采和运输的严格控制使其能够对大部分生产征收税款(见附件 68)。

215. 来自鲁巴亚和马西西其他矿区的矿物继续被大规模走私到卢旺达(见 S/2024/969，第 61-65 段；S/2025/446，第 109 至 121 段)。驻基加利的专员和出口商直接从当地交易商那里购买矿物，并安排运输。主要的当地交易商包括 Bazimazika Kabano Bazinga，他也是刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”任命的鲁巴亚手工采矿协调员。²⁴⁰

216. 从鲁巴亚到基加利的矿物运输是通过严格控制的系统进行的，仅使用刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”批准的运输商，这激励运输商遵守既定程序。来自马西

²³⁶ 省矿业服务部门。

²³⁷ 民间社会行为体、矿业服务部门。

²³⁸ 省级矿业统计数据、矿业服务部门、民间社会。见附件 66。

²³⁹ 研究人员、民间社会、交易商。

²⁴⁰ 交易商、民间社会。

西县和卡莱亥县的货物在戈马附近穆班比罗的一个检查站接受检查，以防止走私。Patrice Biraira 负责监督这些运输服务的协调。²⁴¹

217. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”在鲁巴亚和穆班比罗开具每公斤的税务发票，在卢旺达交货后支付。货物在卢旺达交付后，运输商将金额存入刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”省级财务协调员 Patient Haba 持有的股权银行账户，结清给刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”的税款(见附件 69；S/2025/446，附件 16)。

218. 自 2025 年以来，几家新成立的总部设在基加利的出口公司参与从鲁巴亚购买大量钶钽铁矿石。拉尼矿业有限公司通过其主要代理商 Gilbert Kabano 购买了几批货物，直至 2026 年 3 月。²⁴² 公司海关记录显示出口量超过 84 吨。²⁴³ 同期，另一家最近成立的公司 3U Mining Supporters Ltd 也从鲁巴亚购买了钶钽铁矿石。²⁴⁴

219. 经过验证的录音和文件证据证实，Philbert Trading Minerals Ltd.至少在 2025 年 11 月之前从鲁巴亚购买了钶钽铁矿石，²⁴⁵ 2025 年 11 月，国际锡供应链倡议暂停了该公司的计划。²⁴⁶ 唯一所有者 Viateur Sibomana 在 2011 年已被怀疑尽职调查不当。²⁴⁷

220. 另一家设在基加利的出口商 Kanzamin Limited 在本报告所述期间从马西西购买并运送了锡、钽和钨矿物。²⁴⁸ Kanzamin Limited 至少部分由 Dany Nzaramba 拥有，²⁴⁹ 他于 2012 年参与从刚果民主共和国走私锡、钽和钨矿物(见 S/2012/843，第 175 段)。²⁵⁰ 海关记录显示，Kanzamin Limited 在 2025 年全年出口了至少 70 吨钶钽铁矿石。²⁵¹

221. 这些调查结果显示，鲁巴亚的矿产产量在本报告所述期间增加，受刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”严密控制的供应链已整合进卢旺达的锡、钽和钨矿物市场。

²⁴¹ 同上。

²⁴² 秘书处存档的与来自鲁巴亚的货物有关的发票和化验结果、录音和证词。

²⁴³ 秘书处存档的海关记录。

²⁴⁴ 秘书处存档的机密文件和录音。

²⁴⁵ 同上。

²⁴⁶ 国际锡供应链倡议。

²⁴⁷ 同上。

²⁴⁸ 交易商、民间社会消息来源。

²⁴⁹ 研究人员、行业消息来源。

²⁵⁰ 秘书处存档的机密公司文件。

²⁵¹ 秘书处存档的海关记录。

卢旺达 2025 年出口增长表明锡、钽和钨矿物的非法流动

222. 刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”控制下的北基伍省和南基伍省主要地区的锡、钽和钨矿物生产仍在继续，其中大量物资被转移到卢旺达(见第 215-220 段；S/2025/446，第 109 至 121 段)。²⁵²

223. 卢旺达锡石和钨钽铁矿石出口的增加在时间和数量上与从刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”控制区向卢旺达走私的增加相一致。2025 年，卢旺达锡石出口增长了 58%，从 4 859 吨增加到 7 700 吨。²⁵³ 这一增长略高于南基伍官方记录的 2024 年锡石产量。²⁵⁴ 此外，在刚果河联盟/“3·23 运动”接管后，布卡武的官方国家出口于 2025 年 2 月停止。卢旺达的钨钽铁矿石出口也呈类似但不太明显的上升趋势(见附件 70)。

224. 卢旺达最大的锡石矿商和该国唯一的锡精炼厂(主要从 17 个矿区采矿)加在一起，占 2024 年锡石出口的 60%左右。两家实体都没有报告 2025 年出口量有任何显著增长。²⁵⁵ 这意味着，如果仅通过国内生产来解释所观察到的锡石出口激增，其余较小的卢旺达锡石生产商的产量要增加两倍。卢旺达锡石部门没有报告可以解释这种增长的重大事态发展。

225. 2026 年 4 月 2 日，专家组向卢旺达政府提交了一份请求，要求澄清据报告的锡石和钨钽铁矿石出口增加的来源，并正在等待答复。

七. 答辩权

226. 专家组在 2025 年最后报告中报告称，“埃德蒙·卡塞雷卡持有小额信贷银行 T.I.D 的股份”(见 S/2025/446，第 167 段)。T.I.D 和卡塞雷卡先生寻找机会做出回应。专家组正在审查此事，并将在随后的报告中述及。

八. 建议

227. 专家组提出以下建议：

给安全理事会的建议：

(a) 在延长安理会第 1533(2004)号决议所设委员会的任务期限时，考虑纳入以下规定：

(一) 要求会员国在充分遵守安理会第 2773(2025)号决议的规定之前，提前通知委员会向卢旺达政府供应、销售或转让军火和相关物资的情况(见第 68、71-78、80、83、85、95-101 段)；

²⁵² 民间社会、采矿部门行为体、研究人员。

²⁵³ 见 https://www.bnr.rw/documents/Monthly_Exports_1tRIAvE.xlsx。

²⁵⁴ 秘书处存档的省级采矿当局统计数据。

²⁵⁵ 秘书处存档的通信记录。

- (二) 鼓励会员国在向违反武器禁运的交战方转让先进的军事和两用技术时，加强尽职调查，包括最终用户核查和装运后监测，并酌情向委员会通报在这方面采取的措施(见第 76、153-160、166-170 段)；
- (三) 呼吁卢旺达国防军和刚果民主共和国武装部队根据第 2773(2025)号决议，分别停止与非国家武装团体的一切合作和对这些团体的支持，特别是受制裁的“3·23”运动(CDe.006)和卢民主力量(CDe.005)(见第 7、39、44、48、95-100、131 段)；

给第 1533(2004)号决议所设委员会的建议：

- (b) 提醒会员国确保履行授权的军事或执法职能的非国家或辅助行为体遵守适用的国际人道法和人权法(见第 7-8、48、83、102、114、139-140、143-144、161-162 段)；
- (c) 要求刚果民主共和国、卢旺达和乌干达根据第 2773(2025)号决议第 16 段，说明采取了哪些措施来提高黄金贸易的透明度和可追溯性，包括努力解决申报的出口、进口和国内生产能力、申报的原产地和供应链行为体之间不一致的问题(见第 199、211-212、223 段)；
- (d) 请大湖区问题国际会议秘书处报告区域认证机制和相关工具的执行情况和效力(见第 199、211-212、223 段)。

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Annex 1 (para. 5)**Investigative methodology, particularly in contexts of insecurity and access denial****Méthodologie d'enquête, particulièrement dans des contextes d'insécurité et de refus d'accès**

The Group has operated in complex and often volatile environments, covering extensive areas of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in the course of its investigations. Access to remote or sensitive locations has frequently been constrained by logistical challenges, insecurity, or restrictions imposed by armed groups or official authorities. While such constraints have posed operational challenges, they have not prevented the Group from fulfilling its mandate since its establishment in 2004.

The absence of physical access to areas under the control of AFC/M23 constrained the Group's ability to verify certain specific incidents using standard investigative methods, including the examination of material evidence and on-site observations. Nevertheless, the Group was able to pursue its investigations by applying established methodologies tailored to non-permissive environments.

To mitigate such constraints, the Group has been applying established methodological practices consistent with United Nations sanctions monitoring and reporting in contexts where direct field access is restricted due to insecurity or denial of access by armed groups. In particular, the Group adopted a triangulation-based methodology²⁵⁶ relying on a combination of the following sources and techniques:

- Authenticated documents, photographs, and audio/video recordings.
- In-person interviews with individuals displaced from Goma or other relevant locations after having witnessed the events under investigation.
- Interviews with captured/detained or defected AFC/M23 and RDF elements.
- Remote interviews with victims, witnesses, members of armed groups, including AFC/M23, members of state armed forces, including RDF, trusted key informants, using secure communication platforms and only after rigorous identity verifications when the source was not previously met in person.
- Privileged reliance on primary witnesses and those directly involved or implicated participants in alleged circumstances.
- Triangulation of information across multiple, independent, and credible sources to corroborate facts and assess the reliability of testimony.
- Reliance on trusted and rigorously vetted intermediaries who have worked with the Group in the past.
- Cross-verification of testimonies from multiple independent sources.
- Analysis of satellite imagery, open-source information, and verified multimedia content.
- Use of imagery and third-party verified visual evidence to confirm the presence of military activity, destruction of infrastructure, or civilian impact.

²⁵⁶ [S/2006/997](#), pages 17-32.

- Confidential inputs from protection actors, researchers, and UN entities operating in adjacent or accessible areas.
- Documentation by UN agencies, NGOs, and other verified humanitarian or protection actors, including incident reports.
- Remote data collection, open-source intelligence, and secondary sources.
- Photographs of injuries suffered by victims of atrocities.
- Authentication of origin for all documentary evidence used.
- Credible media and civil society reporting.
- Studies or contemporaneous reports obtained from UN and other credible sources.
- Statements by the alleged sanctions violators.
- Statements published through official government channels or verified social media accounts.
- Verification of circumstantial evidence based on previously documented patterns.
- Analysis of systemic issues based on previously observed behaviors and documented practices.
- Systematic search for extenuating or exculpatory information.
- Conversations conducted in the presence of at least two experts taking notes and verifying relevant documents, photographs, or videos that confirm or contradict key allegations, independently of each other.

Given these limitations on direct documentation in certain geographical areas, the Group prioritized the verification of incidents for which corroboration could be obtained through multiple, independent, and credible sources. Consequently, the Group's findings in this context focused on substantiated patterns and trends of violations, exemplified through verified individual cases. While maintaining a high evidentiary threshold for the confirmation of specific incidents, the Group's inability to access key locations likely resulted in the underreporting of the full extent and severity of violations committed during the reporting period.

The methodology applied is consistent with international standards for documentation of grave violations in armed conflict settings, including guidance from OHCHR,²⁵⁷ the UN Office of Legal Affairs, and relevant jurisprudence from international accountability mechanisms.

²⁵⁷ OHCHR – *Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Guidance and Practice*, 2015;

Annex 2 (para. 7)

Overview of UN-verified Human Rights Violations and Abuses in DRC in 2025 and 2026

Aperçu des violations des droits de l'homme et des exactions constatées par l'ONU en RDC en 2025 et 2026

1. Main Types of Human Rights Violations and Abuses from January to December 2025

From 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025, the UN verified a total of 6,185 violations and abuses across the DRC. The main types of violations and abuses are depicted below:





Chart prepared using data provided by UN source.

2. Main Types of Human Rights Violations and Abuses from January through March 2026

From 1 January 2026 to 31 March 2026, the UN verified a total of 1,462 violations and abuses across the DRC. The main types of violations and abuses are depicted below:



Chart

prepared using data provided by UN source.

Interpretive Note:

- extrajudicial or summary execution is a violation/abuse of the right to life;
- torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are a violation/abuse of the right to physical integrity;
- abduction is counted separately from other violations/abuses;

- sexual violence is counted separately from other violations/abuses;
- since one incident can involve multiple violations/abuses, the number of violations/abuses is not necessarily equal to the number of incidents.

3. Main Perpetrators of Violations and Abuses from January to December 2025

Of the 6,185 violations and abuses that were verified by the UN, non-state armed groups were responsible for 71 per cent, while state actors accounted for 28 per cent. The top 6 perpetrators are indicated below.




Chart prepared using data provided by UN source.

4. Main Perpetrators of Violations and Abuses from January through March 2026

Of the 1,462 violations and abuses that were verified by the UN, non-state armed groups were responsible for 68 per cent, while State actors accounted for 31 per cent. The top 6 perpetrators are indicated below:




Chart prepared using data provided by UN source.

5. Hate Speech

Article 20, paragraph 2 of the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights \(ICCPR\)](#) states that “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” Since limitations on freedom of expression should remain an exception, in 2011 and 2012 the UN Office of the High Commissioner for the Human Rights convened a series of expert workshops to assist States to define the high threshold that must be met to restrict freedom of expression.²⁵⁸ The resulting Rabat Plan of Action contains six criteria establishing a clear line between freedom of expression and incitement to hatred. The Rabat criteria are: (1) the social and political context; (2) status of the speaker; (3) intent to incite the audience against a target group; (4) content and form of the speech; (5) extent of its dissemination; and (6) likelihood of harm, including imminence.²⁵⁹

The Group previously alerted to the danger of hate speech targeting individuals perceived to be affiliated with AFC/M23 or Rwanda ([S/2025/446](#), para. 78). In 2025, the UN documented at least 13 allegations of hate speech directly targeting Rwandophone populations and members of the Banyamulenge community, six of which met the Rabat criteria for incitement to hatred.²⁶⁰

On 27 December 2025, FARDC spokesperson General Sylvain Ekenge made disparaging remarks about Tutsi women on RTNC (the DRC's national television broadcaster), which spread widely on social media.²⁶¹ The DRC government subsequently disavowed the remarks and suspended Ekenge from his functions.²⁶² On 29 December, the RTNC's General Directorate announced the preventive suspension of its interim Director of Television Information, Oscal Mbal Kahji, for allowing such statements to be broadcast.²⁶³

²⁵⁸ [UN Rabat Plan of Action](#).

²⁵⁹ [Rabat criteria](#).

²⁶⁰ UN source.

²⁶¹ [Video](#) on file with the Secretariat.

²⁶² Patrick Muyaya, [X post](#), 29 December 2025. Le Potentiel.cd, [FARDC : le général-major Sylvain Ekenge suspendu pour des propos jugés discriminatoires](#), 29 December 2025.

²⁶³ RNTC.CD, [X post](#), 29 December 2025.

Annex 3 (para. 9)


Security Incidents Affecting Humanitarian Workers

Incidents de sécurité touchant les travailleurs humanitaires²⁶⁴

Overview

Under international humanitarian law (IHL), humanitarian relief personnel and objects used for humanitarian relief operations must be respected and protected in armed conflict situations.²⁶⁵ In 2025 and early 2026, the operating environment for humanitarian workers in the eastern provinces of DRC became increasingly complex due to the escalation of the conflict.²⁶⁶ In 2025, OCHA DRC recorded a total of 626 security incidents affecting humanitarian workers, including thirteen deaths.²⁶⁷ This represented a 46 percent increase from 2024 when OCHA recorded a total of 428 security incidents, including nine deaths.²⁶⁸ In January and February 2026, OCHA recorded a total of 83 incidents, including one death.²⁶⁹ The geographic distribution of security incidents in 2025 and January and February 2026 is described below: the majority of recorded incidents occurred in North Kivu and South Kivu.

Figure 1: Geographic Breakdown of Security Incidents Affecting Humanitarian Workers for 2025



Source: The information in the chart was extracted from the OCHA Overview of incidents against humanitarian workers (Jan - Dec 2025).

²⁶⁴ OCHA groups security incidents into different categories: (a) burglaries, robberies, forced entries/intrusion in humanitarian compounds; (b) intimidation, threats, physical aggression, (c) interference or restriction of movement; and (d) other, including kidnappings and killings.


²⁶⁵ <https://casebook.icrc.org/highlight/humanitarian-action-and-ihl>

²⁶⁶ <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/ingo-forum-drc-strongly-condemns-strike-killed-unicef-aid-worker-gomamarch-2026>

²⁶⁷ <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-eastern-region-overview-incidents-against-humanitarian-workers-jan-dec-2025>

²⁶⁸ <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-overview-incidents-affecting-humanitarian-workers-1st-january-2020-31-december-2024>

²⁶⁹ <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-eastern-region-overview-incidents-against-humanitarian-workers-february-2026>

Figure 2: Geographic Breakdown of Security Incidents Affecting Humanitarian Workers for January and February 2026

Source: The information in the chart was extracted from the OCHA Overview of incidents against humanitarian workers (February 2026).

Drone strikes affecting humanitarian workers in Masisi and Goma

In late 2025 and early 2026, the armed conflict was marked by a rise in aerial warfare, in particular the use of drones. On 2 January 2026, a drone strike hit the office of the INGO War Child in Masisi, killing seven people and injuring 42 and others, mainly women and children (para. 163).²⁷⁰ On 11 March 2026, a drone strike hit a private residence in Goma, killing a female UNICEF staff (paras. 171-172).²⁷¹ The Group is continuing to investigate these incidents.

The Group notes that the use of drones by parties to the conflict must comply with the IHL principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution.²⁷²

- **Distinction:** parties must do everything feasible to verify that the targets to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects²⁷³ and are not subject to special protection (e.g. humanitarian relief personnel and objects used for humanitarian relief operations);²⁷⁴
- **Proportionality:** parties must ensure that the harm to civilians and civilian objects is not disproportionate to the military advantage the parties seek to achieve from the means and methods of warfare used;²⁷⁵ and
- **Precaution:** parties must take all feasible precautions with a view to avoiding and in any event minimizing harm to civilians and civilian objects.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁰ <https://www.warchild.org.uk/news/war-child-strongly-condemns-attack-its-office-masisi-eastern-drc>.
<https://www.sosmediasburundi.org/en/2026/01/04/north-kivu-at-least-7-civilians-killed-and-more-than-40-wounded-in-a-drone-strike-in-masisi-centre/>.

²⁷¹ <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/statement-unicef-killing-staff-member-democratic-republic-congo>

²⁷² <https://www.icrc.org/en/article/faq-international-humanitarian-law-drones-armed-conflict>

²⁷³ <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule7>

²⁷⁴ <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule31>; <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule32>

²⁷⁵ <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule14>

²⁷⁶ <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule15>

The Group further notes that pursuant to Resolution 2293 (2016), paragraph 7(e), sanctions can be imposed on individuals or entities for planning, directing, or committing acts that constitute human rights violations or abuses or violations of IHL.

Ambush of humanitarian convoy in Ituri Province

The Group documented that prior to the November 2025 death of Zaïre leader Baraka Maki Amos (para.180), he was involved in a July 2025 attack on humanitarian workers in Ituri. The humanitarians were travelling in a vehicle from Beni to Bunia to distribute humanitarian assistance when they were attacked in Mabanga, an area under the control of Baraka. All the humanitarian workers were killed, their vehicle destroyed, and USD 1.2 million stolen. Sources with knowledge of the matter informed the Group that the stolen money was shared among armed actors including Zaïre and CRP commanders. Sanctioned individual Thomas Lubanga (CDi.007), leader of the CRP, received USD 300,000. Following Baraka's death, his family decided to reimburse USD 900,000 to the humanitarian organisation.²⁷⁷

The Group notes that pursuant to Resolution 2293 (2016), paragraph 7(f), sanctions can be imposed on individuals or entities for obstructing the access to or the distribution of humanitarian assistance.

²⁷⁷ Intelligence, civil society, researchers, and armed groups sources.

Annex 4 (para. 11)**Conflict Related Sexual Violence in DRC****Violences sexuelles liées au conflit en RDC***Background*

1. Resolution [2293 \(2016\)](#), paragraph 7(e) provides that sanctions can be imposed on individuals or entities engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the DRC, including rape or other sexual violence. A related provision is paragraph 7(f), which provides that sanctions can be imposed for obstructing the access to or the distribution of humanitarian assistance.
2. Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) is a sub-set of sexual violence. The UN defines CRSV as rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage, and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls and boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict, e.g., through the profile of the perpetrator or the profile of the victim. It includes trafficking in persons for the purpose of sexual violence and/or exploitation, when committed in situations of armed conflict.²⁷⁸ CRSV occurs in many conflict settings.²⁷⁹
3. CRSV is a violation of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and Congolese domestic law.²⁸⁰
4. A common misconception is that there are many false claims of rape and other sexual violence. Research has shown that false claims are rare.²⁸¹ For diverse reasons – shame and stigma, fear of retaliation and lack of protection, fear of abandonment by one’s family or community, lack of trust in the legal system – victims may not wish to report incidents to state authorities for accountability purposes.²⁸² They may however report incidents to care providers to obtain medical and related assistance.
5. Care providers typically do not require perpetrator data, but they may document if the perpetrator was armed.²⁸³ This underscores the importance of data gathered by care providers when assessing the scale of sexual violence in a geographic area. It is acknowledged that in conflict settings, some individuals may make false claims to receive humanitarian assistance and therefore data gathered by care providers also has its limitations.²⁸⁴ Nonetheless, it is generally agreed by experts who are working in the field that the main challenge in DRC is not false reporting.²⁸⁵ It is underreporting.²⁸⁶

²⁷⁸ [UN Secretary General Report on CRSV](#), July 2025, para. 3.

²⁷⁹ [UN Secretary General Report on CRSV](#), paras. 19 – 71.

²⁸⁰ [International humanitarian law and policy on sexual violence](#). United Kingdom All-Party Parliamentary on International Law, Justice and Accountability and the International Bar Association Human Rights Institute, [Ad-Hoc Parliamentary Inquiry into the Responses to CRSV in the DRC](#), June 2025, pp. 39-42.

²⁸¹ Lisak, D., Gardinier, L., Nicksa, S. C., & Cote, A. M. (2010). [False allegations of sexual assault: An analysis of ten years of reported cases](#). *Violence Against Women*. *Violence against Women*, 16(12), 1318–1334. Government of Canada, [Sexual Misconduct Myths and Facts](#).

²⁸² [UN Secretary General Report on CRSV](#), para. 25. [Ad-Hoc Parliamentary Inquiry into the Responses to CRSV in the DRC](#), pp. 16, 19, 37.

²⁸³ Confidential sources.

²⁸⁴ Paltermo T., Peterman A. (2011) [Undercounting, Overcounting and Flawed Estimates in Conflict](#), *Bulletin of World Health Organization*. 89(12), 924–925.

²⁸⁵ Confidential sources.

²⁸⁶ [DRC: Silence, a slow killer](#), August 2025.

2025 Marked by a Rising Level of CRSV in DRC

Documentation by Humanitarian actors

6. One humanitarian actor reported that between January and June 2025, nearly 28,000 victims of sexual violence sought care at facilities they supported in eastern DRC, noting that 75 percent of these attacks were committed by armed individuals.²⁸⁷ A second humanitarian actor recorded 90,000 cases of sexual violence nationwide between January and September 2025.²⁸⁸ The same actor noted that cases of CRSV under their response had increased by more than 35 percent compared to 2024, with some health zones reporting increases of up to 50 percent.²⁸⁹ During the same period, a third humanitarian actor logged 35,000 cases of sexual violence against children nationwide and observed that in the eastern provinces, CRSV had risen steadily since 2022.²⁹⁰ Taken together, these reports from multiple humanitarian actors indicate that sexual violence remained pervasive in DRC and in 2025, CRSV in eastern DRC intensified compared to previous years.

Investigations by the Group of Experts on DRC

1. The Group has verified a sharp escalation of cases of CRSV in South Kivu in areas under the control of the DRC Government and affiliated Wazalendo armed groups (S/2025/858, para. 82, annex 38). The Group also received information about but was not able to investigate new cases of CRSV in Ituri and North Kivu, in particular sexual slavery and forced pregnancy by ADF-ISCAP elements leading to the birth of children (S/2023/990, para. 21, annex 12).²⁹¹
2. The ongoing challenges experienced by the Group to investigate CRSV are outlined in previous reports (S/2024/432, para. 91, annex 60; S/2025/446, para. 150; annex 66; S/2025/858, paras. 2, 3).

UN Verified Information

3. Between January and December 2025, the UN in DRC verified at least 887 cases of CRSV affecting a total of 1,534 victims in conflict-affected provinces in eastern DRC. This represented an increase of 59 per cent in comparison to 2024 when 364 cases were verified. Among the victims were 854 women, 672 girls, four men, and four boys. North Kivu was the most affected province with 676 victims, followed by South Kivu with 537 victims and Ituri with 300 victims. The UN identified that DRC armed groups were responsible for cases affecting 75 per cent of CRSV victims. M23 ranked first followed by CODECO, Wazalendo and Mai-Mai factions. State agents were responsible for cases affecting 19 per cent of CRSV victims. FARDC soldiers ranked first followed by the PNC. Foreign armed forces – the UPDF and the FNDB – as well as foreign armed groups – RED-Tabara – were also responsible for CRSV cases.²⁹²
4. In January 2026, the UN in DRC verified at least 46 cases of CRSV affecting 61 victims in conflict-affected provinces in eastern DRC. This figure represented a 59 per cent decrease compared to December 2025. Among the victims were 39 women, 21 girls and one man. North Kivu was the most affected province with 33 victims (22 women and 11 girls), followed by South Kivu with 22 victims (13 women and nine girls) and Ituri with six victims (four women, one girl and one man). Individual rape (20 incidents) and gang rape (12 incidents) were the most

²⁸⁷ Statement to UN Security Council. 12 December 2025.

²⁸⁸ Advocacy Note: Securing Life-Saving Sexual and Reproductive Health (SRH) Services for Women and Girls in the DRC.13 March 2026.

²⁸⁹ Statement on the Situation for Women and Girls in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 21 October 2025.

²⁹⁰ The Hidden Scars of Conflict and Silence, 30 December 2025. See also UN Secretary General Report on CRSV, para. 15.

²⁹¹ Confidential sources.

²⁹² UN source. Information on file with the Secretariat.

frequent types of sexual violence. Armed groups continued to bear the main responsibility for CRSV and were responsible for cases affecting 52 per cent of victims. M23 committed most cases with 21 victims (13 women and eight girls), followed by the Nyatura with four victims (two women and two girls), the Raïa Mutomboki with three victims (two women and one girl), and the ADF with two victims, (both women). State agents were responsible for 46 percent of the cases. FARDC soldiers ranked first followed by the PNC and one official from Ministry of Mines and Energy.²⁹³

²⁹³ UN source. Information on file with the Secretariat.

Annex 5 (para. 11)

Obstruction by AFC/M23 of Access to and Distribution of Humanitarian Assistance to Victims of Sexual Violence in North Kivu**Entraves mises en place par l'AFC/M23 à l'accès et à la distribution de l'aide humanitaire aux victimes de violences sexuelles dans le Nord-Kivu***Obstruction of access to and distribution of humanitarian assistance to victims of sexual violence in North Kivu*

1. During the reporting period, the Group received information regarding the attempt by AFC/M23 to exert increased control over humanitarian actors operating in North Kivu (S/2025/858, annex 39), including in relation to the collection, management, and publication of data on sexual violence, with the risk of reducing access to and distribution of humanitarian assistance to victims of sexual violence in North Kivu.
2. Sources indicated that the AFC/M23 reacted negatively to the publication in 2025 by humanitarian actors of data on the level of sexual violence in eastern DRC, viewing the publication of such data as damaging to their reputation and not reflective of their commitment to address CRSV by prevention and punishment measures.²⁹⁴
3. The Group reviewed a document dated 11 February 2026 that the AFC/M23 distributed to multiple humanitarian actors involved in the provision of health care, including governmental and non-governmental organisations and international organisations. Entitled "Note Explicative," the document described institutional failures within the management of the AFC/M23-run North Kivu Provincial Health Department (Direction Provinciale de la Santé or DPS). It detailed alleged irregularities and infractions committed by civil servants within the provincial health system, singling them out by name. It also canvassed a range of broader systemic issues.²⁹⁵
4. Among other things, the note expressed concern regarding the DPS management of sensitive health data, particularly concerning sexual violence. It explicitly referenced data collected and published by two humanitarian actors, asserting that such external data should have been collected, analysed, and validated by the DPS to fulfill its role as the guarantor of reliable and transparent health information. The note recommended strengthening the role of DPS in validating and analysing sexual violence data to ensure the dignity of victims and the effectiveness of interventions.²⁹⁶
5. Following the distribution of this note, the AFC/M23-run Provincial Health Inspection Department (Inspection Provinciale de la Santé or IPS) initiated a series of inspections of the premises of humanitarian actors. IPS inspectors requested aggregate data on sexual violence incidents and access to confidential patient files containing names of victims and other personal information. They also requested access to consumption records for supplies such as PEP kits and dignity kits.²⁹⁷ While humanitarian actors had implemented measures to safeguard confidential patient data, these efforts were not entirely successful. In some instances, IPS inspectors indicated they would go into communities to cross-check information directly with victims. Some humanitarian actors were ordered to cease the distribution of dignity kits to curb the number of what they alleged to be "fake" victims seeking humanitarian assistance.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁴ Confidential sources.

²⁹⁵ Note Explicative. Document on file with the Secretariat.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ A PEP (post-exposure prophylaxis) kit is an emergency medical response given to a person who has been exposed to HIV to prevent possible HIV infection. A dignity kit consists of basic items that women and girls need to protect themselves and maintain hygiene. The contents are not standardized but generally include items like bath soap, underwear, sanitary napkins, detergent, toothbrush, toothpaste, and a flashlight. Some kits include a piece of cloth that can be used to cover oneself.

²⁹⁸ Confidential sources.

6. A joint meeting was held in late March 2026 between humanitarian actors and AFC/M23 at which the issue of sexual violence data was discussed. AFC/M23 officials present at the meeting included Colonel John Imani Nzenze, AFC/M23 Director of Intelligence and the AFC/M23 liaison with humanitarian actors, and Ms. Chantal Kayitaba Murekatete (S/2025/858, annex 39), Special Adviser on Gender, Family and Children, Education, and Social and Humanitarian Affairs. At the meeting, the AFC/M23 reprimanded humanitarian actors and accused them of inventing data. It affirmed that AFC/M23 did not tolerate sexual violence and criticised the lack of perpetrator data in patient files as this made it more difficult for it to punish perpetrators. Further meetings between the AFC/M23 and humanitarian actors were held in late March and April 2026, resulting in an agreement that only aggregate data on sexual violence would be shared in the future. The AFC/M23 expressed its intention to implement measures to increase oversight of the activities of humanitarian actors, but not to impede access to or provision of humanitarian assistance to victims.²⁹⁹
7. At the time of writing, discussions between the AFC/M23 and humanitarian actors about new modalities for engagement on sexual violence were ongoing.³⁰⁰
8. The Group notes that actions by AFC/M23 may have the effect of deterring victims of sexual violence from accessing humanitarian assistance and impede the ability of humanitarian actors to distribute assistance them. It may also reduce the number of recorded and published data on cases of sexual violence in eastern DRC in 2026.
9. Broader discussions on humanitarian assistance through the Doha peace process on the Protocol on Humanitarian Access and Judicial Protection were also ongoing (para. 52).³⁰¹

²⁹⁹ Confidential sources.

³⁰⁰ Confidential sources.

³⁰¹ [Joint Statement on Progress Between the Representatives of Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and of the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement \(AFC/M23\)](#), 19 April 2026.

Annex 6 (para. 14)**ADF/ISCAP as one of the most lethal affiliates of the Islamic State / Da'esh worldwide****ADF/ISCAP comme l'un des affiliés les plus meurtriers de l'État islamique / Daech à l'échelle mondiale.**

Da'esh ranked ADF/ISCAP as its second most violent affiliate, only surpassed by Somalia in the total claimed death toll in 2025.

On 3 January 2026, Da'esh-managed '*Amaq News Agency* published an Arabic-language infographic presenting aggregated figures for attacks, reported casualties and material losses over the preceding year. According to the infographic, a total of 1,218 operations were claimed across all affiliates, with Nigeria accounting for 368 operations, followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (221) and Somalia (176). Reported killed and wounded totalled 5,745, the majority attributed to Somalia (1,734), followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1,216), and Nigeria (1,121).³⁰²

These figures reflect Da'esh claims and were not independently verified by the Group.

³⁰² Site Intelligence Group website, consulted by the Group

Annex 7 (para. 14)

ADF camps - structure, function and locations

Camps de l'ADF – structure, fonction et localisation

1. ADF's structured deployment model (S/2024/969, paras. 9, 15-17, 23, and annex 2, and S/2025/446, para. 123) was organized around a tiered system of fixed positions, mobile units, and designated regrouping sites referred to internally as "RAV" (supply rendez-vous points) (paras. 24-29). Fixed positions served as semi-permanent strongholds used for command, logistics storage and training activities, typically established in remote forested areas. Mobile positions consisted of smaller, highly flexible combat units tasked with conducting attacks, reconnaissance and population control operations along key axes. The RAV sites functioned as temporary assembly and fallback locations, enabling dispersed elements to regroup, redistribute resources and re-establish command-and-control links following operations, or in response to military pressure.³⁰³
2. This configuration enhanced ADF's operational resilience, enabling rapid retreat and regrouping of mobile units, and hampering efforts to track and neutralize ADF command. ADF's resilience was also supported by extensive knowledge of the terrain,³⁰⁴ and by access to timely intelligence on adversary movements through local collaborators.
3. ADF continued to exploit remote and forested areas to preserve relative freedom of movement (S/2024/969, annex 2), and over the years has developed proficiency in jungle warfare. ADF continued using commercial reconnaissance drones to detect potential threats against their positions and deployed improvised explosive devices to protect camps from attacks (S/2024/969, annex 5). It has also invested in developing local intelligence networks, equipping chosen collaborators with motorcycles, vehicles, and phones to enhance information collection.³⁰⁵

Fixed ADF camps

4. In response to intensified military pressure from the joint Shujaa operations, ADF leadership implemented a strategy of fragmentation and geographic dispersion. This restructuring resulted in the establishment of two principal camps, located at significant distance from one another, one in Ituri Province and the other in North Kivu Province (S/2024/969, paras. 11, 15-17). One camp operated under the direct control of ADF leader Musa Baluku (CDi.036), while the second was commanded by his deputy, Seka Umaru (S/2024/969, para. 24 and annex 7). These two camps hosted the largest concentrations of dependents within ADF. Both adopted a deliberate low-profile posture, characterized by strategic cooperation with local economic actors and a pattern of non-aggression toward surrounding

³⁰³ UN sources; civil society, local authorities, military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities; humanitarian sources; human rights researchers; interviews with former ADF combatants, survivors of ADF abduction and witnesses.

³⁰⁴ ADF units have been known to return to areas where they had operated in the past.

³⁰⁵ UN sources; civil society, local authorities, military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities; humanitarian sources; human rights researchers; interviews with former ADF combatants, survivors of ADF abduction and witnesses.

civilian populations. This approach was intended to reduce exposure to military targeting, limiting pressure on the camps and decreasing the necessity for frequent relocation.³⁰⁶

5. In late 2024, Musa Baluku's Madina camp – serving as the headquarters of ADF (S/2024/969, paras. 14-15, S/2021/560, annex 3) – had relocated northwards across the Ituri River, establishing positions in the Apakwanga (also referred to as Pakango) forest area in Ituri Province,³⁰⁷ with smaller, “satellite” positions in forested areas around the main camp ensuring its defenses.³⁰⁸ Until February, Musa Baluku's camp was in Mambasa territory, in an area referred to as “Centrale,” situated between the Epulu and Ituri rivers, in an area of the Ituri Rainforest which hosts the Okapi Wildlife Reserve.³⁰⁹ Madina had relocated to “Centrale” in August 2025, following its displacement from the Apakwanga area³¹⁰ in July 2025 as a result of joint FARDC–UPDF operations.³¹¹ At the time of writing, Madina relocated further north as a result of the Shujaa attacks on 23 February 2026 (para. 27).
6. The strength of Musa Baluku's camp was estimated at approximately 1,500 individuals, including combatants who generally made up 20% of the larger camps. The remaining individuals were dependents, including family members of leaders, elderly or wounded fighters, and abductees undergoing indoctrination. The camp also hosted combatants with key technical and strategic functions, including operational planning and the maintenance of communication channels with Da'esh for coordination and the exchange of expertise. Sanctioned individual Mohamed Ali Nkalubo alias Meddie Nkalubo (CDi.042) remained in Baluku's camp, in charge of communication including with Da'esh for propaganda purposes (S/2024/969, annex 1).³¹²
7. The second large fixed camp, under the command of Seka Umaru, relocated to the remote and densely forested areas of the Bapere sector in north-eastern Lubero territory, North Kivu Province,³¹³ following Abwakasi's move to Lubero territory in the second half of 2024 (S/2024/969, para. 17). At the time of reporting, Seka Umaru's camp was located on Mundiale hill, approximately one day's walk-through dense forest from the village of Bilulu, on the right bank of the Lindi River in the Bapere sector.³¹⁴ The size of Seka Umaru's camp was smaller than that of Madina, and similarly included dependents, wounded fighters, abductees undergoing indoctrination, as well as individuals described as Da'esh emissaries assigned to provide training in improvised explosive devices.³¹⁵

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ In Babila Bakwanza chiefdom, approximately 25 kilometers north of Mungamba village. See also S/2024/969, paras. 15-16.

³⁰⁸ Military and intelligence sources, judicial authorities, UN sources, researchers; interviews with former ADF combatants, survivors of ADF abduction and witnesses.

³⁰⁹ Within the Andifele *groupement* of the Walese Karo chiefdom.

³¹⁰ Situated along the Mambasa–Epulu axis.

³¹¹ This new relocation reinforced the previously documented pattern of strategic withdrawal to sparsely inhabited zones with limited or no State security presence. ADF often used diversionary attacks to facilitate the relocation of its larger camps by carrying out violent incidents in other areas, the group draws security forces away, allowing it to withdraw in an organized manner, protect key leaders and assets, and establish new positions with reduced pressure (S/2024/969, para. 17).

³¹² Military and intelligence sources, judicial authorities, UN sources, local authorities, civil society, researchers. See also S/2026/44, para. 29.

³¹³ Including the Mundiale hill area and adjacent localities.

³¹⁴ Military and intelligence sources, judicial authorities, UN sources, researchers, civil society, Wazalendo combatants. The Lindi River forms part of the boundary between North Kivu and Tshopo Province, in the Bafwasende territory.

³¹⁵ Military and intelligence sources, judicial authorities, UN sources, researchers, civil society.

Mobile ADF camps

8. In addition to the two principal fixed camps, ADF deployed mobile units operating independently across North Kivu and Ituri Provinces. Unlike the fixed camps, these mobile units consisted predominantly of combatants (paras. 20 and 22). They performed offensive, defensive and logistical functions and remained in near-constant movement. Their primary role was to conduct attacks at distance from the fixed camps, thereby dispersing security forces and alleviating military pressure on core leadership positions (S/2024/969, annex 2).³¹⁶
9. In Ituri Province, one such mobile unit, led by “Mzee” Meya Sebagala. During the reporting period, the unit operated within a triangular area bordered by Mamove, Idohu and Mungamba villages in Mambasa territory, downstream of Ituri river. Meya’s camp was estimated to comprise approximately 180 combatants, organized in teams of 15 to 25 fighters tasked with operational missions. In addition, the unit comprised around 120 dependents, including women, children, and family members of leaders.³¹⁷ The unit operated in a highly mobile manner, targeting villages, population centers, major road axes and strategic points assessed to be weakly secured by the FARDC. It carried out ambushes and direct attacks, provoked population displacement and compelled security forces to redeploy significant resources to affected areas, thereby reducing pressure on Musa Baluku’s camp in Ituri Province.³¹⁸
10. The mobile camp led by Abwakasi operated in Lubero territory, North Kivu Province, with support from Muhammad Kasibante, alias Difenda or Defender³¹⁹ who relocated from Ituri to Lubero around April-May 2025.³²⁰ Abwakasi’s group operated within a triangular area covering approximately 80 square kilometers of forested terrain, formed by the villages of Bandulu, Minenye and Mayeba in north-eastern Lubero territory.³²¹ This area lies east of Bafwasende territory in Tshopo Province, south of Mambasa territory, west of the city of Butembo, and north-east of Manguredjipa town.³²² The group comprised an estimated 100-150 combatants, organized similarly into teams of 15 to 25 fighters (para. 20) tasked with conducting specific missions. The camp comprised around 80 dependents, primarily women and children.³²³
11. During the reporting period, Abwakasi’s group continued conducting subversive operations in Lubero territory (S/2025/446, para. 124, and S/2024/969, annex 2) both within and beyond areas covered by Operation Shujaa. It carried out mass killings, large-scale looting, destruction of villages and forced displacement of civilians. Abducted civilians were used as porters for looted goods and subsequently subjected to indoctrination; some were retained in the bush, while others were released and at times exploited as sources within populated areas.³²⁴ At the time of writing, Abwakasi was conducting reprisal and diversionary attacks in Mambasa territory (paras. 21-22).

³¹⁶ Ibid.³¹⁷ Military and intelligence sources, judicial authorities, researchers.³¹⁸ Ibid.³¹⁹ Also known as “Chauffeur”.³²⁰ Ibid.³²¹ This area lies at the intersection of Mwenye *groupement* in the Bapere Sector and Manzya *groupement*.³²² Military and intelligence sources, judicial authorities, UN sources, researchers, civil society.³²³ Ibid.³²⁴ Ibid.

12. Other smaller camps led by Tabani and Hadad³²⁵ (S/2024/969, para. 17) operated as mobile units at the peripheries of Lubero territory, with Tabani's group occasionally crossing into Bafwasende territory in Tshopo Province.³²⁶

RAV ("rendez-vous") positions

13. The ADF maintained a network of positions commonly referred to as "RAV" (supply rendez-vous points), which functioned as liaison and logistical points between mobile units operating in the bush and external support networks.³²⁷ These sites were overseen by senior ADF figures and advisers close to Musa Baluku, including Meya, Abwakasi and Difenda.³²⁸
14. RAV positions typically comprised small groups of 15 to 25 fighters tasked with logistical support rather than direct combat. Their functions included the reception of food supplies and ammunition, the transfer of recruits, and meetings with collaborators based in nearby population centers. Fighters assigned to these posts were often young – including minors as young as 12 years of age³²⁹ – but experienced. They often established concealed positions in previously attacked or depopulated villages located near main supply routes, including the RN4 and RN44, as well as secondary agricultural roads and tracks.³³⁰
15. Multiple RAV positions were identified along the Butembo–Manguredjipa axis in North Kivu and along the RN4 between Komanda and Mambasa in Ituri Province. These sites were strategically located near bridges, villages and agricultural zones, facilitating discreet contact with collaborators and supply chains.³³¹
16. According to testimonies of arrested and surrendered ADF combatants as well as former hostages and collaborators, RAV operations typically occurred at dusk, when fighters established contact with suppliers to receive goods while minimizing detection. Security measures included advance positioning, the establishment of observation posts and careful monitoring of approaching contacts, whether on foot or by vehicle, to avoid interception. ADF elements stationed at RAV sites were instructed to avoid confrontation and withdrew if risks are identified. Weapons were used only in self-defense or if ordered by senior leadership.
17. The RAV network constituted a critical logistical and communication link between ADF elements in the bush and external sources of support. These positions facilitated the transfer of essential supplies, recruits, electronic equipment, ammunition and weapons, including materiel procured domestically and from abroad.³³²

³²⁵ Also referred to as Seka Dadi or Adadi, or Sheik Hadad, see S/2024/969, para. 17 and annex 2 (page 35).

³²⁶ Security and intelligence sources, researchers.

³²⁷ UN sources; civil society, local authorities, military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities; humanitarian sources; human rights researchers; interviews with former ADF combatants, survivors of ADF abduction and witnesses.

³²⁸ Military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities; interviews with former ADF combatants, including collaborators and former RAV operatives.

³²⁹ The Group interviewed a former ADF recruit who was assigned to "RAV" duties at the age of 12.

³³⁰ Military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities; interviews with former ADF combatants, including collaborators and former RAV operatives.

³³¹ Military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities.

³³² Ibid.

Annex 8 (para. 18)**Additional information on ADF recruitment****Informations supplémentaires sur le recrutement par l'ADF**

While ADF's leadership remained predominantly composed of Ugandan nationals, the majority of lower-ranking combatants were Congolese nationals, recruited forcibly, most frequently through abduction. As previously documented, foreign nationals were often recruited through false promises of employment ([S/2023/990](#), annex 12), with only a small fraction joining for ideological reasons. Recent arrests in 2025 of one individual from Mozambique, two from Tanzania and three from Burundi revealed continued efforts to recruit foreign fighters, although the number of foreign recruits remained low.³³³

³³³ Military and intelligence sources. See also S/2026/44, para. 31.

Annex 9 (para. 20)

ADF attacks since June 2025

Attaques de l'ADF depuis juin 2025

1. Following the period of relative lull between March and June 2025 (para. 20), during which no mass-casualty incidents were recorded, a marked escalation in both the frequency and intensity of attacks against civilians was observed from July 2025 onwards, exceeding 650 civilian fatalities at the time of reporting.³³⁴ The incidents outlined below represent some of the deadliest attacks recorded. However, they constitute only a small number of the hundreds of attacks carried out in a sustained and systematic manner during this period.

Attacks in Mzee Meya's operational area

2. In Ituri Province, elements led by Mzee Meya carried out an attack on a church in Komanda town on the night of 26 to 27 July 2025, between 21:00 and 23:00 hours. The attackers targeted Christian worshippers gathered at the Anuarite Catholic chapel during a prayer vigil marking the 25th anniversary of the parish, resulting in 41 fatalities, including 25 women and 16 men. Ten civilians were injured, including three girls and seven boys, and four persons were reported abducted. The assailants also looted and set fire to at least nine houses, including the targeted church, and burned two vehicles.³³⁵ On 29 July, the same group of assailants carried out an ambush along the road linking the villages of Akotano and Loya, approximately 15 kilometers south of Komanda, where they robbed and thereafter killed two civilians by slitting their throat.³³⁶
3. Throughout 2025, Meya's group was responsible for the killing of over 230 persons. Its operations led to the displacement of an estimated 9,000 people and the destruction of at least 36 villages and localities.³³⁷

Attacks in Abwakasi's operational area, in Lubero territory

4. In Lubero territory, Abwakasi's group was responsible for the majority of ADF killings.
5. On 15 August 2025 at approximately 05:00 hours, ADF elements carried out an incursion into the village of Mangoli, located approximately 15 kilometers north of Bandulu, Bapere sector, Lubero territory, killing at least 32 civilians using bladed weapons. An undetermined number of persons were abducted. The assailants also looted and set fire to at least 28 houses.³³⁸
6. On the night of 15 to 16 August 2025, between approximately 20:00 and 22:00 hours, ADF elements carried out an incursion into the town of Oicha, in the Mbimbi neighborhood. The attack resulted in the

³³⁴ UN sources; civil society, local authorities, military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities; humanitarian sources; human rights researchers; interviews with former ADF combatants, survivors of ADF abduction and witnesses.

³³⁵ UN sources; civil society, local authorities, military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities; researchers.

³³⁶ Ibid

³³⁷ Ibid. Villages attacked included Katere, Kareso, Mambalenga, Idohu, Ndalya, Oicha, Komanda, Eringeti, Boga, Mbau, Loya and Monge.

³³⁸ UN sources; civil society, local authorities, military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities; researchers.

killing of nine civilians and the injury of two others. The assailants set fire to 19 houses and burned five motorcycles.³³⁹

7. Among the most significant incidents attributed to Abwakasi's elements was the massacre of civilians attending a funeral in Ntuyo village, located approximately 6 kilometers east of Manguredjipa town, in Bapere sector, Lubero territory. The attack was carried out on the night of 8 to 9 September 2025, between approximately 19:00 and 23:00 hours. A total of 71 civilians, including men, women, and children, were killed. At least 36 houses were looted and set on fire, and the village was extensively devastated.³⁴⁰
8. On 15 November 2025, between approximately 19:00 and 23:00 hours, ADF elements carried out an incursion into the village of Byambwe, in Manzya *groupement*, Baswagha chiefdom, Lubero territory, killing 23 civilians, including 13 women and 10 men. Among the victims were women admitted to the maternity ward who were killed inside a Catholic Church-run health center. During the attack, four hospital pavilions housing patients were set on fire. The assailants looted and burned 27 houses, including the medical facility, from which equipment and medicines were taken. Several civilians were abducted and used as porters to transport looted goods.³⁴¹
9. Throughout 2025, the attacks perpetrated under Abwakasi's command led to the killing of over 600 persons, making it the deadliest of all ADF units. The attacks resulted in the displacement of an estimated 25,000 people and the destruction of at least 26 villages and 9 mining sites.³⁴²

New peak of violence in March-April 2026 along the RN4 axis

10. After the lull observed in February-early March, ADF attacks intensified in Mambasa territory in mid-March, culminating in the highest monthly fatality levels recorded in the past six months (over 90 reported deaths). Attacks were predominantly concentrated along the National Route 4 (RN4) corridor.³⁴³
11. On 12 March, ADF attacked Muchacha, a large, semi-industrial mining site (S/2021/560, annex 91)³⁴⁴ located 100 kilometers west from Mambasa town, along the RN4 national road (leading from Mambasa to Kisangani). Da'esh subsequently claimed responsibility for the attack, citing 17 civilians and seven FARDC killed,³⁴⁵ and around 100 individuals kidnapped. Photographs showed burning buildings and vehicles (trucks, excavating machines). A significant amount of weaponry was seized from FARDC (AK-47-type assault rifles, machine gun, RPGs, and ammunition).³⁴⁶ Imagery and video recordings of the unfolding attack at Muchacha showed women and children participating in the attack – some as porters, other children (estimated by the Group to be around 10-12 years of age) carrying weapons.³⁴⁷

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Ibid. See also <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statements/2025-11-22/statement-attributable-the-spokesperson-for-the-secretary-general-adf-attacks-against-civilians-lubero-territory>

³⁴² UN sources; civil society, local authorities, military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities; researchers.

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ The mining site was exploited by Chinese-owned MCC Resources and Kimia Mining.

³⁴⁵ FARDC were present at the site, guarding the concession. See S/2021/560, annex 91.

³⁴⁶ FARDC and intelligence sources, UN, researchers, Da'esh claims consulted by the Group on SITE Intelligence website.

³⁴⁷ Video footage obtained from Congolese security services on file with the Secretariat.

12. On the night of 1–2 April, militants carried out a large-scale attack in Bafwakoia village along the RN4,³⁴⁸ killing dozens of civilians and burning significant portions of the village. Preliminary reports indicate over 40 fatalities,³⁴⁹ but the Group could not yet independently verify the total death toll. The incident caused displacement and temporarily disrupted movement along the corridor. This attack formed part of a broader pattern of repeated, high-impact operations in the same geographic area, suggesting the group's ability to exploit persistent security gaps in rural zones.
13. On 6 April, ADF elements launched an attack south of Mambasa town, marking a notable shift in ADF's area of operations. The attack was initiated shortly after midnight in Arua 2, south of Mambasa town centre, along the Mambasa–Nduye–Mungbere road, triggering panic, looting of shops and pharmacies, before being repelled by FARDC.³⁵⁰ Although the Group has not yet been able to confirm exact casualty figures, the proximity of the incident to Mambasa center marked a significant development, indicating a shift in ADF violence from remote villages toward a significant urban area such as Mambasa, the territorial capital and an administrative and economic hub.
14. The location of the attacks in March-April 2026 represented a geographic extension of the ADF threat toward the borders with Haut-Uele and Tshopo Provinces.

³⁴⁸ Close to Nia-Nia town, near the border with Tshopo Province.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

Annex 10 (para. 24)**Further information on ADF *modus operandi*****Informations supplémentaires sur le mode opératoire de l'ADF**

ADF fighters attacked in small, highly mobile groups, at times comprising as few as three to five individuals, using mostly bladed weapons and sometimes assault rifles. In coordinated attacks, smaller elements were tasked with diversionary actions, while larger teams of approximately eight to ten fighters conducted the main attack.³⁵¹ ADF continued to target small and relatively undefended villages, with reduced likelihood of a rapid military response. Mass killings were followed by looting, kidnappings, and destruction of property.³⁵²

ADF maintained well-established observation positions in areas stretching from Mambasa to Komanda and Mukasila, as well as around Manguredjipa. These positions enabled advanced surveillance and the preparation of carefully planned operations. Opportunistic attacks were uncommon; movements were typically deliberate and intelligence-driven, often aimed at securing specific items such as medicines or supplies.³⁵³

While ADF did not conduct mass-casualty IED attacks during the reporting period, it continued to employ IEDs as traps to secure camp perimeters, deter intruders, and prevent defections.³⁵⁴ Congolese security and judicial sources reported a noticeable increase in the acquisition and movement of electronic components, including batteries, mobile phones, and other related equipment, suspected to be intended for IED fabrication. Most individuals apprehended in connection with these activities were found in possession of such components, with supply chains linked to Uganda and Butembo. The latter served as a key logistical hub for ADF-associated supply and support networks.³⁵⁵

³⁵¹ Military, police, intelligence, and security sources; UN sources, judicial authorities; researchers

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ Military, police, intelligence, and security sources; judicial authorities; researchers.

³⁵⁴ UN source, Congolese intelligence and security sources; judicial authorities; former ADF captives interviewed by the Group; researchers.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

Annex 11 (para. 28)

Provincial Peace Forum on ADF held in Beni from 23 to 25 February 2026

Forum provincial de paix sur les ADF tenu à Beni du 23 au 25 février 2026

Shujaa Operation has been affected by persistent shortcomings, including limited access to timely and reliable tactical intelligence and the deployment of units insufficiently trained in jungle warfare (S/2024/969, para.11). Additional vulnerabilities included the limited infiltration capacity within ADF networks and insufficient availability of surveillance drones. FARDC elements reported that these challenges reflected broader weaknesses in the intelligence system. Gaps in intelligence analysis, inadequate intelligence-sharing and coordination with the UPDF (S/2024/969, para.13), and insufficient resources dedicated to counter-terrorism intelligence constrained the planning and implementation of effective operations.³⁵⁶

The Provincial Peace Forum on the ADF/MTM-ISCAP issue, held in Beni from 23–25 February 2026 under the patronage of President Félix Tshisekedi, aimed to establish a shared understanding of the ADF threat and mobilize coordinated action toward peace and stabilization in North Kivu.³⁵⁷ Convened by the Provincial Governor, Major-General Somo Kakule Evariste, the forum sought to analyze the evolution and impact of ADF activities, assess military and community responses, strengthen cooperation – including cross-border with Uganda – and generate recommendations for an integrated provincial strategy against terrorism and violent extremism.

The forum brought together a broad spectrum of stakeholders, reflecting a whole-of-society approach. Participants included national and provincial political authorities, FARDC and UPDF senior officers, MONUSCO leadership and UN agencies, members of the diplomatic corps, representatives from Ituri and Uganda, security services, local administrators, customary and religious leaders, civil society, private sector actors, youth and women's groups, as well as victims of ADF violence. This inclusive composition facilitated exchanges across security, governance, humanitarian, and community perspectives.

Key findings emphasized a consensus that the ADF constituted a transnational terrorist movement affiliated with the Islamic State, characterized by deception, manipulation, and reliance on civilian environments to conduct attacks. Participants acknowledged ongoing military pressure – particularly joint FARDC-UPDF operations (Shujaa) – as having degraded ADF capabilities, while stressing that the threat remains significant and requires sustained, multidimensional responses. A central conclusion was that collective awareness, community cooperation (notably intelligence-sharing), and trust between state and non-state actors were critical to success.

The forum underscored the need for an integrated approach combining military action with governance reforms, counter-radicalization, justice, victim support, and socio-economic development. It also highlighted risks posed by disinformation, weak local capacities, and cross-border dynamics. Recommendations focused on strengthening early warning systems, enhancing civil-military collaboration, improving regional cooperation, tracking financial flows, supporting deradicalization and reintegration, and developing a Provincial Integrated Action Plan against terrorism. Overall, the forum concluded that only a coordinated, multi-level strategy—linking local, national, and international efforts – can sustainably reduce the ADF threat and restore stability.³⁵⁸

³⁵⁶ Military, intelligence and judicial sources, UN sources, researchers.

³⁵⁷ FARDC sources, UN, civil society sources.

³⁵⁸ Final report on the Forum, on file with the Secretariat.

*ADF-published videos in reaction to the Forum held in Beni*³⁵⁹

In an apparent reaction to the Forum held in Beni, ADF-linked media channels disseminated two videos on 24 February in which members of the group commented directly on the proceedings. The footage showed small groups of ADF elements³⁶⁰ addressing the forum's discussions. Among those identified is Hamuli Banza Suleiman Zakaria, also known as "Bonge La Chuma," (S/2022/967, para. 23), a Congolese national and prominent ADF religious figure (para. 37).

The speakers addressed Congolese authorities, including the Military Governor of North Kivu, rejecting ongoing military operations by the Governments of DRC and Uganda. They framed the conflict in ideological and coercive terms, asserting that the conflict would only end under two conditions: the population's adherence to Islam as the sole religion, or compliance with payments described as "tokens" imposed by ISCAP (ADF). Failing this, they warned of a protracted and indefinite conflict.

One of the videos further referenced the establishment of a "token" system in the Lwemba area, under which, according to ADF, civilians who complied were permitted to continue their daily activities.

The timing of publication on 24 February, discussing reactions to the ADF-focused Forum that was still ongoing at that moment in Beni 23-25 February, further demonstrated ADF's enhanced level of connectivity. It further attested to ADF's deliberate efforts to expand its online presence and amplify its visibility.

³⁵⁹ Videos on file with the Secretariat.

³⁶⁰ Two individuals in the first video and three in the second.

Annex 12 (para. 34)

Da'esh-disseminated ADF propaganda

Propagande de l'ADF diffusée par Daech

Propaganda video aimed at encouraging foreign recruitment

In September 2025, Da'esh disseminated an 18-minute propaganda video attributed to Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) through a Telegram channel.³⁶¹ No comparable propaganda video linked to ISCAP had been published since 2022 (S/2022/967, para.28).

A video entitled “Jihad and Da’wah”, was disseminated online and assessed by the Group to be targeting foreign recruitment, calling on supporters to join the group in the DRC. The video explicitly discouraged the continued use of the name “Allied Democratic Forces” and instead promoted the designation “Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP)”, aiming to reinforce affiliation with Da’esh. It included religious references, prayers and sectarian messaging, and claims regarding the forced conversion of Christian civilians.

The video featured footage of alleged ADF combatants and statements by senior ADF commanders and religious figures. The inclusion of speakers identified as originating from the DRC, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda appears intended to underscore the group’s regional dimension and broaden its appeal to a transnational audience.

The video falsely portrayed ADF as a professional and well-equipped armed force, showing fighters in uniform carrying advanced weapons and displaying Da’esh symbols. This portrayal contrasts with evidence that ADF combatants are poorly equipped, lack standardized uniforms and often only possess rudimentary weapons or no firearms. The footage does not reflect living conditions within ADF camps, which are characterized by severe hardship, including food shortages and limited access to medical care.

The video included a compilation of recent and archival footage depicting combat scenes, executions of captured individuals, including members of UPDF and the FARDC, and images from the burial ceremony in Komanda following the 26 July 2025 massacre by ADF. It contained messages targeting what was described as “Western-influenced” actors and included accusations against international Christian and missionary organizations operating in the region, accompanied by imagery of United Nations insignia and humanitarian vehicles. The segment also referenced military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia, and included a direct threat to Operation Shujaa.

To date, the Group has not identified evidence that the dissemination of the video has resulted increased foreign recruitment or observable operational shift.

³⁶¹ Video on file with the Secretariat.

Annex 13 (para. 37)**Taxation and ADF-issued tokens (“jeton”)****Taxation and jetons émis par ADF**

Since March 2025, ADF progressively expanded its taxation system across multiple localities in Ituri Province. In cases documented by the Group, both tokens marked “Dubius” and “AMANI NAPEO – Delivrance cacao” were collected by ADF elements. Taxation was conducted in villages and agricultural areas, in some instances including local authorities, and was enforced within ADF security zones under threat of displacement or execution.

ADF issued token (“jeton”) marked with the inscription “Dubius”.

Between March and December 2025, ADF elements implemented a standardized taxation system across Mambasa and parts of Irumu territories. This system included the imposition of a USD 10 payment on individuals operating within ADF-controlled or contested areas, including farmers, traders and persons engaged in timber-related activities. In exchange of payment, ADF issued tokens (“jetons”) bearing the inscription “Dubius”, which functioned both as proof of payment and as authorization for movement within ADF-controlled areas.

Corroborated testimonies indicated that collection was conducted directly in villages and agricultural zones, including through engagement with local authorities and on-site distribution of tokens. These practices were enforced within ADF security zones, where civilians were compelled to comply under threat of violence, displacement or execution.

The Group received tokens from various unrelated sources in different locations, indicating the broader geographical distribution of these practices.



Token received from farmers, military intelligence and civil society in Irumu.

Cocoa-related taxation / Taxation liée au cacao

ADF - issued tokens marked with the inscription “AMANI NA UPENDO– Délivrance Cacao”.

The taxation for which these tokens were issued targeted specific economic sectors, particularly cocoa production. The tax consisted of an annual payment of USD 15 imposed on cocoa producers per hectare or per field, referred to as “AMANI NA UPENDO – Délivrance Cacao”. Collection was carried out directly in agricultural fields by groups of 10 to 20 ADF elements.

These practices indicated a shift from episodic looting of agricultural production to the establishment of recurring and organized revenue streams linked to a high-value commodity sector.



Tokens received from farmers and identified by Wazalendos fighters, judicial authorities, and civil society.

Annex 14 (para. 37)**Video footage of Bonge La Chuma promoting adherence to ADF taxation system****Vidéo de Bonge la Chuma promouvant l'adhésion au système de taxation de l'ADF**

Video footage received by the Group in September 2025 depicted a known ADF operative, Bonge la Chuma ([S/2022/967](#), par. 23) stating that individuals were required either to convert to Islam or to pay taxes, and that those who refused would be killed or forced to leave the territories in which ADF operated ([S/2021/560](#) para.29-31).³⁶² Bonge la Chuma was based at ADF's Musa Baluku's headquarters.³⁶³ This messaging indicated that ADF taxation was embedded within a broader coercive framework combining ideological justification with territorial control.



Screenshot from video received from confidential source.

³⁶² Video authenticated by the Group on file with the Secretariat.

³⁶³ Military and intelligence sources, judicial authorities, UN sources, researchers.

Annex 15 (para. 38)**Kidnaping for ransom by ADF****Enlèvements contre rançon par l'ADF**

The Group documented ADF hostage-taking as a source of financing in Irumu (Ituri Province) and Beni (North Kivu Province) territories. According to testimonies, abductees were systematically screened and categorized based on their perceived ability to pay ransom. Those considered able to pay were generally spared, while those unable to pay were executed.

In several documented cases, ADF released hostages prior to launching attacks on villages, as documented in Tchani Tchani and Mamove. During captivity, hostages were used for forced labour while negotiations were ongoing. ADF elements established temporary positions in areas with internet access to facilitate communication with families during ransom negotiations. In some instances, families paid ransom in instalments, using contact details provided by ADF.

Testimonies received by the Group indicated that some payments ranged between USD 4,000 and USD 5,000.

Kidnapping incidents (January–February 2026)

- In early January 2026, in Bwana Sura and Mamove (Irumu territory, Ituri), ADF conducted large-scale incursions resulting in the abduction of dozens of civilians. Some victims who were unable to pay ransom were later found executed.
- On 16 February 2026, 26 hostages abducted in January in Bwana Sura and Mamove were released in Monge, Walesse Vonkutu chefferie (Irumu territory), following ransom payments.
- On 23 January 2026, during an attack in Kazaro (approximately 15 km west of the RN4 axis, Komanda–Luna), ADF abducted several civilians from fields and killed three men. The ADF elements subsequently moved towards Mamove with additional hostages, including a Muslim woman.
- On 17 February 2026, an additional 27 civilians were released after negotiations, with victims confirming to local authorities that ransom payments had been made through their families. Victims reported that ADF initially demanded approximately USD 5,000 per hostage. In most cases, families paid between USD 2,000 and USD 3,000, sometimes in instalments, using contact details provided by ADF. Releases occurred following negotiations.
- On 26 February 2026, in Ofay (capital of Walese Vonkutu chefferie), audio evidence related to the release of 12 civilians indicated that some hostages paid up to USD 4,500. One elderly hostage had been abducted in Tchani-Tchani (Beni territory).

Annex 16 (para. 39)

Update on peace initiatives related to the AFC/M23 crisis

Mise à jour des initiatives de paix liées à la crise de l'AFC/M23

1. Since the drafting of the Group's midterm report, the diplomatic initiatives under the Washington and Doha frameworks have produced formal commitments but recorded limited tangible implementation on the ground (S/2025/858, para.7). The terms of the UN Security Council resolution 2773 (2025) were not implemented. The developments documented by the Group highlighted a persistent pattern in which formal diplomatic commitments were systematically undermined by simultaneous military reorganization or advances on the ground, thereby weakening confidence in negotiated processes and exposing civilian populations to persistent insecurity (S/2025/858, paras. 8-9; 10-11 and S/2025/446, para.13, and Annex 5).
2. Representatives of the DRC Government and AFC/M23 agreed to a ceasefire and signed the Terms of Reference of the Ceasefire Oversight and Monitoring Mechanism in Doha, Qatar, on 14 October 2025 (S/2025/858, para.11). However, military operations, including clashes and drone attacks impacting civilians, military build-up by both sides, as well as troop reinforcements and territorial expansion by AFC/M23 continued.³⁶⁴
3. The operationalization of the ceasefire monitoring through the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region-Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (ICGLR-EJVM+) was delayed (S/2025/858, para.11, and annex 5), and eventually signed in April 2026 (para. 52).
4. The capture of Uvira in December 2025 represented a significant territorial expansion occurring in flagrant breach of the bilateral agreement signed in Washington, intended to halt hostilities.³⁶⁵ This sequence of events also heightened the risk of an open confrontation between Rwanda and Burundi.³⁶⁶

Calls for an inclusive dialogue among DRC actors and the African Union as a potential coordination body

5. Calls increased for an inclusive internal dialogue – parallel to the ongoing diplomatic initiatives – among local actors³⁶⁷ to link up external mediation initiatives to domestic causes of chronic instability. In early January 2026, the calls for internal dialogue gained momentum partly due to the lack of progress in the peace process and the worsening security situation on the ground. Consequently, the President of Angola and the outgoing chair of the African Union, João Lourenço, proposed an internal and inclusive dialogue which sought to provide the framework for social, political, and armed groups to address structural and systemic causes of chronic instability in the DRC.³⁶⁸
6. While several Congolese political parties, civil society organizations and armed movements manifested their willingness to participate in the dialogue, they raised concerns over its credibility, inclusivity, and the Government's commitment to implement subsequent resolutions. In letters sent to President João

³⁶⁴ Political, diplomatic, civil society and intelligence sources.

³⁶⁵ UN, Civil society, intelligence sources, researchers.

³⁶⁶ Ibid.

³⁶⁷ Political actors, civil society, churches, armed groups

³⁶⁸ Political, diplomatic, civil society and intelligence sources.

Lourenço, AFC/M23 (see document “A” below) and the “Sauvons le Congo” movement of former President Joseph Kabila (see document “B” below) requested clarification on the relationship between the proposed initiative and the Doha process, including whether it would constitute a new or parallel process.

Lome meeting 16-17 January 2026

7. On 16 and 17 January 2026, the President of the Council of the Republic of Togo and appointed AU mediator, Faure Gnassingbé, convened a meeting in Lomé. According to the final communiqué issued at the end of the meeting (see document “C” below), the AU mediation stated objective was to reinforce harmonization, cohesion, and coordination among all peace initiatives, to capitalize on existing synergies and to avoid any fragmentation of mediation efforts likely to undermine peace and stability in the eastern region of the DRC. The meeting intended to establish a consolidated architecture articulated around three main organs, including President Faure Gnassingbé as a mediator and coordinator of the overall peace process, a panel of five facilitators, each with areas of responsibility and an independent joint secretariat to provide technical assistance to the panel.
8. The initiative was regarded as essential for the AU as the continental organization to ascertain its leadership in the peace process, providing political support and legitimacy to the various peace initiatives and the implementation of key decisions.³⁶⁹


Luanda initiative and proposed ceasefire, February 2026

9. On 9 February, a meeting in Luanda between presidents Félix Tshisekedi, João Lourenço, Faure Gnassingbé and Olusegun Obasanjo called for a ceasefire in eastern DRC, with the aim of accelerating the implementation of the Doha verification mechanisms and ensure compliance with existing agreements and UN Security Council resolutions. On 11 February, Angola proposed that a ceasefire between the DRC Government and AFC/M23 take effect on 18 February. The GoDRC subsequently accepted the ceasefire framework. However, AFC/M23 rejected the initiative, stating it had not been consulted, and accused the GoDRC of continued military operations and acting in bad faith.³⁷⁰ It also questioned Angola’s mediation role and indicated a preference to prioritize the Doha process.
10. On 18 February, the date when the proposed ceasefire was meant to formally take effect, hostilities were ongoing and even escalated in the following days.
11. These developments further highlighted the limited coordination between the different mediation tracks and their minimal impact, amid persistent mistrust between the parties.

³⁶⁹ Government authorities, Diplomatic and Civil society sources. Also see <https://www.radiookapi.net/2026/02/02/emissions/dialogue-entre-congolais/dialogue-national-felix-tshisekedi-pose-les-conditions>.

³⁷⁰ AFC / M23 Coordinator, Corneille Nangaa, claimed the GoDRC in fact undermined mediation efforts by multiplying parallel diplomatic initiatives. Nangaa further accused the GoDRC of violating its own ceasefire declarations by military offensives, the use of “mercenaries”, and by conducting “indiscriminate bombardments”. See https://x.com/cnangaa/status/2022325018902884491?s=46&t=_n75XfLAiYyaxKQtM7ZzVg.

(A) Reactions by AFC/M23 and “Sauvons le Congo” on the inter-Congolese Dialogue proposed by Angola



3. Nous souhaitons rappeler, avec le plus grand respect, à la haute attention de Votre Excellence que l'Alliance Fleuve Congo / Mouvement du 23 Mars (AFC/M23) demeure pleinement engagée dans la recherche sincère d'une solution pacifique, globale et durable à la crise congolaise.

4. À cet égard, nous tenons à rappeler que notre Organisation a proclamé, de manière volontaire et unilatérale, un cessez-le-feu le 7 mars 2023 à Luanda, dans un esprit de responsabilité et de confiance à l'égard du processus politique alors engagé. Force est toutefois de constater que ce cessez-le-feu n'a jamais été respecté par le Gouvernement de Kinshasa, lequel a fait le choix assumé de privilégier l'option armée, entraînant une succession d'escalades militaires dont il porte l'entière responsabilité.

5. Nonobstant notre attachement constant au respect strict de cet engagement de cessez-le-feu unilatéral, et en dépit des violations répétées commises par les forces gouvernementales et leurs alliés, l'AFC/M23 n'a été contrainte de recourir à des mesures de défense que pour assurer la protection de ses positions et de ses populations, en l'absence de toute autre alternative.

6. Nous tenons à souligner avec clarté que, tant que notre Organisation ne fera pas l'objet d'attaques, l'AFC/M23 continuera de respecter rigoureusement les termes du cessez-le-feu, fidèle à son engagement invariable en faveur d'un règlement politique négocié, fondé sur le dialogue, la bonne foi et la recherche d'une paix véritable.

Excellence, Monsieur le Président,

7. Votre Haute Autorité n'est pas sans savoir que le Gouvernement de la République Démocratique du Congo et l'Alliance Fleuve Congo / Mouvement du 23 Mars (AFC/M23) sont, l'un comme l'autre, pleinement et résolument engagés, depuis le 30 mars 2024, dans un processus de négociation conduit à Doha, sous l'égide de l'État du Qatar, avec la Médiation active de partenaires régionaux et internationaux, notamment les États-Unis d'Amérique, ainsi que de l'Union Africaine, à travers le Médiateur désigné, Son Excellence Monsieur Faure Gnassingbé, Président du Conseil des Ministres de la République du Togo. Ce processus a été engagé dans le but clair et partagé de parvenir à la résolution des causes profondes du conflit par des négociations politiques.

8. Nous tenons respectueusement à rappeler à Votre Excellence que ce processus demeure pleinement en cours et qu'il a, malgré les difficultés inhérentes à toute négociation de cette nature, progressivement et laborieusement abouti à des résultats substantiels, concrets et reconnus. En effet, grâce à la constance, à la persévérance, à la neutralité et au professionnalisme de la Médiation, les parties ont pu avancer de manière significative et conclure cinq instruments majeurs à portée internationale, constituant autant de jalons essentiels du processus de paix, à savoir :

- Le Communiqué conjoint du 24 avril 2025, signé entre l'AFC/M23 et le Gouvernement de la République démocratique du Congo ;
- La Déclaration de principes du 19 juillet 2025 ;



- Le Mécanisme pour la libération des détenus par les parties du 10 septembre 2025 ;
- Le Mécanisme de Surveillance et de Vérification du Cessez-le-feu du 14 octobre 2025 ;
- L'Accord-Cadre de Doha pour un accord de paix global, signé le 15 novembre 2025 entre le Gouvernement de la République démocratique du Congo et l'AFC/M23.

Excellence Monsieur le Président,

9. Les processus de résolution des conflits armés sont, par essence, complexes, exigeants et progressifs. Ils requièrent du temps, de la patience, de la constance et une construction graduelle de la confiance. Dans ce cadre, chaque avancée, même mesurée, constitue un acquis précieux qu'il convient de préserver.

10. À cet égard, les accords conclus à Doha doivent être considérés non comme des étapes secondaires, mais comme des acquis structurants et irréversibles du processus de paix, appelant à être pleinement protégés, consolidés et mis en œuvre.

11. Nous souhaitons également souligner qu'à ce jour, aucune des parties engagées dans le processus de Doha n'a remis en cause ni dénoncé ce cadre de dialogue. Tant le Gouvernement de la République Démocratique du Congo que l'AFC/M23 demeurent formellement et explicitement engagés dans ce processus.

12. Concomitamment, les Médiateurs et Facilitateurs poursuivent, avec constance, responsabilité et détermination, la mobilisation des efforts, des garanties et des mécanismes nécessaires en vue de l'aboutissement d'un accord de paix global, durable et définitif, au service de la stabilité, de la réconciliation nationale et de la paix régionale.

Excellence Monsieur le Président,

13. Tout en exprimant notre très haute considération pour les initiatives récemment évoquées à Luanda, que nous tenons à qualifier de louables dans leur principe, l'Alliance Fleuve Congo / Mouvement du 23 Mars (AFC/M23) se permet, avec le plus grand respect, de soumettre à votre haute appréciation quelques interrogations essentielles, dans le souci de dissiper toute ambiguïté et de préserver la cohérence des efforts de paix en cours.

14. À cet égard, nous souhaiterions être éclairés sur la nature exacte de la démarche envisagée : s'agit-il de l'ouverture d'un nouveau processus de négociations, de la mise en place d'un processus parallèle à celui actuellement conduit à Doha, ou d'une initiative complémentaire appelée à s'inscrire dans la continuité et le renforcement du processus de Doha ?



15. Dans la perspective d'une éventuelle rencontre entre les parties à Luanda, nous souhaiterions également connaître, dans ce cadre précis, le statut qui serait réservé au processus de Doha, ainsi que les modalités envisagées pour son articulation ou son devenir, afin d'éviter toute remise en cause implicite des acquis déjà obtenus.

16. Enfin, nous serions reconnaissants de bien vouloir nous préciser si la Médiation Qatarie est appelée à être associée à cette éventuelle rencontre, et, le cas échéant, à quel titre et dans quel rôle, compte tenu de son implication centrale, constante et déterminante dans le processus en cours.

Excellence Monsieur le Président,

17. Depuis l'ouverture des différents cadres de discussions, nous avons observé avec une attention soutenue une tendance récurrente à la multiplication des initiatives de paix autour d'une même crise. Une telle dynamique, lorsqu'elle n'est pas clairement articulée, est susceptible d'engendrer des chevauchements, des enchevêtrements et parfois des contradictions, au détriment de la clarté, de la cohérence, de la constance et, in fine, de l'efficacité des efforts déployés.

18. De manière plus structurelle, le processus de négociation a souffert, dès ses prémices, d'une instabilité méthodologique et institutionnelle peu propice à la consolidation d'une trajectoire de paix. Engagées initialement à Nairobi, les discussions ont été transférées vers Luanda sans concertation formelle préalable avec la partie Kényane, alors même que le processus était en cours. De façon analogue, alors que les échanges se poursuivaient à Luanda, un nouveau déplacement du cadre de négociations vers Doha est intervenu sans information préalable ni coordination avec les autorités Angolaises. Par ailleurs, parallèlement au processus de Doha, une demande distincte de médiation américaine a été formulée par le Président Félix TSHISEKEDI, introduisant ainsi un canal supplémentaire qui n'a pas été formellement intégré au dispositif existant.

19. La succession de cadres, de médiations et de formats ainsi observée, en l'absence de clarification préalable, d'articulation institutionnelle explicite et de continuité politique clairement assumée, ne saurait réunir les conditions minimales de confiance, de prévisibilité et de crédibilité indispensables à toute négociation de paix sérieuse. Elle tend, au contraire, à fragiliser les mécanismes de médiation, à brouiller les responsabilités, à affaiblir les garanties offertes aux parties et à entretenir une incertitude persistante quant au cadre de référence effectif du dialogue.

20. Dans un tel contexte, aucune négociation, aussi sincère soit-elle, ne peut raisonnablement prétendre aboutir à un accord global et durable. La multiplication de forums non coordonnés, l'absence de cohérence stratégique et la superposition de médiations concurrentes constituent des faiblesses structurelles majeures, incompatibles avec les exigences de stabilité, de confiance mutuelle et de continuité politique que requiert tout processus de paix crédible et soutenable.



AFC/M23 communiqué of 9 January 2026, received from a confidential AFC/M23 source.

(B) Reaction by “Sauvons le Congo”, 14 January 2026:






**Communiqué du Mouvement Sauvons la R.D.C
au sujet du dialogue**

Ayant été consulté à deux reprises, par les hautes autorités de la République d'Angola, à leur initiative, au sujet d'un éventuel dialogue entre congolais, **le Mouvement Sauvons la RDC**, salue l'implication personnelle de **Son Excellence João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço**, Président de la République d'Angola, dans la recherche de la paix en République Démocratique du Congo et réaffirme, pour sa part, son attachement et son engagement au dialogue comme meilleur moyen de règlement des conflits.

Il tient néanmoins à exprimer, ci-après, ses préoccupations et observations en rapport avec cette nouvelle initiative.

1. Le succès de tout dialogue repose d'abord et avant tout sur la sincérité, la bonne foi des parties, ainsi que sur leur constance dans le respect des engagements. Pas sur le nombre de voyages effectués, de capitales visitées ou de médiateurs de haut rang invités à s'impliquer. Le changement sans arrêt de lieux et de médiateurs auquel nous assistons - de Nairobi à Luanda, de Luanda à Doha, de Doha à Luanda, en passant brièvement par Bujumbura, Kampala, Lomé et tant d'autres capitales, consacre l'instabilité de la vision, laisse un goût d'inachevé et semble voulu, beaucoup plus, pour donner le tournis que l'assurance attendue du pouvoir qu'il aurait finalement compris - mieux vaut tard que jamais, le bien-fondé d'une solution politique à la crise. Bien plus, l'instabilité de la parole d'Etat, les ambiguïtés stratégiques, les contradictions quant au choix des options pour la résolution de la crise, l'instrumentalisation des processus politiques, et la manipulation de ceux-ci afin de faire triompher sa cause et non celle du pays, ont fini par enlever toute fiabilité aux discours tenus et engagements pris par le Président Tshisekedi et son régime, à l'intérieur comme à l'extérieur du pays.
2. La volonté politique se prouve par le respect des engagements pris et des accords déjà signés. En l'espèce, il s'agit notamment et principalement de ceux portant sur la libération des prisonniers, la décrispation du climat politique et l'observance du cessez-le-feu souscrits par le Gouvernement. Contrairement à ces accords et engagements, le Gouvernement du Président Tshisekedi continue à arrêter et/ou enlever, contraindre à l'exil des opposants politiques, des généraux et autres officiers, des journalistes, des activistes des droits de l'homme ainsi que tous ceux qui, au nom de la liberté d'opinion qui est constitutionnellement reconnue à tous les citoyens congolais, se permettent d'émettre un son discordant par rapport à celui du pouvoir. De la même manière, toutes les fois que le Président Tshisekedi prend son avion pour, soi-disant, aller à la recherche de la paix, il laisse derrière lui des instructions pour de grands mouvements des troupes, des attaques massives sur des localités densément peuplées, ainsi que des bombardements des civils par des drones et des avions de combat.

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Documents obtained from civil society sources

(C) African union mediation Final communique of the high-level meeting on coherence and consolidation of the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes Region, 16 & 17 January 2026:



MEDIATION DE L'UNION AFRICAINE

COMMUNIQUE FINAL DE LA REUNION DE HAUT NIVEAU SUR LA COHERENCE ET LA CONSOLIDATION DU PROCESSUS DE PAIX EN REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO ET DANS LA REGION DES GRANDS LACS

Lomé, 16 & 17 janvier 2026

1. À l'invitation de **Son Excellence Faure Essozimna GNASSINGBE**, Président du Conseil de la République togolaise et Médiateur de l'Union africaine dans le cadre des efforts pour le règlement du conflit et de la situation sécuritaire à l'Est de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC), une Réunion de Haut niveau s'est tenue le 17 janvier 2026 à Lomé, en République togolaise, sur la cohérence et la consolidation du processus de paix en République démocratique du Congo et dans la région des Grands Lacs.
2. La Réunion de Haut niveau a été présidée par **Son Excellence Faure Essozimna GNASSINGBE**. Ont pris part aux travaux les personnalités suivantes :
 - **Son Excellence Olusegun OBASANJO**, ancien Président de la République fédérale du Nigeria, membre du Panel des Facilitateurs ;
 - **Son Excellence Uhuru KENYATTA**, ancien Président de la République du Kenya, membre du Panel des Facilitateurs ;
 - **Son Excellence Catherine SAMBA-PANZA**, ancienne Présidente de la République centrafricaine, membre du Panel des Facilitateurs ;
 - **Son Excellence Mokgweetsi MASI**, ancien Président de la République du Botswana, membre du Panel des Facilitateurs ;
 - **Son Excellence Sahle-Work ZEWDE**, ancienne Présidente de la République fédérale démocratique d'Éthiopie, membre du Panel des Facilitateurs.
3. Les Ministres des Affaires étrangères et des représentants de la République démocratique du Congo, de la République du Rwanda, de la République d'Angola, de la République du Burundi, de la République d'Ouganda, des États-Unis d'Amérique, de l'État du Qatar, de la République française et de la République togolaise ont également pris part à la Réunion.
4. Le Président de la Commission de l'Union africaine, **Son Excellence Mahmoud Ali Youssouf**, des représentants des Nations Unies, de la Communauté d'Afrique de l'Est (CAE), de la Communauté de développement de l'Afrique australe (SADC), de la Conférence internationale sur la région des Grands Lacs (CIRGL), du Groupe de contact international pour la région des Grands Lacs, ainsi que de nombreux partenaires internationaux et représentants de la société civile ont participé aux travaux.
5. La Réunion de Haut niveau a passé en revue les efforts diplomatiques déployés aux niveaux africain et international au cours des douze (12) derniers mois en vue de rouvrir les espaces de dialogue entre les protagonistes du conflit et d'accélérer la dynamique vers la désescalade et des solutions négociées.
6. Elle a rappelé les conclusions de la réunion tenue par le Médiateur avec le Panel des Facilitateurs le 17 mai 2025 à Lomé, et salué les efforts conjugués de la Médiation conduite par la République togolaise, de la CAE et de la SADC, en faveur du retour à une paix durable à l'Est de la RDC et du renforcement de la stabilité dans la région des Grands Lacs.
7. La Réunion de Haut niveau a salué les efforts diplomatiques des États-Unis d'Amérique ayant permis la signature de la Déclaration de principes de

Washington, du 25 avril 2025, de l'Accord de paix de Washington du 27 juin 2025 et d'un accord du Cadre d'intégration économique régionale du 7 novembre 2025 et des Accords de paix de Washington du 4 décembre 2025 entre la RDC et le Rwanda. Elle a également salué les pourparlers de Doha conduits par l'État du Qatar qui ont conduit à la Déclaration de principes de Doha du 19 juillet 2025, suivie de l'Accord-cadre de Doha pour un accord de paix global assorti de huit Protocoles thématiques, signé le 15 novembre 2025.

8. La Réunion s'est également réjouie de la tenue, le 30 octobre 2025 à Paris, de la Conférence de soutien à la paix et à la prospérité dans la région des Grands Lacs.
9. Le Médiateur a réaffirmé sa disponibilité à travailler de manière concertée avec les États-Unis d'Amérique et l'État du Qatar ainsi que toutes les parties prenantes, dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre des accords signés et de la poursuite des négociations de Doha entre le Gouvernement de la RDC et l'AFC/M23.

I. CONSOLIDATION DE LA COHÉRENCE DES EFFORTS DE MÉDIATION

10. La Réunion de Haut niveau a souligné la nécessité de renforcer l'harmonisation, la cohérence et la coordination de l'ensemble des initiatives de paix, afin de capitaliser sur les synergies existantes et d'éviter toute fragmentation des efforts de médiation au détriment de la paix et de la stabilité à l'Est de la RDC.
11. À cet égard, la Réunion a acté la révision de l'architecture de la Médiation, avec le Secrétariat Conjoint Indépendant en appui technique au Panel des Facilitateurs.
12. La Réunion a réaffirmé le rôle du Panel des Facilitateurs comme mécanisme central d'appui politique à la Médiation, agissant de manière coordonnée, complémentaire et dans le strict respect des mandats confiés par le Médiateur.
13. La Réunion a insisté sur la nécessité d'assurer une harmonisation étroite avec les initiatives internationales, afin de garantir la cohérence des messages, le respect du séquençage politique et l'alignement des appuis extérieurs sur les priorités définies dans le cadre de la Médiation.

II. CONSOLIDATION DU PROCESSUS DE PAIX À L'EST DE LA RDC, TENANT COMPTE DES ÉVOLUTIONS RÉCENTES

14. La Réunion de Haut niveau a invité les Parties à accélérer la mise en œuvre de bonne foi de leurs engagements respectifs et à privilégier des moyens pacifiques dans la gestion et le règlement du conflit.
15. La Réunion a réaffirmé son plein soutien au processus de Doha et exhorté les Parties à une reprise sans délai des pourparlers afin de conclure les négociations sur les six (6) protocoles restants.

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16. Elle a souligné l'importance d'un suivi africain structuré de la mise en œuvre des accords et de l'évolution du processus de paix.

III. DÉCISIONS DE LA RÉUNION DE HAUT NIVEAU

17. Les décisions ci-après ont sanctionné les travaux de la Réunion de Haut niveau :
 - a. L'alignement sur le principe de la centralité de la Médiation conduite par la République togolaise ;
 - b. L'harmonisation de la compréhension et de l'appropriation du processus unifié de médiation à l'échelle africaine ;
 - c. L'alignement des acteurs autour de l'architecture révisée de la Médiation ;
 - d. L'adoption d'un document-cadre de la Médiation, fondé sur l'état des lieux et l'analyse des dynamiques du processus de paix ;
 - e. L'adoption du Plan de travail des Facilitateurs en tant qu'instruments opérationnels guidant l'action coordonnée du Panel ;

IV. DIVERS ET PROCHAINES ÉTAPES

18. Les participants ont exprimé leur profonde appréciation au Gouvernement et au peuple de la République togolaise pour l'accueil chaleureux et les facilités mises à la disposition des délégations, ainsi que pour l'engagement constant du Togo en faveur de la Médiation.
19. Les participants ont réaffirmé leur détermination collective à poursuivre, dans un esprit de cohérence, de coordination et de responsabilité partagée, les efforts engagés afin de consolider durablement le processus de paix et de promouvoir la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité en République démocratique du Congo et dans la région des Grands Lacs.

Fait à Lomé, le 17 janvier 2026

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Annex 17 (para. 42)

The United States Treasury sanctioned RDF and Rwandan Officials, condemning blatant violations of Washington Peace Accords

Le Département du Trésor des États-Unis a sanctionné les RDF et des responsables rwandais, condamnant des violations flagrantes des Accords de paix de Washington

On 2 March 2026, the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) and four senior commanders, citing their direct involvement in destabilizing eastern DRC.³⁷¹

According to the U.S. Treasury, the Rwanda Defence Force was “actively supporting, training, and fighting alongside” M23, including through troop deployments, provision of advanced military equipment, and direct participation in territorial offensives. This included the capture of Uvira—days after the signing of the Washington Peace Accords—a strategic urban centre near the Burundi border, which heightened regional tensions and posed a potential cross-border security risk despite the subsequent withdrawal of RDF and M23 elements.

The Treasury assessed that RDF actions materially enabled M23’s capture of key urban centres and mining areas, and contributed to widespread human rights abuses and mass displacement. It further determined that M23’s offensives would not have been possible without the active support and complicity of the RDF and senior officials. This included the deployment of thousands of RDF troops in eastern DRC, their direct engagement in combat operations, and the introduction of advanced military capabilities, including GPS jamming systems, air defence equipment, and drones. The RDF was also reported to have trained M23 fighters at its military facilities and supported recruitment efforts, including among refugee populations.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control concluded that such conduct constituted material support to a sanctioned armed group and actions threatening the peace, security, and stability of the DRC, in violation of the Washington Peace Accords and broader international de-escalation efforts, and called for the immediate withdrawal of RDF troops, weapons, and equipment from DRC territory.

Accordingly, Vincent Nyakarundi, Chief of Staff of the RDF; Major-General Ruki Karusisi, commander of the RDF 5th Infantry Division and former Special Operations Force Commander; General Mubarakh Muganga, Chief of Defence Staff; and Stanislas Gashugi, Special Operations Force Commander since 15 March 2025, were designated for their leadership roles within the RDF.

³⁷¹ <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0411>

Annex 18 (para. 45)**Commitments made by the Governments of DRC and Rwanda during 17-18 March 2026 meeting in Washington DC****Engagements pris par les gouvernements de la RDC et du Rwanda lors de la réunion des 17 et 18 mars 2026 à Washington DC.**

Representatives of the Governments of the DRC and Rwanda met in Washington DC on 17–18 March 2026, to advance the implementation of the Washington Accords and agree on concrete steps to de-escalate the conflict.³⁷²

According to a Joint Statement on Advancing the Washington Accords issued on 18 March 2026 by the Governments of Rwanda, DRC, and U.S.,³⁷³ both Rwanda and DRC agreed on a set of coordinated measures aimed at de-escalating tensions and advancing progress on the ground, including:

- Mutual commitment to specific measures to support each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- The scheduled disengagement of forces/lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures in designated areas within DRC territory;
- Time-bound and intensified efforts by the DRC to neutralize the FDLR;
- The protection of all civilians.

The Group consulted a copy of the agreement, titled "Initial Steps Plan" (Plan), which referenced a map of North and South Kivu Provinces identifying six areas of interest: five located in North Kivu, and one in South Kivu. These corresponded to areas (Named Area of Interest or "NAI") defined in Operational order (OPORD) (S/2025/858, paras. 8 and 14), broadly overlapping with areas of known FDLR presence.

The Plan agreed upon during the 17-18 March 2026 meeting required both parties to undertake sequential action in the areas identified: RDF and AFC/M23 to withdraw its forces and equipment, and FARDC to subsequently neutralize FDLR, including "through kinetic action against any and all FDLR members present in the designated areas." FARDC operations against the FDLR would thus require the prior withdrawal of RDF elements from the area.

The Plan defined actions and timelines for NAI 1 and 2 (located in North Kivu, specifically around Pinga-Mpeti-Lukweti), and NAI 3 (situated in the Hauts Plateaux of South Kivu, excluding Minembwe).

The Plan also required RDF withdrawal from the Lubero frontline (Alimbongo, Kasegbe and Kayna), even though this area was not marked as a "NAI" on the OPORD map.

The Plan established the following timeline and actions:

- **By 18 March 2026:** Rwanda to ensure the absence of RDF and AFC/M23 personnel and equipment in NAI-2 (Mpeti-Lukweti-Kimoho axis, extending until Mweso);
- **By 23 March 2026:** Rwanda to withdraw all RDF personnel and equipment from Lubero territory (Alimbongo, Kasegbe and Kayna) to Rwandan territory;
- **By 31 March 2026:** The DRC to initiate operations against the FDLR in NAI-1 along the Pinga-Lukweti axis, and to cease any collusion, communication or co-location between FARDC and FDLR elements;
- **By 31 March 2026:** Rwanda to ensure the absence of RDF and AFC/M23 personnel and equipment in NAI-3;

³⁷² Diplomatic, intelligence and governmental sources.

³⁷³ <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/03/joint-statement-by-the-governments-of-the-united-states-of-america-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda-on-advancing-the-washington-accords/>

- **By 31 March 2026:** The DRC to submit to the United States a proposal for operations to neutralize the FDLR and affiliated groups in NAI-3;
- **By 15 April 2026:** The DRC to commence operations to neutralize the FDLR in NAI-2, including through kinetic action, unless it determines the continued presence of RDF or AFC/M23 personnel or equipment in the area;
- **By 15 April 2026:** The Parties to invite the United States to assess the presence of RDF and AFC/M23 elements in NAI-2;
- **In April 2026:** A Joint Oversight Committee (JOC) meeting to be convened in Washington on or before 25 April 2026, with both parties to submit plans regarding Ruzizi no later than seven days prior;
- **In September 2026:** Full implementation of the CONOPS.

The Plan outlined additional commitments, including:

- Rwanda to refrain from conducting drone strikes in DRC territory, and the DRC to refrain from conducting drone strikes in Rwandan territory;
- The DRC to refrain from conducting drone strikes or attacks against RDF personnel and equipment departing the identified zones;
- The DRC to refrain from launching offensive operations against AFC/M23 positions in Lubero;
- The DRC to ensure the absence of collusion, communication or co-location between FARDC and FDLR elements;
- Surrendering FDLR elements to be handed over to MONUSCO;
- The Parties to request a report from MONUSCO on FDLR repatriations between 27 June 2025 and 18 March 2026;
- The Parties to ensure the protection of civilian populations without discrimination across the DRC territory, and to instruct associated forces to do the same.

At the time of drafting, there was only limited implementation of the agreed actions and the timelines were not respected (paras. 46-51).

In Lubero, at the time of reporting, RDF and AFC/M23 still at Alimbongo, i.e. 20 km south of Lubero. Kasegbe and Kayna were not vacated.³⁷⁴ RDF did not withdraw its equipment to Rwanda, as foreseen in the agreement, but rather redeployed them to Rutshuru territory and the Masisi-Walikale axis, including heavy artillery, jamming, spoofing and other air defense capabilities.

While RDF and AFC/M23 withdrew a few kilometers from Mpeti³⁷⁵ and Mindjenje (located within NAI-2, at the border between Walikale and Masisi territories) towards Kalembe (approximately 15 kilometers) but remained within artillery-strike distance from these localities. During the second half of April operations were ongoing to retake these localities.³⁷⁶ Additionally, despite having vacated Mpeti and Mindjenje – which relieved offensive pressure on Pinga – RDF and AFC/M23 still controlled and maintained operations along southern axis leading to Pinga, via Lukweti and Nyabiondo,³⁷⁷ facing FARDC supported by APCLS, FDLR-FOCA, NDC/R, ANCDH and other Wazalendo groups.³⁷⁸

³⁷⁴ Military, diplomatic and intelligence sources, UN sources, civil society, researchers, AFC/M23 elements, Wazalendo combatants.

³⁷⁵ Less than 15 kilometers from Mpeti.

³⁷⁶ Military, diplomatic and intelligence sources, UN sources, civil society, researchers, AFC/M23 elements, Wazalendo combatants.

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

Most of the villages vacated by M23/RDF were occupied by the Wazalendo, FARDC, and Congolese state authorities progressively returned to some of the localities – such as in Kipese, Lubero territory, and Mpeti and Minjenje.³⁷⁹ Clashes continued in and around the vacated areas, and some of the initially vacated areas were subsequently reoccupied by AFC/M23.

RDF and AFC/M23 continued to occupy and control large parts of Masisi and Walikale territories, as well as Rutshuru and Nyiragongo territories and significant portions of South Kivu. At time of drafting, there was no evidence of RDF withdrawals from North and South Kivu to Rwanda.³⁸⁰

On the contrary, new RDF troop and materiel reinforcements with new troops and materiel reinforcements were documented in April passing through Nyangezi-Kamanyola towards Ruzizi Plaine, Lemera in the Moyens Plateaux, and others towards the Hauts Plateaux of Uvira and Mwenga. RDF positioned sophisticated weaponry, including anti-aerial defense systems (MANPADS) and conducted attacks with kamikaze and armed drones, notably between 10 and 19 April (paras. 168-170).³⁸¹

³⁷⁹ FARDC and Wazalendo sources; UN and researchers.

³⁸⁰ Military, diplomatic and intelligence sources, UN sources.

³⁸¹ Ibid.

Annex 19 (para. 50)

Paul Kagame interview published in Jeune Afrique

Entretien de Paul Kagame publié dans Jeune Afrique

In an exclusive interview granted to Jeune Afrique on 26 March 2026,³⁸² President Paul Kagame addressed questions about Rwanda's role in the ongoing conflict in the DRC, the US sanctions and the RDF's expected withdrawal from the DRC.

Kagame rejected Rwanda's responsibility in the DRC conflict, portraying the conflict as a Congolese internal issue and attributing escalation to Kinshasa's actions, including alleged collaboration with FDLR, which he claimed was as a long-standing and unresolved security threat to Rwanda. He minimized the relevance of FDLR force size, emphasizing instead their ideology and alleged backing by the DRC Government as the primary concern.

Kagame characterized Rwanda's actions as defensive measures, asserting that operations beyond its borders – which he admitted including deployment of troops, materiel, and coordination with AFC/M23 – were justified measures to neutralize this threat, even if conducted 5–20 km inside DRC territory.

Kagame indicated no intention to withdraw or scale down Rwanda's military posture, stating that defensive measures would remain in place until the perceived threat was addressed, by any means necessary, conditioning progress on reciprocal implementation of agreements by the DRC. He dismissed international sanctions as insulting, unjustified and politically motivated, arguing that Rwanda was being penalized for safeguarding its security. He described the fall of Uvira as “inevitable”, a necessary consequence of the situation on the ground, claiming that it should not have come as a surprise to any of the parties, including the US, since they were informed on a daily basis of the “evolution of the situation”.

On allegations of human rights and international humanitarian law violations by AFC/M23, Kagame dismissed such accusations, arguing that conditions in areas under M23 control (including Goma and Bukavu) had improved compared to the period prior to their takeover. He suggested that criticism of M23's conduct was selective and overlooked previous instability, implicitly rejecting claims of abuses and portraying the group as contributing to improved security conditions.

Kagame stated Joseph Kabila's association with M23 proved that the latter was not a Rwandan movement, but a Congolese movement now known as AFC/M23: “the issue posed by this movement is a Congolese political problem, which must find a Congolese political solution.” Kagame distanced himself from direct involvement with Kabila, stating that Kabila's association with AFC/M23 and his presence in M23-controlled areas reflected his own political choices. He framed Kabila as part of a broader Congolese political dynamic, indicating that individuals seeking to contribute to stability in the DRC were “welcome” in Rwanda, and denied that Rwanda was directing or sponsoring his actions.

On his future relations with President Tshisekedi, Kagame remained ambiguous and stated being comfortable with the “status quo”. He stated that there is “still a great deal of work to be done, both in the East and in the Congo as a whole, so that neither poses a threat to its neighbors, particularly Rwanda. That is why we will be uncompromising when it comes to the security of our border—by all means.”

³⁸² <https://youtu.be/jBTZKT2uTe4?si=EnIcd0KXXfHbXPYA>; <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1784913/politique/paul-kagame-nattendez-pas-de-moi-que-je-leve-nos-mesures-de-defense-alors-que-vous-laissez-felix-tshisekedi-faire-ce-quil-veut/>

Annex 20 (para. 52)**Doha talks in Montreux, Switzerland, 13-17 April 2026****Pourparlers de Doha à Montreux, Suisse, du 13 au 17 avril 2026**

Building on the Declaration of Principles, discussions focused on improving humanitarian access including by reopening the Goma and Kavumu airports, the operationalization of the ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism, and the exchange of prisoners³⁸³ (S/2025/858, paras. 7, 10-11).

On 14 April, representatives of the DRC Government, AFC/M23 and the International Conference on the Great Lakes (ICGLR) signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the operationalization of the ceasefire monitoring through the ICGLR-Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (ICGLR-EJVM+)³⁸⁴ (annex x, and S/2025/858, para.11). Discussions on a humanitarian protocol only resulted in the issuing of a joint statement on 17 April, stating the intention to facilitate access and freedom of movement for humanitarian personnel, to begin ceasefire monitoring activities and to proceed with the release of prisoners. The parties undertook to continue negotiations on the remaining protocols.

The AFC/M23 was represented by six delegates, and five “experts”. The delegates were Jean-Paul Shaka, AFC advisor;³⁸⁵ Benjamin Mbonimpa, AFC permanent secretary and M23 executive secretary; René Abandi Munyarugerero, chief negotiator for AFC/M23; Jean Pierre Alumba Lukamba Omokoko, advisor to AFC-Coordinator Corneille Nangaa; Lt. Col Donat Muganza, M23 military intelligence officer; and Major Fred Ngenzi Kagorora, AFC/M23 liaison officer for military and political coordination.³⁸⁶ Fred Ngenzi is a Rwandan-Congolese national, influential member of M23 since the movement’s first iteration in 2012, and a key liaison with Rwandan leadership and RDF, notably through Brigadier General Patrick Karuretwa (S/2014/428, para. 65 and annex 41, S/2025/446, para. 8) and Jean Paul Nyirabutama, deputy advisor to President Kagame on defense and security (para. 98).

The five experts assisting the AFC/M23 team were Justine Mbabazi Rukeba, advisor on Human Rights, Gender, Peace Building, Legal and Judicial Reforms; Chantal Kayitaba Murekatete, AFC/M23 humanitarian focal point in Goma, and advisor on Humanitarian Affairs, Gender, Social Affairs; Cedric Fiema Pundu Yange, advisor on Banking, Insurance and Finance Sector; as well as Claude Ibalanky Ekolomba and Franck Mwe Di Malla Apenela as “external” advisors.³⁸⁷

(1) Memorandum of Understanding between the International Conference on the Great Lakes (ICGLR) and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo River Alliance / March 23 Movement – as Parties of the Doha Declaration of Principles on the Operationalization of EJVM Plus ICGLR

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), signed on 14 April 2026, established the operational framework for implementing the Doha ceasefire through the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM+), formalizing cooperation between the Government of the DRC, AFC/M23, and the ICGLR. It defined the structure, mandate, and functioning of the ceasefire monitoring system, including joint verification teams, equal representation of the

³⁸³ Diplomatic and confidential sources.

³⁸⁴ Ref annex x (on peacemaking initiatives)

³⁸⁵ Lawyer registered with the New York Bar.

³⁸⁶ UN, diplomatic and confidential sources.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

Parties, and the participation of observers (AU, Qatar, United States) and MONUSCO, with a focus on surveillance, investigation, and reporting of ceasefire violations.

The agreement further set out modalities for coordination, information-sharing, security guarantees, and access to areas of operation, alongside provisions on financing, reporting, dispute resolution, and liability. It underscored the commitment of the Parties to facilitate monitoring activities, ensure the safety of verification personnel, and resolve disputes through the Doha facilitation framework, with the aim of operationalizing a permanent ceasefire and reducing violations through structured oversight mechanisms.

See the full text of the MoU below.

REF: ICGLR/COVM/DRC/AFCM23 MOU/VER/0042026/EMM



MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN

THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE GREAT LAKES
REGION (ICGLR)

AND

GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
AND

CONGO RIVER ALLIANCE/ MARCH 23 MOVEMENT

AS PARTIES OF THE DOHA DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
ON THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE EJVM PLUS ICGLR

REF: ICGLR/COVM/DRC/AFCM23 MOU/VER/0042026/EMM

resolution to the current armed conflict in the DRC, including relevant articles of UNSC Resolution 2808 that gives to MONUSCO mandate to support the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism, and as well as applicable International Law.

NOTING the framework agreement between the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Rwanda, signed in Washington, on June 27, 2025 in its provisions recommending the Doha peace process;

REFERRING to the 19th Ordinary Meeting of the Ministers of Defence of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, held on November 8, 2025, in Kinshasa, DRC at points 6.11.8-10, convening a meeting of Defence Experts from the ICGLR to review the Terms of Reference, finalize a memorandum of understanding clarifying the roles, responsibilities, hierarchical lines, operational modalities, and the cost of monitoring by EJVM;

IN ACCORDANCE with the agreement that established the Ceasefire Oversight Verification Mechanism of October 14, 2025, in DOHA, QATAR between the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Congo River Alliance/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23), in favor of a path toward a permanent ceasefire agreement;

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Preamble

WHEREAS this Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter referred to as "MoU") is signed between the International Conference on the Great Lakes Regions (hereinafter referred to as "ICGLR") Secretariat and the GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC) AND CONGO RIVER ALLIANCE/ MARCH 23 MOVEMENT (AFC/M23) AS PARTIES OF THE DOHA DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (hereinafter referred to as "PARTIES OF THE DOHA PEACE PROCESS") for the purposes of operationalization of the EXPANDED JOINT VERIFICATION MECHANISM PLUS (EJVM+) in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter referred to as "DRC");

AIMING to define the terms, modalities, and operation framework for the rapid and full operationalization of the ICGLR through its technical body, the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM) in its capacity as a member of the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism (COVM). Established within the framework of the Doha Process, with the two signatory Parties;

IN ACCORDANCE with the Charter of the United Nations, the constitutive act of the African Union (AU), the fundamental principles of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions that recommend peaceful

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TAKING NOTE OF the DOHA framework agreement of November 15, 2025, between the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Congo River Alliance/March 23 Movement;

The Parties to DOHA PEACE PROCESS and the ICGLR Secretariat, each individually a "Party" and collectively, the "Parties", have agreed on the following.

Objectives of the MoU

The purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding is to establish a formal framework for collaboration between the Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification Mechanism of the Doha Framework Agreement and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), acting through its technical body, the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM), with the participation of the Parties, namely the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Alliance Fleuve Congo/Movement of March 23 (AFC/M23).

In accordance with their respective mandates, and with a view to ensuring the effective implementation of the permanent ceasefire, this MoU aims in particular to organize the modalities for the participation of the EJVM within the Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, and to establish effective mechanisms for information-sharing, operational coordination, and technical cooperation among the Parties;

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The Terms of Reference for the EJVM are attached hereto as Annex A and are incorporated by reference into this MoU.

SECTION II Implementation of the MoU

The parties agree as follows:

Composition: The Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism is composed of:

- (a) Three representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ("the Government") and three representatives of the Alliance Fleuve Congo/Movement of March 23 ("AFC/M23") (the "Parties");
- (b) Representatives of the African Union, the State of Qatar, and the United States may serve as observers;
- (c) The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region ("ICGLR"), through its Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism ("EJVM").

The EJVM+ shall comprise the EJVM, three representatives of the Government, and three representatives of the AFC/M23 (in a coordination role); and

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consolidated report and transmit it to the members of the Doha Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification Mechanism.

Finance. The parties shall mobilize resources for the activities of the mechanism. The EJVM shall propose a budget for the EJVM Plus.

Mission planning. Mission planning shall be conducted jointly between Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism and the EJVM.

Security. The parties shall ensure that the EJVM Plus is accorded secure and unimpeded access to both sides of the frontline for the purpose of facilitating their effective participation in the monitoring of the permanent ceasefire on the ground. Additionally, the parties commit to ensuring the safety of the experts at all times during verification missions.

Coordinating Meetings. Either party to the MOU may call for a meeting within a notice of 72 hours. The quorum of the meeting shall be realized when both parties are present with Observers.

Conduct and Discipline. Members of the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism shall abide by the cultural and legal considerations of the DRC.

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- (d) MONUSCO, as an additional participant.

Mission: The mission of the mechanism is to conduct surveillance, monitoring, verifying and reporting the implementation of the permanent ceasefire including the investigation on any alleged violation as well as taking necessary measures with the interested parties to avoid further violations.

Command: The leadership of the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism will be determined by the Parties. EJVM plus will be commanded by the Commander EJVM. For the duration of this MOU, the EJVM should not be commanded by a representative originating from a country involved in the conflict, either AFC/M23 representative.

Joint Verification: The verification shall be conducted by the Joint Verification Team appointed by the Commander EJVM which will be joined by equal representative of the Parties and where possible Observers.

Secretariat: The composition of the Secretariat shall be determined by the Parties.

Sharing of verification reports: The reports of the activities related to the verification of ceasefire violations shall be shared with the Commander EJVM or his representative. The Commander of the EJVM+ shall prepare a

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Liability and third-party claims provisions

Each Party shall assume responsibility for any damage, injury, disability, or death suffered by its own personnel in the course of the implementation of the MOU. However, the liability of the Party exercising control over the area may be incurred in cases of gross negligence, deliberate omission, or a serious breach of the agreed security measures;

Entry into force

This MoU shall enter into force on the date of its signature by the Parties ("Effective Date") for the period of the Ceasefire Oversight Verification Mechanism mandate unless earlier terminated in accordance with the terms of this MoU. If there is more than one date of signature, the latest date shall be the date from which this MoU shall enter into force.

Amendments

This MoU may be modified, supplemented, or amended at any time by written agreement between the Parties. Amendments to this MoU shall be made in writing and signed by the duly authorized representatives of the Parties. Such amendments shall become effective from the date of signature of the Parties.

Settlement of disputes

The Parties shall use their best efforts to promptly settle through direct negotiations any dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of the MoU or the interpretation, application, breach, termination or invalidity thereof by

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initially referring the matter to the facilitators of the DOHA peace process and the Executive Secretary of the ICGLR within (30) days.

Privileges and immunities

Diplomatic privileges and immunities remain fully in effect in all areas during execution of the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism.

Termination

This MoU may be terminated by either Party by giving thirty (30) days' written notice to the other that will become effective thirty (30) days from the date of its receipt. Where notice of termination is given, Parties of the DOHA peace process and ICGLR Secretariat will take immediate steps to bring any provision of support or joint activities to a close in a prompt and orderly manner. This MoU shall automatically terminate upon fulfillment of the mandate as described in the agreement on the ceasefire oversight verification mechanism. Upon termination of the MoU, the Parties shall cooperate to bring the agreements set forth in this MoU to an orderly conclusion. For the avoidance of doubt, any determination of this MoU shall not terminate the requirement to maintain confidentiality.

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IN WITNESS WHERETO the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have on behalf of the Parties hereto signed this MoU in Mwinda on this 14 Day of April, 2026

AGREED BY:

Simba Amia

Representative of the Republic of DRC

Benjamin MBO NIMPA

Representative of the AFC/M23

MURITA LUWABEWA

Executive Secretary of the ICGLR

Confidential source

(2) Joint DRC Government – AFC/M23 communiqué on humanitarian protocol and judicial protection, the operationalization of the joint ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism, and release of prisoners, 17 April

After difficult discussions on a humanitarian protocol – notably on the issue of reopening the Goma and Kavumu airports – no MoU was signed and parties agreed on issuing a joint communiqué statement instead, reflecting a reluctant compromise on the published language reflecting several operational and humanitarian priorities that were discussed linked to the implementation of the Doha framework.³⁸⁸

The Parties reported progress toward a protocol on humanitarian access and judicial protection, and reaffirmed their commitment to comply with international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and refugee law. They undertook to protect civilians and civilian objects, including critical infrastructure and essential services, and to refrain from attacks on goods indispensable to civilian survival. The communiqué also emphasized obligations to ensure safe, rapid, and unimpeded humanitarian access, safeguard humanitarian personnel and assets, prevent diversion of aid, and maintain the delivery of basic services and medical assistance to affected populations.

The Parties further agreed to operationalize ceasefire monitoring through the expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM+) and the Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CMVM), with initial verification missions to be launched within one week, with support from MONUSCO.

Confidence-building measures included a commitment to release 311 AFC/M23 detainees and 166 prisoners held by AFC/M23, within ten days in line with mechanism signed on 14 September 2025. The communiqué also underscored the intention to sustain momentum in the peace process by advancing remaining protocols under the Doha framework, while acknowledging the role of regional and international partners—including Qatar, the United States, the African Union, and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region—in facilitating implementation.

³⁸⁸ Diplomatic and confidential sources with knowledge of the discussions in Montreux.

Communiqué conjoint entre les représentants du Gouvernement de la République démocratique du Congo et de l'AFC/M23 sur les progrès réalisés concernant le protocole relatif à l'accès humanitaire et à la protection judiciaire, l'opérationnalisation du mécanisme de surveillance et de vérification du cessez-le-feu, ainsi que la libération de prisonniers

Le 17 avril 2026

La déclaration suivante est publiée par le Gouvernement de la République démocratique du Congo, ainsi que l'Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 Mars (AFC/M23), ainsi que les gouvernements de l'État du Qatar, des États-Unis d'Amérique, de la République togolaise (en tant que médiateur de l'Union africaine), l'Union africaine, de la Suisse, à l'issue des réunions qui se sont tenues du 13 au 17 avril à Montreux, en Suisse, concernant la mise en œuvre de l'accord-cadre de Doha pour un accord de paix global.

Début du texte de la déclaration :

Du 13 au 17 avril, des représentants du Gouvernement de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC) et de l'Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars (AFC/M23), ainsi que des États-Unis d'Amérique, de l'État du Qatar, de la République du Togo (en tant que médiateur de l'Union africaine), l'Union africaine et de la Suisse, se sont réunis à Montreux, en Suisse, pour discuter du protocole sur l'accès humanitaire et la protection judiciaire, conformément aux dispositions du accord-cadre de Doha pour un accord de paix global entre le gouvernement de la RDC et l'AFC/M23, signé à Doha le 15 novembre 2025.

Le gouvernement de la RDC et l'AFC/M23 (les Parties) ont convenu de l'importance cruciale d'assurer une aide humanitaire vitale à la population de l'est de la RDC et ont réalisé des progrès substantiels en vue de la conclusion d'un protocole sur l'accès humanitaire et la protection judiciaire.

Au cours des négociations, les Parties ont convenu de respecter l'ensemble des obligations qui leur incombent en vertu du droit international humanitaire, du droit international des droits de l'homme et du droit international des réfugiés, selon qu'ils sont applicables et de se référer aux principes fondamentaux de la Constitution de la République démocratique du Congo.

Les Parties ont aussi convenu de s'abstenir de toute attaque, destruction, enlèvement ou mise hors d'usage des biens indispensables à la survie de la population civile, y compris les denrées alimentaires, les zones agricoles destinées à la production de denrées alimentaires, les récoltes, le bétail, les installations et réserves d'eau potable et les ouvrages d'irrigation ainsi que les infrastructures et la fourniture de services de télécommunications et d'énergie, ainsi que les installations hospitalières et scolaires.

Les Parties ont reconnu que l'aide humanitaire comprend, sans s'y limiter, les activités et services liés à la fourniture de nourriture, de nutrition, de soins de santé, d'eau, d'assainissement et d'hygiène, d'abris, et à la garantie que la protection des civils reste primordiale pendant la conduite des hostilités. Cela inclut les activités de protection, y inclus celles visant à prévenir et à répondre à la violence, à l'exploitation et aux abus à l'encontre des civils, y compris des femmes et des enfants, et à promouvoir le respect du droit international humanitaire et droit international des droits de l'homme.

Les Parties ont convenu de respecter et protéger les acteurs humanitaires, y compris les intervenants locaux et les bénéficiaires, ainsi que les objets utilisés pour les opérations de secours humanitaires afin de leur permettre d'opérer en toute sécurité.

Les Parties ont convenu, chacune en ce qui la concerne, de tout mettre en œuvre pour empêcher que l'aide humanitaire ne soit ni détournée, ni pillée. Elles s'engagent en outre à ne pas indûment influencer la sélection de prestataires et de bénéficiaires.

Les Parties ont convenu de s'abstenir de toute action qui compromettrait la fourniture d'une aide humanitaire délivrée sur la base des principes humanitaires dans les territoires affectés par le conflit.

Les Parties ont convenu de faciliter un accès humanitaire rapide, sans entrave, sûr et durable, ainsi que la liberté de circulation du personnel humanitaire, des biens et des services, y compris pour la fourniture d'une aide humanitaire conforme aux principes fondamentaux aux populations dans le besoin, sur la base de besoins évalués de manière indépendante, sans distinction basée sur la religion, origine familiale, condition sociale, résidence, opinions ou convictions politiques, appartenance à une race, à une ethnie, à une tribu, à une minorité culturelle ou linguistique sur les territoires affectés par le conflit.

Les Parties ont convenu de faciliter le passage et de permettre la liberté de circulation du personnel humanitaire, des biens et des convois humanitaires.

Les Parties ont convenu de respecter, protéger et faciliter la fourniture continue de services essentiels à la population civile. Les Parties s'abstiendront de toute action qui compromet ces services et faciliteront l'accès de la population aux services sociaux de base (alimentation, eau, soins de santé, logement, éducation). Les Parties ont convenu, lorsqu'elles mettent en œuvre des mesures affectant les services sociaux de base, de tenir compte de l'impact humanitaire sur la population civile.

Dans toute la mesure du possible et avec le moins de retard possible, les Parties ont convenu de fournir les soins et l'assistance médicale requis par l'état des blessés et des malades, notamment en prenant toutes les mesures possibles pour rechercher, recueillir et évacuer les blessés et les malades. À cette fin, les Parties s'engagent à faciliter le transport de fournitures médicales et

d'aide humanitaire par des organisations humanitaires impartiales afin de soutenir le fonctionnement des établissements de santé et autres unités médicales dans les zones touchées par le conflit armé.

En plus de ces engagements, les Parties, en collaboration avec la Conférence internationale sur la région des Grands Lacs (CIRGL), ont signé un protocole d'accord qui met en œuvre le Mécanisme conjoint de vérification élargi Plus (MCVE+). L'opérationnalisation du MCVE+ permet au Mécanisme de surveillance et de vérification du cessez-le-feu (COVM), établi dans l'accord-cadre de Doha, de commencer à mener des activités de surveillance, de suivi et de vérification et à faire rapport sur la mise en œuvre du cessez-le-feu permanent entre les Parties. Les Parties et la CIRGL ont exprimé leur volonté de lancer, dans un délai d'une semaine, les premières missions de vérification du COVM, rendues possibles grâce au soutien logistique de la Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en RDC (MONUSCO).

Les parties ont également convenu de procéder, dans un délai de 10 jours, à la libération de prisonniers conformément au Mécanisme de libération des détenus signé le 14 septembre 2025 afin de continuer à renforcer la confiance. Les Parties remercient le CICR pour la fourniture des listes des détenus conformément aux procédures établies.

Les Parties ont convenu de maintenir la dynamique du processus de paix et à continuer de s'appuyer sur les progrès réalisés concernant le Protocole sur l'accès humanitaire et la protection judiciaire, tout en accélérant les négociations sur les protocoles restants, notamment en soumettant aux facilitateurs des propositions de plans concrets pour les prochaines étapes.

Le Gouvernement de la RDC et l'AFC/M23 expriment leur gratitude à l'État du Qatar, aux États-Unis, à la Suisse, à la République du Togo, l'Union africaine ainsi qu'aux Nations unies, notamment par l'intermédiaire de la MONUSCO, pour leur soutien indéfectible à la promotion de la paix et de la stabilité dans l'Est de la RDC et dans l'ensemble de la région des Grands Lacs.

Fin du texte de la déclaration.

Confidential source

Annex 21 (para. 54)

Statements by AFC/M23 leaders proposing federalism

Déclarations des dirigeants de l'AFC/M23 proposant le fédéralisme

Corneille Nangaa and Bertrand Bisimwa publicly promoted federalism as a model for DRC in late November 2025, including through social media statements.³⁸⁹

Statement by Corneille Nangaa, 27 November 2025:



 **#URGENT** : le Coordinateur de l' **#AFC/ M23** #**Corneille_Nanga** , annonce que la République Démocratique du Congo aura une nouvelle appellation celle de la République **#Fédérale** du Congo (**RFC**).

Video footage of Corneille Nangaa, received by the Group on 27 November 2025 from a confidential source, also posted on X:

Original French:

“ C’est notre terrain commun : le Congo, la République démocratique du Congo, que nous appelons encore République démocratique du Congo par conformisme. Mais nous, dans notre logique, nous n’avons pas peur d’aller à Naivasha. Nous nous sommes dit que nous nous battons au Congo et, dans notre projection en tant que mouvement, la République démocratique du Congo devra devenir la République fédérale du Congo. Et nous n’avons pas peur : c’est une option, c’est une vision. Car nous disons que le Congo est un intérêt primordial, mais le véritable intérêt, c’est le Congolais pris individuellement, où qu’il se trouve. C’est pour cela que nous nous battons.”

English translation [by the Group]:

³⁸⁹ <https://24newsagency.com/rdc-jose-makila-soppose-fermement-a-la-vision-federaliste-de-corneille-nangaa> ; Bisimwa: “We have always asserted and reasserted it at the negotiating table: integration (merging or mixing) within a defeated army is not our choice. We will build and lead the new Defense and Security Forces of the Federal Republic of Congo” https://x.com/bbisimwa/status/1994820683516580189?s=46&t=_n75XfLAiYaxKQtM7ZzVg

“This is our common ground: the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which we still call the Democratic Republic of the Congo out of conformity. But for our part, in our logic, we are not afraid to go to Naivasha. We have said to ourselves that we are fighting in the Congo and, in our projection as a movement, the Democratic Republic of the Congo should become the Federal Republic of the Congo. And we are not afraid: this is an option, this is a vision. For we say that the Congo is a primary interest, but the real interest is the Congolese individual, wherever they may be. That is what we are fighting for.”

This speech reflects earlier public statements by Nangaa, talking since 2024 about taking power by force and instating a federalist system.³⁹⁰

Statement by Bertrand Bisimwa

Bertrand Bisimwa posted on social media AFC/M23’s rejection of army integration (“brassage” or “mixage”), in favor of AFC/M23 building and leading the new armed forces of a the “Federal Republic of Congo”:



Source: [X account of Bertrand Bisimwa](#), posted on 29 November 2025

“We have always asserted and reasserted it at the negotiating table: integration (merging or mixing) within a defeated army is not our choice. We will build and lead the new Defense and Security Forces of the Federal Republic of Congo”

[English translation by the Group]

³⁹⁰ https://x.com/rdc_times/status/1773341807780266233?s=46&t=_n75XfLAiYxKQtM7ZzVg, 28 March 2024.

Annex 22 (para. 60)

Moïse Nyarugabo, key member of Joseph Kabila’s inner circle signing the communique of Sauvons la RDC

Moïse Nyarugabo, membre clé du cercle rapproché de Joseph Kabila, signataire du communiqué de Sauvons la RDC

Moïse Nyarugabo signed the final communiqué of Joseph Kabila’s Sauvons la RDC’s³⁹¹ second conclave held from 6–8 April 2026 as one of its “founding members” and “Coordinator of the Technical Secretariat (see full text below). It was the first time Nyarugabo was associated with the movement or that his signature appeared on a Sauvons la RDC communiqué or declarations.³⁹²

The communiqué constituted a sharp critique of the authorities in Kinshasa, challenging the constitutional and political legitimacy of existing institutions. It portrayed the regime as ineffective, oriented toward authoritarian control and political self-preservation, marking a shift toward dictatorship. It cited the systematic repression of opposition and the refusal of meaningful political dialogue as its defining features. Governance was characterized as predatory, serving regime continuity rather than public administration.

The communiqué concluded by situating Sauvons la RDC within the framework of constitutional resistance, invoking article 64 of the DRC Constitution related to the defense of the state. As such, the text was simultaneously a critique of the regime and a call for political mobilization.

³⁹¹ <https://sauvonslardc.org/2025/10/15/urban-renewal-loans-available/>

³⁹² <https://sauvonslardc.org/2025/12/05/declaration-relativev-a-la-signature-de-laccord-de-paix-entre-la-rdc-et-le-rwanda/> ; <https://sauvonslardc.org/2026/01/19/sauvons-la-rdc-denonce-et-exige-la-liberation-immediate-et-sans-condition-daubin-minaku-communique/>;



📞 📧 📱 @SauvsLaRdc1

2è Conclave du Mouvement Sauvs la RDC – Communiqué final

Les membres fondateurs du Mouvement Sauvs la RDC se sont réunis du 6 au 8 Avril 2026, sous la Présidence du Président de la République Honoraire, **S.E. Joseph Kabila Kabange**.

A cette occasion, ils ont examiné la situation politique, sécuritaire, économique et sociale du pays ainsi que les différentes initiatives régionales et internationales de recherche de solution à la crise qui prévaut en République Démocratique du Congo.

Au terme de cet examen, ils ont fait le constat que :

Le pouvoir en place a délibérément engagé le pays dans une dérive dictatoriale clairement assumée, caractérisée par une répression politique, systématique et brutale, un musellement violent de toute voix discordante et le refus de tout dialogue crédible pouvant mettre fin à la crise.

Bien plus, contrairement à ses engagements internationaux et aux aspirations de notre peuple à la paix, ce pouvoir a choisi la voie de la guerre, y compris contre les populations civiles qu'il est censé protéger, en violation du droit de la guerre.

Cela étant, les membres fondateurs :

1. Dénoncent les atteintes graves et répétées aux libertés publiques et aux droits fondamentaux, les bombardements indiscriminés des zones fortement habitées en mettant gravement en danger les populations civiles (Minembwe, Masisi, Goma), le recours à des assassinats et tentatives d'assassinats de personnalités qui refusent de se plier à la dictature, l'abandon total, aux ADF, des populations de l'Ituri et de la partie septentrionale de la Province du Nord Kivu, livrées à des massacres d'une cruauté indescriptible. Il en est de même de la population dans l'espace Grand Bandundu et dans la commune de Maluku, qui subit les horreurs des Mobondo.

Ces actes odieux contreviennent aux dispositions pertinentes de la Constitution et constituent des graves violations des règles et principes fondamentaux du droit international humanitaires ainsi que du droit de la guerre.

2. Expriment leur compassion et leur solidarité à l'endroit des hommes, des femmes, des jeunes et des vieux, victimes de cette barbarie d'État, ainsi qu'à leurs familles.

3. Déplorent la dégradation continue des conditions de vie sur l'ensemble du territoire national, marqué par une précarisation croissante des populations dont 64 millions d'entre elles vivent sous le seuil de pauvreté (Rapport INS 2025), la famine et l'insécurité chronique, faisant de la RDC la tête de liste des pays en extrême pauvreté.

4. S'agissant des initiatives de recherche de la paix, tout en saluant les efforts déployés par les uns et par les autres (Washington, Doha, Union Africaine, Luanda, Lomé, Nairobi, CENCO/ECC), ils notent qu'à cause de la mauvaise foi du pouvoir en place, les perspectives d'une paix durable s'éloignent de plus en plus.

Ce résultat décevant est aussi dû à ce que ces initiatives ont jusque-là, sciemment éludé ou gravement minimisé les causes profondes de la crise, à savoir le non-respect du pacte républicain de Sun-City, de la Constitution et des lois de la République, l'illégitimité des institutions, les choix désastreux du régime en place, une gouvernance prédatrice et la consolidation d'un système dictatorial, l'instrumentalisation de la justice à des fins politiques ainsi que l'exploitation du tribalisme et de la stigmatisation comme stratégies de division pour se maintenir au pouvoir.

5. Notent, avec préoccupation, l'opacité qui, comme dans le cas du deal minier, entoure les autres accords qui ont été conclus entre le régime de Kinshasa et le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, singulièrement l'Accord sanitaire qui viole l'éthique médicale et le droit à la protection des données personnelles, et l'Accord pour l'accueil des migrants refoulés de ce dernier pays.

A ce régime de Kinshasa qui est prêt à tout vendre, à brader les intérêts nationaux pour se ménager les faveurs de tous ceux qui peuvent garantir ou sécuriser sa survie, les membres fondateurs rappellent que la RDC et ses ressources ne sont pas son bien privé dont il peut disposer à sa guise mais bien un patrimoine commun appartenant à tous les Congolais.

Bien plus, La RDC est encore moins un dépotoir humain où les autres viendraient décharger tous ceux qu'ils n'ont pas envie de garder chez eux.

6. S'opposent à toute tentative de révision et de changement de la Constitution et s'engagent à y faire échec. De ce qui précède, ne pouvant se dérober au devoir que leur prescrit, comme à tout citoyen congolais responsable, la Constitution en son article 64, alinéa 1, les membres fondateurs du Mouvement Sauvons la RDC réaffirment leur détermination à poursuivre la lutte jusqu'à ce qu'il soit mis fin à cette dictature abjecte.

Fait le 08 avril 2026

Pour les Membres Fondateurs



Me Moise Nyarugabo

Le Coordonnateur du Secrétariat Technique.

Source: Sauvons la RDC website (<https://sauvonslardc.org/2026/04/12/communique-final-2e-conclave-du-mouvement-sauvons-la-rdc/>)

Annex 23 (para. 61)**Tensions affecting AFC/M23 leadership****Tensions affectant la direction de l'AFC/M23**

Internal tensions within AFC/M23 persisted, including divisions between AFC and M23 leadership, linked to differing objectives. While prominent political figures like Corneille Nangaa and Joseph Kabila harbored ambitions to seize power in Kinshasa, most M23 leaders were opposed to military operations beyond North and South Kivu.³⁹³ AFC/M23 sources reported that Makenga did not trust Kabila, and the two did not have a good relationship.

Tensions were also reported between certain M23 officers and Rwanda. Reports resurfaced that Rwandan authorities were considering Makenga's replacement, amid allegations that Makenga maintained close ties to Uganda and lacked trust in Rwanda.³⁹⁴ Sanctioned individuals Laurent Nkunda (CDi.022)³⁹⁵ and Baudoin Ngaruye (CDi. 019), both perceived as aligned with Rwanda, were expected to assume more prominent roles within M23 (S/2025/446, para. 9). This prospective restructuring favouring Rwanda-aligned AFC/M23 leaders deepened mistrust among commanders and combatants loyal to Makenga,³⁹⁶ historically associated with Uganda (S/2014/428, paras. 59-66, S/2025/446, para. 9, annex 3).

Tensions also affected M23 senior leadership, including over access to and distribution of resources.³⁹⁷ Historical and personal rivalries accentuated, notably between Makenga and Baudoin Ngaruye, who only tolerated each other because their external sponsor, Rwanda, imposed their cooperation.³⁹⁸

³⁹³ Ibid.

³⁹⁴ Intelligence sources, AFC/M23 sources.

³⁹⁵ AFC/M23 and intelligence sources, sources close to the Rwandan government, and a researcher reported the presence of Laurent Nkunda in Goma at the end of March 2026.

³⁹⁶ Including Bernard Byamungu and Imani Nzenze.

³⁹⁷ AFC/M23 and intelligence sources, UN, and researchers.

³⁹⁸ Ibid.

Annex 24 (para. 77)


Announcements of withdrawal from Uvira

Annonces du retrait d'Uvira

Initial withdrawal announcement on 15 December 2025

On 16 December, AFC coordinator Corneille Nangaa posted on his X account a statement in which he announced that AFC/M23, referring to the Doha process and the signing of the Doha Framework agreement on 15 November 2025, it will unilaterally withdraw its forces from Uvira “as per the United States' mediation request”.

AFC/M23 urged the “guarantors of the peace process” to establish conditions for the city’s administration following its withdrawal. These included the demilitarization of Uvira, protection of civilians and infrastructure, and the deployment of a neutral force to oversee the ceasefire. Given the practical difficulties associated with implementing the third requirement, it appeared more like a delaying tactic than a credible commitment to ceasefire monitoring.



Source: [Corneille Nangaa's official X account, posted on 16 December 2025](#)

Despite public claims of withdrawal, in practice, only a partial, staged withdrawal has taken place, amounting to a strategic repositioning of M23 and RDF forces (para. 77). Some elements repositioned north of Uvira other across the Hauts and Moyens Plateaux, linking up with Twirwaneho and Red Tabara elements. Thereby, AFC/M23 consolidated its presence in elevated positions overlooking the Ruzizi Plain, in anticipation of a full withdrawal.³⁹⁹ The town remained effectively under AFC/M23 and RDF control until January. AFC/M23 and RDF maintained a covert presence within Uvira, including through combatants dressed in civilian attire or their integration into local “police” units.⁴⁰⁰

AFC/M23 Letter addressed to the UN Secretary General, January 2026

In a letter addressed to the Secretary-General three days prior to its withdrawal from Uvira, AFC/M23 justified the withdrawal by citing its “sincere commitment to the ceasefire” and its intention to pursue a peaceful and political resolution of the conflict. It further indicated that it had requested MONUSCO to ensure civilian protection in Uvira and called for the deployment of a “neutral force”.

However, according to information obtained by the Group, an AFC/M23 delegate in Doha acknowledged that the capture of Uvira had overstretched coalition forces, suggesting that the withdrawal also constituted a tactical repositioning aimed at preserving leverage in ongoing negotiations.

³⁹⁹ Military and intelligence sources, UN, researchers, armed groups sources.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid.



Alliance Fleuve Congo
Peuple Uni, Digne et Prospère

COORDONNATEUR POLITIQUE

Goma, le 15 janvier 2026

N°réf 003/COORDO-POL/AFC-M23/CNY/TMC/2026

À **Monsieur António Guterres**,
 Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies à
 New York / États-Unis d'Amérique

Objet : Mise à la disposition de la communauté internationale de la ville d'Uvira

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

Faisant suite à notre décision du 15 décembre 2025, relative au retrait de nos forces de la ville d'Uvira, ainsi qu'à notre correspondance référencée 003/COORDO-POL/AFC-M23/CNY/JPAL/2026 du 12 janvier 2026 adressée à Madame la Représentante spéciale du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo, par laquelle nous avons formellement invité la MONUSCO à assurer la protection des populations civiles de ladite ville, conformément à son mandat,

Animée par le souci constant de lever toute ambiguïté quant à notre bonne foi, à notre attachement sincère au cessez-le-feu en vigueur, ainsi qu'à notre engagement résolu en faveur d'une résolution pacifique et politique à la crise,

Notre Organisation, l'Alliance Fleuve Congo / Mouvement du 23 mars (AFC/M23), a décidé, en ce jour, de placer officiellement la ville d'Uvira sous la responsabilité pleine et entière de la Communauté Internationale.

À compter de cette date, notre Organisation désengage l'unité d'observation et de monitoring qui attendait organiser la remise et reprise de la ville avec la force neutre et décline toute responsabilité quant à la sécurisation de cette importante agglomération de la province du Sud-Kivu.

Il incombe, désormais, à la Communauté internationale, dans le cadre de ses responsabilités et de ses engagements, d'assurer la protection des populations civiles, la préservation de la paix, ainsi que la sécurité de l'ensemble des habitants d'Uvira, sans aucune discrimination.

Nous attirons solennellement l'attention de la Communauté internationale sur le fait que l'armée Burundaise, les FDLR, les groupes armés dits Wazalendo, ainsi que les mercenaires soutenant les FARDC, constituent une menace manifeste pour la ville d'Uvira. Ces acteurs armés ne sont « parties » à aucun engagement issu d'un processus de paix.

À ce titre, leur présence et leurs activités représentent une menace directe et immédiate non seulement pour les populations civiles, mais également pour le processus de paix en cours et pour la stabilité régionale dans son ensemble.

Dans ce contexte préoccupant, il apparaît indispensable que la Communauté internationale assume pleinement ses responsabilités et veille au déploiement rapide d'une force véritablement neutre dans la ville d'Uvira, afin d'éviter que celle-ci ne bascule à nouveau dans le chaos, la désolation et la violence.

La présente démarche, entreprise en toute responsabilité, s'inscrit dans notre volonté claire de préserver les civils, de consolider le cessez-le-feu et de créer les conditions d'une paix durable, fondée sur le dialogue, le respect des engagements internationaux et les principes du Droit International Humanitaire.

Nous vous prions d'agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, l'expression de notre très haute considération.


Cornelle NANGAA YOBELU



2/3

Document received from diplomatic source

Annex 25 (para. 78)

AFC/M23 and RDF coordinated redeployments and operations in South Kivu after withdrawal from Uvira

Redéploiements coordonnés et opérations de l'AFC/M23 et des RDF dans le Sud-Kivu après le retrait d'Uvira

Disregarding calls by the United States at the Security Council for a withdrawal at least 75 kilometers north of Uvira,⁴⁰¹ AFC/M23 and RDF only withdrew until Sange, 35 kilometers north of Uvira, in the Ruzizi Plain, where it established its headquarters. In fact, strategic redeployments were aimed at ensuring control of strategic positions in the hills surrounding Uvira, as well as key axes and positions in the Moyens and Hauts Plateaux, which would allow them to project force for subsequent operations.⁴⁰²

The exact strength and geographic distribution of AFC/M23 and RDF deployments could not always be reliably determined. However, as noted in paragraphs 98-100, the RDF exercised operational control over AFC/M23 forces, including through mixed RDF–M23 units and the embedding of RDF officers within M23 units in operational command roles. Accordingly, overall troop estimates are presented on a conservative basis. Furthermore, no significant withdrawals of RDF or M23 personnel were observed, notwithstanding the requirements set out in Resolution 2773 (2025) and subsequent commitments (paras. 43-50).

Positions:

- Forces redeployed in several directions: one contingent advanced north toward Sange along the RN5 between Kamanyola and Uvira, where AFC/M23 established their South Kivu headquarters; another moved south toward Makobola; a third repositioned in the hills surrounding Uvira; and a fourth deployed to the Hauts Plateaux to reinforce Twirwano and Red Tabara combatants.⁴⁰³ Withdrawal included repositioning in, and control of the following areas/localities: Sange, Kamanyola, Lemera, Mulenge, Kahololo, Masango, Bishambo, Mikenge, Kamombo, Tuwe Tuwe, Point Zero, and Minembwe.⁴⁰⁴
- In March 2026, AFC/M23 and RDF forces also occupied the hills of Lemera, west of Sange, forming a corridor extending toward Minembwe (**see map below**).⁴⁰⁵ Continued reinforcements AFC/M23 were reported across the Hauts Plateaux of Fizi Territory and Uvira Territory, as well as on the Ruzizi Plain, throughout March 2026.
- RDF reinforced its presence and positioning on front lines in South Kivu. On 2 February 2026, approximately 25 trucks carrying RDF troops departed from Bugarama and Nyangezi in Rwanda, arriving in Kamanyola before continuing toward Luvungi and Sange along the RN5.⁴⁰⁶ One week later, around 15 additional trucks originating from Bukavu and Rwanda were also observed transiting Kamanyola towards southern positions. These reinforcements aimed to consolidate AFC/M23 positions around Sange and the axis leading to Minembwe in the Hauts Plateaux.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰¹ Request made by the US during an emergency session convened at the UN Security Council on 19 December 2025, following the takeover of Uvira and on the occasion of MONUSCO's mandate renewal, confirmed in Resolution 2808 (2025). See <https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2025/12/114214/security-council-renews-dr-congo-peacekeeping-mission-amid-renewed>.

⁴⁰² Military intelligence, diplomatic sources; UN; AFC/M23 sources; Wazalendo sources; Banyamulenge sources; sources close to RDF.

⁴⁰³ Ibid.


⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁶ Intelligence sources, civil society sources, researchers, and diplomatic sources.

⁴⁰⁷ Military intelligence, diplomatic sources; AFC/M23 sources; Banyamulenge sources and sources close to RDF.

- As of mid-February 2026, RDF deployments in South Kivu were as follows: approximately 1,800 troops along the Ruzizi Plain–Moyens Plateaux axis; 800 troops in the Hauts Plateaux; 1,800 troops along the Ngweshe–Mwenga axis; and an undetermined number elsewhere, including in direction of Fizi.⁴⁰⁸



Map showing positions and movements of the AFC/M23-RDF coalition after the retreat from Uvira – annotated by confidential source, February 2026.

Base map: MONUSCO

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

Operations:

- In late January 2026, the AFC/M23 coalition, including Twirwaneho combatants, launched an offensive and temporarily seized the strategic positions of Point Zero, Kanguli, and Tuwe-Tuwe along the Mwenga–Fizi road. Although FARDC-FDNB forces subsequently regained these positions on 29 January, continued fighting along the southern axis suggests that Baraka, Fizi, and potentially Kalemie remain exposed to further advances. At the time of drafting, intense fighting for control of Minembwe was ongoing.⁴⁰⁹
- In mid-February, the frontline stabilized north of Uvira. Fighting ceased on the Ruzizi Plain but persisted in the highlands. The line settled around Kabunambo (approximately 25 kilometers north of Uvira, south of Sange, where AFC/M23’s forward headquarters was located) with a 10–15 kilometer buffer between the warring parties.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

Annex 26 (para. 79)**Résistance pour un État de droit au Burundi (RED-Tabara) and Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL) fighting alongside AFC/M23****Résistance pour un État de droit au Burundi (RED-Tabara) et Forces nationales de libération (FNL) combattant aux côtés de l'AFC/M23**

RED Tabara and FNL armed groups have been targeted by joint FDNB and FARDC attacks since 2023 (S/2023/431, paras. 134-140). Therefore, since the extension of the AFC/M23-crisis into South Kivu, both RED Tabara and FNL have allied themselves with Twirwaneho and AFC/M23. RED Tabara already had long-standing ties with Rwanda and RDF, with recruitment for the group ongoing in refugee camps in Rwanda - particularly Mahama camp - and the subsequent training of recruits occurring at the Gako, Gashora and Gabiro military facilities in Rwanda (S/2024/432, para. 103 and S/2025/446, annex 14).⁴¹⁰

During the reporting period, AFC/M23, Twirwaneho, RED Tabara and FNL, with RDF support, have conducted multiple joint operations, including the capture of key positions along the Mwenga-Fizi axis – notably Point Zero, Kanguli, and Tuwe Tuwe – and sustained operations in and around Minembwe in January and February 2026.⁴¹¹

RED Tabara had long-standing camps in Masango (Uvira territory), Magunda (Mwenga territory), and Kipupu (Mwenga territory). Although the RED Tabara leadership has repeatedly denied any links with AFC/M23, Red Tabara combatants have taken part in hostilities alongside AFC/M23, Twirwaneho, and RDF across several axes, including in including Muranvia and Bijabo, as well as along the routes leading to Minembwe.

FNL elements were present in the Nyaburunda forest (Uvira territory), in mountainous areas near Sange, and in Magunda, where they co-locate with Red Tabara units.

By mid-February 2026, RED Tabara and FNL combatants had physically joined the AFC/M23-RDF-Twirwaneho coalition in the Kamombo sector of the Hauts Plateaux.⁴¹² Intelligence sources also reported that additional RED Tabara and FNL combatants redeployed from the Hauts Plateaux of Fizi, Uvira and Mwenga toward the hills overlooking Sange along the Burundian border.

The proximity of RED Tabara and FNL combatants to the border and their involvement in hostilities alongside AFC/M23 and RDF worried Burundian authorities that the AFC/M23 coalition and Rwanda could use these rebel groups to destabilize Burundi.⁴¹³

Security concerns regarding the cross-border movement of armed actors led Burundi to close border posts with the DRC and designate several frontier areas as “military zones” on 9 December 2025. On 25 February 2026, Burundi reopened a number of crossings, citing economic, humanitarian, and operational/military considerations. This step did not reflect diminished security concerns but rather a transition from emergency closure measures to a system of controlled and securitized border management, characterized by increased patrols, enhanced military presence at key crossing points, and selective restrictions on cross-border movement.

⁴¹⁰ Military, intelligence, former recruits, family members of recruits, former refugees from Mahama refugee camp in Rwanda, armed group sources, and researchers.

⁴¹¹ Military, intelligence, armed group and Banyamulenge sources, and researchers.

⁴¹² Military, intelligence, armed group and Banyamulenge sources, and researchers.

⁴¹³ Burundian authorities.

Annex 27 (para. 90)

Additional information on the AFC/M23 governance structure

Informations complémentaires sur la structure de gouvernance de l'AFC/M23

In its previous reports, the Group documented the AFC/M23 parallel administration and provided details on nominations and newly installed local authorities, including security and intelligence actors (S/2024/432, annex 25; S/2022/967 annex 23; S/2024/969, paras. 40, 59-61; S/2025/446 annex 16).

New appointments following the takeover of Goma and Bukavu have been publicly announced in AFC/M23 communiqués (see below).

On 6 March 2026, AFC/M23 adopted Decision No. 021/COORD-PR/AFC-M23/2026, formalizing the structure of its Political Coordination and appointing senior administrative officials. Through this decision, AFC/M23 designated:

- Tshisola Kwasa Mukwenu Yannick as Chief of Staff of the Political Coordination (Tshisola was suspended on 16 March 2026; subsequently resigned and replaced by Vicky Ntumba in April 2026⁴¹⁴);
- Ruguduka Baleke Stanislas as Deputy Chief of Staff in charge of political, administrative, legal and diplomatic affairs;
- Nsengiyumva Kajombole Victor as Deputy Chief of Staff responsible for economic, financial and development matters, including resource mobilization.

The decision repealed any prior conflicting provisions and tasked the Permanent Secretary of AFC/M23 with its implementation. The decision was signed in Goma by Bertrand Bisimwa, President of M23 and Deputy Coordinator of AFC/M23 in charge of political, administrative, legal and diplomatic affairs.

Nord Kivu:

Under the same provincial order of 1 April 2026, AFC/M23 designated an extensive network of neighborhood-level authorities across the communes of Goma and Karisimbi, covering both primary and deputy positions.

In the **commune of Goma**, the following appointments were made:

- Dedesi Mitima Jean de Dieu as Chief of the Himbi neighborhood, with Kanane Daniel François as Deputy Chief;
- Fanta Sadiki Bella as Chief of Mapendo, with Mukubwa Rwicha Jean de Dieu as Deputy Chief;
- Mwaka Kubuya Jean as Chief of Lac-Vert, with Tshomba Nicolas as Deputy Chief;
- Namunganga Rahabu Françoise as Chief of Kyeshero I, with Rutagaramba Rugo Etienne as Deputy Chief;
- Ishara Nzabanita Emmanuel as Chief of Kyeshero II, with Zabika Zirirane Jonathan as Deputy Chief;
- Akiza Rwabahenda as Chief of Les Volcans, with Grace Faïda Grady as Deputy Chief;
- Habamungo Kadakala Désiré as Chief of Katindo, with Hategekimana Kabaje Jérémie as Deputy Chief;
- Kambale Sikulikyolo Théophile as Chief of Mikenno, with Safari Sambiri Joseph as Deputy Chief.

In the commune of **Karisimbi**, AFC/M23 appointed:

- Bilingo Masandi Annie as Chief of Mabanga-Nord, with Muhamed Batalingane Lucien as Deputy Chief;
- Nzadi Vikayilwira as Chief of Mabanga-Sud, with Matabaro Mastaki Justin as Deputy Chief;
- Bushu Bulenda Georges as Chief of Katoyi, with Anifa Kavira Mwenge as Deputy Chief;

⁴¹⁴ https://x.com/afcongo/status/2042173815896076509?s=46&t=_n75XfLAiYYaxKQtM7ZzVg

- Bahani Muchinya Sarah as Chief of Kasika, with Obedi Rwabika Léonce as Deputy Chief;
- Habaweze Maliro Germain as Chief of Majengo, with Kavada Balinda as Deputy Chief;
- Busanga Luutu Emile as Chief of Virunga, with Shako Tchomba Souverain as Deputy Chief;
- Nzoloko Akiba Claude as Chief of Mugunga, with Balume Nyirenge Nicodème as Deputy Chief;
- Bahati Lugere Jackson as Chief of Ndosho, with Sadiki Runiha Benjamin as Deputy Chief;
- Gabikire Maguru Ibrahim as Chief of Kahembe, with Mumbere Kavutirwake Michel as Deputy Chief;
- Masinisindano Serge as Chief of Murara, with Mukeyina Brigitte as Deputy Chief;
- Bahemuke Célestin as Chief of Bujovu, with Gafurura Gitsitsi Blaise as Deputy Chief.

Vu l'Arrêté Provincial n°01/005/CAB/GP-NK/2025 du 24 avril 2025 portant organisation et fonctionnement du Cabinet du Gouverneur de la Province du Nord-Kivu ;

Vu l'Arrêté Provincial n°01/007/CAB/GP-NK/2025 du 24 avril 2025 portant nomination des Membres du Cabinet du Gouverneur de la Province du Nord-Kivu ;

Considérant le besoin de doter les quartiers de la Ville de Goma des animateurs capables de répondre aux enjeux actuels de consolidation de paix ;

Vu la nécessité et l'urgence ;

ARRETE :

Article 1^{er} : Sont désignées Chefs de Quartiers et Chefs de Quartiers Adjoints dans la Ville de Goma, les personnes dont les noms, post-noms et prénoms repris ci-dessous en regard de leurs fonctions.

Il s'agit de :

I. COMMUNE DE GOMA		
N°	NOMS, POST-NOMS & PRENOMS	FONCTIONS
1	DEDESI MITIMA Jean de Dieu	Chef de Quartier HIMBI
2	KANANE DANIEL François	Chef de Quartier Adjoint HIMBI
3	FANTA SADIKI Bello	Chef de Quartier MAPENDO
4	MUKUBWA RWICHA Jean de Dieu	Chef de Quartier Adjoint MAPENDO
5	MWAKA KUBUYA Jean	Chef de Quartier LAC-VERT
6	TSHOMBA NICOLAS	Chef de Quartier Adjoint LAC-VERT
7	NAMUNGANGA RAHABU Françoise	Chef de Quartier KYESHERO 1
8	RUTAGARAMBA RUGO Etienne	Chef de Quartier Adjoint KYESHERO 1
9	ISHARA NZABANITA Emmanuel	Chef de Quartier KYESHERO 2
10	ZABIKA ZIRIRANE Jonathan	Chef de Quartier Adjoint KYESHERO 2
11	AKIZA RWABAHENDA	Chef de Quartier LES VOLCANS
12	GRACE FAIDA GRADY	Chef de Quartier Adjoint LES VOLCANS
13	HABAMUNGO KADAKALA Désiré	Chef de Quartier KATINDO
14	HATEGEKIMANA KABAJE Jérémie	Chef de Quartier Adjoint KATINDO
15	KAMBALE SIKULIKYOLO Théophile	Chef de Quartier MIKENO
16	SAFARI SAMBIRI Joseph	Chef de Quartier Adjoint MIKENO
II. COMMUNE DE KARISIMBI		
N°	NOMS, POST-NOMS & PRENOMS	FONCTIONS
1	BILINGO MASANDI Annie	Chef de Quartier MABANGA-NORD
2	MUHAMED BATALINGANE Lucien	Chef de Quartier Adjoint MABANGA-NORD
3	NZADI VIKAYILWIRA	Chef de Quartier MABANGA-SUD
4	MATABARO MASTAKI Justin	Chef de Quartier Adjoint MABANGA-SUD
5	BUSHU BULENDA Georges	Chef de Quartier KATOYI
6	ANIFA KAVIRA MWENGE	Chef de Quartier Adjoint KATOYI

Adresse : Avenue du Lac, Quartier Himbi, Commune de Goma, Goma/RDC
gouverneur@nk2025@gmail.com

7	BAHANI MUCHINYA Sarah	Chef de Quartier KASIKA
8	OBEDI RWABIKA Léonce	Chef de Quartier Adjoint KASIKA
9	HABAZEWE MALIRO Germain	Chef de Quartier MAJENGO
10	KAVADA BALINDA	Chef de Quartier Adjoint MAJENGO
11	BUSANGA LUUTU Emile	Chef de Quartier VIRUNGA
12	SHAKO TCHOMBA Souverain	Chef de Quartier Adjoint VIRUNGA
13	NZOLOKO AKIBA Claude	Chef de Quartier MUGUNGA
14	BALUME NYIRENGE Nicodème	Chef de Quartier Adjoint MUGUNGA
15	BAHATI LUGERE Jackson	Chef de Quartier NDOSHO
16	SADIKI RUNIHA Benjamin	Chef de Quartier Adjoint NDOSHO
17	GABIKIRE MAGURU Ibrahim	Chef de Quartier KAHEMBE
18	MUMBERE KAVUTIRWAKE Michel	Chef de Quartier Adjoint KAHEMBE
19	MASINI SINDANO Serge	Chef de Quartier MURARA
20	MUKEYINA Brigitte	Chef de Quartier Adjoint MURARA
21	BAHEMUKE Célestin	Chef de Quartier BUJOVU
22	GAFURURA GITSITSI Blaise	Chef de Quartier Adjoint BUJOVU

Article 2 : Sont abrogées toutes les dispositions antérieures contraires au présent Arrêté Provincial.

Article 3 : Le Directeur de Cabinet du Gouverneur de Province ainsi que le Maire de Goma sont chargés, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de l'exécution du présent Arrêté Provincial qui sort ses effets à la date de sa signature.

AFC/M22

Fait à Goma, le **01 AVR 2026**

= :BAHATI MUSANGA Erasto :=

Pour copie certifiée conforme à l'Original

Goma, le **01 AVR 2026**

Cabinet du Gouverneur de la Province du Nord-Kivu,

= : **NSANZAMAHORO TENGERA VINCENT** :=

Directeur de Cabinet

PROVINCE DU NORD-KIVU

On 9 April 2026, the AFC/M23-appointed Governor of North Kivu, Bahati Musanga Joseph, also known as Bahati Erasto (S/2024/432, paras. 35, 36 and 102), adopted a provincial order reorganizing key administrative positions within the province. Citing the need to enhance efficiency and effectiveness within the public administration, the order reassigned several senior officials across territorial and municipal functions:

- Katembo Ndaliéni Julien, previously Mayor of Goma, was appointed Administrator of Lubero Territory,
- Kisuba Ngabo Désiré, formerly Deputy Mayor of Goma, was elevated to Mayor of Goma.
- Nshimimana Juvénal, previously head of mobilization and recruitment, was appointed Deputy Mayor of Goma.
- Katembo Isevisya, formerly Administrator in Lubero, was reassigned as Deputy Mayor of Goma.
- Radjabu Kwizera Elle, previously Assistant Territorial Administrator of Lubero, was appointed Deputy Mayor of the Karisimbi commune.
- Munyandekwe Fizi Innocent, formerly Mayor of Kirumba, was reassigned as Assistant Territorial Administrator of Lubero,
- Kavugho Jeanine, previously Deputy Mayor of Kirumba, was appointed Mayor of Kirumba.

2

Vu l'Arrêté Provincial n°01/001/CAB/GP-NK/2025 du 11 février 2025 portant nomination du Directeur de Cabinet du Gouverneur de la Province du Nord-Kivu ;

Vu l'Arrêté Provincial n°01/005/CAB/GP-NK/2025 du 24 avril 2025 portant organisation et fonctionnement du Cabinet du Gouverneur de la Province du Nord-Kivu ;

Considérant la nécessité de procéder à la permutation de quelques Cadres de l'Administration Publique dans la Province du Nord-Kivu pour des raisons d'efficacité et d'efficacité ;

Vu l'urgence et la nécessité ;

ARRETE :

Article 1^{er} : Sont permuetées de leurs postes d'attache les personnes ci-après dont les fonctions sont reprises en regard de leurs noms et post-noms.

Il s'agit de :

N°	NOMS ET POST-NOMS	ANCIENNE AFFECTATION	NOUVELLE AFFECTATION
01	KATEMBO NDALIENI Julien	Maire de GOMA	Administrateur du Territoire de LUBERO
02	KISUBA NGABO Désiré	Maire Adjoint de GOMA	Maire de GOMA
03	NSHIMIMANA Juvénal	Chef d'Equipe de Mobilisation et Recrutement	Maire Adjoint de GOMA
04	KATEMBO ISEVISYA	Administrateur du Territoire de LUBERO	Bourgmestre Adjoint de la Commune de GOMA
05	RADJABU KWIZERA Elle	Administrateur du Territoire Assistant de LUBERO	Bourgmestre Adjoint de la Commune de KARISIMBI
06	MUNYANDEKWE FIZI Innocent	Bourgmestre de la Commune de KIRUMBA	Administrateur du Territoire Assistant de LUBERO
07	KAVUGHO Jeanine	Bourgmestre Adjoint de la Commune de KIRUMBA	Bourgmestre de la Commune de KIRUMBA

Article 2 : Sont abrogées toutes les dispositions antérieures contraires au présent Arrêté Provincial.

Article 3 : Le Directeur de Cabinet du Gouverneur de Province est chargé de l'exécution du présent Arrêté Provincial qui sort ses effets à la date de sa signature.

Fait à Goma, le **09 AVR 2026**

= : BAHATI MUSANGA Erasto ;=

Pour copie certifiée conforme à l'Original
Goma, le **09 AVR 2026**
Cabinet du Gouverneur de la Province du Nord-Kivu,
= : NSANZAMAHORO PENGHA VINCENT
Directeur de Cabinet

Adresse : Avenue du Lac, Quartier Himbi, Commune de Goma, Goma/ROC
E-mail : gouvemoratn2025@gmail.com

Order signed by the AFC/M23 appointed governor of North Kivu. Document received from an economic actor.


Annex 28 (para. 91)

Official records of AFC/M23 codified list of taxes applicable in areas under its control

Documents officiels relatifs à la nomenclature codifiée des taxes de l'AFC/M23 applicables dans les zones sous son contrôle.

AFC/M23 published a Tax code distinguishing direct taxes ⁴¹⁵ – including on personal and corporate income – from other categories of taxes, and specified for each levy the taxable event, periodicity, and applicable rate. The code has set out a structured and comprehensive revenue framework for AFC/M23.

On 24 March 2026, in Goma, AFC/M23 officially launched the new fiscal nomenclature for territories under its control in North and South Kivu provinces.⁴¹⁶ The initiative was led by the AFC/M23's Coordination through its Finance Department, represented by the Deputy Head of Finance, Fanny Kaj Kayembe, in the presence of the Vice-Governor in charge of finance, economy and development, Chadrack Amani Bahati, as well as provincial financial sector authorities (customs, tax, etc.) and members of the Federation of Enterprises of the Congo (FEC).



Document received from AFC/M23 sources.


⁴¹⁵ The document is on file with the Secretariat.

⁴¹⁶ [GOMA: L' AFC M23 LANCE OFFICIELLEMENT UNE NOUVELLE NOMANCLATURE](#)

AFC/M23 information campaign for the dissemination of its tax code⁴¹⁷

Following the publication of its Tax code, AFC/M23 conducted large dissemination within the territories under its control in eastern DRC.

On 27 March, AFC/M23 Governor for South Kivu convened all Congolese States provincial directors and heads of divisions of public services, including mines, customs, tax, migration, agriculture, states water company (REGIDESO) and electricity (SNEL) companies, and AFC/M23 local authorities to attend a meeting dedicated to the presentation and dissemination of the AFC/M23 tax code. On 28 March 2026, in Bukavu, the Deputy Head of the AFC/M23 Finance Department, Fanny Kaj Kayemb, handed over the new tax nomenclature to the Governor of South Kivu, Busu Bwa Ngwi Shombo Patrick.⁴¹⁸



Document received from AFC/M23 sources.

⁴¹⁷ AFC-Alliance Fleuve Congo on X: "AFC/M23 : UNE RÉVOLUTION FISCALE EN GESTATION POUR LIBÉRER LA RDC DE L'ARBITRAIRE Pendant que l'ancien pouvoir de Kinshasa laissait prospérer une fiscalité chaotique, étouffante et gangrenée par les prélèvements fantômes, l'AFC/M23 pose aujourd'hui les bases d'une réforme <https://t.co/IgispB21Gu>" / X


⁴¹⁸ CONGO RÉVOLUTION on X: "Ce samedi 28 mars 2028 à Bukavu, la cheffe adjointe du département des finances de l'AFC/M23, @FannyKaj1, a remis au gouverneur du Sud-Kivu la nouvelle nomenclature. Sur 536 taxes et impôts de l'ancienne nomenclature, 225 sont maintenus, soit un écart de 311, ou 60 %. <https://t.co/I557YHscuT>" / X

Annex 29 (para. 92)

AF/M23 Finance department letter issued to a private company in Goma for the collection of taxes

Correspondance du département des finances de l'AFC/M23 adressée à une entreprise privée à Goma pour la collecte des taxes

The Group obtained a tax enforcement notice issued by the AFC/M23 provincial finance coordination in North Kivu through the Karisimbi-Nyiragongo revenue operations center. The notice instructed a private economic operator to present themselves within five days to declare and settle outstanding liabilities, including property tax, rental income tax, and other applicable duties and fees. It further indicated that failure to comply would result in ex officio tax assessment with penalties.



Document received from a confidential source.

Annex 30 (para. 92)

Examples of AFC/M23 issued receipts for taxes and fees

Exemples des reçus émis par l'AFC/M23 pour des taxes et autres paiements

1. AFC/M23 issued receipt through CADECO payment slips for “custom fees” payment

Payment fees delivered by the AFC/M23 following the issuance of a construction permit using a receipt of CADECO.

The image shows two documents. The top document is a CADECO payment slip, which is a form with various fields and a stamp. The bottom document is an AFC/M23 receipt, which is a form with a table and a section for the ordonnateur to fill out. The table has columns for 'X' and 'Montant du Versement'. The section for the ordonnateur is titled '2. A REMPLIR PAR L'ORDONNATEUR' and contains handwritten text 'Favorable'.

Province

Exp

CADECO

Mod. 3

CAISSE GENERALE D'EPARGNE

DU CONGO

SUCCURSALE DE

Montant du Versement

Observation

Signature

2. A REMPLIR PAR L'ORDONNATEUR

Avis de l'Ordonnateur

Montant ordonné : en chiffres

en lettres (francs fiscaux)

Le paiement doit intervenir

Date d'ordonnancement

Favorable

F.C./S

sous peine de pénalité

Document obtained from confidential armed group source

2. AFC/M23 ticket for a traffic notice amounting to \$100 as per AFC/M23 tax code

The Group obtained a traffic violation notice issued by the AFC/M23 “Revolutionary Police” traffic unit in Goma, documenting the enforcement of road regulations. The notice recorded a fine of USD 100 imposed on a driver for driving under the influence of alcohol.

ALLIANCE FLEUVE CONGO / M23
POLICE DE REVOLUTIONNAIRE
POLICE DE CIRCULATION ROUTIERE
ESCADRON DE GOMA

CONTRAVENTION ROUTIERE PCR/ESCG/20

1. IDENTIFICATION DU VEHICULE

Date: _____
Genre: _____ TYPE: _____ Marque: _____
Plaque: _____
Propriétaire: _____ Tél: _____
Conducteur: _____ Tél: _____
Permis de conduire No _____ Validité _____

2. DOCUMENTS SAISIS


3. INFRACTIONS CONSTATEES

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____


CONTRAVENANT _____ AGENT QUALIFIE _____

Document illustrating traffic fine applied by AFC/M23, received from a confidential source.

3. AFC/M23 issued receipt illustrating exit visa fee from the DRC territory for seven days as per the provision of article I.2.1 of AFC/M23 tax code.



AFC/M23 issued token illustrating exit visa fee from the DRC territory as per article I.2.1(1) of AFC/M23 tax code.



Documents received from a confidential source.

Annex 31 (para. 93)

AFC/M23 took control of the national electricity (SNEL) water utility (REGIDESO) companies in territories under its control.

L’AFC/M23 a pris le contrôle de la société nationale d’électricité (SNEL) et de la Régie de distribution d’eau (REGIDESO) dans les territoires sous son contrôle

On 5 March 2026 in Goma, AFC/M23 Permanent Secretary and Head of the Executive, Benjamin Mbonimpa, convened the management of SNEL and REGIDESO, in the presence of the AFC/M23-appointed Governor of South Kivu and the deputy head of the finance department, to announce AFC/M23 take over both SNEL and Regideso.

AFC/M23 subsequently placed both SNEL and Regideso under the administrative authority of provincial governors and the financial oversight of its finance department, while mandating the centralizing and banking all revenues of these entities under a “single window” system.⁴¹⁹


⁴¹⁹ (163) L’AFC-M23 pour une réadaptation du mode de gestion technique et financière de la SNEL et la Regideso - YouTube

Annex 32 (para. 93)

AFC/M23-linked Imperial Assur Insurance company


Société d'assurance Imperial Assur liée à l'AFC/M23

AFC/M23 facilitated the replacement of existing insurance companies, in particular the National Insurance Company (SONAS) with new entities such as Imperial Assur,⁴²⁰ which began operations in mid-2025. The Group obtained copies of official notices issued by AFC/M23 mandating compulsory third-party liability insurance for all vehicles and transport operators. The notice in South Kivu designated Imperial Assur as the provider responsible for delivering insurance services and set a two-week compliance period, after which enforcement measures—including vehicle checks, immobilization, and impoundment—would be implemented.



Communiqué by the AFC/M23 appointed mayor of Bukavu. Document received from AFC/M23 source.

⁴²⁰ Sud-Kivu : Imperial Assur lance ses activités à Bukavu - Radio Maendeleo



Communiqué of the AFC/M23-appointed governor for North Kivu. Document received from AFC/M23 source.

Imperial Assur-issued administrative and commercial documents

The Group obtained a set of administrative and commercial documents evidencing the sequential process required for vehicle regularization in areas under AFC/M23 control. These included a receipt issued by the Congolese State provincial *Bureau d'Enregistrement et de Développement (BED)* for vehicle registration (USD 50), a corresponding registration certificate valid for one year, and insurance documentation issued by *Imperial Assur*. The registration certificate identified the vehicle, owner, and validity period.

Insurance documentation reviewed by the Group included payment receipts and certificates issued by *Imperial Assur* for multiple vehicles, indicating standardized third-party liability coverage ("responsabilité civile") for defined durations (typically three to six months). Premiums observed range between USD 107 and USD 690 depending on vehicle category and duration.

Receipts evidencing insurance coverage with Imperial Assur.

BED
Bureau d'enregistrement et de développement (BED)
Adresse: 141. AV. Patrice Emery LUMUMBA,
Q. Nderere, Commune d'IBANDA, Ville de BUKAVU
Email: bedcongoinfo@gmail.com / Tél: +243 849098277

REÇU N° [REDACTED]

En Chiffres [REDACTED]

REÇU DE: [REDACTED]

La somme de (en toute lettres) [REDACTED]

Pour: [REDACTED]

Signature [REDACTED]

IDENTIFICATION DU CLIENT	
Nom [REDACTED]	Adresse Physique [REDACTED]
Prénoms [REDACTED]	Nature Document Identité [REDACTED]
Téléphone [REDACTED]	Numéro Document [REDACTED]
Email [REDACTED]	

IDENTIFICATION DU VEHICULE	
Immatriculation [REDACTED]	Puissance Fiscale (CV) [REDACTED]
Numéro Chassis [REDACTED]	Matr. [REDACTED]
Marque [REDACTED]	Année de Fabrication [REDACTED]
Type de Véhicule [REDACTED]	Année de mise en circulation [REDACTED]
Modèle [REDACTED]	Couleur [REDACTED]
Nombre de sièges [REDACTED]	Usage [REDACTED]
	Durée (Mois) [REDACTED]

IMPERIAL ASSUR
AGENCEMENT 2018

VERIFICAT D'ASSURANCE
Réf: CRT-ED-
152193015210L01555

Nombre Police :
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Date d'expiration :
[REDACTED]
Date d'activation :
[REDACTED]
Garde :
[REDACTED]
Montre :
[REDACTED]
Indemnité Montre Chaudron (MCC) :
[REDACTED]
Indemnité Occupant Auto (IOA) :
[REDACTED]
Montre FIC :
[REDACTED]

Nombre d'immobilisations :
[REDACTED]
Nombre de cycles :
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Montre d'attente / Cycle :
[REDACTED]
Nombre de cycles :
[REDACTED]
Valeur estimée du véhicule :
[REDACTED]
Valeur de l'assurance :
[REDACTED]

Cachet et Signature de l'assureur

IMPERIAL ASSUR
AGENCEMENT 2018

Ce document est émis par IMPERIAL ASSUR, une société certifiée. Toute reproduction est interdite.

N° BEO : 14441979109
Branch : Agence de Bukavu
POS : P03005
NIF : A12345678
Téléphone : +243979395793 / +243912717115
Email : contact@imperialassur.org / contact.bukavu@imperialassur.org

Documents obtained from confidential source.

Annex 33 (para. 94)


AFC/M23 - Financial intermediation and emergence of parallel banking channels

AFC/M23 – Intermédiation financière et émergence de circuits bancaires parallèles

The Group documented the emergence of financial intermediation mechanisms operating within areas under AFC/M23 control, such as “Accès Finance S.A.”,⁴²¹⁴²²⁴²³ which presented itself as a financial institution offering deposit, transfer and account-based services. The company was operational in Goma and Rubaya, with planned expansion to Bukavu.

Account documentation from January 2026, including client identification details and account numbers, indicated that individuals were able to open and operate accounts through this entity. AFC/M23 promoted Access Finance S.A., expanding financial intermediation in areas under its control and potentially enabling oversight and capture of financial flows.⁴²⁴

No publicly verifiable evidence of regulatory authorization from the Central Bank of the Congo exists for this company, nor confirmation of its inclusion among licensed banks, microfinance institutions, or electronic money issuers. The activities of Accès Finance indicate the provision of financial services outside the State financial system, contributing to the development of parallel financial channels benefiting AFC/M23.



⁴²¹ Official / primary web presence: <https://accesfinance.africa> also appears as: <https://www.accesfinance.africa>)

⁴²² App distribution: Google Play listing:

<https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.banksoft.client.accessFinance>

⁴²³ LinkedIn: <https://cd.linkedin.com/company/acces-finance>

YouTube (example video): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5kOWihG3WPg>

Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/100067446540898/videos/-bonne-nouvelle-pour-la-population-de-goma-sous-l'autorit%C3%A9-de-lafcm23-la-stabilit/1608550256803084/>

⁴²⁴ <https://www.facebook.com/m23twirwaneho/videos/rdc-rubaya-acces-finance-une-nouvelle-banque-op%C3%A9rant-dans-le-nord-kivu-territoire/1272577938091509/>

AF www.accesfinance.africa
www.accesfinances.net
contact@accesfinance.net
10, Boulevard Kanyamuhanga, Quartier
les Volcans, Commune de Goma, Ville Goma

AF **Accès Finance**
Votre partenaire Épargne-Répère

Nom du Compte : [REDACTED]
Code Client : [REDACTED]
Numero Compte : [REDACTED]
Date de creation: [REDACTED]

Merci d'avoir choisi Accès Finance SA. Votre confiance nous honore et nous
engageââtre à vos côtés pour réaliser vos projets et bâtir ensemble
un avenir prospère.

Documents obtained from confidential source.

Annex 34 (para. 105)

Documents relating to the attempt to establish a « Coalition nationale des Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie » in December 2025

Documents relatifs à la tentative d'établir une « Coalition nationale des Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie » en décembre 2025

**COMMISSION PRÉPARATOIRE ELECTIVE DU DIRECTOIRE EXÉCUTIF
NATIONAL DE LA COALITION DES VDP- WAZALENDO EN RD CONGO**

Tél (+243)815807743/995546010/838806210

E-mail: coanatvdpwazalendo@gmail.com

À la particulière attention des Responsables des mouvements ou groupes des VDP –WAZALENDO de la RD Congo, Tous, avec pouvoir de Représentation par procuration spéciale ;

Qualité : Délégué à l'Élection / Membre de la Commission / Personnalité Invitée

Messieurs ou Mesdames les Responsables des mouvements ou groupes des VDP – WAZALENDO de la RD Congo, Tous, avec pouvoir de Représentation par procuration spéciale ;

Votre Commission Préparatoire électorale a l'honneur et l'urgence de vous convier à l'étape finale et historique de la mise en place de notre Directoire National.

Cette cérémonie marquera l'aboutissement de nos efforts d'unification derrière la vision du Chef de l'État, S.E. Félix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo, et condensera en trois heures les phases cruciales suivantes : l'Élection, la Proclamation des résultats et l'Installation des membres du Directoire Exécutif National.

Détails de l'événement	
Date	Samedi 13 Décembre 2025
Heure	12h00 précises (Clôture impérative à 18h00)
Lieu	Salle LA REINE DE LA PAIX, GOMBE, en diagonal de l'INRB, Huileries, Kinshasa
Tenue	Tenue de ville

Votre ponctualité est essentielle pour le bon déroulement du processus électoral (pour les postes compétitifs) et pour le respect du chronogramme serré.

Veuillez agréer, **Monsieur le Chef d'État-Major-Général des FARDC**, l'expression de notre très haute considération et de notre engagement patriotique.

Fait à Kinshasa, le 10/12/2025



Me Richard PALUKU, Président de la Commission Préparatoire Élective

CHRONOGRAMME DÉTAILLÉ FINAL DE L'ACTIVITÉ

Événement : Mise en place du Directoire Exécutif National de la Coalition VDP-WAZALENDO

Lieu : Kinshasa Période : 12h00 précises à 18h00

Heure (Début)	Heure (Fin)	Durée	Phase de l'Événement	Activité Principale	Responsable
12h00	12h25	25 min	1. ÉLECTION / VOTE	Accueil des Délégués et Participants, Remise de la Brochure de Présentation Institutionnelle Stratégique de la Coalition Nationale VDP/WAZALENDO et Démarrage immédiat du Vote pour les postes compétitifs.	Commission/P protocole
12h25	12h40	15 min	2. TRANSITION / ANALYSE	Clôture des opérations de vote, Mot de la Commission et lecture du Rapport Synthétique des travaux préparatoires.	Président de la Commission
12h40	13h10	30 min	3. PROCLAMATION DES RÉSULTATS	PROCLAMATION OFFICIELLE et définitive des 23 membres élus et désignés (y compris les postes par cooptation).	Secrétaire Rapporteur
13h10	13h40	30 min	4. INSTALLATION OFFICIELLE	Lecture des Actes d'Investiture et Cérémonie de Prestation de Serment des membres du Directoire.	Doyen d'âge
13h40	14h00	20 min	5. ORIENTATION	Discours d'Orientation du nouveau Président du Directoire Exécutif National. ¹⁰	Nouveau Président du Directoire ¹¹
14h00	14h45	45 min	6. TRAVAUX INITIAUX (Urgence)	Première session de travail : Adoption du Règlement Intérieur du Directoire.	Directoire Exécutif National
14h45	15h00	15 min	7. CLÔTURE OFFICIELLE	Lecture des résolutions (si nécessaire), Photos de Famille et Fin de la cérémonie formelle.	Président du Directoire
15h00	16h00	60 min	8. POINT DE PRESSE	Conférence de presse du nouveau Directoire Exécutif National (DEN) avec les médias nationaux et internationaux.	Porte-Parole du DEN
16h00	18h00	2h00	9. COCKTAIL & ÉCHANGES	Réception, cocktail et échanges protocolaires entre les membres du Directoire, les autorités invitées et les délégués.	Protocole/Organisation
18h00			FIN DE L'ÉVÉNEMENT	Clôture impérative du site.	

Fait à Kinshasa, le 10/12/2025

Me Richard PALUKU



Président de la Commission Préparatoire Élective

LISTE DES MEMBRES DU DIRECTOIRE EXECUTIF NATIONAL DE LA COALITION NATIONALE DES PATRIOTES (VDP/WAZALENDU) EN RDC.

Fonction / Rôle	Nom / Prénom et Contacts	Observations
MEMBRES DU CONSEIL D'ADMINISTRATION		
Président du Conseil d'Administration	Hon. Prince Willy MISHIKI BUIHINI	
MEMBRES DU DIRECTOIRE EXECUTIF NATIONAL		
Président National	Dashy Suleh Idr Emmanuel	
1 ^{er} Vice-Président National	WABWELWA KIWIILA Duhon	
2 ^{ème} Vice-Président National	OMBWA SHAPEPE MUNABAKASAMBE	
3 ^{ème} Vice-Président National	ENGE LOMBE Gérard	
Porte-Parole	ASSANDA MWENEBATU Joseph	
Porte-Parole adjoint	AKILI MAGAYANE KUAMBILIWA	

solidarité nationale, affaires humanitaire, genre, femme et famille		
Secrétariat National (SN) / Chargé des affaires coutumières, traditionnelle, culturelles et mystico- religieuse	SELEMANI BWAMI KITUNDA [REDACTED]	
Membre rattaché (Affaires coutumières)	KAKULE SAHANI MONILPH [REDACTED]	
Membre rattaché (Affaires coutumières)	JOSEPHINE MURIMANYA CIRUZA [REDACTED]	
Secrétariat National (SN) / Chargé de la Mobilisation, RH et Organisations des missions	NELIBIZI AIMABLE [REDACTED]	
Secrétariat National (SN) / Chargé des affaires politiques, relations avec les institutions, FARDC et PNC		
Membre rattaché (Affaires Politiques)	BWETSHIA KABENGELE HUGOR [REDACTED]	
Membre rattaché (Relation avec les institutions, FARDC et PNC)	GUSTAVO FRANCISCO KASONGO [REDACTED]	

Secrétariat National (SN) / Chargé des Affaires Juridiques	Me PALUKU MATOFALI GUY RICHARD SAMUEL [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Secrétariat National (SN) / Chargé des Relations Interprovinciales	Monsieur BUSHENYULA CIHEBEYE CHRISTIAN [REDACTED]	

Documents received from Wazalendo and DRC government sources

Annex 35 (para. 109)

Wazalendo armed groups and “generals” active in southern South Kivu in early December 2025

Groupes armés Wazalendo et « généraux » actifs dans le sud du Sud-Kivu au début du mois de décembre 2025.

2

I. EFFECTIFS DES COMBATTANTS ENGAGES AUX FRONTS

N°	GROUPE ARME	LOCALISATION	RESPONSABLE	GRADE	EFFECTIF
1	FPL	LUBARIKA	ALEXIS MWAMBA DUNIA	Lt Gén. -	3786
2	COPACO	ZIRALO	KIRIKICHO MIRIMBA	-	675
3	RM	BUNYAKIRI/KALEHE	MUNGORO MATOFALI	-	517
4	APL	LUSAMBO	MAYELE WILONDJA RASHIDI	-	450
5	CNPSC	BABENGWA	AMURI WILLIAM YAKOTUMBA	-	362
6	CPLC/FABB	KABANJA	KALEMBE NGOMANZITO	-	1093
7	MPLC/FPLC	KALONGE	RENE MUKANDAMA ITONGWA	-	546
8	MNLC	KAGOGO	KASHUMBA MUSAGARA	-	254
9	UCAC	MUNANIRA	JEAN NALUBE	-	322
10	UPCB	MASANGO	ILUNGA RUSESEMA	-	1080
11	LPCC	MASANGO RUDEFU	MUHUBIRI MUSHOMBE PACIFIQUE	-	511
12	MPDAC	KAGOGO	OMARI NAMUTAGA	-	176
13	FPDP	KITALA	KURUNINGA VENANCE	-	112
14	MRPC	BUTUMBA	AMURI MAMADOU	-	234
15	FPCC	LUHITO	NYERERE BUNANA	-	256
16	MAIMAI NDONDI	KATOBO	NDONDI	-	121
17	URCOP	KIRAMBI	KASHOLOGOSI BIRASI JOHN	-	233
18	MDP	RUBANGA	MAKANAKI KASIMBIRA JOHN	-	123
19	MAIMAI PATRON	MASANGO 2	PATRON	-	125
20	FPC	LULAMBO	MCHINGWA	-	231
21	MAIMAI TORONTO	LWEBE	TORONTO	-	424
22	MAIMAI REUNION	MAKYAKA	REUNION	-	112
23	GPE DE JEUNES	MALINGI	MAMASA KAJIWEKA	-	343
24	MULC	KISEKE	MILENGE ISHIBONANE ZELAMBUMA	-	162

3

25	FCLP	NANINDI	E'A MUKINA CESAR	-	454
26	MAIMAI ISHIBWELA	KONGWE	ISHIBWELA WAELENGO	-	277
27	MAIMAI ANGULU	ACIKA	ICIMBOELO	-	124
28	MAIMAI AOCI	KIPOMBO	AOCI WITANDA	-	156
29	MCVA	LUBUMBA	ISSA MUTOKA NGUVU ZA MILIMA	-	378
30	MAIMAI LWISULA	MIKI	KWISULA KISALE C'ARRIVE	-	132
31	FPDC	KIPUPU	KIBUKILA MUTETEZI TRESOR	-	521
32	MAIMAI MUPEKENYA	MATHETA	LWIKO	-	241
33	FDCC	TUWETUWE	KAKOBANYA NAKALAMBI	-	345
34	MAIMAI NAKILIBA	KIGOGO	NAKILIBA MATEBURA	-	224
35	MAIMAI ACTION	MUHUZI	ACTION LEOPOLD	-	184
36	UPC	MUKUTU	RUMA HONDWA	-	134
37	RM	NYAMIBUNGU	IBANDA WABENGA	-	642
38	RM	CIRONGE	MUS MUBANGO SAFARI	-	321
39	APDC/RM	KASHESHI/KASHIMBA	GASTON LUKISA BLAISE	-	883
40	RM	MUPOKE	LUKOBAMUNINGA	-	124
41	RM	LWAMBA	WINDELA KAFUMA	-	320
42	RM	MUMBILI	100 KILOS WABULA	-	123
43	RM	LUYULU	KIMBA MUSAFIRI	-	131
44	RM	MIGELE	MUKAMBA BOZY	-	89
45	RM	BWANA HALI	KABALA MUSUMBU	-	476
46	MAIMAI KIMPENZE	WAMITI	BIMPENZE MANZYA	-	454
47	MAIMAI	KITINDI	MAKINDU	-	467

48	MAIMAI SHUSHA	LWEKA	VANDAME	-	143
49	MPDAC	KAGOGO	RUKUMETA PIERRE	-	504
50	KIBALO KYETU	MASANGO	JULES MAVAZI	-	215
51	LANDA BANGO	KIRUNGU	HURUMA LANDA BANGO	-	118
52	MMK	SANGE	KAMAMA MBIGIRWA	-	1213
53	UPCN	LEMERA	JOGO BYAMUNGU	-	106
54	FABB-A	MIRIMBA	ASSANI MBAKANI	-	122
55	CPDC	LULENGE	MEDI YEREMIA	-	111
56	MPLC/SEBA	LUVUNGI	SEBASTIEN NAMULERHA	-	143
57	UPCRN	MINOVA	GENTIL TUUNGANE	-	345
58	GAM	SEBELE	OLIVIER KIZA	-	130
59	FPDP/RDC	NYAMUTIRI	EMMANUEL MBOLE	-	267
60	AFPDC	LUBERIZI	MAMAN CLAUDINE	-	127
61	CNL/FAP	LUBERIZI	MWENYEMALI YOSHUA	-	87
62	UPN	LUVUNGI	DORCAS NDAMUSO ABDOU	-	288
63	PNCN	MULENGE	TUNDWA EFESO	-	75
64	UCL	KAHANDA	KIJANGALA MUTONGA	-	61
65	FAP	LANGALA/LEMERA	NAKAMBOGO NDEGESHA	-	43
66	MALAIKA	MULANGABALA/KASO NGO	IMANI MANDEVU	-	470
67	MALAIKA	MACHAPANO/NAMO YA	KABALA SELEMANI	-	300
68	UPPD/RDC	KAZIBA WALUNGU	POUTINE RIZIKI	-	402
69	MCDPIN/RAD	KALEHE HAUTS PLATEAUX	HAGUMA RUKEBA MIKE MIKE	-	783
70	PDNC	MULUME MUNENE	OLAME CHRISTOPHE	-	251
71	M. MAHESHE	WALUNGU	MAHESHE	-	302
72	M. NYAMBABA	WALUNGU	JOSUE NYAMABA	-	301
73	APDC/RAD	KALEHE	BAHIGE/KALUME	-	854
74	UPDC/RM	WALUNGU	MAATABARO JESUS	-	600
75	RM	MWEMA	KALUME MUKANIWA KIWIS	-	256
76	MRPDP	KATOBO	MECHACK RADI	-	110
77	FARC	BIJOMBO/ISHENGE	SAMUEL MAYELE CLEVER	-	400
SOUS TOTAL					29744

Commentaire : Des ces effectifs comme l'indique le tableau ci-dessus, il y a dans les 29744 éléments engagés sur les lignes des fronts, quelques centaines des combattants venus du Maniema et du Tanganyika.

Document received from a confidential source.

Annex 36 (para. 120)

Food rations and other support provided to Wazalendo groups in South Kivu

Rations alimentaires et autres formes de soutien fournies aux groupes wazalendo au Sud-Kivu


RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET ANCIENS
COMBATTANTS
RESERVE ARMÉE DE LA DÉFENSE « RAD »
COALITION NATIONALE DES VOLONTAIRES POUR LA DÉFENSE
DE LA PATRIE / SENTINELLE DE LA RDC
CN-VDP/S - RDC
Tel : +243 975473189/811358410


N°002/KM/COORD/ WAZ/ RDC/2026
 Uvira, le 14 avril 2026

Transmis copie pour information à :

- A Monsieur le Commandant de la 33^e région militaire,
- Commandant secteur Sokola 2 Sud Sud-Kivu
Tous à Uvira.

Objet : Accusez de réception de vivres
 A Monsieur le Commandant axe opérationnel
 Makobola-Uvira
 A **Uvira.**

Mon commandant,

Nous avons l'honneur de vous transmettre, ce

dont l'objet reprend en marge.

En effet, Nous accusons réception, en date du 13 avril 2026, du don du Président de la République destiné aux volontaires pour la défense de la patrie, composé de : 50 sacs de farine de maïs, 50 sacs de riz, 25 sacs de haricots, 18 sacs de sucre, 9 cartons de sardines et 3 bidons d'huile de palme auprès du T4 de l'axe opérationnel Makobola-Uvira.

Nous exprimons au Chef de l'État notre profonde gratitude.

Restants fidèles à sa vision et aux institutions de la République, nous lui attachons notre soutien indéfectible pour la paix et la restauration de l'autorité de l'État.

Nos sentiments patriotiques.

Pour la coalition nationale


KAMAMA MBIGIRWA
 Commandant de la coalition

Annex 37 (para. 124)


CNPSC – Structured taxation system and sectoral revenue framework

CNPSC – Système de taxation structuré et cadre sectoriel de génération de revenus


The Group obtained a circular issued by the “Bureau des finances” of the CNPSC, under the label “Réserve armée de défense” (RAD), outlining a coordinated system of taxation across areas under its influence. The document, presented as a formal fiscal directive, framed taxation as a contribution to the “effort de guerre” and was addressed to administrative structures at sector, groupement, and village levels, indicating an organized chain of dissemination and enforcement.

The taxation framework established fixed and standardized tax across a wide range of economic actors and sectors. These included commercial entities and service providers such as agencies (USD 1,000), motorcycle associations (USD 1,000), cooperatives and traders (USD 2,000–5,000), hotels and bars (USD 3,000), and transport-related actors, including tankers (USD 5,000). The system further targeted productive sectors and supply chains, including mining cooperatives (USD 2,000), gold processing equipment such as generators and crushing tools (up to USD 5,000), fishing-related activities, timber depots, and agricultural services.

In addition, the framework imposed sector-specific charges on essential and small-scale economic activities, including restaurants (USD 2,000), pharmacies (USD 1,000), hydraulic associations (USD 500), and waste management services (USD 5,000). The inclusion of both large-scale and subsistence-level actors suggests an effort to maximize revenue extraction across the full spectrum of local economic activity. The document also referenced a “50 per cent share” linked to “state services”..



1. AGENCE : 1.000 \$ Par Agence
2. ASSOCIATION DE MOTARD : 1.000 \$ Par Association
3. CONCASIER : En Générale : 5.000 \$
4. FEC : 5.000 \$
5. TRAITEMENT DE DECHETS : Par unité 5.000 \$
6. Les Négociants : 5.000\$
 - Machine pour bruler l'or en Général : 5.000 \$
7. MARTON PIQUEUR en Général : 5.000 \$
8. P.P.O : Selon le puits influant 1.000 \$
9. LES SERVICES DEL' ETAT 50 %
 - D agri : 500 \$
 - KAPATA : 500 \$
10. Bisima ya maji : 1.000\$
11. Association des Hydrauliques ; 500\$
12. BOITE et HOTEL en général : 3.000 \$
13. Grand Maisons négociants : 5.000\$ (Négociants)
14. Police Routière : 1.000 \$
15. D.MAP : 1.000 \$ (Voir Pablo)
16. Coopératives Minières : 2.000\$
17. Kasomba en Général: 2.000\$
18. Lotéristes : 3.000\$
18. Tankiers en Général : 5.000\$



Document obtained from confidential Wazalendo source, military intelligence, mine operators, and mining services.


Annex 38 (para. 125)

CNPSC – documents evidencing the exercise of quasi-judicial authority


CNPSC – documents attestant l'exercice des fonctions quasi judiciaires

1. Closure orders evidencing sustained judicial enforcement and regulatory control over mining activities (December 2023–August 2026)

The Group obtained official “closure orders” (“ordres de fermeture”) issued by the CNPSC’s “Bureau de la justice”, directing the suspension of mining activities at identified sites in areas under its influence, including locations in Ngoma and Misisi, in Fizi territory. The documents identified responsible individuals, specified the affected mining sites, and indicated dates of enforcement spanning multiple years (including 18 December 2023 and 23 August 2026), suggesting continuity in the exercise of authority over time. The orders further state that all extraction activities had to cease immediately and warned that any violation would result in arrest and referral to CNPSC “justice” authorities.



Document obtained from confidential mine pit owners and Wazalendo source



Document obtained from confidential mine pit owners and Wazalendo source.

2. CNPSC “Justice” - Official summons (“invitation”) issued to a mine pit owner.


The Group obtained an official summons (“invitation”) issued by the CNPSC under its “Justice” structure, requiring a named individual to appear before a judicial office in Ngoma on a specified date (18 December 2024).



Document obtained from confidential source.

3. Judicial records evidencing the exercise of quasi-judicial authority

The Group obtained multiple handwritten judicial documents issued under the authority of the CNPSC “Department of Justice,” including a formal judgment relating to a dispute between private individuals. The documents identified the parties involved, outlined the facts of the case, and recorded findings following an investigation conducted by CNPSC-affiliated authorities. They included references to evidentiary elements, witness statements, and the reasoning underpinning the decision, and were signed by designated judicial officials, with references to a “High Council” authority. The documents had official stamps and indicated dates and locations of issuance (e.g., Ngoma, April 2022).



Document obtained from confidential source.

Annex 39 (para. 132)

Letter from Victor Byiringiro the FDLR “President” addressed to the U.S. President, and FDLR manifest received in April 2026

Lettre adressée par Victor Byiringiro, « Président » des FDLR, au Président des États-Unis, et le manifeste FDLR reçu en avril 2026

(1) Letter addressed to the U.S President by the president of FDLR



BUREAU DU PRESIDENT / IBIRO BYA PEREZIDA / OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Homepage: <https://urugaga.org> Tel: +243 858 820 862 Email: fdlr2020@proton.me

A Son Excellence Monsieur le Président des États-Unis d'Amérique
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington, DC 20500
USA

Le 02 Juillet 2025

Objet : Contribution des Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda pour ramener la paix dans la Région des Grands Lacs Africains.

Monsieur le Président

Permettez-nous de vous adresser, avec tout le respect dû à votre haute fonction, nos sincères félicitations pour la signature de l'Accord de paix de Washington intervenue le 27 Juin 2025 entre la République Démocratique du Congo et la République du Rwanda. Vous avez brillamment réussi dans les délais record où d'innombrables acteurs ont échoué pendant trois (3) décennies d'insécurité à l'Est de la République Démocratique du Congo.

Les Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) accueillent favorablement et soutiennent toutes les initiatives sincères visant à ramener une paix véritable et durable dans la Région des Grands Lacs Africains (RGLA) en mettant fin définitivement aux conflits armés récurrents qui ravagent la Région depuis plus de trois décennies et qui avaient déjà coûté la vie à plus de dix (10) millions d'êtres humains en RDC (ex-Zaïre) en 2010 (cfr le rapport Mapping de l'ONU, 2010, toujours classé sans suite et le rapport Gersony).

Les FDLR remercient toutes les personnes physiques ou morales qui ont œuvré pendant ces trois décennies passées à trouver les voies et moyens pour résoudre l'épineux problème de l'insécurité persistante dans la RGLA. Elles remercient particulièrement le Président américain M. Donald TRUMP qui s'y est investi personnellement et dont les efforts ont abouti à l'Accord de paix du 27/06/2025 entre la RDC et le Rwanda. Elles remercient aussi la SADC, la Communauté Sant'Egidio, l'Eglise du Christ au Congo, l'Union Africaine, l'Union Européenne, la Communauté des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Est (EAC) et l'ONU pour leurs efforts inlassables dans la recherche d'une paix juste et durable dans la Région.

Les FDLR soulignent néanmoins que, contrairement à la propagande du régime rwandais et ses soutiens politiques, elles n'ont jamais été une menace pour le Peuple Rwandais dont elles sont par ailleurs l'émanation et pour lequel elles luttent.

De même, contrairement au narratif que le régime rwandais ne cesse de chanter pour tromper l'opinion publique internationale, les FDLR ne sont pas une organisation génocidaire ou terroriste. Kigali tient ce narratif afin que l'opinion internationale détourne son regard des crimes contre l'humanité, des crimes de guerre et crimes de génocide dont il est coupable dans la Région.

En effet, dès sa création en Mai 2000 par des réfugiés rwandais disséminés à travers le monde, et après le calvaire inédit vécu par les survivants des différents massacres commis par le Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR-Inkotanyi) au Rwanda et en RDC, et abandonnés à leur triste sort après le désengagement des institutions internationales en charge des réfugiés, le mouvement « Les Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, FDLR en sigle » s'est donné pour mission de protéger les réfugiés rwandais rescapés, contre les récurrentes menaces d'extermination proférées et exécutées par les forces du FPR-INKOTANYI sans discontinuer depuis trois décennies.

Par ailleurs, les FDLR se sont impliquées activement, et ont toujours manifesté leur volonté de participer dans toutes les initiatives visant à ramener la paix et la stabilité dans la Région.

Parmi ces initiatives il y a lieu de citer:

- le désarmement et le cantonnement des combattants à Kamina et la destruction des armes devant la Communauté Internationale à Kinshasa en 2001 ;
- la déclaration de Rome par les FDLR devant la Communauté Internationale et sous la facilitation de la Communauté Sant'Egidio (Mars/Avril 2005) ;
- les rencontres de Chambucha et de Ntoto avec les représentants de la RDC sous les auspices de l'Eglise du Christ au Congo (2007 et 2011) ;
- la rencontre de Nyabiondo entre les représentants du Gouvernement de la RDC, de la MONUSCO et des FDLR sous la facilitation de l'Eglise du Christ au Congo (2008) ;
- la contribution à la Conférence de Goma (2008) ;
- le désarmement de plus de 1500 combattants, la remise de leurs armes à la SADC/MONUSCO et le cantonnement des combattants désarmés et de leurs dépendants dans les camps de Kisangani, Kanyabayonga et Walungu (2014), en présence de la Communauté Internationale et des journalistes internationaux ;
- la participation à la réunion de Rome en 2014 sous la médiation de la Communauté Sant'Egidio représentée par Monseigneur Matteo Maria Cardinal ZUPPI, réunissant des représentants des USA (Sénateur Russell D. FEINGOLD, envoyé spécial des USA dans la RGLA), M. Martin KOBLER, Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire-Général des Nations Unies en RDC, les représentants des Etats de l'UE et des représentants de la RDC.

En réponse à toutes ces initiatives de paix auxquelles les FDLR ont répondu présentes, le Rwanda a brillé par son absence et son sabotage, tandis que la Communauté Internationale n'a pas respecté ses engagements d'accompagner positivement et activement ces initiatives.

C'est ainsi que les engagements pris par la RDC et la Communauté Internationale à Rome en 2005 et en 2014 ont été jetés aux oubliettes en prônant et encourageant plutôt la destruction des FDLR par le feu des armes.

Par ailleurs, de 2009 à 2015, les FARDC, en collaboration avec les forces spéciales des Forces Rwandaises de Défense (RDF) et de la MONUSCO ont mené des opérations militaires contre les

FDLR à l'Est de la RDC. Ces opérations ont fait plusieurs centaines de milliers de morts et de déplacés au sein des populations Congolaises et des réfugiés Rwandais.

Il s'agit des opérations:

- UMOJA WETU (Nord-Kivu, Janvier 2009)
- KIMIA I et II (2009)
- AMANI LEO (FARDC/MONUSCO 2010)
- AMANI KAMILIFU (MONUSCO/FARDC Février 2012)
- SOKOLA II (FARDC Nord et Sud-Kivu, 2015)

Dans un souci de mise en application des préconisations des maîtres à penser dans la création du chaos et le sabotage des processus de paix dans le monde, certains membres de la Communauté Internationale ont planifié et mis en exécution dès 2007 la décapitation par tous les moyens du leadership des FDLR.

C'est ainsi que le Président des FDLR M. Ignace MURWANASHYAKA, le Vice-Président M. Straton MUSONI et le Secrétaire-Exécutif M. Callixte MBARUSHIMANA ont été arrêtés et mis en prison en Allemagne et en France, puis trainés devant les tribunaux nationaux et internationaux pour leur « rôle présumé » dans les crimes de guerre et crimes contre l'humanité commis dans les provinces du Nord et Sud-Kivu (RDC) en 2009.

Il sied de noter que le Président Ignace MURWANASHYAKA est mort en prison en Allemagne en 2019 dans des circonstances non élucidées, que le Vice-Président Straton MUSONI a été condamné en Allemagne à une peine de 8 ans puis libéré et déporté au Rwanda où il est souvent exhibé comme un trophée de guerre et que le Secrétaire-Exécutif Callixte MBARUSHIMANA a été relaxé en 2011 par la Cour Pénale Internationale faute de preuves. Le Général Sylvestre MUDACUMURA, feu-Commandant des forces des FDLR, quant à lui, a été froidement abattu dans un raid coalisé des FARDC et des RDF en 2019.

Enfin, en 2018, la RDC avec la complicité de Kigali, a décidé unilatéralement de rapatrier de force et dans des conditions inhumaines, après une longue période de privations alimentaires avec risques d'inanitions délibérées, les ex-combattants des FDLR et leurs dépendants cantonnés à Kisangani, Walungu et Kanyabayonga. Certains d'entre eux ont été recyclés par le régime rwandais et retournés en RDC pour combattre dans l'armée rwandaise (RDF). La situation actuelle des autres n'est pas connue.

Il n'est pas inopportun de signaler que, dans une tactique d'accusation en miroir dont le régime rwandais est passé maître, les exactions imputées faussement aux FDLR par le FPR-INKOTANYI et ses thuriféraires sont plutôt celles délibérément commises par ses propres forces qui les font endosser aux FDLR afin de les discréditer et ainsi salir leur image.

En guise d'illustration, pour ne citer qu'un cas, en Février 2021, le FPR a assassiné dans une embuscade tendue sur la route Goma-Rutshuru l'Ambassadeur italien M. Luca Attanasio et s'est empressé d'attribuer ce forfait aux FDLR.

Les FDLR déclarent que le projet visant à les neutraliser n'a pour objectif que de décimer les réfugiés rwandais présents à l'Est de la RDC, survivants des massacres successifs orchestrés depuis 1990 par les forces du Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR-Inkotanyi) au pouvoir à Kigali.

La neutralisation des FDLR ne résoudra pas le problème de fond qui est d'essence politique et qui, par conséquent, ne peut se résoudre que politiquement à travers des pourparlers francs, sincères et inclusifs entre toutes les parties concernées. C'est ce que les FDLR sollicitent depuis des années.

Les FDLR restent convaincues et déclarent haut et fort qu'elles ne sont en rien impliquées dans la déstabilisation de la RGLA, et que s'il y a une force nuisible à neutraliser dans la Région, c'est bel et bien les Forces de Défense Rwandaises (FDR) qui sèment la mort et la désolation au sein des populations de la Région et sont à l'origine de l'insécurité persistante au Rwanda, en RDC et dans toute la Région depuis 1990 dans l'intérêt de piller des richesses immenses de la RDC et massacrer des Bantous de la RGLA.

Les FDLR réaffirment leur ferme attachement à la paix et sont convaincues que l'ouverture de l'espace politique libre et sécurisé au Rwanda, et un dialogue franc, constructif et hautement inclusif entre toutes les parties sont et restent la seule voie viable pour la recherche d'une paix durable dans la Région.

Les FDLR restent attachées à la paix et réaffirment leur plein engagement à toutes les initiatives visant à ramener la paix, la sécurité et la prospérité dans la RGLA et l'épanouissement harmonieux de tous les peuples frères auxquels elles seront conviées.

Les FDLR restent déterminées à mener à bien leur mission de protéger les populations rwandaises réfugiées à l'Est de la RDC jusqu'à leur retour définitif dans leur mère-patrie le Rwanda en toute sécurité et dignité.

Veillez agréer, Excellence Monsieur le Président, l'expression de notre très haute considération.

Victor BYIRINGIRO

Lt-Général



Président ai des FDLR

CPI à:

- Monsieur le Président de la République Démocratique du Congo
- Monsieur le Président de la République du Burundi
- Madame la Présidente de la République Unie de Tanzanie
- Monsieur le Président de la République de l'Ouganda
- Monsieur le Président en exercice de l'Union Africaine
- Monsieur le Président de l'Angola
- Monsieur le Président de la République Sud-Africaine
- Monsieur le Président du Rwanda
- Monsieur le Secrétaire Général de l'ONU
- Monsieur le Président de l'Union Européenne
- Monsieur le Président en exercice de la SADC
- Monsieur le Président en exercice de la Communauté des États de l'Afrique de l'Est
- Monsieur le Président en exercice de la Conférence Internationale sur la Région des Grands Lacs

*(2) Manifest shared with the Group by an FDLR source in April 2026:***MANIFESTE – PROGRAMME ET STATUTS DES FORCES DEMOCRATIQUES DE LIBERATION DU RWANDA (FDLR)****I. MANIFESTE – PROGRAMME.****PREAMBULE**

Le problème rwandais relève de l'histoire.

En effet, le système de clientélisme de type féodal dit "UBUHAKE" basé sur le complexe de supériorité et d'infériorité que le régime féodo-monarchique a inculqué dans la vie quotidienne du citoyen rwandais a fait que le HUTU était réduit au rang d'esclave et le TUTSI élevé au rang de "seigneur". Cette mentalité fut bannie et éradiquée par la Révolution Populaire de 1959.

C'est ce genre d'UBUHAKE que le Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR – INKOTANYI) cherche à raviver en opérant un lavage de cerveau de la population rwandaise en organisant des séminaires et des campagnes d'intoxication et d'endoctrinement (genre ingando) en vue de la dépersonnalisation totale du citoyen rwandais. C'est de ce système que cherche à se libérer le peuple rwandais dans son ensemble.

Depuis l'éclatement de la guerre lancée le 01 Octobre 1990 par le FPR – INKOTANYI à partir de l'Ouganda, le Rwanda vit un drame sans précédent. Cette guerre d'invasion a fait basculer le Rwanda dans un abîme de souffrances et de tragédies. Les estimations les plus crédibles, à l'intérieur du Rwanda, font état de plus de trois (3) millions de morts, de plusieurs centaines de milliers de blessés et mutilés, de plusieurs centaines de milliers de prisonniers et disparus sans compter de nombreuses victimes dans les camps des déplacés.

A l'extérieur du Rwanda, principalement dans les pays limitrophes, le FPR-INKOTANYI a massivement massacré les réfugiés Hutu rwandais. Selon le "Mapping Report du 01 Octobre 2010" de l'Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU), les massacres commis en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) par le FPR-INKOTANYI sont susceptibles d'être qualifiés de génocide par un tribunal compétent.

La situation née de la prise du pouvoir par le FPR- INKOTANYI en Juillet 1994 en violation flagrante de l'Accord de Paix d'Arusha du 04 Août 1993 est d'une extrême gravité.

Le bilan du FPR – INKOTANYI reste extrêmement négatif pour le Rwanda sur le plan politique, juridique, socio-économique, intellectuel et moral. L'édifice institutionnel bâti depuis l'indépendance du Rwanda en 1962 s'est effondré. Le Rwanda et son peuple se retrouvent de nouveau soumis à un pouvoir sans partage.

Sur le plan politique, la monopolisation du pouvoir par une poignée de militaires, d'intellectuels et d'hommes d'affaires issus d'une seule ethnie minoritaire Tutsi, l'instauration d'un Etat totalitaire, révèlent le mépris du régime en place envers le peuple rwandais considéré comme mineur et incapable de faire des choix politiques et de les assumer.

Sur le plan économique, tous les indicateurs montrent que les richesses du pays sont inégalement réparties. La corruption ainsi que la spoliation des biens meubles et immeubles publics et privés ont été institutionnalisées. Non seulement les principaux circuits économiques et financiers sont entre les mains d'une clique qui contrôle tout le pouvoir, mais on assiste aussi à une véritable perte de souveraineté nationale suite à une privatisation irresponsable des entreprises publiques.

Sur le plan social, le paysan rwandais connaît une chute vertigineuse de son niveau de vie et une aggravation dangereuse de la fracture sociale suite au phénomène de paupérisation, à l'absence de services de santé publique et d'éducation, à la marginalisation et à la dépravation de la jeunesse.

La politique de la haine interethnique et d'idéologie raciale prônée par le régime en place et les associations extrémistes ne cessent d'élargir le fossé entre les composantes de la société rwandaise.

La famille, noyau du développement socio-économique du pays, a vu son unité et sa cohésion complètement démantelées.

Sur le plan des droits de l'homme, l'échec du régime mis en place par le FPR – INKOTANYI est tout aussi désolant. Les éliminations massives à caractère ethnique, les exactions et arrestations arbitraires, la persécution de l'Eglise chrétienne, les exécutions sommaires individuelles et collectives, les enlèvements et les disparitions, les tortures, les viols et d'autres formes d'atteintes aux droits de la personne humaine ont été institutionnalisés dans le but de briser tout espoir de justice et de liberté du peuple rwandais.

La dictature du FPR-INKOTANYI étend ses atrocités dans toute la Région des Grands Lacs Africains ; une situation qui risque d'entraîner le Rwanda et la Région toute entière dans un abîme encore plus profond.

En utilisant la tragédie rwandaise comme fonds de commerce, de manipulation et d'extorsion, le régime du FPR – INKOTANYI s'adonne à une extermination planifiée d'une partie du peuple rwandais pour sauvegarder les privilèges et perpétuer la domination d'une élite corrompue et de mâter un peuple qui n'a jamais accepté la tutelle de l'oligarchie en place. Cette politique de répression n'est pas aveugle. Elle s'inscrit dans le cadre d'une stratégie bien élaborée qui vise à éliminer tout projet, réel ou potentiel, de résistance à son ordre établi par force, et à paralyser la population par la douleur et la peur afin d'inhiber en elle toute velléité de contestation.

Convaincus que la crise politique, économique, sociale et morale qui ronge la société rwandaise n'est pas une fatalité;

Convaincus qu'il est grand temps de combattre cette stratégie de la violence afin de permettre au peuple rwandais d'être le principal acteur de son propre destin;

Persuadés qu'aucun citoyen rwandais, épris de paix et d'amour pour son pays et pour son peuple, ne peut demeurer spectateur indifférent du désastre en cours depuis Octobre 1990;

Avons décidé de créer les Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, FDLR en sigle.

La création des FDLR est une réponse légitime du peuple rwandais au mépris, à l'arrogance et à la répression impitoyable et sanguinaire que le FPR – INKOTANYI a préféré opposer à diverses initiatives faites en vue du dialogue politique, de l'ouverture démocratique et du respect des droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine.

Les FDLR constituent donc une Organisation de libération qui vise à redonner l'espoir d'une nouvelle ère de paix et de reprise en mains, par le peuple rwandais, de son avenir et de ses destinées.

L'objet du présent "Manifeste – Programme et Statuts" est d'exposer les éléments qui permettront au peuple rwandais de sortir du désarroi qui l'accable depuis plusieurs années.

Les FDLR regroupent les personnes qui ont fermement décidé de se lever comme un seul homme pour:

- Mettre fin au génocide perpétré par le FPR – INKOTANYI depuis Octobre 1990;
- Œuvrer au rétablissement d'une paix durable, au développement intégral et à la concorde nationale et internationale;
- Réhabiliter le peuple rwandais dans ses droits;
- Œuvrer au rétablissement d'un Etat de droit visant à aider la société rwandaise à se réconcilier avec elle-même, à travailler pour son propre progrès socio-économique et son plein épanouissement;
- Réaliser les objectifs définis par leurs statuts.

1. PRINCIPES DIRECTEURS.

La recherche de solutions au conflit rwandais doit se fonder sur une analyse minutieuse des causes profondes qui l'ont généré et sur les leçons tirées des événements tragiques qui ont marqué l'histoire du Rwanda.

A cet égard, les FDLR estiment que :

- Le conflit rwandais est d'essence politique et la solution doit être politique;
- Toute démarche sincère de négociation ou d'arbitrage visant à résoudre ce conflit doit être soutenue;
- Le respect des droits fondamentaux du citoyen et de ses valeurs morales et culturelles demeure un principe sacré devant être sauvegardé;
- Une solution politique n'est viable que si elle est juste, équitable et préserve les intérêts légitimes de toutes les composantes de la société rwandaise;
- L'unité nationale et la sauvegarde des acquis de la Révolution Sociale de 1959 demeurent les piliers de la société rwandaise.

Les FDLR considèrent que toute perspective d'une solution durable à la crise actuelle doit être fondée sur un certain nombre de principes communément partagés par le peuple rwandais et fondés sur la culture rwandaise et la déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme.

Parmi ces principes, l'on peut citer notamment:

- Respect et promotion de la dignité humaine et des droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine, des libertés fondamentales individuelles et collectives;

- Respect des droits des minorités et protection des identités culturelles;
- Promotion de l'état de droit, des valeurs démocratiques et républicaines;
- Respect d'un vrai multipartisme politique, d'un vrai pluralisme social et économique;
- Séparation, indépendance et complémentarité des pouvoirs exécutif, législatif et judiciaire;
- Egalité devant la loi;
- Droit du peuple à une justice équitable garantissant à tout citoyen une vie digne;
- Respect des valeurs morales et culturelles du peuple rwandais;
- Préservation de la souveraineté de l'Etat rwandais et respect de l'intégrité territoriale des pays voisins;
- Etablissement des relations de bon voisinage et de coopération dans le cadre du respect mutuel de la solidarité avec les partenaires rwandais;
- Lutte contre l'aliénation du pays;
- Instauration d'une loi fondamentale basée sur les principes ci-dessus.

2. PROGRAMME.

Les FDLR se proposent notamment de:

2.1. Politique intérieure

- Promouvoir l'instauration dans le pays d'un pouvoir ayant comme responsabilité première de protéger et rassurer chaque citoyen, sans aucune distinction;
- Combattre toutes les causes et les situations conduisant à l'état de réfugié;
- Concourir au bien-être, à la cohésion et à la réconciliation des Rwandais;
- Instaurer et promouvoir un pouvoir fondé sur les principes universels de l'Etat de droit, la démocratie basée sur le pluralisme politique, les élections libres et transparentes ainsi que d'autres valeurs républicaines;
- Asseoir les valeurs morales dont le respect de la vie et la dignité humaine, le respect et l'amour du prochain, la tolérance, la justice, l'honnêteté, la vérité, l'égalité, l'émancipation de l'individu;
- Respecter les droits des minorités et assister les groupes vulnérables.

2.2. Politique extérieure

- Œuvrer au rétablissement d'une paix durable et de la stabilité dans la Région des Grands Lacs Africains;
- Promouvoir une politique active de bon voisinage, de coopération et d'échanges avec les Etats voisins en vue d'une intégration dans les marchés régionaux;
- Intensifier les rapports avec les partenaires étrangers et les organismes internationaux;
- Redorer l'image du pays et du peuple rwandais auprès de la Communauté Internationale;
- Œuvrer en faveur de l'intégration économique et politique au niveau régional et international.

2.3. Economie et développement.

- Construire un pays moderne et prospère;
- Lutter contre la corruption et le pillage du patrimoine national;
- Satisfaire les besoins de base de la population en matière d'habitat, alimentation, santé, éducation et formation, information, culture et loisirs;
- Encourager la femme rwandaise à jouer pleinement son rôle dans le développement du pays;
- Promouvoir l'initiative privée;
- Réduire les dépenses liées à l'armement;
- Améliorer le bien-être et la qualité de la vie des Rwandais tout en protégeant l'environnement.

2.4. Justice

- Mettre en place une commission nationale indépendante de vérité et réconciliation;
- Œuvrer pour la mise en place d'un tribunal international neutre et traduire devant la justice tous les responsables de la tragédie rwandaise sans distinction.
- Poursuivre et punir, sans aucune distinction tous les coupables de la tragédie rwandaise;
- Réhabiliter toutes les victimes innocentes (personnes physiques ou morales) de la tragédie rwandaise;
- Garantir le droit et la sécurité pour le retour digne des réfugiés au Rwanda;
- Protéger les droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine.

2.5. Sécurité.

- Sauvegarder la sécurité nationale;
- Garantir l'épanouissement et la sécurité des personnes et des biens;
- Mettre en place une armée nationale et des services de sécurité dans lesquels se retrouvent toutes les composantes de la population rwandaise;
- Lutter contre le terrorisme national et international.

Annex 40 (para. 134)

FARDC telegrams prohibiting FARDC collaboration with the FDLR and with VDP/Wazalendo groups linked to it

Télégrammes des FARDC interdisant toute collaboration avec les FDLR ainsi qu'avec les groupes VDP/Wazalendo qui leur sont liés

TELEGRAMME

EXT-URGENT **GROUPE-DATE-HEURE**
051355A JAN 26

DE : CHEFEMG FARDC

POUR : PROGOU MIL (TOUS) - COMD ZDEF (TOUS) - COMD RGN
MIL (TOUS) - COMD SECT OPS (TOUS)

INFO : VPM/MDNAC - CHEF MM - IG FARDC - CHEFEM FORCES
(TOUS) - SCHEFEM (TOUS)

SEC : SECRET N°01/00005 /EMG/DEPT OPS/26

VOUS INFORME (-) IL ETRE STRICTEMENT INTERDIT (-) TOUT
ENTRETIEN RELATION AVEC FDLR (-) ET TOUTE COLLABORATION
AVEC VDP AYANT LIENS AVEC FDLR (-) EN OUTRE (-) VOUS DEVOIR
(-) SENSIBILISER VDP (-) DANS ZRESP RESPECTIVES (-) NE PAS
COLLABORER AVEC FDLR (-) EXECUTION CORRECTE (-) ACK (-) (-)

PARAPHE : SCHEFEM OPS

CHEFEMG ADJT ADM-LOG

CHEFEMG ADJT OPS-RENS

BANZA MWILAMBWE JULES
LTGEN
CHEFEMG FARDC

KABANDA WA KABANDA PIERRE
Lt Gen
Chaf EMG Adjt Adm-Log

TELEGRAMME

EXT-URGENT

GROUPE-DATE-HEURE
081305 A JAN 26

DE : CHEFEMG FARDC
POUR : SCHEFEM RENS
INFO : VPM/MDNAC - CHEF MM - IG FARDC
SEC : SECRET N°01/00014 /EMG/DEPT OPS/26

DES RECEPTION PRESENT MSG (-) VOUS DEVOIR (-) FOURNIR RENS
(-) SUR VDP AYANT LIENS AVEC FDLR (-) POUR DIPO UTILES (-)
EXECUTION CORRECTE (-) ACK (-) (-)

PARAPHE: SCHEFEM OPS
CHEFEMG ADJT ADM-LOG
CHEFEMG ADJT OPS-RENS

BANZA MWILAMBWE JULES
LTGEN
CHEFEMG FARDC

BANZA MWILAMBWE Jules
LTGen
ChefEMG FARDC

Documents received from FARDC source

Annex 41 (para. 146)

Establishment of paramilitary “Mining Guard”

Création de la Garde Minière, unité paramilitaire


COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE -Embargo jusqu'au lundi 27 avril 2026 à 08h 00 heure de Kinshasa-

L'Inspection Générale des Mines annonce la création de la Garde Minière, une unité paramilitaire dédiée à la sécurisation du secteur minier en République Démocratique du Congo

L'Inspection Générale des Mines (IGM) informe l'opinion publique nationale et internationale de la création officielle de la Garde Minière, une unité spéciale paramilitaire destinée à sécuriser l'ensemble de la chaîne d'exploitation des minerais en République Démocratique du Congo.

« La volonté du Président de la République, que nous mettons en œuvre, est d'assainir l'ensemble du secteur minier de la RDC, en éliminant les pratiques contraires à la bonne gouvernance à la transparence et à la traçabilité des minerais », a déclaré l'Inspecteur Général, Rafael Kabengele.

D'ici fin 2028, le déploiement progressif d'un effectif de plus de 20 000 gardes couvrant les 22 provinces minières dont l'IGM a la supervision est prévu. Le premier contingent sera composé de 2 500 à 3 000 agents, recrutés à l'issue d'un processus de sélection rigoureux.

Les recrues suivront un programme d'entraînement intensif de six mois, conduit en collaboration avec la Maison militaire, et seront dotées d'équipements de dernière génération.

Calendrier de mise en œuvre :

- mai 2026 : ouverture du recrutement, sans distinction de genre
- juin à décembre 2026 : formation de la première promotion de recrues
- décembre 2026 : déploiement du premier contingent opérationnel
- fin 2027 : couverture complète des besoins sécuritaires dans le Grand

Katanga et la Grande Orientale

- fin 2028 : extension du dispositif à l'ensemble des provinces minières

du territoire national

Le programme, financé à hauteur de 100 millions de dollars, s'inscrit dans le cadre de partenariats stratégiques avec les États-Unis et les Émirats arabes unis, et sera déployé au sein d'infrastructures d'entraînement déjà opérationnelles.

La Garde Minière aura pour principales missions :

- la sécurisation des sites miniers sur l'ensemble du territoire national
- le convoyage sécurisé des minerais, depuis les zones d'extraction jusqu'aux unités de traitement et aux postes frontaliers

-le remplacement progressif des éléments des forces de défense actuellement déployés dans les zones minières.

La mise en place de la Garde Minière permettra, à terme, d'optimiser la valorisation des ressources minières de la RDC et d'offrir un environnement sécuritaire fiable et stable, indispensable à la continuité des activités et à la protection des investissements.

À propos de l'Inspection Générale des Mines

Créée par le décret n°23/19 du 9 juin 2023, l'Inspection Générale des Mines est l'organe chargé du contrôle, de l'audit et de la lutte contre la fraude dans le secteur minier en République Démocratique du Congo.

Rafael Kabengele, Inspecteur Général, a pris ses fonctions à la tête de l'institution le 12 janvier 2026.

Contact presse :

Anasthasie Tudieshe +243815358310

Confidential source

Annex 42 (para. 150)**Deployment of Salvadoran PMCs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo****Déploiements de PMC salvadoriens en République démocratique du Congo**

The present annex consolidates documentary, photographic and communication material relating to the 2025 deployment of approximately 300 Salvadoran nationals to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The documentation reviewed includes communication screenshots, photographs of individuals identified in connection with the contractual structure, and a scanned professional business card associated with legal representation.

WhatsApp communications reviewed by the Group indicate that private military personnel were recruited under a one-year contractual framework offering a monthly remuneration of USD 4,225, with the first deployments commencing in July 2025. Subsequent exchanges, reproduced in **Figure 1** below refer to the early termination of contracts, the return of personnel to El Salvador, and alleged payment disputes involving partial settlement proposals of USD 300 conditioned upon signature of discharge documentation.

Health consequences were consistently referenced in the communication records, including confirmed cases of malaria among returnees and hospitalizations within the Salvadoran public health system (**Figure 2**).

Commercial registry records identified Importaciones de Productos Americanos (IMPROA S.A. de C.V.) as the locally registered entity, referenced in communications and media reporting as having managed contractual matters within El Salvador. Former El Salvador army Colonel Juan Emilio Velasco Alfaro is listed as legal representative of the company in official registry documentation. The declared corporate object of IMPROA does not explicitly reference overseas security recruitment, suggesting functional expansion beyond its formal commercial description (**Figure 3**).

From a financial perspective, for 300 individuals to be contracted at USD 4,225 per month, the gross monthly contractual exposure would approximate USD 1,267,500, corresponding to an annual exposure of approximately USD 15,210,000 under a full twelve-month implementation.

Figure 1:




WhatsApp communications allege the recruitment of approximately 300 Salvadoran former police and military personnel for deployment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo under a one-year contract, reportedly managed by IMPROA S.A. de C.V., with a monthly remuneration of USD 4,225.

Confidential source

Figure 2:

Photographic evidence indicates austere living conditions of Salvadoran PMC personnel in Kisangani, characterized by makeshift encampments with sandbag fortifications, rudimentary shelter, and limited infrastructure.

Confidential source

Figure 3

Screenshot of IMPROA S.A. de C.V. website displaying a contact interface referencing international security services in El Salvador. The page includes a direct contact email (jvelasco@improa.com), consistent with the identity of Juan Emilio Velasco Alfaro as legal representative.

Confidential source

Annex 43 (para. 155)

Electronic equipment seized in Masisi Territory

Équipements électroniques saisis dans le territoire de Masisi



Recovered electronic equipment seized in Masisi Territory, North Kivu Province, consisting of multiple ruggedized control units fitted with whip antennas, arranged for storage or field deployment.

Confidential source



Close-up of a MindMade WB Group ruggedized electronic module seized in Masisi, fitted with an RF connector and identification labels (QR code and serial markings).

Confidential source

Annex 44 (para. 156)**Electronic equipment seized on 12–13 August 2025 in Mulamba, Walungu Territory, South Kivu Province****Les équipements électroniques saisis le 12 et 13 août 2025 à Mulamba, dans le territoire de Walungu, province du Sud-Kivu**

Modules bearing identical MindMade WB Group manufacturer markings (see annex 43) recovered on 12–13 August 2025 in Mulamba, Walungu Territory, South Kivu Province.

Confidential source




Module bearing MindMade WB Group manufacturer markings, consistent with previously recovered equipment. This unit was documented as part of seizures conducted during field operations in Mulamba, Walungu Territory, South Kivu Province.

Confidential source

Annex 45 (para. 157)

Tadiran RT-7106 (PRC-710) Radio seized In March 2025 by Congolese security forces

Radio Tadiran RT-7106 (PRC-710) saisie en mars 2025 par les forces de sécurité congolaises



Confidential military sources

Annex 46 (para. 159)

Kenya Airways incident with Jamming/Interference and Flight Management System Control Display Unit (FMS CDU)

Incident de Kenya Airways avec brouillage/interférences et unité d'affichage de contrôle du système de gestion de vol (FMS CDU)

DASNA
Collectez tous les cas similaires
et projet de lettre à envoyer à l'hierarchie
26/1/2026
15/01/2026

 **Kenya Airways**
The Pulse of Africa

15th January, 2026.

Directeur Général
 Direction Générale Autorité de l'Aviation Civile du Burundi
 B.P. 694
 Bujumbura, Burundi

Ref: OAT/OTH/2026/0050/0002

Dear Sir/Madam,

GPS INTERFERENCE/JAMMING

The following incident has been reported to our Flight Safety Office:

Date of Occurrence: 13/01/2026
Location: HBBA
Aircraft Type: B737
Registration: 5Y- CYF
Flight No: KQA460 NBO-BJM,
 KQA461 BJM-NBO.
Phase: INITIAL CLIMB

SUMMARY

"Experienced GPS jamming/interference on both approach into and on departure climb out of Bujumbura.
 GPS L INVALID & GPS R INVALID CDU messages.
 GPS DATA UNRELIABLE QRH Checklist carried out & ATC informed."

Kindly investigate this further to avert a similar situation in the future. Your feedback on the occurrence will be highly appreciated.

Yours Sincerely,



Captain Haig Anyonyi,
 Director, Corporate Quality, Safety and Environment,
 Email: Haig.Anyonyi@kenya-airways.com
 Co: IATA Regional Office

Head Office: Airport North Road Entebbe, P. O. Box 10002-00101, KENYA. TEL: +254 (20) 642 2000. www.kenya-airways.com

Source: Military intelligence



Picture of a Flight Management System Control Display Unit (FMS CDU) of a plane landing in Bujumbura, indicating “position uncertain” following jamming on 13/1/2026.
Confidential source.

Annex 47 (para. 159)

Official request for assistance to investigate the safety of international civil aviation, and the response of the ICAO

Demande officielle d'assistance pour enquêter sur la sécurité de l'aviation civile internationale, et la réponse de l'OACI

REPUBLIQUE DU BURUNDI
Ministère des Infrastructures, des Logements
Sociaux, des Transports et de l'Équipement.

Bujumbura, le 22.01.2026


DIRECTION GENERALE

A Monsieur le Secrétaire Général de
l'Organisation de l'aviation civile
Internationale (OACI)
à
Montréal

N/Réf : 729/DG/0134/2026

Objet : Demande d'assistance urgente pour une enquête
de sécurité de l'aviation civile internationale

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

Je vous adresse avant tout mes salutations et mes vœux de bonheur et de prospérité pour l'année 2026.

En ce qui concerne l'objet en marge, je saisis l'occasion de vous informer que depuis le 19 octobre 2025, plusieurs cas de brouillage des équipements de navigation à bord des aéronefs, visiblement orchestrés à partir du territoire d'un pays voisin, ont été enregistrés dans l'espace aérien du Burundi, mettant en péril la navigation aérienne internationale.

A titre illustratif, je vous fais parvenir une copie du rapport d'incident officiel de la compagnie aérienne Kenya Airways nous transmis en date du 15 janvier 2026.

Face à cette violation de l'esprit et des principes de la Convention de Chicago, je vous demande instamment une assistance urgente en vue d'une enquête technique efficace, après laquelle des actions subséquentes sont à mener en vue de freiner cette atteinte délibérée à la sécurité des aéronefs et des personnes à bord.

Comptant sur votre sensibilité à la sécurité aérienne, je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, l'expression de ma haute considération.


LE DIRECTEUR GENERAL DE L'AUTORITE
DE L'AVIATION CIVILE DU BURUNDI
Lt COLONEL BAKERIMANA

C.P.L.A :

- Madame la Directrice Régionale du Bureau ESAF de l'OACI
- Monsieur le Directeur à l'AACB (tous)

B.P 694 Bujumbura-Burundi Tél : +257 22203102 (Secrétariat);
Email: aacb@aacb.gov.bi ; aacbburundi@hotmail.com ; site.aacb.gov.bi

Confidential source



International
Civil Aviation
Organization

Organisation
de l'aviation civile
internationale

Organización
de Aviación Civil
Internacional

Международная
организация
гражданской
авиации

منظمة الطيران
المدني الدولي

国际民用
航空组织

Eastern and Southern African Regional Office/Bureau régional Afrique orientale et australe

Réf.: ES AN 6/5 – 0040

30 January 2026

Lieutenant-Colonel Gervais HARERIMANA
Directeur Général
Direction Générale
Autorité de l'Aviation Civile du Burundi
Bujumbura - Burundi
Email: gaach@asach.bi; harege04@gmail.com

Objet: Préoccupations en matière de sécurité de l'aviation relatives aux interférences visant le Système mondial de navigation par satellite (GNSS)

Monsieur le Directeur général,

J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser réception de vos lettres réf. 729/DG/0134/2026, datée du 20 janvier 2026, relatives aux activités de brouillage des équipements de navigation à bord des aéronefs et de leur rage visant le Système mondial de navigation par satellite (GNSS/GPS) signalées dans l'espace aérien du Burundi et la demande d'assistance technique pour mener une enquête efficace.

Par la présente, je voudrais vous confirmer que l'Organisation de l'aviation civile internationale (OACI) partage entièrement votre préoccupation sur ce phénomène regrettable que l'on observe de plus en plus récemment dans diverses régions du monde.

En effet, depuis 2003, l'OACI joue un rôle actif dans l'élaboration de recommandations et d'éléments indicatifs concernant le brouillage radiofréquence (RFI) du GNSS. Il y a lieu de rappeler la résolution A41-8 de l'Assemblée de l'OACI, appendice C, Assurer la résilience des systèmes et des services CNS/ATM de l'OACI, qui constitue la politique de l'OACI la plus récente en matière de résilience du GNSS.

À ce propos, par lettre circulaire réf. E 3/5-24/54 en date du 30 avril 2024 (dont une copie est ci-jointe), le Secrétaire général de l'OACI attirait l'attention des États sur la question cruciale des interférences visant le GNSS et les informait des résultats du Symposium EUR/MID sur la radionavigation qui s'est tenu du 6 au 8 février 2024, à Antalya (Turquie). Parmi les résultats importants du symposium figurent des recommandations pertinentes portant sur les efforts que toutes les parties intéressées sont appelées à poursuivre pour assurer la sécurité, la fiabilité et la résilience de la navigation aérienne.

.../2...

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-2-

L'OACI note avec appréciation que votre État a pris des mesures d'atténuation diligentes en émettant rapidement un avis aux navigateurs aériens (NOTAM) sur la base des premiers comptes rendus d'incidents de brouillage radiofréquence du GNSS. Il est essentiel que les États garantissent la continuité de la fourniture de services de navigation aérienne sûrs, fiables et efficaces, même en cas de perturbations. La sécurité est une priorité absolue. Les États doivent également disposer de capacités de navigation et de procédures opérationnelles alternatives pour gérer efficacement les défaillances du GNSS.


Bien que l'OACI ne soit pas habilitée à mener l'enquête technique demandée sur les interférences GNSS, un mécanisme permettant de traiter les cas d'interférences transfrontalières a été mis en place dans le cadre d'un protocole d'accord avec l'Union internationale des télécommunications (UIT).

En vertu des dispositions d'un protocole d'accord, les cas d'interférence ayant un impact transfrontalier qui ne peuvent être résolus au niveau national ou international par des procédures habituelles doivent être signalés à l'UIT. Le rapport doit inclure des informations détaillées, telles que la description de l'interférence (service GNSS affecté, durée du problème, zone affectée et toute information sur la source présumée de l'interférence, autres détails). Pour plus d'informations sur la procédure de signalement, je vous invite à vous référer à l'Appendice F du Manuel du GNSS (OACI Doc 9849), ci-joint.

En vue d'assurer une surveillance continue et efficace de la situation actuelle, il y a lieu de recommander aux exploitants d'aéronefs d'élaborer une procédure selon laquelle l'équipage serait tenu d'informer le contrôle de la circulation aérienne (ATC) des incidents de RFI du GNSS, de même que les constructeurs d'équipement d'origine (OEM) de l'aéronef et de l'avionique.

Soyez assuré de la disponibilité de l'OACI, à travers son Bureau régional accrédité, à fournir l'appui nécessaire dans la mise en œuvre par votre État des mesures recommandées pour l'atténuation des vulnérabilités du GNSS, selon les besoins.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Vice-Premier Ministre, l'assurance de ma très haute considération.


Lucy Mbugua
Directrice régionale

Pièces jointes:

- Lettre aux États réf. E 3/5 – du Secrétaire général de l'OACI en date du 30 avril 2024
- Appendice F du Manuel du GNSS (OACI Doc 9849)

Copie:

- M. le Secrétaire général de l'OACI, Montréal, Canada


Confidential source.

Annex 48 (para. 159)

Cross-Border GNSS Drift: False Geolocation Between Bujumbura and Uvira

GNSS transfrontalière : géolocalisation erronée entre Bujumbura et Uvira

While attempting to determine location using mobile phone GPS services, the device utilized by the Group of Experts indicated a position in Sange, South Kivu Province, Democratic Republic of the Congo, despite the Group being physically present in Bujumbura, Burundi. The discrepancy persisted across multiple devices and was assessed as consistent with GNSS spoofing or jamming effects, affecting satellite navigation signals in the area at the time of the observation.



Screenshot of smartphone map interface showing the Bujumbura area displaying the user's location in Kiliba / Sange. The position marker appears across the border near the Uvira axis despite the device being physically located in Bujumbura.

Source: Map data ©2026 Google

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 49 (para. 160)

Indicative GNSS Interference Affecting KLM Flight KL537 in Eastern DRC

Interférence GNSS indicative affectant le vol KLM KL537 dans l'espace aérien Est de la RDC



Flightradar24 playback of KLM flight KL537 (Amsterdam–Kigali) shows a significant discrepancy between barometric altitude (38,975 ft) and GPS altitude (35,850 ft) while transiting the eastern DRC–Rwanda airspace. Such divergence is consistent with satellite navigation interference, including GNSS jamming or spoofing affecting aircraft positional data received by tracking systems.

Source: Flight Radar24 (<https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flights/kl537#3ec39cd0>)

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 50 (paras. 166-169)

Drone attacks on Kisangani airport and technical analysis

Attaques de drone sur l'aéroport de Kisangani et analyse technique

Attack on Bangoka airport Kisangani

Between the night of 31 January and 1 February 2026, as well as on 5 February 2026 and 1 March 2026 Bangoka Airport in Kisangani was hit by three distinct waves of fixed-wing, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV/drone) attacks. The incidents occurred in a structured temporal sequence, and involved multiple drones configured for one-way strike missions (kamikaze drones).

The first wave commenced at approximately 01:45 local time during the night of 31 January to 1 February 2026. Eight kamikaze drones were launched within a limited timeframe. According to available operational records, six kamikaze drones were intercepted or neutralized. Two were not recovered.

The second wave of kamikaze drone attacks occurred during the night of 4 to 5 February 2026. The first drone attack was at 01:07 local time, followed by a second drone at 04:30. Both drones were intercepted. The third strike occurred on 5 February 2026, at approximately 14:00 local time during daylight hours and was also intercepted.

On 1 March 2026, between 15:46 and 21:30, four kamikaze drones once again targeted Bangoka airport. The first drone impacted approximately 250 meters from the control tower, at 200 meters from a hangar used by FARDC for the operation of TAI Anka UAV systems.

The second drone approached the end of the runway in proximity to positions held by the Republican Guard. The third drone crashed directly in front of the TAI Anka hangar, narrowly missing a landing Airbus A330 aircraft, and destroying a generator supplying power to the UAV control system. The fourth drone fell into the Kagenge River, approximately 450 meters from the airport. All four UAVs failed to reach their intended targets, which may indicate a technical malfunction or inaccuracies in targeting coordinates.

Physical damage remained limited, with one fatality and one injured individual reported, with no recorded destruction of airport structural assets. The material evidence recovered and photographed confirms technical uniformity across the incidents .

The nocturnal employment of the system is consistent with an autonomous navigation architecture based on satellite-enabled positioning and inertial stabilization, rather than reliance on visual piloting. Across all three attacks, the technical characteristics observed remained consistent, **indicating the use of the same system configuration and operational profile throughout the attacks.**

Geographically, Kisangani is separated from several known front-line areas by approximately 400 kilometers. The propulsion and fuel-based configuration documented in the debris is consistent with medium-range one-way UAV capability within such operational envelopes. The fuel system components photographed indicate sufficient capacity for extended flight duration. The combination of lightweight composite airframe and two-stroke propulsion suggests endurance optimization.

Examination of the structural debris

The Group obtained access to the remnants of a drone that struck Bangoka Airport during the initial wave of attacks. The debris was examined on 9 February 2026, and the findings were comprehensively documented through photographic evidence (Figures 1-6). Finding and conclusions are detailed below.

Drone with fixed-wing composite construction, medium range, semi-industrial fabrication: Examination of the structural debris photographed (**Figure 1**) indicates a drone with a fixed-wing composite construction. Recovered fragments show layered fiberglass and carbon composite panels bonded with industrial epoxy resin (**Figure 2**). The absence of metallic airframe framing suggests a weight-optimized structure typical of medium-range loitering munition platforms. The internal rib structure visible in several photographs demonstrates CNC (Computer Numerical Control) cut composite reinforcement rather than improvised wooden bracing, indicating semi-industrial fabrication standards (**Figure 2**).

Catapult deployment: No landing gear assemblies, skid structures, or recovery mechanisms were identified in the documented debris. This confirms one-way strike configuration. The wing fragments photographed show mounting points consistent with catapult launch stress reinforcement. The leading-edge laminate thickness and reinforced root section indicate structural adaptation for rail or pneumatic catapult acceleration. The absence of abrasion patterns associated with runway take-off further supports catapult deployment.

Navigation module: A navigation module identified as Here4 (figure 3) an Australian-branded Cube Pilot product manufactured in Taiwan, was recovered intact and mounted on a dedicated metallic support bracket. The component bears the following markings: PN: 134600579, SN: 251000217, REV: 001. The module housing, fasteners, and labeling are consistent with industrial production standards.

Engine compatible with endurance-oriented UAV platforms: A high-torque digital servomotor identified as Savox SB-2270SG Taiwanese-origin product (Figure 3) was recovered and remains mounted to a rigid structural bracket. The unit displays industrial markings including a part number, serial number, and revision identifier. The servomotor is housed in a CNC-machined aluminum casing and is equipped with steel gear transmission.

The SB-2270SG is a brushless digital servo motor designed to operate on a 7.4–8.4 V DC supply, corresponding to a two-cell lithium-ion battery configuration. Such servos are designed for precise and repeatable angular positioning under sustained mechanical load. The construction and torque rating of the unit are consistent with applications involving aerodynamic control surfaces.

The propulsion system consists of a Dual-cylinder, air-cooled internal combustion engine with a finned cylinder head and aluminum crankcase. The engine casing bears the molded marking “DLE”, identifying the manufacturer as DLE Engines (Figure 4) Multiple subcomponents display individual part numbers and serial numbers, including PN: 173200007, PN: 172000013, and serial numbers beginning with the prefix 25, indicating recent production.

The engine architecture includes a diaphragm carburator, aluminum intake and exhaust assemblies, and a direct-drive propeller interface. These characteristics are consistent with gasoline engines designed for UAV and heavy aeromodeling applications. DLE engines are manufactured in the People’s Republic of China and distributed globally as COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf) propulsion units.

Based on physical dimensions, mounting configuration, and associated propeller characteristics, the engine corresponds to a medium-displacement class, assessed within the range of approximately 40–55 cubic centimeters. Engines of this class are typically selected for endurance-oriented UAV platforms requiring sustained cruise performance rather than short-duration thrust.

Propeller: The recovered propeller (**Figure 5**) is manufactured from carbon-fiber composite, exhibiting a visible woven structure and reinforced blade root. The blade bears a yellow manufacturer logo consistent with Mejzlik Propellers manufactured in Czech Republic. The propeller hub incorporates a reinforced multi-bolt mounting interface designed for high-torque internal combustion engines.

Although the exact diameter and pitch markings are not visible on the recovered fragment, the blade geometry and hub configuration are consistent with propellers typically paired with engines in the 40–55 cc range.

These characteristics indicate the use of regulated power distribution and signal conditioning subsystems. The level of finish, serial traceability, and standardized connectors are **consistent with semi-industrial manufacturing practices and exclude ad hoc or improvised assembly**.

The examined components demonstrate a coherent and integrated UAV architecture based on **commercially available but professional-grade subsystems**. Navigation, actuation, propulsion, and power components originate from multiple international manufacturers and are integrated using standardized mechanical and electrical interfaces.

From an operational standpoint, the configuration also reflects weight optimization considerations. The explosive payload appears to have been limited to an estimated 4 to 6 kilograms, incorporating a fragmentation mechanism composed of metallic ball bearings. This type of payload design is indicative of an **anti-personnel effect, prioritizing lethality against individuals over destructive effects on infrastructure**.

The reported consequences of the three waves were one fatality and one injury. No structural destruction of airport infrastructure was recorded. No runway collapse, terminal damage, or fuel storage detonation occurred. This damage profile aligns with the limited warhead mass inferred from debris examination.

The selection and integration of components originating from multiple commercial product lines, readily available on the open market and through online procurement channels, confirm a **deliberate effort to fragment the supply chain and reduce traceability to a single manufacturer or point of origin**. This modular assembly approach is consistent with a **system produced on demand**, rather than through standardized industrial production.

Kamikaze drone attacks in South Kivu, March-April 2026

In March and April 2026, the Group documented a series of kamikaze drones attacks with the remnants of the drones bearing a high degree of similarity with those utilized in the strikes against Kisangani airport. Notably:

- On 10 March 2026, two one-way attack (“kamikaze”) drones were shot down over Mikenge in the Hauts Plateaux area.
- On 2 April at approximately 12:00 another kamikaze drone struck FARDC positions at Point Zéro in the Itombwe of Mwenga Territory.
- On 9 April at approximately 17:00, a kamikaze drone struck FARDC and Wazalendo positions along the Mikenge-2 axis in the Itombwe sector, Mwenga Territory.
- On 10 April at approximately 23:00, in the Kutundu axis within Kitundu groupement (Uvira area), a kamikaze drone struck positions of the FARDC 113th Infantry Regiment, causing multiple FARDC casualties. Approximately 30 minutes later, around 23:30, a drone strike targeted additional FARDC positions in Muranvya, Bijombo (Uvira Territory), affecting elements of the 22nd Simba Battalion. Shortly thereafter, around midnight, another drone strike hit FARDC positions in Mugeti, Bijombo.
- On 25 April, FARDC confirmed having shot down another kamikaze drone at Point Zero in Minembwe. The incident followed FARDC’s reported interception of another kamikaze drone in Kakenge, northern Minembwe, within the previous 48 hours.

Conclusion

The Group concludes that a comparative review of debris imagery and descriptions associated with the Kisangani incidents, the recent incidents between March and April 2026, indicates a high degree of technical commonality. Similarities include fixed-wing expendable airframes, compact rear-propulsion layouts, simplified launch-oriented construction, and the repeated use of the exact subcomponents integrated into a purpose-built one-way attack platform. These recurring characteristics **confirm manufacture within the same production ecosystem**.

The drones do not appear to correspond to any known mass-commercialized drone brand or openly marketed military model. Instead, the available indicators are more consistent with low-volume, contract-style production tailored for operational use. Such platforms appear **designed around deniability**, with generic airframes, non-distinctive electronics, modular commercial parts, and absent visible manufacturer markings. This architecture significantly complicates forensic tracing to a specific state company.

Debris of one of the drones that struck the airport of Kisangani photographed and analyzed by the Group of Experts on 9 February 2026




Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3



Figure 4



Figure 5



Figure 6

Photos of the debris of kamikaze drones shot down in the Hauts and Moyen Plateaux, received from FARDC sources



Source : Military intelligence sources.

Annex 51 (para. 171)

Drone strike on Goma on 11 March 2026

Frappe de drone à Goma le 11 mars 2026

On 11 March 2026, at around 4:00 a.m., two successive detonations were reported near a residential compound located in the Himbi neighborhood in Goma, with the second detonation impacting a residential structure. The Group conducted an analysis based on photographic and video evidence, complemented by testimonial and expert evidence.

The temporal spacing of approximately five minutes between the two detonations indicate either sequential targeting or a correction between initial and follow-on strike, which is consistent with loitering munition employment or remotely guided UAV-delivered munitions.

The structural damage patterns on the impacted house, including localized breaches, material displacement, and fragmentation impacts on surrounding surfaces, confirms the detonation of an explosive device designed to generate both blast overpressure and high-velocity fragments.

The structure is a two-stores residential building constructed of rendered masonry. The roof consists of a wooden frame covered with ceramic tiles. Observed damage is concentrated on the upper section of the façade and along the roofline (**Figure 1, 2**). A partial collapse of the wooden roof structure is visible, along with the outward projection of multiple roofing elements.

The façade exhibits a high density of small, localized impact marks. Most perforations are quasi-circular and relatively uniform in size, (Figure 5, 6) indicating the projection of high-velocity metallic fragments. This pattern is consistent with the effects of a high-explosive fragmentation (HE-FRAG) charge. The density of impacts is greatest around the first-floor windows and gradually decreases toward the lateral sections of the façade and the lower level (**Figure 4**).

The absence of a ground crater, combined with the concentration of damage along the roofline, suggests that the detonation occurred at the edge of the roof or slightly above it. The observed breakage of roof beams and the outward displacement of tiles indicate a release of explosive energy upon contact with, or immediately after impact on the structure (**Figure 3**).

The spatial distribution of impacts on the façade indicates a forward and downward-oriented fragmentation cone. This configuration is consistent with a descending attack trajectory. Based on the vertical dispersion of impacts, the angle of attack is estimated to be between 25 and 45 degrees.

The identified trajectory and the location of the detonation point are consistent with a munition delivered by an unmanned aerial system (UAS). The extent and intensity of the observed damage exceed those typically associated with light improvised munitions dropped from small drones, suggesting the use of an aerial munition specifically designed to produce a significant fragmentation effect.

The available information supports, as the leading working hypothesis, the use of a glide munition of approximately 70 mm caliber, carrying an explosive payload estimated at 5 to 10 kg, possibly combining incendiary and high-explosive fragmentation effects. According to witness accounts and damage analysis, the munition was delivered by a propeller-driven unmanned aerial platform approaching from over Lake Kivu. **The same platform has released two successive munitions:** the first producing a muffled explosion in the lake, and the second detonating on the house approximately 5 to 10 minutes later.

Confidential sources confirm the presence of a second drone, possibly in an observation role.

The detonation pattern is consistent with an airburst detonation triggered by a sensor before direct impact, at approximately the height of the upper section of the victim's bedroom window. On the basis of the observed blast effects (**Figure 4**) and witness accounts, the victim died instantly.



Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3



Figure 4




Figure 5



Figure 6

Confidential source

Annex 52 (para. 183)

Resignation letter from CRP/FRP members

Lettre de démission des cadres de la CRP/FRP

Kampala, le 18 Octobre 2025

**DECLARATION DES HAUTS CADRES FONDATEURS DU MOUVEMENT
POLITICO-MILITAIRE C.R.P
SUITE AUX ANTIVALEURS QUI ROUINENT LE MOUVEMENT**

Nous, hauts cadres et membres fondateurs du mouvement politico-militaire Convention pour la Revolution Populaire en sigle C.R.P, sommes très surpris, déçus et choqués de constater le ridicule qui a élu domicile dans le chef de celui dont nous avons désigné comme notre autorité politique du mouvement, à la personne de monsieur Thomas LUBANGA DYILO.

En effet, le mouvement C.R.P depuis sa création en date du 07 Janvier 2025, avait pour but d'apporter un changement radical en RDC sur tous les plans. Car qui dit changement, sous-entend le courage de combattre ses propres anciennes habitudes ou comportement, avant de prétendre imprimer un nouveau mode de vie ou de conduite à autrui. C'est ainsi que nous-mêmes avons pris un engagement courageux au péril de notre vie et celle de nos dépendants pour mener une lutte de libération au bénéfice de tout le peuple congolais.

Curieusement, avant même que la C.R.P ne totalise une année, nous nous sommes rendu compte que celui à qui nous avons donné le pouvoir, est une incarnation absolue de tous les antivaleurs que la C.R.P a toujours reproché aux gouvernants de la RDC tant au niveau national que provincial. Nous citons notamment :

1. La gestion autocratique : ceci est démontré par l'absence du débat, la confiscation des toutes les tâches dans un travail en vase clos, où il croit pouvoir tout faire et mieux faire seul au détriment des organes du mouvement et même les réunions sont convoquées au grès de son humeur ;
2. L'affairisme dans la révolution : à peine pris le control du centre de négoce IGA BARRIERE par les éléments de la FRP-CRP, monsieur Thomas LUBANGA alors Président du mouvement, a pris la décision unilatérale d'ériger un système de péage route sur la RN27 à travers ses représentants personnels méconnus par le comité, où chaque véhicule était obligé de payer la somme qui varie entre 50 et 100\$ avant de passer et cette pratique a duré près d'un mois. Une façon d'imposer encore de la souffrance à ceux dont on prétend libérer. Malgré tout cela, le fond collecté n'a jamais été présenté au comité directeur jusqu'à ces jours.
3. Manque de vision claire : il a confondu la révolution à une vacance dorée à Kampala sans la moindre intention de mener une lutte de libération au sens du terme.
4. L'escroquerie voire l'arnaque des opérateurs économiques de l'ituri au nom de la C.R.P: Menace des commerçants sous prétexte de la souscription à l'effort de guerre à échange d'une exonération future après coquette du pouvoir par la C.R.P et ce, à l'insu du collège de fondateurs et comité directeur ;

5. Le clanisme dans le fonctionnement : il ne donne de l'importance qu'aux orientations ou conseils prodigués par les ressortissants de son clan et c'est ces derniers qui se donne le luxe même de tracer la ligne maitresse de la C.R.P ;
6. L'extrême opacité dans la gestion financière : le Président Thomas LUBANGA a expressément ignoré le chargé des finances du mouvement, désigné le jour même de la création de la C.R.P, pour ainsi imposer sa propre petite sœur avec qui il vit dans la même maison. C'est pourquoi, la gestion financière échappe donc au contrôle de tous les membres du mouvement ;
7. L'arrogance en outrance et le mépris total à l'égard d'autres membres fondateurs du mouvement, etc.

Il ressort en outre que, l'initiative pour la création de la C.R.P et surtout sa désignation à la Présidence, n'aurait servi que de tremplin pour son encension politique et financière entant qu'un homme aux intentions sournoises, dont la vraie nature s'est révélée au fil du temps, malheureusement dans un virage éhonté et très dégoûtant, en dépit des véritables mobiles ayant concouru à la création de la structure aussi prestigieuse que la C.R.P, pour tenter de libérer le peuple meurtri, abandonné et oublié de l'ituri en particulier et ceux du reste du pays en général.

C'est pourquoi, face à ce comportement irresponsable de monsieur Thomas LUBANGA DYILO qui relève d'une délinquance politique démesurée, de vouloir à tout prix caporaliser tous les cadres en vue de les soumettre à sa petite volonté, nous avons pris la décision en ce jour, de nous désengager totalement de la C.R.P dont l'image est complètement souillée et qui visiblement s'est écartée de ses objectifs fondamentaux suite à l'avarice incontrôlée.

Par conséquent, nous interpellons la conscience des filles et fils ituriens, de ne plus jamais tenter d'apporter le moindre soutien à la C.R.P dans son format actuel et surtout pas à travers monsieur Thomas LUBANGA qui s'en sert au profit de ses besoins personnels tout en se moquant des victimes d'atrocités de l'ituri qui ont besoin d'une libération en urgence.

LES SIGNATAIRES

01. BUNGAMUZI KAKANI Charles 
02. Tunguza Basitako Vital 
03. Ung'yesho Birumyo-David : 
04. WEDUNGA NDARA BAUDOUIN 
05. DRANI DRILEBA J. Xavier 

Annex 53 (para. 190)**Additional information on CRP/FRP's resource mobilisation****Informations complémentaires sur la mobilisation des ressources du CRP/FRP**

CRP/FRP established a voluntary as well as a coercive system of taxation to mobilize resources for its war efforts ([S/2024/432](#), paras. 167-170, [S/2025/446](#), paras-158-159). Multiple sources reported that Hema community traders and businessmen made voluntary and coercive cash contributions, ranging between USD 10,000 to USD 50,000 each, while other provided foodstuffs to sustain the armed movement.⁴²⁵

CRP/FRP also mobilised resources through taxation at checkpoints. CRP/FRP sources reported that along the Nizi-Mongbwalu axis CRP/FRP charged USD 100 per heavy truck per movement, and USD 25 for light vehicles. The same sources indicated that the CRP/FRP raised between USD 15,000 to 18,000 per day. CRP/FRP had also deployed its elements to collect taxes at gold mining sites, which generated considerable resources to sustain the war efforts. The resources served to purchase weapons and ammunitions.

⁴²⁵ CRP ex-combatants, Intelligence, civil society and researchers sources

Annex 54 (para. 191)

Interdiction on UPDF movements into Ituri without prior notification and approval

Interdiction des mouvements de l'UPDF vers l'Ituri sans notification préalable et autorisation



Mahagi, le 04-03 /2026

N°324/D53BUR/AT/MGI/2026

TRANSMIS copie pour information à :

- Son Excellence Monsieur le Gouverneur Militaire et Commandant des opérations de l'Ituri à **BUNIA**

OBJET : Instruction sur l'entrée
des éléments UPDF
Cl. : J.038

A Messieurs :
- Le Chef de Poste de la DGM ;
- Le Chef de Poste de l'ANR ;
- Le Chef de Poste de DSF ;
- Le Commandant Escadron Police des Frontières ;
(TOUS) à **MAHAGI**

Monsieur,

Sur instruction de Son Excellence Monsieur le Gouverneur Militaire et Commandant des opérations de Province de l'Ituri, il est strictement interdit de faire entrer sur notre Territoire par les frontières de ANZIDA et KAROMBO les éléments UPDF et leurs matériels sans l'aval de la hiérarchie.

Stricte application.



L'ADMINISTRATEUR MILITAIRE
DU TERRITOIRE,


[Signature]
"DISANOA-LALUA Jacques"
« Colonel/DSD »

Confidential source

Annex 55 (para. 193)

Suspension order semi-mechanized mining in parts of Djugu and Irumu territories

Ordre de suspension des activités semi-mécanisées dans une partie des territoires de Djugu et Irumu




Instruction sent by the military governor of Ituri, Gen. Johnny Luboya N'Kashama

Annex 56 (para. 195)

Conditioned resumption of mining activities in parts of Djugu and Irumu territories

Résomption partielle des activités minières dans des zones des territoires de Djugu et Irumu



Letter sent by military governor of Ituri, Gen. Johnny Luboya N'Kashama, to the provincial mining services enumerating the conditions under which semi-mechanized mining operators can be allowed to resume operations

Annex 58 (para. 201)

Estimates of semi-mechanized gold production along the Shari river, Djugu territory

Estimation de la production aurifère par des opérations semi-mécanisées le long de la Rivière Shari, territoire de Djugu

The Group assessed information provided by mining officials and civil society sources to derive conservative gold production estimates per production unit, typically composed of two to three excavators feeding a sluice, in Djugu territory, with a particular focus on operations along the Shari River. In parallel, detailed information was collected on the volume of gold-bearing gravel (“paydirt”) processed by each unit on a daily basis. Combining these daily production figures with estimated throughput allowed the Group to establish a conservative estimate of the recovered grade of the alluvial deposits along the Shari River. The total volume of material mined was then estimated on a six-monthly basis from March 2024 onwards using medium-resolution satellite imagery, complemented by average deposit depths derived from cross-checked interviews.

1. Context, assumptions and scope of the analysis

The typical alluvial mining setup in Djugu territory consists of 2–3 excavators working with a locally constructed sluice (commonly referred to as a “*drum*”). One to two excavators remove topsoil, prepare the site, and transport gold-containing gravel, also known as “paydirt”. The remaining excavator ensures that paydirt is continuously being fed into the sluice. A sluice is a channel that uses flowing water to separate gold from gravel.

According to concordant sources, a standard operation of this type in Djugu territory, assuming 12–20 effective workdays per month, can conservatively be expected to produce 1.8–3 kg of gold per month, equivalent to approximately 150 g/day on average.⁴²⁶ This aligns with other lower-bound estimates for profitable operations in the area.⁴²⁷

Along the Shari River, reported production levels are considerably higher. Observed daily yields per sluice typically reach 300 g/day, with peaks up to 500 g/day or more.⁴²⁸

As such, information on expected daily production per operating unit does not allow us to infer total alluvial production in a specific area over time. The number of days of production per operating unit varies widely throughout the year because of seasonal and idiosyncratic operational constraints. In addition, there are no reliable statistics available on the number of excavators operational in a specific area. The reported number of excavators per site is often an underrepresentation to evade the 4500 USD/year tax.⁴²⁹

This annex therefore presents a model to estimate alluvial production along the Shari River by assessing the average grade of the resource, i.e. grams of gold per m³ of gravel. The average grade in combination with the estimated total volume (in m³) of mined material over time allows us to estimate total gold production of the operation.

2. Estimated gravel throughput

To estimate the grade of the Shari River deposits, daily throughput is assessed alongside observed daily gold production. Throughput is the volume of paydirt processed by the operation. The average grade of the resource is then obtained by dividing the average daily gold production by the daily throughput. Two independent methods are used to crosscheck the estimates: the sluice processing capacity and the excavator feeding cadence. Combining both methods increases confidence in the result.

The sluices in use are generally described as having a “horizontal V”-shaped configuration. The upper sluice, measuring 3–4 m in length, performs initial washing and sorting. Finer material then passes to a second sluice of similar length positioned

⁴²⁶ Mining officials, civil society actors, geologists.

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

at an angle underneath the first (= the second leg of the V) equipped with gold matting. The most recurrent sluice widths range from 0.5–0.8 m.⁴³⁰ Some sluices used are considerably larger, but for the purposes of the current analysis we will be focusing on a standardized setup.

While sluice length influences gold recovery efficiency, sluice width primarily determines processing capacity. Industry references indicate that sluices of the aforementioned dimensions can typically process 22.5–36 m³ of paydirt per hour.⁴³¹

Whereas sluice capacity gives a first, but rather broad, range of estimate of expected throughput, data on excavator feeding cadence provides a more specific and independent estimate of throughput. Smaller excavators with a 300-kg bucket reportedly complete a loading cycle in ~30 seconds, corresponding to approximately 18 m³/hour (assuming a gravel density of 2 tons/m³). Larger excavators with 1.5 m³ buckets have turn-around times of 3–5 minutes, equating to roughly 22 m³/hour based on an average of 15 cycles per hour.⁴³²

These data points are internally consistent, showing a feeding rate between 18 and 23 m³/hour. Moreover, this throughput aligns with the lower end of the sluice's processing capacity, indicating that excavator feeding cadence rather than sluice capacity is the primary bottleneck. This is typical for semi-mechanized alluvial mining operations.

Knowing the hourly throughput rate, it is necessary to determine the effective number of operating hours per day to calculate the total daily throughput of paydirt. Although work is typically organized into three shifts totaling 21 hours, actual feeding of the sluice is periodically interrupted due to routine operational requirements, including excavator repositioning and ensuring sufficient stockpiled paydirt.⁴³³

For the purposes of this assessment, we will therefore consider an estimated 19 to 20 hours of effective daily production. In combination with the hourly feeding rate of 18 – 22 m³, this corresponds to an approximate daily throughput of 350 – 450 m³ of paydirt.

3. Estimating recovered grade from throughput and production

Based on this throughput, we can translate the observed daily gold outputs along the Shari River into indicative grade values. Considering a daily throughput of 400 m³ of paydirt and a gold production level of 300 g/day, this corresponds to roughly 0.75 g/m³, while 500 g/day corresponds to approximately 1.25 g/m³. Days with exceptionally high production can also reflect more continuous and optimized feeding, leading to a somewhat lower grade in practice.

	Daily production	Recovered Grade
Low	150 grams	0.38 g/m ³
Good	300 grams	0.75 g/m ³
Great	>500 grams	>1.25 g/m ³

4. Assessing plausibility using independent reference points

Several independent reference points support the plausibility of the estimated grade range for the Shari River deposits:

Rule-of-thumb grade used by mining authorities

Mining officials apply a rule-of-thumb grade of “1 g per (large) excavator bucket” for production estimates in Shari. This corresponds to 1 g per 1.5 m³, reflecting the approximate volume of a large excavator bucket. This equals 0.67 grams per m³. The shorthand is broadly consistent with an excavator feeding cadence of 15 cycles per hour (approximately 4 minutes per cycle) over an effective working period of 20 hours, yielding 300 grams per day.

⁴³⁰ Ibid.

⁴³¹ See eg. Robin Grayson, ‘Best available techniques for placer gold mines’, p. 671

⁴³² Mining officials, civil society actors, geologists

⁴³³ Ibid.

Comparison with global and Congolese alluvial benchmarks

Assuming a recovery rate of 60–80 percent⁴³⁴, the inferred true grades of the Shari river deposit can be compared against a placer (i.e. alluvial) deposit grade distribution model developed by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to provide an objective assessment of deposit quality.⁴³⁵ This comparison places the Shari resource within a global context and allows for a structured evaluation of its relative standing among documented placer deposits.

The table below presents recovered grades and their corresponding true grades and percentile ranges across the three recovery-rate scenarios:

Recovered Grade (g/m ³)	60% recovery rate		70% recovery rate		80% recovery rate	
	True grade (g/m ³)	Percentile	True Grade	Percentile	True Grade	Percentile
0.38	0.63	78-82	0.54	75-78	0.48	72-76
0.75	1.25	90-93	1.07	88-91	0.93	86-89
1.25	2.08	95-97	1.79	94-96	1.56	93-95

Overall, the USGS benchmarks place the estimated grade of the Shari resource broadly within the 80th–95th percentile of documented global placer gold deposits. At the time of writing, no detailed resource estimates or exploration reports were available for placer systems in Djugu territory to enable a more localized comparative framework. However, historical geological assessments from other Congolese alluvial gold hubs provide relevant reference points.

In Kampene (Maniema Province), historical records indicate placer deposit grades averaging approximately 1.6 g/m³ (with a reported range of 0.88–1.95 g/m³).⁴³⁶ Along the Kimbi river in Fizi territory (South Kivu Province), operations from the 1930s to 1950s reported recovered grades in the range of 0.5–0.93 g/m³.⁴³⁷ These values indicate that the estimated grades along Shari, including the inferred average of around 0.75 g/m³, fall well within the spectrum of known Congolese placer deposit grades and are not anomalous in a regional context.

The Kilo-Moto placer systems are widely regarded as high-quality deposits, and the Shari basin, situated along a paleo-channel and in proximity to primary mineralization, aligns with this geological profile. This suggests that certain stretches of the Shari deposit may yield recovered grades significantly higher than 0.75 g/m³.

Interpretation and limits of field pan sampling

Field identification of exploitable deposits is carried out through localized sampling at the base of the gravel column, with assessments relying largely on visual and intuitive evaluation by operators.⁴³⁸ A yield of ½–1 “tige” (0.1 g) per two 15-kg pans is considered promising. This corresponds to approximately 3.3–6.6 g/m³.⁴³⁹ However, these samples represent bottom-layer concentrations, which are typically several times richer than the overall deposit due to gravitational sorting and localized gold accumulation in bedrock traps. As a result, such sampling results are not reliable predictors of average grade, but they do provide a reasonable indication of mineralization intensity and economic viability.

Operating costs and influence on grade targeting

The Shari placer deposits are overlain by thick swampy sediments, requiring substantial efforts to reach the paydirt that can extend over several months. Given these high preparatory costs in fuel (400 liters per 21-hour working day per excavator) and manpower, it is reasonable that operators focus on areas with above-average expected yields, which helps explain why

⁴³⁴ Robin Grayson, l.c., p. 673

⁴³⁵ USGS, Grade and Tonnage Model of Placer Au-PGE, <https://pubs.usgs.gov/bul/b1693/html/bull421h.htm>;

⁴³⁶ The mentioned average is weighted by volume of the respective resource. Hattingh J. et Taylor C. B. (2007). A review of the South Kivu – Maniema Exploration permit and the Kampene Mining and concession areas - Democratic Republic of Congo. Wardell Armstrong International Limited. La Quinta Resources Corporation. Ref : 61-0441, as referenced by the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources, “[Evaluation Géologique et Economique des Gisements d’Or Alluvionnaire de Kampene, Maniema, RD Congo](#)”, April 2024, p.3;

⁴³⁷ G. Schaar, Les mines d’or du 5^{ème} parallèle, Académie royale des sciences coloniales, 1959, p. 39

⁴³⁸ Mining officials, civil society actors, geologists

⁴³⁹ Ibid.

reported Shari production levels consistently exceed the conservative baseline estimate of 150 g/day commonly used by mining services.

5. From observed mine footprint to cumulative production

Daily production cannot be extrapolated across the year because operations along the Shari River include extended periods of preparatory work, as mentioned above, as well as intermittent downtime for equipment maintenance and eventualities such as last year's administrative suspension. These factors vary and cannot be reliably quantified.

A more robust approach is therefore to infer cumulative production from changes in excavated surface area visible on satellite imagery. Semi-mechanized alluvial mining creates identifiable water-filled pits, tailings ponds, and reworked channels, allowing mined areas to be mapped over time. This method implicitly incorporates all operational interruptions.

Accumulated production is estimated by multiplying the mapped excavated area by the average paydirt thickness. Interlocutors report that economically attractive placer deposits in Djugu generally have 0.5–1.5 m of gravel, while major river systems such as the Shari exhibit thicker sequences.⁴⁴⁰ Observers estimate Shari paydirt at 2–3 m on average, with some zones up to 8 m.⁴⁴¹ However, grades decline toward the upper gravel layers because of gravitational sorting, so exceptionally thick zones contribute less to overall output than their thickness alone would suggest. For conservative estimation, an average paydirt thickness of 2 to 3 m is applied.

Alluvial mining along the Shari River provides a suitable case study due to the clear visibility of excavation activity on satellite imagery. The river basin and its successive expansions can be monitored effectively using 3-metre resolution imagery from Planet Labs PBC, allowing reliable tracking of spatial progression over time. Excavated sections are reused as water reservoirs and tailings ponds, resulting in a relatively orderly and easily identifiable mining footprint.

A key limitation relates to the temporal resolution of the satellite-based approach. Once an area is identified as excavated, its full estimated production potential is counted immediately, even though extraction within that area may still be ongoing. This can lead to over- or under-estimation at specific points in time, as the method does not distinguish between depleted sections, newly opened areas and those still in mid-extraction. However, these temporal discrepancies are expected to average out over longer observation periods, particularly when imagery is assessed at regular intervals.

A second limitation is the potential inclusion of non-productive features, such as artificial dams, sterile zones, or areas cleared but not mined, which may be captured within the mapped footprint. To take this limitation into account, a correction factor will be applied in the below calculations. Despite this, the most significant uncertainties remain the grade of the deposit and the average paydirt thickness, which exert a far greater influence on production estimates.

Although the methodology developed lends itself to replication in other semi-mechanized mining context in the DR Congo and beyond, it should be noted that not all such operations exhibit the same characteristics as those described for the Shari River. Extrapolating the methodology for instance to the semi-mechanized mining operations in the *Réserve de faune à Okapi* (See [S/2022/479](#), paras. 141-150) would not be valid. There, mining activity frequently reworks previously disturbed areas, producing a diffuse and shifting footprint that does not expand in a clear, cumulative manner. As a result, surface area progression cannot be reliably linked to incremental volume extracted, making production estimates derived from this approach considerably more uncertain.

6. Production estimates derived from spatial analysis

Planet Labs PBC satellite imagery with a 3-metre resolution was analyzed to quantify the expansion of mined surface area along the Shari river. Measurements were conducted twice yearly beginning in March 2024. The additional surface area identified in each interval is presented below (in thousand m²):

Period	Additional surface area mined (1000 m ²)
3/2024-09/2024	949

⁴⁴⁰ Mining officials, civil society actors, geologists

⁴⁴¹ Mining officials, civil society actors, geologists

09/2024-03/2025	1,156
03/2025-09/2025	1,586
09/2025-03/2026	1,525
Total	5,216

The cumulative mapped area over the two-year period is therefore 5.22 km². In line with a conservative analytical approach, we will correct for that part of the mining footprint that corresponds to the non-productive features. Considering the characteristics of mining along the Shari river, a correction factor of 80% will be applied. We will hence assume a total mined footprint of 4.2 km².

Using this total mined footprint and applying different assumptions for average recovered grade and average paydirt thickness, the resulting production estimates (in tons) are shown below:

Average recovered grade (g/m ³)	Avg. Paydirt Thickness (m)		
	2	2.5	3
0.38	3t	4t	5t
0.75	6t	8t	10t
1	8t	10t	13t
1.25	10t	13t	16t

These values represent cumulative gold production estimates for the period March 2024 – March 2026, based solely on observed excavation footprints and the stated grade and thickness assumptions.




Image © 2026 Planet Labs PBC, September 2024 (left) and March 2025 (right). Analysis by the Group of Experts







Image © 2026 Planet Labs PBC, September 2025 (left) and March 2026 (right)
Analysis by the Group of Experts

	Mined Surface_2403
	Mined Surface 2409
	Mined Surface_2503
	Mined Surface_2509
	mined Surface_2603



Above: IPIS and Mapbox map, showing location of Shari river section shown on the left (Image © 2026 Planet Labs PBC, March 2026).

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 59 (para. 202)**Alluvial Mining around Yedi, Djugu****Exploitation alluvionnaire autour de Yedi, Djugu**

Source: (top) Near-Infrared Image with visible excavation highlighted, © Copernicus Sentinel Data, March 2026 and (bottom left and right) © Google Earth/Maxar Technologies, Airbus, Landsat and Copernicus, June 2025
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

A second alluvial mining area in Djugu territory that experienced a major expansion in 2025 is located around Yedi, a secluded locality approximately 25 km northwest of Mongbwalu. Mid-June 2024, mining operators began constructing a 55 km dirt road from Komanda to Yedi. By the last quarter of 2024, semi-mechanized alluvial mining became visible on EU Copernicus satellite imagery.

Since then, the pace of mine-site development has been exceptionally rapid. Within just over one year, approximately 12.5 km² of terrain have been visibly disturbed by alluvial mining activities. High-resolution satellite imagery shows extensive and fast excavation of small riverbeds, with shallow overburden and the continuous formation of gravel tailings fans. These patterns are characteristic of operations working directly in the active channel, where paydirt is relatively shallow; a conservative estimate places average paydirt thickness between 0.5 and 1.0 m. The spatial footprint of the workings is also relatively “clean”: excavated cells along the river are frequently reused as water reservoirs or tailings ponds, reducing the non-productive part of the footprint. The methodology developed in the previous annex can hence be applied.

Not all visibly disturbed ground represents actual excavation of paydirt. Applying a conservative correction factor of 70%, the effectively mined area is estimated at 8.75 km². Even under the most conservative assumptions for both grade and paydirt thickness, cumulative production over the past year likely reaches several tons of gold. It should be noted that no production was officially declared for this operation in 2025.⁴⁴²

The table below summarizes estimated production (in tons) across a range of conservative and plausible paydirt thicknesses and grades, including a minimum recovered grade of 0.35 g/m³:

Recovered grade (g/m ³)	Paydirt thickness (m)		
	0.5	0.75	1
0.35	1.5t	2.3t	3.1t
0.5	2.2t	3.3t	4.4t
0.75	3.3t	4.9t	6.6t
1	4.4t	6.6t	8.8t
1.2	5.25t	7.9t	10.5t
1.5	6.5t	9.8t	13.1t

⁴⁴² Ituri province production and export statistics, 2025, mining services, document on file with the Secretariat

Annex 60 (para. 203)

Analysis of active semi-mechanized mining camps in Djugu territory

Analyse des camps actifs d'exploitation semi-mécanisée dans le territoire de Djugu

To assess overall trends in semi-mechanized mining activity in Djugu territory, the Group used the number of identifiable mining camps active during the year as a proxy indicator. This approach was adopted for reasons of efficiency and feasibility. Mapping changes in mined surface area requires substantial resources, whereas the visual identification of mining camps provides a reliable first-order indication of the level of mining activity.

Mining camps display a distinctive and recurrent signature in medium-resolution satellite imagery. They are typically characterized by rectangular, man-made earthen embankments delineating the camp area and are situated near visibly exploited alluvial deposits. During periods of operation, high-reflectance features associated with corrugated iron roofing, metal containers and equipment are generally observable. These features disappear once a camp is abandoned (see below). EU Copernicus satellite imagery for 2024 and 2025 was systematically reviewed, and Planet Labs PBC imagery was used selectively to confirm the operational status of camps where required. As with any visual classification based on medium-resolution satellite imagery, some degree of over- or under-identification of likely mining camps cannot be excluded.



Left: active mining camp near Yedi; Center: abandoned mining camp near Yedi; Right: active mining camp along the Ituri river. Source: © Google Earth/Airbus, 2025

The use of mining camps as a proxy indicator reflects both the scale of material and manpower deployed and the spatial progression of alluvial exploitation along placer deposits. This relationship is indicative but not linear. The maps show camps that were active at some point during the reference year, rather than simultaneously. Some were abandoned shortly after establishment due to insufficient ore grades, while others ceased activity following resource depletion. In addition, smaller and more transient camps are likely associated with significantly lower levels of equipment and output than larger, longer-established camps. Accordingly, the results provide an indicative rather than exhaustive measure of mining activity over the period under review.



Position of active mining camps 2024 (left) and 2025 (right); Base layer: © OpenStreetMaps

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

A comparison of the maps indicates a marked increase in semi-mechanized mining activity in 2025. The expansion was particularly pronounced, though not exclusively so, in the aforementioned areas surrounding Yedi and along the Shari River. Nine mining camps commenced operations in southern Banyali-Kilo. Significant stretches of the Ituri River were also exploited and mining operators ventured into new areas, including around Makofi in the north.

In quantitative terms, approximately 55 mining camps were identified as having been active at some point during 2024, compared with 104 in 2025. Some of the camps highlighted on the maps are located just beyond the administrative boundaries of Djugu territory. Given their immediate proximity and linkage to mining activity within Djugu, these sites were included to present a more representative picture of overall trends.

The raw number of such camps for 2024 gives an inflated impression of semi-mechanized activity throughout that year. First, mining activity around Yedi only appeared in the last quarter of 2024. Moreover, after a significant lull in violence in Banyali-Kilo collectivity in 2023, there was a renaissance of semi-mechanized mining in the first half of 2024, especially around Abelkoso. This triggered a spate of particularly violent attacks by CODECO-URDPC, killing 126 civilians in incidents directly linked to control over mining activity, including six foreigners.⁴⁴³ Mining activity stopped overnight and the timid boom hence turned into a sudden bust. This alteration between interacting cycles of violence and semi-mechanized mining had been observed in Djugu before and therefore serves as a cautionary tale for the current gold rush in the area.

⁴⁴³ UN Sources

Annex 61 (para. 206)

Regulatory framework governing the use of cyanide in mining operations in the DR Congo

Cadre réglementaire sur l'utilisation de cyanure dans des opérations minières en RD Congo

The use of cyanide in combination with mercury is widely recognized as one of the most hazardous forms of artisanal gold mining, especially as their interaction results in the formation of stable, highly hazardous compounds. These substances contaminate soil and aquatic ecosystems, endangering the health and livelihoods of the local population.

Under Annex C of the Minamata Convention on Mercury, to which the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a State Party, cyanide leaching of mercury-bearing tailings is identified as a practice that should be eliminated as a matter of priority.⁴⁴⁴ Scientific and policy guidance issued under the Convention, including UNEP's guidance on sound tailings management in ASGM, further emphasizes that this practice represents a worst-case scenario.⁴⁴⁵ Consistent with these international commitments, the Democratic Republic of the Congo's National Action Plan under the Minamata Convention explicitly commits the Government to eradicating these practices.⁴⁴⁶

The *Règlement minier*, as amended by Decree n°18/024 of 8 June 2018, subjects the use of cyanide in mining activities to a prior authorization regime. Cyanide is treated as a hazardous chemical reagent whose use is restricted to mineral processing and transformation activities carried out in processing plants or workshops expressly authorized by the Minister of Mines. Unauthorized use of cyanide, including its use by artisanal miners, mining cooperatives, or unapproved processing units, is prohibited and exposes the operator to administrative sanctions, including withdrawal of authorization or *agrément* (art 238 *Règlement minier*).

Authorization to use cyanide is further conditioned on compliance with restrictive environmental impact management requirements. In accordance with articles 430 to 433 of the *Règlement minier*, any mining or processing activity involving hazardous substances must be covered by risk assessments and mitigation plans. These instruments must specifically target risks associated with the use, storage and disposal of cyanide.

While the *Règlement minier* governs the authorization to use cyanide, the requirement to obtain a prior licence for its importation derives the import licensing regime is established under *Ordonnance-loi n°83-033 du 12 septembre 1983 portant régime général du commerce extérieur*. Cyanide, as a dangerous chemical product, falls within the category of goods requiring prior authorization for importation. In practice, import licenses are issued only to operators able to demonstrate lawful end-use, notably possession of a valid ministerial authorization to use cyanide under the *Règlement minier*, and compliance with applicable environmental approvals. The only gold producer to which such authorizations are currently awarded is Barrick Gold, which operates the Kibali Gold Mine in Haut Uele province.⁴⁴⁷

⁴⁴⁴ https://minamataconvention.org/sites/default/files/documents/information_document/Minamata-Convention-booklet-Sep2019-EN.pdf

⁴⁴⁵ http://minamataconvention.org/sites/default/files/documents/information_document/4_INF6_ASGM_Guidance.English.pdf

⁴⁴⁶ https://minamataconvention.org/sites/default/files/documents/national_action_plan/RDC-NAP-2021-FR.pdf

⁴⁴⁷ Mining officials

Annex 62 (para. 207)

Satellite imagery of cyanide leaching operations near Iga Barrière

Images satellitaires des opérations de lixiviation au cyanure vers Iga Barrière





UN Group of Experts
Established pursuant to Resolution 2783 (2025)

Iga Barrière, DRC



Office of Information and Communications Technology
Geospatial Information Section

Images (C) CNES (2026), Distribution
Airbus DS Périodes Neo

UNITED NATIONS
Map No. 4712.3 (Feb 2026)

Annex 63 (para. 207)

A forensic production assessment of cyanide leaching operations

Analyse de la production fondée sur des indices matériels des opérations de lixiviation au cyanure

1. Introduction and summary

In cyanide leaching, crushed gold-bearing rock is mixed with a weak cyanide solution. The cyanide dissolves the gold out of the rock, releasing it into the liquid in a form that can be recovered.

To capture the dissolved gold, activated carbon is added to the solution. Gold sticks strongly to the carbon, so as the liquid flows past, the gold is absorbed onto the carbon grains, while the remaining waste rock and solution are removed.

Once the carbon is “loaded” with gold, it is separated from the slurry and treated with a hot chemical solution that washes the gold off the carbon. This gold-rich liquid is then processed further—typically by electrolysis or smelting—to produce metallic gold. There are currently three installations in Bunia where gold can be recovered from the activated carbon, although smuggling of activated carbon to Uganda remains prevalent as well.⁴⁴⁸

This assessment presents a methodology for estimating gold production capacity of cyanide-leaching operations by analyzing accumulated tailings and associated processing infrastructure visible in high-resolution satellite imagery. Because spent tailings accumulate and are not normally removed, they provide a cumulative and unavoidable physical record of past production. The approach combines estimates of accumulated tailings volumes with throughput modelling. The throughput model is derived from measurements of leaching tank dimensions and operating cycles, and gives an indication of the volumes of spent tailings that are expected to be added per month. Cross-checking these two independent indicators strengthens the reliability of the estimates and provides an external means of assessing the production of leaching operations.

The assessment is based on detailed 3D-modelling of the accumulated spent tailing heaps that are deposited next to the leaching tanks. The modeling was inferred by combining data from high resolution satellite imagery with known physical properties of the tailings, which consist of fine-grained quartz sand. The model indicates that approximately 180,000 tons of tailings were treated by January 2026, with an average grade ranging between five and ten grams of gold per ton, potentially more under less conservative assumptions.

2. Accumulation analysis

In the facilities under consideration, tailings generated through cyanide leaching are deposited adjacent to the processing vats. Over time, these deposits constitute a cumulative record of all ore processed since the beginning of operations. This feature, while incidental to the operation, has the effect of significantly enhancing transparency. By estimating both the physical volume of the tailings and the average grade of the ore, it is possible to infer total gold extraction volumes over the operational period.

Satellite imagery provides clear delineation of the horizontal footprint of these tailings. The primary challenge therefore lies in determining heap height, and hence volume, from these two-dimensional images.

The tailings consist of fine-grained quartz sand. Granular materials naturally stabilize at a characteristic angle of repose, defined as the angle at which gravitational forces balance the internal frictional resistance of the grains. In other words, it is the natural slope along which loose sand settles without collapsing. Hence, if we know how wide the heap is and how steep loose sand naturally piles up, we can estimate how tall the heap must be.

⁴⁴⁸ Civil society sources, mining officials

For dry quartz sand, this angle typically approximates 34° .⁴⁴⁹ This allows us to calculate the approximate height of the heaps using basic geometry: the height is equal to the horizontal run of the slope (i.e. the horizontal distance from the base of the slope to its edge) times the tangent of the angle of repose.


These estimates are approximate and intentionally conservative. This methodology provides a reasonable approximation for constructing three-dimensional models of the tailing heaps, but several limitations remain. The angle of repose may deviate from standard values, as the grain size and consistency of the quartz-rich tailings are not precisely known. Humidity of the spent tailings can also influence the angle of repose, although the tailings accumulated along the slope have typically dried out under direct sunlight. In addition, the heaps are often irregularly shaped, making contour delineation more challenging and introducing a degree of subjectivity into the modelling. Finally, the satellite imagery might contain off-nadir and terrain-related distortions, leading to some geometric inaccuracies.

2. Throughput analysis

In addition to the accumulation analysis whereby we calculate the total historical volume of processed ores via the geometry of the tailing heaps, we can also conduct a throughput analysis. Hereby the monthly processing capacity of the operation is calculated based on the dimensions and count of active treatment vats.

The maximum throughput of a cluster of leaching vats depends on the volume of the treated ore per vat and the duration of a treatment. Based on interviews with industry insiders, one treatment cycle at the Iga Barriere operation takes 14 days, excluding filling and emptying the tank.⁴⁵⁰

The volume of treated ore depends foremost on the volume of the tanks. For the tank volume, we need their diameter and depth. Tank diameter can easily be measured using high resolution satellite imagery, such as 30cm Airbus Neo Pleiades. To establish the depth of the tanks, satellite imagery can also be used by means of the shadow method. Hereby we look at the length of the shadow cast by the sun inside empty tanks. More specifically, the depth of the tank will be equal to the length of the shade times the tangent of the sun's elevation angle.



Images: © Airbus, 16.05.2023

On these images (Airbus, 16.05.2023), one can measure the length of the shade cast in the leaching vats to be approximately 0.75 meters. The sun elevation was 64.24°

$$\text{depth} = 0.75m \times \tan(64.24^\circ) \approx 1.5m$$

The tanks on the left of each image are visibly deeper, though they are not used to treat ore, but rather to collect and treat the gold-containing solution after leaching.

⁴⁴⁹ See for instance: [H.M. Beakawi Al-Hashemi, O.S. Baghabra Al-Amoudi, A review on the angle of repose of granular materials, Powder Technology 330 \(2018\), p.399](#)

⁴⁵⁰ Mining officials, researchers, civil society actors

A depth of 1.5 meters is logical as the sand is shoveled out of the tanks by hand after treatment.⁴⁵¹ Deeper leaching tanks would therefore be highly impractical. Typical tank depth was further confirmed by analyzing other high resolution satellite imagery (Airbus January 2026) and by interviews.⁴⁵² An estimated two-thirds of the volume of the tank is filled with dry ore.⁴⁵³

3. Cross-checking and validation of model

To ensure the robustness and credibility of the production-estimation framework, a systematic cross-checking and validation process was applied. This process compares the theoretical maximum throughput of a cluster of leaching tanks with the 3D-modeled volume of the adjacent accumulated tailing heap. By analyzing multiple clusters and time periods, the method assesses whether observed tailings volumes fall within the expected range of throughput.

The following calculations apply the same basic method repeatedly across different clusters to test whether observed tailings volumes are consistent with plausible processing capacity. This dual-track validation serves to confirm the internal consistency of the model and to identify any anomalies requiring further investigation. It provides a transparent, repeatable mechanism for verifying production estimates.

Cluster 1

Throughput analysis



Images: © Airbus: May 2023 (left), April 2024 (center), August 2025 (right)

The maximum throughput of each these leaching tanks (6m diameter) per month is :

$$r^2 \times \pi \times d \times 65\% \text{ dry tailing content} \times 2 \text{ cycles} = \text{monthly volume per tank}$$

$$(3m)^2 \times \pi \times 1.5m \times 65\% \times 2 \text{ cycles} = 55.1m^3$$

Low resolution satellite imagery from Planet Labs PBC indicates that the cluster started operating in July 2023, when light, high-contrast quartz sand becomes visible and the footprint of the installation increases.

Between July 23 and April 2024, when the second high resolution image was taken, the maximum combined throughput of these tanks was :

$$55 m^3 \times 3 \text{ tanks} \times 9 \text{ months} = 1485 m^3$$

Between April 2024 and August 2025, the maximum combined throughput was:

$$55 m^3 \times 3 \times 16 = 2640 m^3$$


Accumulation analysis

⁴⁵¹ Mining officials, researchers, civil society actors and satellite imagery analysis

⁴⁵² Ibid.

⁴⁵³ Published studies report lower dry-weight fractions (40%) under faster processing conditions (i.e. days rather than weeks), these are hence not directly comparable to conditions in the operations in Iga Barrière. A higher proportion of dry-weight is expected in prolonged vat leaching, making a two-thirds assumption conservative in the absence of clearer operational data.

When assessing the accumulated tailings for the April 2024 and August 2025 image respectively, we estimate the height by multiplying the horizontal run of the slope times the tangent of the angle of repose.




Images: © Airbus, April 2024 (left) and August 2025 (right)

For the April 2024 image, this is: $5.5m \times \tan(34^\circ) = 3.7m$
For the August 2025 image, this is: $11m \times \tan(34^\circ) = 7.5m$

Using QGIS, contours are manually digitized based on estimated slope heights, after which a 3D model is generated using the Triangular Irregular Network (TIN) tool. The Raster Surface Volume tool calculates the volume of the modeled tailings heap.

This gives the following results:




Images: © Airbus, April 2024 (left) and August 2025 (right)

	Maximum accumulated throughput (m^3)	Measured volume of tailings heap (m^3)	Measured/max throughput
April 2024	1485	1100	75%
August 2025	4125	3300	80%

The observed increase in tailings volume, equivalent to approximately 75–80 per cent of the maximum theoretical throughput, falls within the expected range. Variance from the maximum can be explained by the manual emptying and refilling of tanks between 14-day leaching cycles and the time required to source input material. The assumed two-thirds dry-material capacity per tank is also an estimate.

While this alignment provides initial validation of the model, further corroboration is required to ensure that the consistency observed is not coincidental and that the methodology remains reliable across all observed leaching operations. We will therefore assess three more randomly selected clusters that showed continuous operation during the period observed with high resolution satellite imagery.

Cluster 2



Images: © Airbus, April 2024 (left) and August 2025 (right)

The above images show a time comparison between April 2024 and August 2025. Low resolution imagery from Planet Labs indicates that production commenced mid-July 2024.

Using the aforementioned formulas, we calculate the maximum throughput of ore during that period, for a tank with measured diameter of 5 meters.

$$(2.5m)^2 \times \pi \times 1.5m \times 65\% \times 2 \times 13 \text{ months} = 498m^3$$

For five vats the total maximum throughput in that period is approximately $2500 m^3$

We will again calculate the volume of the accumulated tailings heap. The horizontal run of the slope (with visible gullies formed by rain) is 9m, with a resulting estimated height of around 6 meters.




The calculated volume of the tailings heap is 2100 m^3 . This will be 50-100 m^3 less, as the northern slope of the constructed laterite hill on which the tanks are located (see April 2024 imagery) is covered by the tailings heap.⁴⁵⁴

	Maximum accumulated throughput (m^3)	Measured volume of tailings heap (m^3)	Measured/max throughput
August 2025	2500	2100	80-85%

This demonstrates again a good correspondence between the accumulation and throughput analyses.


Cluster 3



Images: © Airbus, April 2024 (left) and August 2025 (right)

There are four tanks with a 5m diameter and four with a 6m diameter. This gives a total maximum monthly throughput of 373 m^3 .

⁴⁵⁴ For the constructed laterite slope, a 45° slope is assumed. Consequently, we can calculate its volume (V) by the following formula: $V = [(\text{horizontal run})^2 \times \text{length}] / 2$




Images: © Airbus, April 2024 (left) and August 2025 (right)

We again make a 3D model of the approximative volume, with a calculated height of around 4 meters in April 2024 and of 8 meters in August 2025. Based on Planet Labs PBC imagery, the first processed tailings were deposited mid-February 2024.

	Maximum accumulated throughput (m^3)	Measured volume of tailings heap (m^3)	Measured/max throughput
April 2024	932.5	900	96%
August 2025	6900	6000	87%

The measured tailings volume is likely slightly overstated, as a constructed laterite slope probably underlies part of the heap, although no imagery is available from the time of construction to confirm its dimensions.

Cluster 4



Images: © Airbus, April 2024 (left) and August 2025 (right)

There are 5 tanks with a diameter of 5.5 meters. Each tank has a maximum throughput of $46 m^3$, giving a combined total of $230 m^3$ per month.

The estimated height of the heaps is 4 and 7 meters respectively. The calculated volume of the accumulated tailings in April 2024 is 900 and in August 2025 $3500 m^3$.

For the period between April 2024 and August 2025, we have a maximum theoretical throughput of 3680 m^3 . The increase in estimated volume for that time is 2600 m^3 . This represents 71% of the maximum.

Validation of model

Across the four assessed clusters, the model demonstrates coherent and credible alignment between theoretical throughput and measured tailings volumes, providing strong initial validation of the methodology.

Certain limitations remain: maximum operational throughput is lower in practice due to the time required to empty, clean, and refill leaching tanks in between cycles. Terrain effects, such as constructed laterite platforms or natural downward slopes, cannot be fully incorporated into the volumetric modelling. Taken together, the results indicate that, despite these constraints, the methodology provides a reliable and sufficiently robust basis for assessing production volumes.


4. Generalization to entire production in cluster since 2023

Having confirmed that the method yields consistent results across multiple independent clusters, it is reasonable to apply the same conservative approach to all observed tailings heaps.

We proceeded to apply the same approach to the full set of tailings heaps associated with the leaching operation. 45 heaps were modeled in total. For each heap, we first inferred the approximate height by measuring visible slope features and manually delineating contour lines. This then provided the basis for constructing a three-dimensional surface using the TIN interpolation and Raster Surface Volume tools in QGIS.

It should be noted that, according to mining officials, the maximum height attained by these heaps is around 8 meters, which corresponds to the maximum height observed in our 3D-generated model. This provides additional validation of the latter.

While this process enables a structured and replicable volumetric estimation, it necessarily contains a degree of subjectivity in the placement and spacing of contour lines; in all cases, a conservative approach was adopted to avoid overestimation. Additionally, some tailings heaps lacked a clearly visible slope or exhibited irregular geometries that prevented reliable 3D modelling. These were hence not modelled. As a result, the calculated aggregate volume of tailings should be interpreted as a lower-bound estimate of total processed material since the start of operations.



Images: © Airbus, January 2026

The total calculated volume of the tailing heaps is approximately 120,000 m^3 . Given the specific density of quartz sand tailings, this corresponds to about 180,000 tons.

5. Indications of grade and total accumulated production estimates

To estimate total gold production, we combine the calculated tailings volume with estimates of average gold grade. Available qualitative evidence suggests that the material processed has a wide range of grades: ore purchased for cyanidation reportedly contains a minimum of 3–5 g/t, with 10 g/t considered to be a ‘decent’ working grade. Interviews and tailings-purchase price indications further imply that certain batches may have significantly higher grades, in some cases exceeding 20 g/t and exceptionally even reaching values up to 40 g/t.⁴⁵⁵

The information at hand is insufficient to derive a reliable grade distribution. In line with a precautionary analytical approach, two scenarios are therefore adopted: a baseline lower-bound scenario of 5 g/t, reflecting the minimum plausible average grade, and a conservative upper-bound scenario of 10 g/t, representing a cautious estimate of maximum average grade.

$$180,000 \text{ tons} \times \frac{5g}{\text{ton}} = 900 \text{ kg}$$

$$180,000 \text{ tons} \times \frac{10g}{\text{ton}} = 1,800 \text{ kg}$$

Based on the estimated accumulated tailings volumes and the assumed grade scenarios, total gold production since the onset of operations is estimated to be around one to two tons of gold, with the possibility of higher outputs under less conservative assumptions.

Recovery rates, i.e. the percentage of contained gold that gets effectively extracted, vary primarily with operator skill. Experienced chemists—often recruited from Tanzania or Kenya—can achieve recovery rates exceeding 95 per cent, consistent with both published literature and anecdotal observations from the operations at Iga Barrière. Recovery efficiency, however, tends to decline as vat size increases, due to less effective mixing and reduced control over process conditions.

6. Maximal theoretical processing capacity and monthly gold production

In January 2026, a total number of 338 tanks were observed, with an estimated average capacity of 27 m³ of ore each. In theory, this would give a maximum processing capacity of 9,126 m³ of tailings per month, corresponding to around 70 – 140 kg of gold per month (assuming an average grade of 5 – 10g/t and 1.75 cycles per month, effective recovery rate not taken into account).

Diameter (m)	Number of tanks	Approx. volume of contained ore (m ³)	Approx. weight of ore per treatment per tank
4	16	12.25	18.5t
5	64	19.1	29t
6	188	27.5	41.3t
7	70	37.5	56.3t
	Total: 338	Weighted Avg: 26.9	

Estimating gold output by simply multiplying the number of tanks by their theoretical maximum processing capacity would result in a substantial overestimate of both current and past monthly production, particularly when viewed against the total gold yield inferred to date. While processing capacity has expanded rapidly over the past two years through the construction of additional tanks, satellite imagery and qualitative reporting indicate that clusters of tanks gradually fall into disuse, in part due to the accumulation of spent tailings around processing sites. In addition, it cannot be assumed that sufficient feedstock is continuously available to keep all tanks operating at full capacity at any given time.

In the following section, we will therefore make an estimate of the effective average utilization rate of installed capacity. Rather than assuming all tanks operated continuously at full capacity, we compare expected output under that assumption with actual accumulated tailings. This will allow us to give a better estimate of past and current monthly outputs.

7. Estimation of capacity utilization

⁴⁵⁵ Mining officials, civil society actors


Based on the observed number of tanks at four points in time between May 2023 and January 2026, we reconstruct how processing capacity at the facility evolved by assuming that tanks were added at a steady rate between each observation. This is supported by the roughly linear increase in number of vats observed at intervals during the period under consideration (see graph below). Using an average tank capacity of 27 m^3 and an operating rate of 1.75 processing cycles per month ($=47.25 \text{ m}^3/\text{month}$), we estimate the expected monthly production of depleted tailings as a function of the number of tanks in operation at any given time.

	Month number (t)	Observed number of tanks (N)	Inferred monthly increase in tanks between observations
May 23	0	49	
			5.3
March 24	11	107	
			10.4
August 25	27	274	
			12.8
January 26	32	338	

Let $N(t)$ denote the number of tanks in operation at time t (measured in months since May 2023), as reconstructed from the observed tank counts. If, as mentioned above, each tank produces on average $q = 47.25 \text{ m}^3$ of depleted tailings per month, the monthly tailings generation rate can be written as:

$$R(t) = q N(t)$$

The graph below shows the expected monthly increase in spent tailings volume, at full capacity utilization:



The maximum volume of tailings accumulated over the study period is then obtained by integrating this monthly rate over time:

$$T_{\text{expected}} = \int_0^{32} R(t) dt.$$

The integral can be evaluated exactly by summing the trapezoids formed between consecutive observation points:

$$T_{\text{expected}} = q \sum_i \frac{N_i + N_{i+1}}{2} (t_{i+1} - t_i),$$

where (t_i, N_i) denote the observed tank counts and their corresponding times.

Applying this formula yields an expected cumulative tailings volume of approximately 258,000 m³ by January 2026, assuming continuous full-capacity operation throughout the period under consideration.

In contrast, the satellite-based volumetric estimates indicate only about 120,000 m³ of accumulated tailings. This discrepancy suggests an effective capacity utilization coefficient of a little under 50%.

This is an approximation as in addition to the assumptions in this section, not all tailings heaps have been modelled and the limited amount of tailings produced prior to May 2023 has not been included.

8. Estimated monthly gold output

Based on a total of 338 tanks and a long-term capacity utilization coefficient of fifty percent, we get an estimated monthly throughput of around 4500 m³ (9,126/2) or 6750 tons in January 2026.

With an average grade of 5 – 10 grams of gold per ton, this gives a total of around 30 to 70 kg per month (not taking into account the effective recovery rate).

It should be noted, however, that according to the sources consulted, stocks of high-grade historical and artisanal tailings in the vicinity of Iga Barrière appear to be increasingly depleted.⁴⁵⁶ Operators have reportedly experienced growing difficulties in securing sufficient feed material, and accepted grades are said to have declined toward the 3–5 g/t range. These factors suggest that actual production is likely closer to the lower end of the estimated range.

At first sight, the fairly low capacity utilization seems to be at odds with the aggressive increase in processing capacity that has been observed. This can presumably be explained in part by (1) competition between operators, who want to secure and process as much of the limited high-grade feed-stock as possible, as well as by (2) tailing heaps becoming too high to be practical in use at around eight meters, leading to their being abandoned.

Integrating the estimated production rate $R(t)$ over the period $t=20$ to $t=32$ yields an expected maximum output of approximately 150,000 tons of tailings for 2025. Dividing this by the cumulative integral of approximately 258,000 tons over the full study period indicates that roughly 60 per cent of total production took place in 2025.

⁴⁵⁶ Mining officials and civil society actors

Annex 64 (para. 209)

Cyanide leaching installations at Mabanga

Installations de lixiviation au cyanure à Mabanga




Image: © Planet Labs PBC, February 2026

Note that the detailed image of the tanks indicates little to none accumulated tailings and that these were hence very recently constructed.

100 tanks are observed, with dimensions and built very similar to the operations in Iga Barrière. Assuming the same average tank volume and duration of processing cycles, we have a maximum monthly throughput capacity of around 5,000 m³. This indicates a maximum gold yield of 25 – 50 kg, assuming an average grade of 5-10 g/t. In practice, production will be considerably less as explained in detail in annex 63.


Annex 65 (para. 209)**Cyanide leaching installations in Mongbwalu (Sayo – Nzebi area) and Pluto****Installations de lixiviation au cyanure à Mongbwalu (Sayo – Nzebi) et Pluto**

Image: © Planet Labs PBC, April 2026

Note that most of the leaching “tanks” are not constructed out of concrete or cement, but rather excavated pits with yellow tarps.



Cyanide leaching operation in Pluto. Image: © Google Earth/Airbus, March 2025

Annex 66 (para. 212)

Analysis of 2025 Ugandan gold exports and imports


Analyse du commerce extérieur d'or ougandais en 2025

Ugandan authorities declared that gold imported in 2025 originated primarily from Tanzania and South Africa, with smaller volumes reported as originating from Ghana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Zambia, and Kenya. However, the official trade data of these countries do not declare any gold exports to Uganda over the past years⁴⁵⁷ – whereas they did declare significant exports to other countries.

The trade data implies approximately eight tons of gold exports from domestic origin, representing a four-fold increase since 2024. This increase in domestic production is not supported by any documented developments in Uganda's gold mining sector.

Consequently, the origins of most gold exported from Uganda in 2025 is not corroborated by any available trade data. This underscores the need for enhanced oversight of Uganda's gold trading and refinery sector, as well as strengthened due diligence measures for companies sourcing through Uganda.

1. Evolution in Ugandan gold exports



Source: Bank of Uganda


In 2025, the Bank of Uganda reported record levels of gold exports for the third consecutive year, reaching 62 tons, valued at USD 6.4 billion. This annex will analyze the reported origins of this gold by drawing on official trade data from Uganda and its trade partner countries.

⁴⁵⁷ Since 2021, only Tanzania reported gold exports to Uganda. These took place in 2021 and 2022, with a total of 175 kg.

Two key inconsistencies motivate this analysis. First, the gap between Uganda's reported gold exports and imports increased sharply in 2025, without any corresponding increase in domestic production. Second, the reported origins of gold imports are not supported by mirror export data from any of the partner countries. Taken together, these imply that Uganda's gold export boom is driven by external supply chains that are not accurately captured in official trade statistics.

The estimates should be interpreted as indicative ranges rather than precise point values.

2. Reported gold provenance in 2024



Source: UN COMTRADE and Bank of Uganda

According to UN Comtrade data reported by Uganda, gold imports in 2024 were primarily attributed to Tanzania, South Africa, Mozambique and Burkina Faso, with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) notably absent. Using these data, the difference between declared imports and exports implies residual (“implied domestic”) production of approximately 1.8 tons. However, this estimate is sensitive to the data source used. When reconstructing imports based on Bank of Uganda (BoU) direction-of-trade data for 2024, the residual increases to around 3 tons.

These inconsistencies highlight structural discrepancies between COMTRADE and BoU statistics and suggest that neither dataset fully captures Uganda's reported gold trade flows.

3. Analysis of reported gold provenance in 2025

At the time of writing, UN COMTRADE had not yet published Uganda-reported trade data for 2025. In addition, the trade reports published by the Bank of Uganda (BoU) do not disaggregate trade with partner countries by commodity code. This poses methodological challenges in assessing the likely provenance of gold for 2025. These are addressed by combining several estimation approaches, selected based on (1) the nature of the trade relationship between Uganda and the specific partner country, and (2) complementary official data where available.

Mozambique, Mali, Burkina Faso and Cameroon

Using UN COMTRADE data reported by Uganda, we identify non-gold imports from these countries in 2024 by deducting gold-related imports from total imports. For Mozambique, Mali and Burkina Faso, non-gold imports were negligible.⁴⁵⁸ For Cameroon and Ghana, non-gold imports were also very limited, amounting to approximately USD 400,000 and USD 1.5 million respectively.

Under a *ceteris paribus* assumption, 2024 non-gold import levels are used as a baseline and deducted from total imports from these countries as reported by the BoU in 2025 to estimate the gold component.

These estimates should be interpreted with caution. Non-gold imports from some of these countries are subject to occasional spikes, with Uganda for example having recorded aircraft imports from Mali in 2023. This may distort the baseline and affect the resulting estimates.

This gives the following results:

	Estimated gold imports 2025 (mio USD)
Mozambique (other)	493
Mali	203
Burkina Faso	491
Cameroon	296
Ghana	360
Total	1843

South Africa

South Africa has already reported its 2025 export data to UN COMTRADE, allowing for a direct separation between gold and non-gold flows. We therefore deduct South Africa's declared non-gold exports to Uganda from the total imports reported by the Bank of Uganda (BoU) to estimate the gold component.

USD 780 million – 108 million = USD 672 million


Tanzania

Estimating gold imports attributed to Tanzania presents the most significant methodological challenge. Unlike the previously discussed countries, Tanzania is both a major reported gold supplier and a significant source of non-gold imports, which are subject to substantial fluctuations.

Tanzanian-reported UN COMTRADE data indicates that non-gold exports to Uganda ranged between USD 264 million and USD 314 million over the 2021–2024 period, with an average of approximately USD 295 million. However, Uganda-reported COMTRADE data for 2024 suggests a substantially higher figure of USD 432 million for non-gold imports, highlighting inconsistencies between datasets.

To resolve this, we estimate non-gold imports from Tanzania using Bank of Uganda data, drawing on a natural experiment created by Uganda's gold export tax policy. In mid-2021, Uganda introduced a 5 percent export tax on refined gold, leading refiners to halt formal exports. This resulted in the collapse of official gold trade, accompanied by a rise in informal, hand-carried shipments. The tax was subsequently repealed with the adoption of the 2023 Mining and Minerals Act, after which official gold trade resumed rapidly. To illustrate this dynamic, the evolution of declared imports from Tanzania is shown below.

⁴⁵⁸ Mozambique is listed under "other African countries" in the BoU data



Source: BoU

During the 2021–2023 tax period, both declared gold exports and imports from countries associated with gold supply chains declined sharply. As gold trade was effectively suppressed, this period provides a useful proxy for baseline non-gold imports.

BoU data for this period suggests that non-gold imports from Tanzania averaged approximately USD 300 million annually. This value is aligned with Tanzanian-reported COMTRADE data and therefore used as a baseline for estimating the gold component of Tanzanian imports in 2025.

As a result, an estimated USD 2757 million – 300 million = USD 2457 million of gold were officially imported from Tanzania in 2025.

Cross-check with aggregate mineral imports

To assess whether the sum of estimated gold imports from the identified partner countries corresponds to the total value of gold imports, we cross-check this aggregate against non-petroleum mineral imports reported by the Bank of Uganda (BoU). The BoU includes gold imports under this category, which also covers other mineral products such as cement and ores (HS codes 25 and 26). While the BoU category of non-petroleum mineral imports does not strictly correspond to HS codes 25, 26 and 7108, the close alignment between BoU totals and COMTRADE-based estimates suggests that, in practice, it is dominated by these categories in Uganda's case.

Based on COMTRADE data, these non-gold, non-petroleum mineral imports consistently amount to approximately USD 200 million per year. This is corroborated by BoU data for 2021–2022, when official gold imports were effectively suspended, as well as by 2024 Uganda-reported COMTRADE data, which recorded USD 211 million in such imports.

In 2025, the BoU reported USD 5,675 million in non-petroleum mineral imports. Assuming, *ceteris paribus*, that approximately USD 210 million of this total reflects non-gold imports, the remaining USD 5,465 million can be attributed to gold.

Comparing this estimate with the aggregated partner-country total of USD 4,972 million implies a residual of approximately USD 493 million. This residual likely reflects gold imports originating from partner countries not captured in the preceding analysis. The next section therefore examines potential origins of this remaining component.

Other potential source countries for 2025

Zambia

BoU-reported imports from Zambia increased from USD 21 to 244 million year-on-year. Historic COMTRADE trade data shows that previous spikes in imports from Zambia, such as in 2020, were not accompanied by an increase in non-gold imports from that country. Moreover, the yearly average non-gold imports are stable around 20 million USD.

We therefore conclude that, according to the official BoU data, Uganda presumably imported around USD 224 million in gold from Zambia over the course of last year.


Kenya

A relatively small residual amount of approximately USD 250 million remains to be accounted for. According to Bank of Uganda direction-of-trade data, this could be attributed to imports from either Egypt or Kenya, or an increase in non-gold, non-petroleum mineral imports. A combination of these factors is of course also a distinct possibility. Given previous reported gold imports from Kenya of a comparable magnitude, Kenya emerges as the most plausible source. This assumption is therefore retained as a working hypothesis for the residual component of Uganda's gold imports.

Consolidated overview of reported origins

This gives the following estimated values for Uganda's 2025 official gold imports. An average price of USD 100 per gram is applied, approximating the observed average export price net of an estimated 3 percent deduction to account for transaction costs and refinery margins.

	2025 Value (mio USD)	2025 Volume (tons)
Tanzania	2457	24.6
South Africa	672	6.7
Mozambique ("Other African")	493	4.9
Mali	203	2
Burkina Faso	491	4.9
Cameroon	296	3.0
Ghana	360	3.6
Zambia	224	2.2
Kenya	249	2.5
Total Imports	5445	54.4
Residual / implied domestic production	760	7.6
Total exports	6400	62



4. Inconsistencies in Uganda's gold trade: residual growth and absence of mirror data

A notable feature of the 2025 estimates is the sharp increase in the residual (i.e. implied domestic production), which rises from approximately 2–3 tons in 2024 to around 7–8 tons in 2025. This change cannot be readily explained by developments in Uganda's domestic mining sector. The only significant addition to production capacity during this period was the commissioning of the Wagagai gold mine in August 2025, with an expected annual output of approximately 1.5 tons. Even assuming immediate full-scale operation, this increase is insufficient to account for the observed jump in the residual. This suggests that the additional implied domestic production is not the result of genuine mining output, but rather reflects unrecorded gold inflows or misrepresented import flows within the statistical system.

A second striking feature of the data is the complete absence of corresponding mirror export flows. None of the countries identified as sources of Uganda's gold imports report any gold exports to Uganda in their own statistics. Since 2021, only Tanzania has reported such exports, amounting to a total of just 175 kg across 2021–2022, which is negligible relative to the scale of Uganda's reported imports. This systematic absence of mirror data indicates that the importer-reported origins do not correspond to formally recorded trade flows.

This pattern is particularly revealing when viewed in the context of these countries' broader export activity. All identified partner countries are significant exporters of gold to established ASM destination markets, notably the United Arab Emirates and India, with annual export values reported in UN COMTRADE often reaching hundreds of millions or even billions of USD. This demonstrates both the scale of their production and their ability to record large formal export flows of ASM gold.

Against this backdrop, the complete absence of reported exports to Uganda cannot be explained by capacity or reporting limitations and instead points to a structural disconnect between physical regional supply chains and Uganda's reported import origins.

The simplest and most consistent explanation for these combined observations is that Uganda's gold refining sector is predominantly supplied by gold originating from eastern DRC, with these flows largely absent from, and misrepresented in, official trade statistics.

Annex 67 (para. 213)

Continued high production levels in Rubaya's coltan mines – satellite assessment

Niveaux de production élevés dans les mines de coltan de Rubaya – évaluation par satellite

1. Introduction

This annex presents a comparative analysis of high-resolution imagery of the hill situated to the south-east of Rubaya, Masisi territory, an area identified as hosting the majority of coltan production in North Kivu. The hill lies in exploitation permit PE16159, which, according to records of the *Cadastre Minier* (CAMI), is currently attributed to the *Société aurifère du Kivu et du Maniema* (SAKIMA).

The analysis uses three-dimensional (3D) rendered imagery obtained from Google Earth/Airbus, dated 14 March 2025, and a 3D surface model generated by the Group with Planet Labs PBC imagery acquired on 26 March 2026.

The Group produced the 3D model in QGIS using PBC Planet SkySat imagery, in combination with elevation tiles from Mapzen/Nextzen. The latter derives its tiles from open-source datasets, including NASA Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM). The Planet PBC Skysat imagery has a resolution of 50 cm, whereas the resolution of the elevation tiles is roughly 30 m. This is adequate for the purpose of our analysis, which is to visually assess temporal changes in mine site features.

Comparison of the two datasets indicates a marked increase in mining-related activity across several principal sites within the concession, most notably along the western flank of the hill, including the sites commonly referred to as D4 Gakombe and D2 Bibatama. While progressive excavation is consistent with ongoing extraction, the observed changes go beyond mere continuity and indicate a significant increase in level of activity.

In particular, the imagery shows:

- a discernible increase in the number and density of mining pits;
- a significant expansion of ore washing and processing areas;
- the rehabilitation and apparent reactivation of several water reservoirs that, in earlier imagery, appeared degraded or non-operational; and
- a significant increase in the number of dwellings and auxiliary structures within settlements located along the hill ridge.

Taken together, these indicators suggest a substantial intensification of mining and associated human activity within PE16159 during the period under review. The observations are consistent across multiple vantage points within the 3D model, as will be further detailed below.



Source: © Airbus/Google Earth, 14.3.25

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

2. D2 Bibatama





Image: © Airbus/Google Earth, 14.3.25 (top) and © 2026 Planet Labs PBC, 26.03.26 (bottom)

The comparative imagery shows strong increase in erosion and excavation of the hillside




Image: © Airbus/Google Earth, 14.3.25 (top) and © 2026 Planet Labs PBC, 26.03.26 (bottom)

This imagery of the hill ridge above D2 Bibatama shows a significant increase in the number of dwellings on both the right and left of the image. In the middle, six large water reservoirs have been constructed. Part of the woods has also been logged, presumably to be used as construction material.

3. G4 Gakombe





Image: © Airbus/Google Earth, March 2025 (top) and © Planet Labs PBC, March 2026 (bottom)


The comparative overview shows a strong progression in mining activity, with an increase in number of pits (1), an increase in washing stations (bottom-left), the reparation of water reservoirs on the hilltop (2), as well as a significant growth in the number of dwellings on the hill ridge (3,4).

1. Repaired and newly constructed water reservoirs



Source: © Airbus/Google Earth, 14.3.25 (left) and © Planet Labs PBC, 26.03.26 (right)

2. Strong progression in excavation and increase in mining pits



Source: © Airbus/Google Earth, 14.3.25 (top) and © Planet Labs PBC, 26.03.26 (bottom)

The mining pits are covered with tarps, making them easy to identify and to compare on the above images.

3 and 4. Significant increase in number of dwellings along hill ridge




Image: © Airbus/Google Earth, 14.3.25 (top) and© Planet Labs PBC, 26.03.26 (bottom)

The same structures have been highlighted for reference



Images: © Airbus/Google Earth, 14.3.25 (left) and © Planet Labs PBC, 26.03.26 (right)

Annex 68 (para. 214)

AFC/M23 Mining-related taxes in Masisi and Kalehe territories – receipts and documentary evidence

Taxes liées aux activités minières de l'AFC/M23 dans les territoires de Masisi et de Kalehe – reçus et éléments de preuve documentaire

AFC/M23 continued to levy a range of taxes on all actors involved in the local production and supply chain. For instance, licenses for local traders cost USD 250 per year and for artisanal miners USD 25 (See S/2024/969, para. 60). In addition, AFC/M23 introduced a tax of FC 500 per day for day laborers, transporters and petty traders to access the site, with the receipts shown below.



Receipts for the “contribution to local development tax”, Source: confidential source

TARIF	
Coltan (T.A)	: 4\$
Cassitérite (SnO_2)	: 2\$
Déchet	: 2\$
Oriframe	: 2\$
Kuars	: 1\$
Monazite	: 0.07\$
Bellule	: 0.05\$
NIOBIUM	: 1.28\$
04006113071717	
<u>UWABAKENDE PATIENT Haba</u>	
D'Après NDAGIJE KAISIYI JOEL	

This document is displayed at the Rubaya centre de négoce by AFC/M23. It shows the applicable tax rates per kilogram and per mineral, as well as the account details for wiring the amounts due. Notably, Patient Saba, AFC/M23 Provincial Finance Coordinator, is indicated as the account holder. The account number and the holder also figure on the Equity

Bank receipts shown below.

Source: confidential source

❖ Propriétaire [REDACTED]
❖ Chauffeur [REDACTED]
❖ Plaque : [REDACTED]
❖ Qualité : *Spot*
❖ Quantité : [REDACTED]
Date : [REDACTED] *02.12.2026*
Nombre des colis : [REDACTED]
Nom & signature
MUGISHA ANTOINE
[Signature]

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ALLIANCE FLEUVE CONGO
PROVINCE DU SUD-KIVU
TERRITOIRE DE KALEHE
ANTENNE MINIERE DE NYABIBWE

AUTORISATION DE SORTIE DES MINERAIS

Date : [REDACTED] *01.12.2026*
Catégorie : *CASSITERITE*
Quantité : [REDACTED]
Provenance : [REDACTED]
Propriétaire : [REDACTED]
Moyen de transport : *MOTO & VEHICULE*
N° Plaque : [REDACTED]
NTARE FAUSTIN
[Signature]

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
TAXE EVACUATION
NORD-KIVU

NOM : [REDACTED]
MONTANT EN CHIFFRE [REDACTED]
MONTANT EN LETTRE [REDACTED]
N° PLAQUE : [REDACTED]
DETAILS : [REDACTED]
Fait à *Mubambiro* [REDACTED] 2026
NOM DU TAXATEUR : [REDACTED]
SIGNATURE *[Signature]*

DEPARTMENT
des Trésoriers

QR CODE


AFC/M23 Transport ‘permits’ and “invoices” for the “evacuation tax”, calculated as per the sheet above. Note that the exit authorization is issued in Nyabibwe, Kalehe territory, South Kivu, and that the “evacuation tax” invoice is issued in Mubambiro.

Source: confidential source

Annex 69 (para. 217)

Bank receipts for deposits of AFC/M23's mineral "evacuation" tax

Reçus bancaires pour les dépôts de la taxe " d'évacuation" minière de l'AFC/M23




Source: confidential source

Bank receipts for deposits of the 'evacuation tax' on the Equity Bank account of Patient Haba (see above). Note that the Equity Bank branches where the deposits were made are located in Kigali (Remera and Nyabugogo neighborhoods).

Annex 70 (para. 223)

Rwandan coltan and cassiterite export statistics

Statistiques d'exportation de coltan et de cassiterite rwandaises



Source: National Bank of Rwanda

In the second and third quarters of 2025, cassiterite exports were over 1600 tons, compared to 1215 tons on average per quarter in 2025. The strong spike in the last quarter of 2025 is caused by reported exports of 1460 tons in the sole month of October, as well as by very strong, though less anomalous, exports in November and December.

The previous time Rwandan cassiterite exports were comparably high was in 2013-2014. At that time, smuggling of 3T minerals from DRC to Rwanda was prevalent due to differences in the implementation of the ITSCI-traceability system and resulting price incentives. See for instance, [S/2014/42](#), para. 200.